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ABSTRACT
An attempt has been made in this study to trace the background, 
and China career, of Horatio Nelson Lay, an Englishman, who 
began his public service in the British consular establishment 
in China and who concluded it in the service of the Ch*ing 
Imperial government. He achieved notoriety, successively, as 
British Inspector in the Shanghai foreign customs administration 
inaugurated in l85fs as interpreter-negotiator in the treaty 
settlements of Tientsin and Shanghai of 1858, as first Inspector- 
General of the Imperial Maritime Custom Service and as one of the 
principals in the development of a European-Chinese naval force 
(the Lay-Osborn Flotilla), which was disbanded when rejected by 
the Ch'ing government in 1863. Lay's dismissal followed immediately 
after this event.
The study discloses that the activities, while carrying out the 
functions related to these responsibilities, placed him in a key 
position to influence various aspects of British relations with 
China during the period. A thesis, based on evaluations of his 
influence has been formulated, which focusses on an analysis of 
the nature of his dual role as a servant both of British (occideut- 
oriented) and Chfing (Confucian-oriented) interests. The re­
examination of evidence previously available and of newly discovered 
evidence provides the basis for a re-evaluation of his career.
The principal conclusions conveyed by the investigation, analysis 
and evaluation of the larger body of evidence fall into two 
categories. As for the direct effects of his influence, except 
for his contributions to the consolidation of the foreign 
Inspectorate customs administration, the influence he himself 
claimed, as well as that ascribed to him by his contemporaries, 
has been overstated. As for the indirect effects, his contribution 
to the process of “dialog11, a pre-requisite for achieving effective 
intercourse, was appreciable.
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PREFACE
Apart from the technical problems which I have created for 
myself, there are only a few about which the reader should be 
forewarned. The problems are restricted to questions of location 
of source materials and of orthography. Sources located in 
depositories to which the public has access constitutes a problem 
only insofar as time and expense are involved in ferreting them 
out. A more serious problem arises with respect to sources which 
can only be found in private collections.
This problem has been dealt with in three ways. FirsfLy, 
the citations in the text indicate the location by use of an 
abbreviated key. Secondly, the Bibliography includes reference 
to the geographical location of major primary sources in private 
collections. Finally, materials of exceptional interest have 
been reproduced or transcribed and have been included as appendices.
Strangely enough, the orthographic problem has been more 
difficult with respect to ’’English*' than with Chinese. In regard 
to Chinese, the problem has been dealt with according to fairly 
common practice for studies in the particular field. Wade-Giles 
transliteration has been followed in the text except where, in
8
geographical place names, traditional usage has made an alternate 
form more common; e.g., Peking, Tientsin, etc.. Chinese ideographs 
have been included only when there might be some doubt as to the 
word intended - a situation which is confined to expressions used 
in direct quotation. A glossary has not been included. All the 
persons referred to in this study are by now well known by 
specialists in the field. Although they do not all have 
individual biographies in “Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period”, 
they are all listed in the index of names. While I am capable of 
transcribing Chinese ideographs, I am grateful to Mr. David Pong 
for those that are included in this text.
“English” orthography has been a problem partly because my 
own early training was in schools in the United States and partly 
because mid-19th Century “English" was more characteristic of 
20th Century “American” English, while 20th Century English is 
more characteristic of mid-19th Century “American”. To make 
matters worse, the transition in “styles” was taking place more 
rapidly in the mid-19th Century. However, every effort has been 
made in the text to conform to current English usage and this 
applies to technical features of “style” as well as to orthography* 
Direct quotation, in this connection, has been transcribed to
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duplicate as nearly as possible the original model* Under the 
circumstances, except in cases of unusual deviation from common 
usage - where the customary editor’s designation ll[sic],t is 
inserted it must be assumed that the quoted transcription is 
"correct".
I find personal acknowledgments in a preface unsettling. 
It is not just the fear that the name of someone who has made 
a valuable contribution has been inadvertently omitted that 
provokes this feeling. It is also because it is literally 
impossible to refer to all those who have, in one manner or 
another, provided me with assistance. Consequently, I trust 
that the acknowledgments made forthwith will be appreciated 
for what they are: a partial list acknowledging assistance of 
a special nature.
In the academic sphere, I wish to record that I was 
stimulated to make the investigations that have led to this 
study by my first Supervisor, Mr. 0. P. B. van der Sprenkel.
My Supervisors since 1957 have been more nominal than real.
I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Britt Martin (n£e So [Yin-kit]) 
who reviewed, and made many suggestions with respect to, my 
own translations of Chinese material. In order, Professors
10
D. C. Twitchett, W.G. Beasley, J. K. Fairbank, and J. S. Gregory 
and Mr.J.Lust have read portions of earlier drafts. The critical 
comments they have generously provided, calling attention in some 
cases to factual errors, have been invaluable. Because none of 
them has read the entire manuscript, it is very easy to concede 
that while their assistance has improved the final product, I 
still remain fully accountable for all errors, interpretations, 
etc.. During the course of my researches I have made use of the 
services and facilities of well over a score of public archives 
and libraries. I prefer not to single out any particular 
individual, since I have always received all the assistance I 
have asked for from each.
I have one unusual acknowledgment to record. My original 
study was planned to include an appraisal of H.N. Lay's activities 
related to initiation of Japanese railway development. While 
researching the subject, I received the unstinting assistance of 
Dr. Tanaka Tokihiko (now of the Toyo Bunko), who supplied many 
source citations and translations. As will be seen, there was 
more than enough to do in dealing with Lay's China career. In 
consequence, I felt it only just that Dr. Tanaka's name should 
be recorded here.
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In the non-academic sphere, I do not propose to enumerate 
all those who have given me access to private collections; their 
names are recorded in the citations, in the designations used for 
sources and in the Bibliography, Without exception, all were most 
generous and most gracious in permitting me to examine and to make 
transcriptions of any and all materials under their control.
Without the materials thus made accessible, there would have been 
no justification for a re-examination of the subject of this 
study.
Three special acknowledgments are in order because of special 
circumstances. I wish to acknowledge the exceptional hospitality 
accorded me by Andrew, Lord Bruce on the severed occasions when I 
made extended visiis to research the Elgin/Bruce collections at 
Broomhall, Scotland. Except for a reference to his book, "Four
Generations in China, Japan, and Korea", Mr. A.C.H. Lay’s name
does not appear in the study. As a grand-nephew of H. N. Lay's, 
he was most helpful in supplying leads to other descendents of 
the Lay family who, in turn, made available source materials.
Another member of the family who falls in a similar category has
been one of H. N. Lay's grandsons, Adm. H. Nelson Lay II, RCN (Ret.).
n
Theiypists of the final draft shall remain nameless, but 
they are entitled to notice because, in the conscientious 
performance of their task, they have saved me much time and much 
anxiety.
There is one for whom there is never an appropriate 
acknowledgment: one who is as deeply involved in the work as the 
author and who yet must never really be part of it; one who 
devotes countless hours of manual labour to deciphering script, 
to unravelling footnotes and to typing drafts and who spends 
even more hours of mental suffering, enduring procrastination, 
lethargy, irritability and the torments of pointless anxiety. 
Writ large across every page, between tears and laughter, is 
the help of my patient wife.
October, 1966
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Abbreviations for frequently cited sources.
BPP - 
E/B -
ECC - 
FL -
FO 17/-
FO 228/- 
IWSM -
JMA -
LCE - 
NCH -
Printed British Parliamentary Papers ("Blue Books1*)#
Official and Private correspondence of James, Eighth 
Earl of Elgin and of Sir F.V.A. Bruce from the family 
collection in Scotland.
A.W. Hummel, ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period,
H.N. Lay’s private papers from the collection of ;
Krs, Frank Lay.
Correspondence and memoranda on China originally filed 
in the British Foreign Office, London.
British Consular and Embassy files: China
Ch’ou-pan i-wu shih-mo OThe complete account of our 
management of barbarian affairs” [Ch’ing Dynasty]).
Jardine Matheson & Co. Archive, University Library 
Cambridge,
London and China Express,
North China Herald.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
British relations with China in the middle decades of the 
19th Century marked a new, opening- phase in the impact of the 
two major politico-culture systemst the "Occidental" and the 
■Confucian". During the period of impact, Great Britain may not 
have been a "true" representative of the Occidental system and the 
Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty may not have been a "true"representative 
of the Confucian. Tet, in the historical panorama of human 
experience, both were as representative of the traditions of their 
respective systems as any other corporate entity within each of 
those systems*
At the point of impact, Great Britain represented the principal 
ingredients of the tradition of occidental ("modern" European) 
expansionism, albeit in proportions different from those 
characteristic of earlier centuries* evangelism (acculturation ?), 
exploration and quest for knowledge, and acquisitiveness* The 
Manchu Dynasty, considerably Confucianised before its assumption 
of imperial control, exercised its control through and within a 
generally acceptable framework of Confucian concepts and values - 
over-formalised, stereotyped and, perhaps, even sterile, but un­
questionably Confucian* In theory the Confucian "aristocracy of 
intellect" subscribed to views of universalism and humanism* The
«
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system was predominantly agricultural, ethno-centric and 
exclusionist. The most significant non-representative feature 
of each was that Great Britain was still an ascendent influence 
within its own sphere, while the Manchu Dynasty1 s influence was 
in a descendent phase within its sphere#
These opening paragraphs undoubtedly are self-indulgent of 
excessively broad generalisations# A backdrop which is suggestive 
of long-term influences is, however, essential to balance the 
excessively narrow limitations required by definitions of the 
thesis title. In individual and institutional terms, the 
acceleration in the intensity of impact - considered exclusively as 
points of contact - constituted a radical transformation of the 
patterns of preceding decades and, of course, of preceding centuries. 
This study, being primarily concerned with the role of an individual, 
Horatio^ Nelson Lay, whose career in connection with British relations 
with China coincided with an early phase of the ”take-off” period 
(1847-1865), details only a small sector, of a section, of a very 
long scroll# While the description and analysis of the small sector 
may be made intelligible for that portion of the section open to view, 
the multi-dimensional significance of the scroll ought not to be forgot# 
(Conjuring up an allusion to a mural, whose horizontal extremities 
were obscured by curtains might also be appropriate. The contrast in 
mural-concept as against scroll-concept might not be too far-fetched.
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In the given instance, since the principal focus is on the 
environment in China, the scroll allusion appeared to he more 
appropriate#)
Reversing the scroll only slightly, the first phases of 
impact intensification are disclosed.^* Without, exception, the 
impulses on an institutional level at least, originated in occidental 
regions# Though a number of occidental empires were engaged in 
efforts to develop and/or expand "relations" with the Ch’ing 
Dynasty, at the end of the 18th and during the early decades of 
the 19th centuries, Great Britain was most active and most 
persevering in these efforts# Britain’s efforts, while principally 
motivated by the interests of the East India Company Trading to 
China (EIC), a monopoly company operating under a Crown Charter 
but not as a "public" enterprise, had acquired a political character# 
The objectives of the early missions (the formal means used to 
develop "relations"), were limited, but the missions were officially
1. The standard introduction is still H#B# Morse, "The Internat­
ional Relations of the Chinese Empire". 3 Vols# (London, 1910, 1918)# 
(V#I, "The Period of Conflict 1834-1860", hereafter cited as Morse, 
Conflict and V#2, "The Period of Submission 186l-1893fl> cited as 
Morse, Submission.) S.P. Wright, "Hart and the Chinese Customs". 
(Belfast, 1950) in his opening chapter gives a fairly comprehensive 
account of the early period# (Hereafter cited as Wright, Hart.)
diplomatic in character and some of the objectives were directed 
toward the regularisation of diplomatic intercourse as well as of 
intercourse among individuals* The Ch’ing government, satisfied, 
in the Confucian context, with its own self-sufficiency and with 
the existing restrictive arrangements applied to commercial inter­
course, was unwilling, and probably unable, to comprehend the 
nature of the overtures* AH efforts were, in essence, turned 
aside so that formally, at least, conditions remained unchanged*
Alterations in the Occidental "system", however, and informal 
developments on the South China Coast, not only resulted in a marked 
change in the conditions of intercourse, but also resulted in a 
relatively rapid growth in impact intensification* The War of 
Independence in North America led to the victory of thirteen former 
British colonies. In increasing numbers former British subjects 
were trading with China, free of the EIC monopoly.
In Britain itself, new concepts in economic thought, emerging 
at the same time as new patterns of economic activity evolved from 
technological and manufacturing innovations, gradually resulted in 
the adoption of a "free trade" policy. In 1833/34» the monopoly 
charter of the EIC was not renewed. Even before the policy had 
become official, non-EIC authorised trade had been expanding. In 
any event, as a successor to the control previously exercised by the 
EIC, the British Government established a Superintendency of Trade, 
which initially involved little more than altering the functions of
21
the EIC China-based officers and investing them with a limited
form of diplomatic responsibility* Such as it was, it was
2
H.B.M.*s China Establishment, *
. Although some cognisance of some of these alterations was 
taken by officials at various levels of Ch’ing officialdom, on 
the whole the Ch’ing framework of "official” intercourse remained 
u n c h a n g e d , I n  this respect, the impact growth was "informal", 
in a manner of speaking regularised, but un-regulated. In another 
significant respect, impact growth was "illegal" as well as "informal".
Beginning in the late 18th century, and continuing through the 
first decades of the 19th, there was a sharply rising increase in 
opium addiction with a corresponding rise in opium consumption, among 
the Ch’ing population. The addiction was fostered and the opium 
willingly supplied by most of the foreign traders, of whom the largest 
group was British. Opium consumption violated the statutes of the 
Ch’ing government, but ineffectual controls had resulted in the 
"intercourse" connected with it assuming its "illegal" character both 
within the territorial limits for general trade sanctioned by the
2. For an account based on British records, see W.C. Costin, 
"Great Britain and China". (Oxford, 1937)
3. For an excellent background account which covers the years 
up to 1854* J*K. Fairbank, "Trade and Diplomacy on the China 
Coafct". 2 Vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1953)* (Hereafter cited as 
Fairbank, Trade.)
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Chfing government and in the context of foreign traders "illegally” 
engaging in the opium trade along the China Coast "beyond the limits 
sanctioned for general trade. For the purpose of this introduction, 
the importance of this development is that the profitability and 
expansion of the trade, at one and the same time, stimulated the 
impact growth and provoked the reinstitution of restrictive and 
exclusionist measures by the Chfing Authorities.
Activities of foreigners related to scientific and religious 
interests were also increasing, particularly in the 1820* and 30* s* 
These were neither significant nor related to any important, 
discernible interests of either the occidental (the French missionary 
activities being the exception) or the Confucian systems. Their 
main effect was to broaden the range of impacts through "informal” 
channels.
All in all, the condition of "intercourse”, of all forms, had 
outstripped the facilities for comprehensible or effective inter­
course. In consequence, most of the intercourse was carried on in 
an atmosphere of unreconciled misunderstanding and in pursuit of 
incompatible and contradictory objectives. The extent of the 
intercourse (the emphasis given to it here notwithstanding), admittedly 
a minor feature of the environment of both systems, was not great 
enough to impress on the participants strongly enough the need for 
personnel trained to understand, and thus to be able to cope with, 
the problems created by the intercourse. On the British side,
23
attention to this aspect was dilatory; on the Ch* ing side it 
was obscurantist. The result was a cumulative sense of 
frustration and friction and evermore frequent outbursts of 
hostility.
Despite another relatively superficial British effort, 
through a diplomatic mission - Lord KajsLer's of 1831^ * (and partly 
because of it) and despite the incongruous efforts of the Ch*ing 
Authorities to eliminate the principal causes of hostility (and 
partly because of them), the British representatives resorted to 
armed force to impose a framework for intercourse that was acceptable 
to them. The British Government condoned and prosecuted the first 
Anglo-Chinese War. The expedition was so far victorious by 1842 
as to be able to force the Chfing Authorities to "negotiate" and 
ratify the Treaty of Nanking.
The details and significance of the treaty settlement (including 
a supplementary commercial treaty) are too well known to need 
repeating here. As far as "relations" with China were concerned, 
a modified form of "diplomacy" was instituted. This expanded the 
functions of the Superintendency of Trade (combined in part with the 
administration of the new colony of Hongkong) to act as a centre of 
control for Consulates to be established at the five ports opened to 
trade and commerce. The enlarged Establishment was expected to 
ensure that the regulatory provisions of the settlement were imple-
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merited and to oversee and adjudicate the affairs of British 
nationals, participants in the intercourse sanctioned at the 
ports (the opium trade being excluded from the terms of settle­
ment).
The settlement appeared to open the door to the possibility 
of a more sophisticated level of intercourse between the two 
"systems". Within a few years, however, though the intentions 
of the British Authorities may have been positive, only minimal 
facilities were maintained at each of the ports - even if for 
nothing else than as a matter of prestige, all the facilities had 
to be maintained. Still no formal or systematic programme was 
developed, as official policy either in Britain or in China, to 
take advantage of the new opportunities. It also soon became 
apparent that the Ch’ing Authorities (as distinct from a few 
individual Ch’ing officials) had no intention of availing themselves 
of these "opportunities". Except at Shanghai, the most northerly 
of the ports opened, Ch'ing policy was almost as exclusionist as it 
had previously been in the south* The impact growth of superficial 
intercourse continued to outstrip the effective facilities for 
developing forms of intercourse which would permit the two "systems" 
to become more intelligible to each other.
This sketch-narrative has served to fill in the back-ground of 
some aspects of the developments in Britain’s relations with China 
for the period prior to the commencement of H.N. Lay’s career in
China* The developments narrated have indicated one pattern of 
conditions which created a demand for organising a "Service" 
constituted to promote more effective intercourse with the 
authorities of the Chfing Empire* Another pattern of conditions 
evolved out of the need to supply personnel specifically recruited 
and trained to man the "Service"* The examination of the early 
years of H.N* Lay’s life in part serves to focus on various lines 
of development of this latter pattern since he was the son of one 
of the first Consuls of the China Service,
Chapter II
Early Influences on H.N. Lay
To initiate the examination referred to in the Introduction 
it is desirable, for two reasons, to give some consideration to 
the influence which G(eorge) Tradescant Lay,^ H.N. Lay's father, 
might have had upon his son* The first reason is apparent. It 
would he desirable in any case to seek to determine the roots of 
character development in H.N. Lay. The obvious place to start 
is with his immediate family. In a number of respects the outlook 
and activities of Lay's parents, who were perhaps characteristically 
"English”, were, nonetheless, not completely conventional in the 
milieu of the first half of the nineteenth century. In the 
following pages, the effect this had on H.N. Lay's formative years 
will be considered.
1. G.T. Lay, from the earliest record of his public activities 
(1825) until his death in 1845, was known to his contemporaries 
and signed himself as "Tradescant" or"G. Tradescent” Lay. Thus, 
Adm. 3/207 Min. 68.5, Minute 23 March 1825, "Mr. Tradescant Lay to 
be appointed 'Naturalist' to the voyage about to be undertaken by 
Capt. Beechey in His Majesty's Ship Blossom with a salary of £160 
a year. Six months advance to be paid to him." For signed 
despatches on the eve of his death, cf. FO 228/50, despatches 
No. 33 passim. He apparently insisted on this name to give credence 
to his claim that he was descended from the John Tredescants [sic], 
father and son, well-known naturalists of the early 17th Century.
Cf. "Notes and Queries" (London) Vol. V. No. 130 (April 24, 1852) 
pp. 385-386.
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The second reason is related to the fact that G.T. Lay, hy 
virtue of his own appointment to the China service, strongly, 
though largely indirectly, affected the start of his son’s 
career in that service* Few young men of the period were able 
to choose their careers, but in a more significant sense, H.N*
Lay’s career was thrust upon him. The examination of this 
aspect will serve as the connecting link between this chapter and 
the one that follows.
Before I84I, despite the growth in trade, the increase in 
the number of British subjects active in the coastal regions of 
Southeast China and the desire of the Government to place relations 
with the Ch’ing rulers on a formal diplomatic basis, little was 
done to meet the need of recruiting or training personnel for a 
"China” establishment. The turning point in this situation can be 
pinpointed through tracing the experience of G. Tradescant Lay.
G.T. Lay was a naturalist by vocation and a missionary by
avocation. In the former capacity he had acquired his first
experience in Southeast Asia and the Pacific when he had accompanied
2
Captain Beechey’s expedition on H.M.S. "Blossom”, which lasted from 
1825-1828. In the latter capacity, he had again journeyed to
2. Vide antea note 1.
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Southeast Asia as agent for the British and Foreign Bible Society 
on a contract that covered the years 1836-1839 • During this 
engagement, he had developed a close working relationship with S.
it
Wells Williams and Charles Gutzlaff, both of whom were then
engaged in missionary activities.
The BFBS project was discontinued for a number of reasons.
Among these were that Lay was subject to frequent illness, that
the restrictions placed by the Ch*ing Authorities on intercourse
limited the opportunities for dissemination of tracts, and that
Lay was unable to find any vessels plying the South China Seas not
engaged in the illicit opium traffic upon which to take passage in
4order to promote his evangelical work.
3. G.T. Lay found it difficult to keep his activities differentiated. 
While serving as naturalist in 1827, he was distributing Dr. Robert 
Morrison's biblical tracts among the natives contacted during the 
expedition. F.W. Beechey,"Narrative of a Voyage on H.M.S. 'Blossom' 
1825-1828” 2 pts. (London 1831) p. 491* While serving as BFBS Agent, 
he was still concerned about scientific exploration, BFBS Foreign 
Correspondence. Inward Vol. 3 (I836) 18/8/36? also cf# Inward Vol.II 
(1837) P» 78. "I remember that I came to China not to practice physic, 
but to distribute Bibles though I am sometimes compelled to do a little 
this way ...." Letter dated from Macao, November 21, I836.
4# William Canton. "A History of the British and Foreign Bible 
Society” (London I904) Vol.II, pp. 391-393* For one episode in Lay's 
unsuccessful efforts to secure a vessel with a cargo excluding opium, 
see Jardine, Matheson & Co., mss. Macao 2043 (W/j7l/37)» Canton 510 
(5//1/3S) and 511 (2^/38) and Macao 2044 (24/4/38)•
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These various limitations did not preclude Lay from studying
Chinese nor from learning something about the country’s society
5
and culture. Consequently, shortly after his return to England, 
late in 1839* in the midst of reports of the hostilities marking 
the opening of the first Anglo-Chinese War, Lay offered his services 
to the British Government.^ On this occasion, Lord Palmerston 
scrawled a pencilled note on the comer of his letter: "Thank him
hut have no occasion for his Services". Lay was accordingly 
officially advised of the decision in a letter from the Foreign Office
7
dated January 18, 1840 .
Fifteen months later, on learning the news that "Admiral [Sir
William] Parker has been appointed to the Indian command" as part of
the policy of augmenting the forces engaged in the China theatre, Lay
addressed himself directly to Lord Palmerston, noting ".... I feel
that I could render the gallant Admiral essential service were I
allowed to accompany him in his expedition". On this occasion Palmerston
8noted simply: "state that I cannot interfere with Admty appointments".
5. G.T. Lay, "The Chinese As They Are" (London, 1841)# There 
were two editions of this work published in German translation, in 
1842 and 1843 respectively, and also an edited version published in 
New York in 1843*
6. FO 17/41* Lay to Win. Foxe Strangeways. Jan. 10, I84O.
7. Ibid. Draft of letter to G.T. Lay.
8. FO/17/44. 15 Mar. 1841* The reply to Lay was dated March 25*
However, within a month, the Government decided to send a
new mission, headed by Sir Henry Pottinger, to prosecute British
policy more vigorously than Captain Charles Elliot appeared to be 
9
doing. It is not clear from the Foreign Office records who 
initiated the next round of contacts between Lay and the F.O.
He was, in any event, doubtless aided by the fact that his latest 
book, "The Chinese As They Are" was reviewed (somewhat indifferently, 
perhaps) in the "Times" of April 15, 1841.^ In fact, although his 
letter of appointment, assigning him to Pottingerfs Special Mission, 
was not drafted until July 15» 1841 Lay had apparently been in 
touch with the Foreign Office since at least mid-June. Palmerston 
saw him on June 24, 1841, and prepared the following memos
I have settled with Mr. Lay author of a Book upon China & who 
knows the Chinese Language that he shall go out to China by the 
overland opportunity at the end of July to be attached to the 
Mission as Interpreter. He will call at the F.O. &a«tt-To- ^  
Morrow or next Bay - V/hat Salary would it be proper to give him?
9. For details of the events leading to this decision see Costin, 
op.cit.. Ch. II and Morse, "Conflict" Ch.X.
10. After referring to the fact that Lay* s trip of 1836-59* 
according to "private sources", had been made "in the threefold 
capacity of missionary, surgeon, and naturalist the reviewer
concludes, "He certainly appears to have been a zealous labourer 
in the cause, although his zeal, at times, somewhat outsteps his 
discretion."
11. FO 17/51* Acknowledged by Lay to Lord Leveson, July 16, I84I.
12. FO 17/51* Palmerston memo.
Extracts of the memo that G. Lenox Conyngham prepared, with 
the notation added by Palmerston, are of some significance for 
the purposes of this account:
I have seen Mr. Tradescant Lay, and endeavoured to 
ascertain from him what amount of Salary he himself 
expected to receive. He seemed to think that €600 a 
year, or thereabouts, would not be more than sufficient 
to support himself in China, and his wife and Children 
in England during his separation from them. He grounds 
his expectations of a liberal allowance on the circumstance 
of his being a scholar and a Naturalist, as well as upon 
his being acquainted with the Chinese language, - laying 
stress on the advantage which we may probably draw from 
his extensive knowledge of Natural History, in all it’s 
[sic] branches. - He appears to be desirous of going to 
China at the present moment not so much for present 
advantage as with a view to permanent employment hereafter, 
in case our Chinese affairs should terminate satisfactorily. 
- I explained to him that it was Lord Palmerston’s intention 
to attach him now to Sir Henry Pottinger’s Special Mission 
and therefore when the Mission should cease, his employment 
would cease likewise. - He said that he was aware of this;
but he observed that, once in China, he would trust his
chance of future success in the obtaining of a Consular 
appointment to the claim which he feels confident he will 
be able to create for himself by useful exertions and good 
conduct whilst he remains attached to the Special Mission.
Taking into consideration the amount of salaries 
allotted to the Interpreters (permanent & temporary) and 
the salary and allowances granted to Major Malcolm,
[Sec’y of Legation] - I submit that it would not be more 
than Mr. Lay has a fair claim to, if he were allowed a
Salary at the rate of £500 a year, - an outfit of £200, -
and reimbursement of the expenses of his journey to China.
[Palmerston], I think he may have £600 a year & 
outfit of 200, and Expenses of his Journey. He will
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probably be useful in some permanent position when the 
Special Mission leaves China.13
As a consequence of the foregoing exchanges, Lay's letter of 
appointment did not specify that he was to be classified as 
"Interpreter” nor did it refer specifically to the fact that 
his appointment was only for the duration of the Special Mission.
In effect, he was being given a probationary appointment to the 
"China Service."
Thus G.T. Lay's perseverence and determination (when reflected 
in his son, these traits were to be judged as "ambition") were 
repaid. Though the evidence presented is scanty, it is clear 
that he hoped to be able to take up a permanent post in China.
In the meantime, before leaving for China on July Jl, 1841* 
he made some adjustments in his family arrangements. His two 
eldest sons, Horatio Nelson (b. July 27, 1832)^4 and George
13« FO 17/51* Conyngham's signed memo was dated June, 30, 
I84I, and Palmerston's initialled note was dated "7/7-41"•
14* All the data of births and baptisms of the children of 
G.T. Lay are recorded on the flyleaf of the Family Bible of G.T. 
and Mary Lay. This was still in the possession of Mrs. Frank 
Lay (widowed daughter-in-law of H.N. Lay) in 1958* Other 
materials from this "collection" are cited as "FL."
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Tradescant (b. August 4* 1834)^“* were enrolled in Mill Hill 
School, Middlesex, in June, 1841# A dual purpose was served
15* Despite the clear evidence in the Family Bible (per note 14) 
and other positive evidence to be cited, both the Lay family and 
scholars on Lay have overlooked this son of G.T. Lay. A.C.H. Lay 
"Four Generations in China, Japan and Korea" (Edinburgh 1952) p.xiii 
and p.l3» considers only four sons of G.T. Lay, the elder. The 
author, in a private letter of February 20, 1957» wrote "No, I 
can shed no light on any G.T. Lay II, and did not know that George 
Tradescant Lay had five sons". It is also apparent that the 
sketch facing p.14 of "The Three Cherubs" should identify them as 
George Tradescant Lay [il], Horatio Nelson Lay and William Hyde 
Lay. The difference in age between the eldest boy (presumably 
Horatio Nelson) and the youngest, if it were Walter Thurlow, should 
be a difference of about eight years. It seems fairly evident 
that there is not this much difference in age between the eldest 
and the youngest boys represented in the sketch.
J.K. Fairbank, "The Definition of the Foreign Inspectors’
Status (1854-1855)* •• •” ’’Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly" 
(Tientsin) Vol.IX, No. 1 (April 1938) (Hereafter cited as Fairbank, 
"NSEQ") p. 138, refers to H.N. Lay as "one of four sons of Consul
G. Tradescant Lay". Listed in note 38 as H.N., W.H., W.T., and 
Amoy. Another twist is given to the problem by S.F. Wright,
"Hart" who, in his biographical note on H.N. Lay (note 75i P* 12l), 
write that lie had four sons and one daughter. Wright’s sketch, 
in fact, contains numerous errors of chronology and fact.
That there was a G.T. Lay [il] has some significance in 
relation to one facet of H.N. Lay* s character. Vide* 1 1. 1 f . *.
Ch. XSL.
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by this step as it relieved his pregnant wife, ■ Mary (nee 
17
Nelson) who was left with only the two younger boys, William 
Hyde (b. March 29, 18J6) and Walter Thurlow (b. April 18, 1840) 
to care for.
The career of G. Tradescant Lay in the China Service from 
I84I until his death at his post as H.B.M. Consul at Amoy on
18November 6, 1845» is deserving of a monograph in its own right. 
However, beacuse of the physical separation between himself and 
his eldest son, and because that son was too young to grasp the
16. G.T. Lay’s only daughter, Angelina, was bom November 25,
I84I, almost four months after he had left to join Pottinger*s 
mission.
17. According to family tradition, Mary Lay claimed collateral 
descent from the family of Admiral Lord Nelson: John King, K.C.
"Horatio Nelson Lay, C.B.,f "Journal of the American Asiatic 
Association" (New York) Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March 1914) P*49i A.C.H.
Lay "Pour Generations", p.5, H.M. Lay to his son John L. Lay, ms. 
April 2, 1939, "My sister Elsie tells me my father’s mother, Mary 
Nelson was a relative of the family of Lord Nelson. I think she 
said she was a niece of his brother. My father never said any­
thing about it but as there has always been a tradition in the 
family that there was a relationship there probably was some 
foundation for it. As a boy I remember visiting my grandmother 
[Mary N. Lay] in King* s Lynn not far from where Nelson* s family 
lived. I met her brother a merchant in Lynn who was named Horatio 
Nelson. My grandmother who married George Tradescant Lay after­
wards Consul at Canton & Amoy called her eldest son Horatio Nelson."
18. Fairbank, "Trade", Ch. VII, passim, touches on several 
aspects of his Consular career. G.T. Lay’s interests and activities 
extended much beyond his immediate official responsibilities - in 
part attested to by the variety of entries associated with his name 
in H. Cordier’s "Bibliotheca Sinica" 5 vols. (Paris, 1904-1924)*
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19implications of trade relations and diplomacy, little of 
historical value would be gained by attempting to establish a 
relationship between the respective careers of father and son. 
Nonetheless, one aspect of his career, which might have a 
direct bearing on such a relationship, is worth examining. This 
has to do with the judgment that prevails concerning G.T. Lay’s 
personality.
The judgment that seems to prevail is reflected by Fairbank
who asserts that he was a mild and retiring man who "proved in-
20capable of pounding the tables of the mandarins." It is
natural to contrast this mildness with the "agresive [sic] energy"
21of the son and to seek to reconcile this contrast.
It is not necessary to go beyond Fairbank to do this. In 
other passages in his study on coastal trade and diplomacy, be 
produces evidence that discloses that G.T. Lay could be energetically 
aggressive when circumstances dictated such a course. Thus Lay was 
adamant in his refusal to permit the employment of Cantonese in his
19. J.K. Fairbank (apparently on a lead found in King, op.cit.
p.45) located a series of 9 letters, in mss., from G.T. Lay addressed 
to his son, H.N., written between June 20, I842 and September 20,
1845> ’’Trade" Vol.II, p. 18, note 50* The present writer initially 
had access to a set of typescripts through the courtesy of Admiral
H. Nelson Lay II, RON (Retired), but subsequently examined the mss, 
through the courtesy of Mr. John L. Lay, Pickering, Ontario. (Here­
after cited as JLL).
20. Fairbank, "Trade", I, p.162
21. As was done by Fairbank in his earlier study, "NSEQ," op.cit. 
p. 158.
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22consulate at Foochow and, ultimately, he was “pounding the table”
25to acquire suitable quarters for the Consulate. The day of 
“gunboat diplomacy" at every treaty port had not yet arrived*
While other evidence could be mustered to demonstrate that the 
prevailing judgment of Lay*s personality ift unsound,^ there is 
positive evidence to indicate that, to the extent that his be­
haviour was conciliatory, he was at least acting in conformity with 
official British policy. On the one hand, the general policy for 
the behaviour of British Officials towards the Chinese up to the 
opening of hostilities in 1839 > was set by the Royal Sign Manual of
December 31» 1833* According to Morse, “the spirit pervading the
25whole was one of conciliating the Chinese in every way*" On the 
other hand, specific instructions issued to G. Tradescant Lay by Lord
22. Fairbank, "Trade", I, p*220, note g., citing "China Mail," 
February 20, 1845•
23* “Ibid." pp. 203-204* The fact that Lay and his more 
aggressive successor, R.B. Alcock, were unable to gain satisfaction 
on this point merely emphasizes the degree of Chinese resistance.
On this, Morse "Conflict", pp. 361-362, is also relevant.
24* The criticisms of Lay stemmed from a specialized group of 
critics who were dissatisfied with his initial policies in opening 
the Port of Foochow. These included the merchant publishers of 
the Hongkong Press (the "China Mail" and the "Friend of China"), 
the "Old China Hand" incumbent Superintendent of Trade, Sir J.F. 
Davis, and the "mavericks" Rutherford B. Alcock and Harry S. Parkes.
25. Morse, "Conflict, p. 120
Aberdeen, at the time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
when confirming Lay1 s appointment as Consul at Amoy, contained 
the following paragraphs *
Under these circumstances I have a few words to 
say to you of a general nature ; and those relate 
principally to your dealings with the Chinese Authorities 
and People* Temper and discretion are, above all things, 
requisite in this respect* You will avoid as much as 
possible all irritating discussion, and endeavour by mild 
and courteous demeanour to influence those persons with 
whom you may be brought in contact* You will steadily 
maintain the rights and privileges of British Subjects, 
and their lawful Commerce, but you will do so most 
effectually by cultivating a good understanding with the 
local authorities* In any discussions of a disagreeable 
character which may unfortunately arise, you will have 
the advantage of suspending them, at least for a time, on 
the ground that you will refer the matter to the Chief 
Superintendent, and it can scarcely be doubted that in 
most cases an intimation to that effect will have a 
salutary influence on those with whom you may have come 
into collision*
You will discountenance and repress to the utmost of 
your ability, any proceedings of British Subjects cal­
culated to give umbrage to the Chinese Authorities or 
People Very extensive powers will, in all probability be 
entrusted to you, under the authority vested by Parliament 
in the Queen, and by her Majesty in the Chief Superintendent, 
for the government and control of British Subjects within 
your Jurisdiction* I trust that you will exercise those 
powers with moderation, though with firmness; and it will 
be fit that you should bear in mind that, on all occasions 
where differences can be adjusted in a conciliatory manner, 
it will be much more consonant with the spirit by which Her 
Majesty's Government would wish to see the whole British 
Community in China animated, that such differences should 
be adjusted by amicable arrangement rather than by any 
formal legal process* Indeed it cannot be doubted that 
the national reputation will be exalted in the estimation 
of the Chinese in proportion to the degree of harmony which 
may pervade the British Community, and therefore you will 
promote such a feeling to the utmost of your ability.26
26* FL ms* Aberdeen to Lay, June 3» 1844
A conciliatory attitude, it is true, was not incompatible
27with Lay*s inclinations* He was a well-educated gentleman, 
diligent and persevering in fulfilling his responsibilities 
and forceful in pursuing what he understood to be matters of
u
principal. In his letters he sought constantly to impress on 
his son the desirability of these qualities. They did come to 
form a part of H.N. Lay* s personality, but in his case, they were 
not supplemented by the same depth of learning and maturity that 
were to be found in his father.
In the China environment of the early 1840*8, G.T. Lay was 
almost unique among his compatriots engaged in trade and diplomacy. 
Obviously not aware of his impending death he complained, almost
27. JLL mss. G.T. to H.N. Lay, Wusung River, 24 June 1842*
"I am not anxious that you should learn to fight, dear boy, since 
it is far more noble to forgive an injury, than it is to resent 
it. A willingness to forget and forgive ranks among the most 
charming attributes of the Deity.” Hongkong, June 14, 1843*
’Tien forsake their lewd and profane courses, but they do not 
leave off their hypocrisy. Therefore, dear boy, hate hypocrisyj 
have you done wrong confess it. And while your heart is wrong 
never fill your mouth with fair speeches.” Canton, 26 November
1843* " I  must express a wish that you will always strive
to please by courtesy, by kindness and above all, by forbearance. 
The great apostle said ’I please all men in all things* • And 
you may well take a hint from his example. It will save you 
from an unspeakable amount of sorrow and self-reproach.....”
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bitterly, in July, 1845*
There is a little religion and a little science at home, 
but here people come to get money and to rear away the time as 
fast as they can* It would be great delight to me to see 
you with a relish for something apart from the pleasures of 
eating, drinking, sleeping, riding, boating and what is 
significantly called, "talking nonsense”. Here if a sub­
ject is started that has a little taste of learning and 
philosophy in it a "terrible" silence is the result, and 
the speaker finds himself struck dumb. I hope this will not 
always be the case, and that you and I shall be instrumental 
in bringing about a change for the better. 28
If a change had taken place by the time H.N. Lay reached China 
in 1847 9 it was not in the direction desired by his father. The 
field was dominated by the assertive, aggressive apostles of national 
prestige and economic "progress". It is not altogether improbable 
that the young Lay may have felt that he had a duty to carry, in 
part at least, the burden of his father's "cross".
In this one aspect, then, despite the span in distance and age, 
the public career of G. Tradescant Lay in the China Service may have 
had a direct bearing on the subsequent career of his son. In 
several other aspects, especially those related to family relation­
ships and arrangements, the impact on H.N. Lay's career was direct 
and concrete.
Although when he left for China on the temporary assignment,
G.T. Lay had apparently hoped that it would lead to a permanent post, 
it was almost two years before the issue was decided. He seems to
28. JLL ms. G.T. to H.N. Lay. Amoy, July 10, 1845
40
have had some second thoughts about his own plans, for in both 
mid-1842 and mid-1843* He alluded to his return to London* His 
hesitancy was doubtless stimulated by his susceptibility to ill­
ness and to the intense depression he felt in intellectual iso-
29lation* By the beginning of 1843» he knew that he had been
30recommended for the Consul's post at Amoy, but his letters re­
flect that he was seeking to overcome resistance from his family* ^  
Thus, after describing his narrow escape though wounded during 
the hostilities at Woosung on June 16, he comments to his son: "Your 
affection for China will not be increased by this circumstance I
29* Illnesses had seriously interfered with his work on previous 
visits to the East. Beechey, ou.cit* p* 411 • Also, vide antea 
p.<££ Fairbank "Trade", p* 168, in a footnote reproduces the 
complaints to be found in G*T* Lay's letters to his son from 1842- 
43* While, in his March 1844 letter, it is true that he recorded 
the fact of his "insomnia from about one to five every morning", 
yet the paragraph opens with the statement "I preserve a healthy 
appearance though my hair turns grey very fast*" In his preceding 
letter of January 19> 1844> He wrote, "I am pretty well in health, 
but sometimes dull for want of dear Mamma*" JLL, mss.
30. FO 17/66* Pottinger Ho. 4 January [16-17] 1843*
31. A statement in Fairbank "Trade" p* 168 (a precis of a portion 
of an uncited despatch from Lay to Davis No* 36 April 19, 1845 - FO 
228/50) "Consul Lay arrived [at Amoy] on April 19, 1845 [sicj •*•» 
He ... had not seen his wiffe at Hongkong for nearly four years ••••" 
might lead one to infer that Mrs* Lay had been in Hongkong for four 
years* This, of course, was not the case*
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32suppose " A year later, within a single letter, his mood
was vacillating.
"When you have finished your education you must come and see
me, should I not he called home before that period." He entices
the boy by relating how he has been able to use his influence in
promoting the career of a youth of 17 who "has come here in search
of a situation" • However, Lay then goes on to assert that he is
physically "very unwell" and has, "entirely lost all.... taste for
study and even the Bible which I was wont to delight in, cannot
concentrate my wandering thoughts, or fill my poor sad heart with
33
that interest which was once do fresh and flowing.
These thoughts seem to have stimulated his indecisions
You will find your dear Mother very uneasy, and I suppose 
you will strive to comfort her by saying that you do not believe 
J shall ever come again [to China?]. We cannot tell what 
shall be* nor how soon I may find myself at Burton Street.
But as I should, in such a case, be out of conceit with every­
thing, I fear our meeting would have but little joy in it.
I used to refresh myself with the picture of meeting you and 
dear Mamma at Burton Street, but the picture is now out of 
sight, and I feel a loss which I cannot describe.54
This period of indecision and despair on G.T. Lay* s part,
gradually gave way to one in which he made increasingly positive and
decisive plans. Evidence of the change may be found in his letter
written just over five months later. He writes about the Consulate
32. JLL, mss. G.T. to H.N. Lay, Wusung, June 24* 1842 
33* Ibid. Hong-Kong June 16, 1843 
34* Loc.cit.
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being constructed in Canton and addst
I have just seen a room, parted off by my direction 
which would suit you exactly.. •. a balcony in front where 
you might take exercise as long as you please • ••• It 
would do me good to see you dear boy, I want somebody to 
make me well* For though I enjoy this honourable post, 
have overcome the mountain of difficulties which at first 
lay before me, and have [assistants] in abundance all 
ready to attend to my wishes, yet I cannot at all times 
enjoy the comforts that God is so kind to give me, first 
because I have not your dear Mother by me, and secondly 
because I am seldom without some pain or disagreeable 
sensation*55
Barely two months later, there is no question about his 
wishess
Still I never think of having [your Mother] with me, 
without remembering yours and your dear brother's [sie36J 
loss, when she is removed from the midst of you* This 
China must be your home as well as mine* Here is a fine 
country, people ready to shew you much attention and an 
employment both honourable and profitable* 57
35* Ibid* Canton, November 26, 1843
36* The three eldest boys, H*N*, G.T. and W.H* remained in 
England* The two youngest children, W.T* and Angelina, accompanied 
Mrs* Lay to China*
37* JLL, ms* G*T* to H*N* Lay, Canton January 19$ 1844* Hay
was over-optimistic about the profitableness of the employment.
While Consul at Canton (23/7/43 - 30/6/44) He received salary at 
the rate of £1,800* At Foochow from July 1 to September 30• the 
annual rate was £1,300, but from October 1, 1844» It was reduced to 
£1,200 because of lack of trading activity at that port* Although 
the salary proposed for Amoy was £1,500 (Fairbank "Trade" p.167)
Lay remained at £1,200* Information in summary tables in FO 228/41* 
In addition, in despatches from Foochow (FO 228/41 Lay's No* 1 
22/6/44 and No. 21, 10/12/44) and Amoy (FO 228/50 Lay's No. 34 
19/4/45) Lay complained both of the inadequacy of the salary and the 
heavy losses arising from commissions and disparities in exchange*
At Amoy, he appealed for a salary increase in view of the potential
trade at that port. FO 228/50 No. 36, 19/4/45*
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A passage in the same letter suggests that he had offered
his wife the opportunity to decide! "Should dear Mamma do me
the honour to come to Canton, I will shew her the same mark of
respect [of putting on his official ‘undress coat and waistcoat1]”
Whatever she may have replied to him (hased on an inquiry of
an earlier letter because the letter of January 19 did not reach
London until April 5^)» by the end of March 1844> the nine months
in virtual isolation at Foofhow and the prospect of a similar future
at Amoy, led him to an even firmer decision. "You know I have sent
39for dear Mamma, for I am not happy without her.” Finally, the
decision is unequivocal. He closes his letter of June 16, 1844*
with the following! "I hope dear Mamma is about starting, therefore
do not write. I do not intend to part with her."^
These developments of necessity focus attention on the feelings
and behaviour of G.T. Lay. As no correspondence from members of the
family to China has been located,^ it is only possible to draw
tentative inferences from the material that is available about the
reaction of H.N. Lay to these developments.
38. The cover of the letter bears the London postmark of this date.
39* JbL, ms. G.T. to H.N. Lay, Canton March 23, 1844*
40. Ibid. The letter did arrive in London, 16 September, 
presumably after Mrs. Lay had left.
41* There are frequent references in G.T. Lay's, letter to information 
and reports received by him. There is also a reference (JLL, ms. G.T. 
to H.N. Lay, March 23, 1344) to a letter received from his son dated 
October 28, 1843*
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In the first place, the suggestion has been made that the idea 
that he was to spend his future in China did not take hold in the 
young boy's mind. At the same time, in increasingly stronger 
terms, G.T. Lay expressed his desire that his son should join him 
and seek a career in China. The letters from Hay, 1843 - those 
after Mrs. Lay had rejoined her husband at Amoy - assumed the boys 
would rejoin their parents in China. The original plan appeared 
to be that H.N. Lay was to travel out in 1846. However, on July 10, 
1843» G.T. Lay wrote*
We hear that Willie is unwell and so dear Mamma anxious 
about him begins to think of sending for him soon. In that 
case George & you might come out .together, deducting one year 
from his stay and adding one to yours .42
If the boy had been won over by the idea that he would soon be 
going out to China, this news of a probable delay might well have 
had an unsettling effect upon him.
Secondly, although there is a constant stream of general counsel 
and advice that flows through almost all the letters, the references 
in the later ones point to specific patterns of behaviour, between 
late 1844 and early 1845 $ that were apparently getting the youngster 
into difficulties at school.
I hear from your dear Mother that you work hard at school 
and am right glad to see three testimonials of your success.
I hope you enjoy sometimes the charms of religious worship, 
and behold the finer beauties of God's temple. I do not 
forget that there are not a few hindrances to piety at a
42. JLL, ms. Amoy.
public school, and that to imitate him who left us an 
example, ["vrogsammos" - in Greek script], is not easy 
anywhere#43
and again*
I often pray that God would plant his love in your 
heart, and keep you from the plague of a fretful temper 
and the seducement to evil which are ever starting up 
around you. Keep company with such lads as seem to have 
a certain raciness [?], judgment and sobriety in their 
talk and doings. Think little of advice that people are 
so fond of thrusting upon their neighbours, remembering 
that few are so well informed and so honest as to tell 
you what you ought to do. Shut your ears against the 
common prelude * "If I were you I would do so and so."
Do nothing and say nothing for which you do not clearly 
see the reasons.44
The difficulties of rebelliousness and insecurity suggested
by these references might normally be found in a boy of 12-13 years
of age. It would not be unusual if they were aggravated by the
sense of loss which the youngster might feel at being isolated
from both his parents.
In the same vein, it is also perhaps of more than passing
significance that G.T. Lay acknowledges a report from his wife that
45the youngster's health is poorly. What evidence there is gives
43* Ibid. Amoy, May 25, 1845* Received in London, 9 October 1845*
44* Ibid. G.T. to H.N. Lay, Amoy, July 10, 1845* Words under­
scored as in ms. .
45* Ibid. G.T. to H.N. Lay, Canton, June 16, 1844* The fact
that the previous letter of March 25, 1844* had been redirected 
from Mill Hill School to Lynn, where it arrived on July 5» 1844» m&y 
indicate that young Lay was withdrawn from the school for the Summer 
Term.
a general picture of a normally healthy hoy* G.T, Lay refers 
nostalgically to the hoy "whom, in days of infancy, I often 
amused hy taking into the fields to look at the beauties of 
nature."^ H.N, Lay's eldest daughter recalled that he "went 
to school first to his grandfather Nelson [at Lynn], who had 
also horses for hunting and he learned there to ride bareback 
on the wildest s t e e d * H i s  poor health, then, appeared to 
coincide with the decision that Mrs* Lay should leave England 
to join her husband in China*
Thirdly, whether because of the unsatisfactory conditions 
which prevailed at Foochow, or because the letters were destroyed, 
it is a fact that the collection of letters from father to son 
contain none written during G.T* Lay's entire consulship at Foo­
chow, (July, 1844» through March, 1845) and during the first two 
months after his arrival at Amoy. Part of the time span (the 
first few months of 1845) for which there are no letters can be
accounted for in view of a compound fracture which Lay sustained
48in one of the metacarpal bones of his right hand* However, as 
the other letters indicate, the pressure of his public duties on 
earlier occasions did not prevent him from writing to his son*
46* Ibid* Canton, March 25, 1844
47* JU»9 ms. Elsie Lay to H*M» Lay, October 13, 1937* 
48* FO 228/50. Lay's No* %  from Amoy, 19/4/45*
In this instance, the gap in letters corresponds closely 
in time with the first few months following the departure of
H.N. Lay's mother for China. The correlation may be due solely 
to coincidence, but it may also be wondered whether the non­
existence of the letters may not in some way be connected with
AQ
the "plague of a fretful temper” which G.T. Lay commented upon.
50 :Finally, young Lay was involved in ”an escapade”"^ involving 
an attempt to run away from Hill Hill School. Although it is 
not clear exactly when the attempt was made, it is probable that 
it took place late in 1844 - after Mrs. Lay had left for China.
This conjecture is based on the fact that on January 30, 1844» 
G.T. Lay sent ”a small gift” to his son, which he entrusted to a
49* Vide antea p.-fi" [note 44«]
30. The incident is referred to in King, op.cit. p.49* He 
refers to an account of it which was in a "published history of 
Hill Hill.” I have been unable to locate this. The details 
cited in this study are from an extract of a letter from Norman 
G.3. James, St. Augustine's, Cliftonville, Margate, (who, I believe, 
wrote a history of Hill Hill) to Hr. H.H. Lay of Barrie, Ontario, 
dated April 20, 1903*
31. JLL ms. G.T. to H.N. Lay. Canton. This small and brief 
"note", along with the forwarding note of the compatriot, "Dr. 
Plimsell Surgeon of Her Majesty's Sloop Childers”, were not included 
amont the co * ~ * * 1 by H.M. Lay to J.K.
The size of the folded cover
48
(l 9/6" x 2 15/l6M - an unusual size) would have been consistent with
a set of "very beautiful pictures on Chinese rice paper" which the
boy sold to eleven other schoolmates, in order to provide funds for 
52the attempt. The "gift" was only delivered to H.N. Lay on 
September 17, 1844*^
The incident may, also, account for the "lost" letters referred 
to previously. According to James' account, the boys who were im­
plicated were severely punished. Among other penalties, the pictures 
purchased by the boys were expropriated by the Master (Mr. Priestley) 
and were tom up "in the presence of the school." The older boy in­
volved in the runaway attempt was expelled. H.N. Lay "was apparently
5 A
forgiven as the younger boy." The failure of the venture and the 
destruction of the pictures would hardly, under the circumstances, 
have been considered adequate punishment for young Lay. He may not 
have been deprived of having the contents of his father's letters 
communicated to him, but he may have been deprived of possession of 
the letters.
52* JLL ms. N.G.B. James to H.M. Lay, April 20, 1905*
53 • Ibid. ms. Plimsell to H.N. Lay. London* Postmard "SPI7 
1844”* on the cover, in pencil, "Rec'd September 17, 1844*” 
note begins "Dr. Plimsell sends his compliments to Master Lay and 
begs to acquaint him, that his father entrusted the enclosed to 
Dr. Plimsell's care, who would have called to see him had not Mill 
Hill been so far distant." G.T. Lay's note of January 30 was small 
enough to have been enclosed and bears no postmark.
54. Oo.cit. (Vide antea p. ^ 7 note 50 )
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From the foregoing view of the developments involving the 
personal relations of G.T. Lay with his family, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that the question of China and his future 
relationship to it was not what was significant to the young boy.
To the extent that the connection with China was responsible for 
splitting his parents, it stimulated an unfavourable reaction to­
ward China. When the connection became so dominant as to separate 
him from both his parents, his main motivating force appeared to be 
the desire to be reunited, as quickly as possible, with his parents.
The untimely death of his father led to a situation which eliminated 
any question of choice on the part of young Lay as far as his 
immediate connection with China was concerned.
Before following the course of events subsequent to G.T. Lay's 
death, it would be appropriate to conclude the account of the in­
fluences affecting his formative years. With respect to environmental 
influences, it may be noted that King's Lynn was a second home to
Hampstead and Mill Hill. When G.T. Lay served with the BFBS from
551836-1839, mother and children moved to Lynn. When he returned,
55* BFBS. "Home Correspondence." See letters of G.T. Lay to the 
committee dated May 9 and May 11, 1836, addressed from "8 Valingers 
Hoad Lynn." Letter of May 16, 1836 (written by Lay at the Society's 
office, 10 Earle's Ct.) addressed to "Gentlemen of the Finance Committee,
I have respectfully to request that my salary may be paid into the Bank 
of Esdaile & Com. and that Mr. H. Nelson Lynn Norfolk be advised of the
same." Mary Lay "No. 8, Valingers Road Lynn Norfolk" to Rev. A. Brandram,
May 28th, 1836, "May I also beg the favor [sic] of your paying our
money into Esdaile's Bank "
Also "Minutes of the Committee" p. 380. Meeting of October 2, 1837#
"Mr. R. Nelson, dated Lynn Sept. 28th stating that Mrs. Lay, had
received, a short time ago, a letter from.... .Lay. •• •" Vide antea p.^-6 
note 47*
IT
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56they moved back to Hampstead, In addition, the family seems to
57have spent the summers fairly regularly in Lynn*
The male members of Mrs* Lay's family at Lynn, according to
earlier citations, were educated but not learned, and moderately
well off, but not affluent. Her father was a townsman with gentry
interests* One brother was a merchant of sufficient standing to
qualify for a public post. Another brother was a clerk, probably
in a bank, and in the 1840's lived in a moderately fashionable
58section of the town. If anything were to be concluded from this, 
it would be that young H.N. Lay was not totally unfamiliar with 
attitudes related to mercantile and financial enterprise. It would 
be folly to press an analogy between these influences and his later 
activities.
On his father's side, as G.T, Lay had severed all connection with
56* FO 17/41* Bay to W.F. Strangeways, January 10, 1840, as 
from 34 Burton St*, Burton Crescent*
57* FL* "Family Bible"* G.T. Lay [il] was baptised in Lynn on 
Sept* 1, 1834* Also, as previously noted, JLL mss* G.T. to H.N.
Lay, Canton 26/ll/43* "Your Uncle Robert tells me that your conduct 
while at Lynn gave great pleasure to himself, Aunt and the rest of 
kind friends there"* G.T. to H.N* Lay, Canton, Mar* 23, 1844, vas 
re-directed to Lynn, where it arrived on July 3> 1844*
58. I drew the connection between the entry in V. White, "History, 
Gazetteer and Directory of Norfolk" (Sheffield 1836) and the apparent 
connection of R. Nelson with Esdaile's Bank*
59his own family, the influence was exclusively that of his father.
By the standards of his day, G.T. Lay was an educated and learned
man, and however unhappy his earlier years, this bespeaks a family
of means* Whether it was acquired by birthright or choice, he was a
convinced adherent of a non-conformist faith. This is confirmed by
his connection with the BFBS and by the choice of Mill Hill School
60for his sons' education. G.T. Lay's interests were as extensive 
as the range of his senses and, if his letters from China are taken 
as an extension of the influence he tried constantly to exert, he 
sought to transmit this concept of learning to his eldest son.^
Luring the period of young Lay's formal education, his father 
was particularly anxious that he should gain a sound foundation in 
the Latin and Greek classics in order "to make further progress with­
out difficulty when you leave school.... that when you come we may talk
59* The only clue for his reasons is to be found in JLL ms. G.T, 
to H.N. Lay, Canton, Nov. 26, 1843* "When I was your age no 
counsellor mingled kindness and experience to direct me in the road 
to happiness. My elders praised or condemned me in cases where I 
did not deserve one nor the other, and always showed me the wrong 
path both by precept and example." As far as his contemporaries 
were concerned, he was successful in obliterating his past prior to 
1825*
In conversation with the present writer, descendents have re­
lated the story that his wife never knew any more of his past than 
that he had been on Beechey's voyage and that when she met him (about 
1829/30) he was already able to speak Chinese.
60. Mr. John L. Lay informed the writer that H.N. Lay was a 
Congregationalist•
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62and read together now and thenH and "to talk with me respecting
the literature of those two n a t i o n s * H e  urged him to learn to
speak well and fluently, to concentrate on developing a find hand,
and when out walking to
• ••endeavour to find entertainment by enquiry into every­
thing that falls in your way— -question the ploughman, the 
herdsman, the mechanic and the dealer in various merchandise, 
each and all can tell you something worth remembrance. What 
they tell you write down to help memory, and thus become 
knowing and intelligent in all the doctrines of that science, 
which men call Common Sense.64
From hindsight, it is clear that young Lay would have been well 
served had he been directly subject to his father's influence for a 
longer period.
Apart from his brief bout with poor health and the unsuccessful 
"’escapade", the youngster was a diligent student* The reports of 
his mother, relatives and tutors, as reflected in the letters, were 
generally favourable ones* It is not possible to determine the 
extent to which he may have readjusted himself a year after his mother's 
departure. He was again enrolled at Mill Hill for the 1845-4-6 session* 
He did not return after the Christmas Vacation. The reasons for this 
will be discussed shortly*
By the time he was 13§- years of age, then, the focus for H*N* Lay's 
future had become China* He was being groomed to pursue a career in
62. Ibid. May 29, 1845
63. Ibid* July 10, 1845
64* Ibid. June 16, 1844* Underscoring as in ms*
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his father* s footsteps - presumably in the public service* He
had been conditioned to apply himself assiduously to studies that
would put him in good stead, once he were to become familiar with
the language and environment of China*
Under the circumstances that were anticipated, he should have
continued with his formal education until 1847 $ to the eve of his
15th birthday* With the additional education and the added years,
he would probably at least have been eligible to support himself in
some form of apprenticeship* The plan was seriously disrupted and
6 5radically distorted by the death of his father at Amoy* The
latter succumbed on November 6, 1845*^ to an ailment variously
6*7diagnosed as "bilious" or "climatic" fever.
65* JLL ms* G«T* to H*N* Lay, Amoy* Hay 29, 1845* Lay noted that 
there was a heavy toll of Chinese "dying of fever". He reported to 
Hongkong (FO 228/50 "Separate" 21/8/45) that the fever was of epidemic 
proportions* He had himself withstood one attack in mid-July ((FO 
228/50 No* 74 Sullivan to David 24/IO/45 enclosing C.A. Winchester 
(who had been a physician before taking up a post as a junior assistant 
in the Consulate) Report 18/10/45))*
In what was probably his last letter to H*N* Lay, of Sept* 20,
18451 Lay wrote, "I am not always at ease, owing perhaps to that nervous 
uncomfortable sensation that has long troubled me*"
66* There has been a tendency to place G*T* Lay*s death in 1846*
King* Op.cit* p.49? Wright, "Hart", p*l21 n*75$ Lay "Four Generations", 
reports both 1845 (p«7) and. I846 (p*xiii). This may have originated 
from the fact that the "Consular letter of Administration to Mrs. Mary 
Lay"signed by E.E. Sullivan and correctly dated at Amoy "2}rd Feb* I846" 
nonetheless arroneously states in the opening sentence that G*T* Lay 
"departed this life 6th day of November 1846*" This ms* copy was found 
in the "FL" collection*
67* FO 228/50* No. 74* Winchester's report refers to "bilious".
No. 70 Sullivan to Davis, 6/ll/45» refers to "climatic."
TChapter III 
In preparation for HEM Service in China
G.T, Lay*s death was a serious enough blow. Even more
serious, however, was the desperate condition in which the family
was left. Impoverished is not too strong a word. The cost of
maintaining three boys at boarding school; the heavy cost of the
move of his wife and two youngest children to Amoy; the need for
more elaborate furnishings of the Consulate, which this latter
move entailed:^  the relatively low salary of the Amoy post, coupled
2
with the losses in exchange; all these had served to exhaust the 
family's resources.
In the 1840's, it would have been inconceivable for Mrs, Lay to 
seek remunerative employment in China, In November, 1845» it was
3
impossible, for she was in the seventh month of pregnancy* This 
factor intensified the economic burden, for she was forced to remain 
in China without a sustaining source of income for a longer period 
than might otherwise have been necessary.
1, JLL ms, G.T, to H.N, Lay, Amoy Sept. 20, 1845*
Drawing and Dining Booms look well, that is they wear the air & 
manner of home, as they have the benfit of some furniture dear 
Mamma ordered at Hong Kong, •. • •"
Vide rantea, ChJI, p. fz. n,37
3* Amoy Lay, her last child, was bom in Amoy, January 22, 1846.
54
5Thus the combination of the news of his father*s death,
which only reached London about mid-January, 1846,^ and the
5
impoverishment of the family, account for the withdrawal of 
the three boys from Mill Hill School after the Christmans term 
of 1845* Where they resided until the teturn of their mother 
is not, at present known*
Apart from all the other considerations enumerated, the blow 
must have been a devastating one for Mrs* Lay in another connection* 
It may also account for the irresistible determination which she 
subsequently demonstrated in sending her sons to China. ^ Mrs* Lay 
apparently "found" herself, particularly when she settled down at 
Amoy. Shortly after her arrival in May, 1845» she was "well and 
happy* Time that works decay in most sublunary[?] things seem to 
have had an adverse effect in her case, for I never saw her look
4* "Times", Jan* 20, 1846* p*3, d* "The death of Mr* Ley [sic], 
the English Consul at Amoy, is mentioned in terms of great regret." 
(The "Times" frequently, and other sources occasionally, used the 
erroneous spelling)*
5* That the impoverishment was not merely a condition related to 
the family's position in China, is confirmed by the document assigning 
Mrs* Lay as Administratrix of G.T* Lay's estate in March, 1847* The 
fee for registering the assighment, paid 19/5/47 $ was £8. On the 
flap of the document the following appears, "The sum of six pounds 
18/6 1ms been returned on the ground of debts [illegible signature] 
Hamp. Office June 1847*" FL collection. FO 17/119» Sir H. Pottinger 
Memo to FO, 27/11/46* "Mrs. Lay •...has come home with seven [sic] 
children. She is in absolute penury, and at present supported by 
her Brothers."
6. All five of them eventually started their vocational careers 
in East Asia*
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7more fresh, nor her heart more cheerful* In July, though she 
suffered from prickly heat, she was "more happy when with me and
0
more cheerful than I ever had the pleasure of seeing her before• "
By the end of September, just prior to G.T. Lay's fatal illness, 
she was
very happy and has enjoyed good health. I never saw her so 
much at home in Society as now, her deafness is not increased, 
perhaps less on account of that cheerfulness she feels and 
that desire to join in the conversation of the company. She 
looks remarkably well and would be complete could she see her 
dear boys now and then. 9
There was no alternative, however, but to return to England.
She remained in Amoy until her infant son was about seven weeks
old.^ Assisted by private subscription,^ and the defrayment of
12tetum travel costs by the Government, Mrs. Lay and the three
7. JLL ms. G.T, to H.N, Lay, May 29.
8. Ibid. July 10.
9. Ibid. Sept. 20.
10. "The China Mail", Vol. IX, Ho. 57, P.20, 19/3/46. Reports 
the arrival of Mrs. Lay on March 17 at Hongkong, from Amoy.
11. Fairbank "Trade", p. 170.
12. FO 17/119* Unsigned memo prepared about Dec. 10, 1846.
"Mrs. Lay's passage home was defrayed by the Public." P.O. 17/193 
Ho. 130. Bowring to Malmesbury. Oct. 1, 1852. Bowring transmits 
request of Mrs. Sullivan, widow of the late Consul at Amoy, that 
£120 passage money be allowed as "in the cases of Mrs. Lay and Mrs. 
Layton, both of whose husbands died at Amoy while engaged as H.M. 
Consuls at that Port."
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youngest children reached England in late Summer or early Pall 
13of 1846. Mrs. Lay let little time elapse before impressing 
herself and her wishes on the Foreign Office in London.
On November 16, 1846, she wrote to Lord Palmerston,
I beg to present to your Lordship my sincere and 
grateful thanks for the favor14 [sic] received this day 
through Mr. [E.J.] Stanley from your kindness Mjy Lord,
I shall be enabled immediately to sent [sic] out my two 
eldest son's [sic], if you My Lord would kindly recommend 
the elder one to the notice of Sir John Davis I am sure 
he would when a vacancy occurred and he thought him 
eligible grant him something. I regret that the youth­
ful ages of my children will prevent my receiving any 
benefit from their exertions for the present. 15
Palmerston had initialled "Recommend accordingly" which was
followed by "NB The eldest boy is under 15* the second under 13
years of age". Mrs. Lay was notified that the recommendation
would be senti ^  "but Lord Palmerston thinks it right to point out
13* FO 17/119 [No* 245] Mrs. Mary Lay to H.U. Addington, Esq.
(on black-bordered paper) Oct. 24, I846. Prom London acknowledging 
receipt of the China Medal for her husband's services with the 
Pottinger Mission. A curious sidelight connected with this matter
is that in July, I846, the P.O. struck the name of J.R. Morrison
from the list of those entitled to the medal, (which lists "G.T.
Ley") because he was dead (1843)» but Lay's name was left on! (FO
17/118 July-August, 1846).
14* FO 17/119* Memo as per n. 12T above. Lord Palmerston authorised 
a grant of £300 out of "S[pecial]. F[unds].w It was probably not fore­
seen that she would use her meagre resources for the purpose she
obviously had in mind.
15. FO 17/119 [No. 252].
16. FO 17/100 [No. 186]. "Separate" to Sir John Davis Nov. 18, 1846.
The recommendation was sent, leaving Sir John discretionary power. The 
following phrase is significant, "... Mrs. Lay... proposes to send out
to China her two sons, aged respectively under 15» and under 13 years..." 
The sons referred to, the ones actually sent under this recommendation, 
were H.N. Lay and G.T. Lay. Vide.ywsHfca. p. Ct n.2ff<
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to you, before you take the serious step of sending the boys to
China that it is very unlikely, considering their youth, that
Sir John Davis will be able to be of any assistance to them at
17all events for some time to come”.
Mrs* Lay was undeterred, probably because she knew that Harry 
S. Parkes, under the energetic sponsorship of Dr* Charles Giltzlaff,
IShad been taken into the China Service before reaching the age of ljJ-
and at 14^ was "salaried”;^ because she had pre-arranged that H.N.
Lay, at least, would be taken into Giltzlaff1 s family and would
20receive tuition in Chinese if he were sent outf because she had
probably been informed by Sir Henry Pottinger that he was going to
advocate the initiation of a programme of student interpreterships
21for the China Service*
Mrs* Lay not only solicited the support of Lord Palmerston 
directly, but she pressed her case on him through Sir G* Staunton, as 
well as through Sir Henry Pottinger* In a personal interview at the
17. FO 17/119 [No. 188]. Draft to Mrs. Lay, No. 18, I846.
18* Stanley Lane-Poole, "The Life of Sir Harry Parkes” 2 Vols. (London 
1894) Vol.I, p.14* The major portion of the data used to draw parallels 
between the early China careers of H.S* Parkes and H.N, Lay is taken from 
Chs.I-VIII of this biography,
19. Ibid. p.54.
20. FO 17/119. In Pottinger's memo of 29/11/46.
21* Loc.cit* Pottinger*s memo closes, after a strong appeal for 
consideration for H*N* Lay and for Mrs. Lay, with a strong statement in 
support of such a policy.
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Foreign Office between December 10-13* Sir George, among other points,
22adverted to Mrs. Lay and was informed of what had been done for her* 
Mary Lay, however, had obviously not been a Consul's wife long enough* 
On December 14* I846, Sir George wrote formally to Lord Palmerston*
Since I had the honour of seeing you, Mrs* Lay has called 
on me, and entreats me to submit to you that Sir Henry 
Pottinger, previous to his embarkation for the Cape, had pro­
mised to speak to you in favor [sic] of her eldest son a boy 
of 13 or 14, going out to China in February to be placed there 
as a pupil to Mr* Gutzlaff* She seemed to entertain a hope 
that some allowance might be made to Mr* Gutzlaff for his main­
tenance as a pupil. with an understanding that he should have 
an appointment as soon as his age and qualifications permitted*
In reply, Palmerston indicated that he felt he had done as much
as possible* He suggested that the idea of training interpreters
was under advisement by the Foreign Office, but in any case were the
policy to be adopted candidates selected would have to be older and
more advanced in training than young Lay to justify the risk involved.
Reflecting a resentment that; had recently been expressed in an inter-
OA
office memo, Palmerston added, "Besides, much embarrassment would be
22. FO 17/119• Office memo* Dec. 10, I846, reporting desire of Sir 
G. Staunton for an interview to discuss various points relating to 
problems of hardship cases growing out of the China Service* Followed 
by Office Memo, supplying information on the points to be discussed.
23. Ibid. [No. 283]
24* Ibid* At the conclusion of the information memo cited in n.22<9 
the unidentified writer (possibly E* Hammond) complained about Sir 
George's continued requests for generous treatment of people with 
short service on the China Establishment. Like the faithful son in 
the parable, he wanted to know what special treatment was to be 
accorded to people with long service?
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J
occasioned to the Secretary to State hy establishing a precedent
for educating at the public expense the younger children of de- 
25ceased Consuls”.
As far as Mrs. Lay was concerned, but unbeknown to her, the 
discussion was conclusively terminated when the office staff got 
around to considering the memorandum which had been prepared by 
Sir H. Pottinger on November 27. The advisory memorandum begins,
”Mrs. Lay's case having already been disposed of in communication 
with Sir George Staunton.•• attention can be directed to the 
question of providing an adequate supply of interpreters. The 
policy of establishing a number of Supernumeraries under the Super­
intendency at Hongkong is recommended, but discretionary power is to
reside with Sir John Davis. The report was approved by Palmerston
26on January 4* 1847» and the despatch embodying the recommendations
27was prepared on January 16.
Mrs. Lay had not achieved her immediate objectives, but to the 
extent that discretionary power was left to the Superintendent and 
he would be dependent upon his Chinese Secretary, Gutzlaff, young 
Lay would be favourably placed. Whether or not she realised the
25* Ibid. [No. 216?] to Sir G. Staunton, Dec. 16, I846.
26. FO 17/119* Memo of 30/12/46 on Sir H. Pottinger's Memo of 
27/H/46 with notation by Palmerston as indicated.
27. FO 17/121. No.9 Draft to Sir J.F. Davis.
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situation, she did not long hesitate in sending off the two eldest 
boys* They left London on March 12, and arrived at Hongkong on 
July 29,18479^  two days after H.N* Lay's fifteenth birthday.
There is a complete gap in documentation for information about 
Lay for the 1£? months between the date of his arrival at Hongkong 
and March 1849* The first direct impressions which "China” might 
have had upon him may be reconstructed from acquaintance with his 
physical environment, from the state of affairs respecting foreign 
intercourse with the Chinese at the time, and with the earlier 
activities of Harry S. Parkes, when he first arrived in China at the 
age of thirteen and a half.^
From the standpoint of natural setting, Hongkong, though topo­
graphically rugged, possessed many attractions. The area, however, 
had only come under British control in I84I. Largely because of this 
circumstance,, there were numerous disadvantages to living in the area. 
Accommodations whether in residential or working quarters were, with
28. "The China Mail", Vol.Ill No. 129, Aug. 5, 1847, p.100 lists 
among the arrivals "Messrs. H. and G. Lay." The "Overland Friend 
of China" No. 25, Aug. 25, 1847, P*H4, confirms the arrivals but 
does not differentiate the two boys.
29* The general discussion on these topics is based on the 
following: environment and state of affairs) Fairbank, "Trade",
Chs,x and xv) Morse, "Conflict", Chs XI to XY, and E.J. Eitel, 
"Europe in China" (London, 1895), Chs. x, xiii-xv) environment 
and personal activities) Lane-Poole I. chs. I-IY.
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few exceptions, of the crudest sort and were intermittently 
destroyed by natural disasters (particularly typhoons) or by fire. 
Because of the elementary state of medical knowledge and of undeve­
loped public sanitation, epidemics of malaria, dysentery and uni­
dentified tropical fevers were frequent and unpredictable.
Despite the wave of optimism which had originally been felt 
concerning the development of Hongkong as a trade emporium, in the 
late 1840's, it was little more than the hub of British diplomatic 
and military administration in East Asia. This, in turn, was 
doubtless a significant factor in creating and exacerbating a deep 
cleavage within the foreign community, setting the "Government" and 
most of its various agencies and officers against the rest.
Another factor that intensified the tension growing out of
conflicts of interest among the parties was that the resident foreign
community (including all Europeans, Americans and Farsees) could not
30have numbered much above four hundred.
The "Foreign complex" of the period should, however, be defined 
to include some of the sections of the military establishment and in 
some respects the communities of Canton and Macao. In this period
30. Morse, "Conflict", p.346, gives the foreign adult male 
population in 1850 as 4^ 4* "Census" figures do not usually include 
the military contingents based or regularly stationed at Hongkong. 
Since the officers, at least, were an integral part of the Colony's 
society, figures of this sort can be misleading.
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regular and fairly frequent transport and communication were 
developed between the Colony and these two cities*
On the native side, there may have been several tens of 
thousands of Chinese distributed throughout the territory, the 
majority of them scattered in a number of small villages or living 
on the "junks” and "sampans” which have been common on the Chinese 
waterways for centuries* In this setting and among this population 
there was little that reflected the range of Confucian "culturism"*
On the one hand, while there appears to have been a few literati - 
type Chinese attracted to the foreign community and, in the early 
period, a few minor officials assigned by the Ch'ing Authorities to 
exercise jurisdiction over the native population, the combined total 
would not have been significantly prominent* On the other hand, the 
nature of the terrain and coastline, the temptations of the foreigners* 
cupidity and wealth and the absence of effective forces for policing 
land or water, drew to Hongkong a considerable number of refugee 
criminals from the mainland and opportunists eager to exploit the 
opportunities for racketeering, smuggling and piracy* The Colony was 
predominantly "Chinese” but it was hardly typical.
This superficial sketch of some of the prevailing features of the 
environment encountered by Lay on his first direct contact with "China” 
does not do justice to the multiplicity of influences which would cer­
tainly have impressed themselves upon him* They have been selected 
in order to draw attention to attitude-forming factors which should be
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taken into account if an adequate understanding of his later career 
is to be formed. Although in his first eighteen months Lay must 
have visited Macao and probably visited Canton, his daily life 
proceeded within an extremely limited social and cultural milieu*
In the foreign community, his minority, both literally and figuratively, 
would have augmented a sense of isolation and encouraged a development 
of self-reliance which he had already been counselled by his father 
to expect* Insofar as he was in contact with a Chinese community in 
this impressionable period, his attitudes were conditioned by 
association with subservient servants and by observation of the 
activities and behaviour of the least sophisticated strata of the in­
digenous society* It was, in fact, to be several years before Lay was 
to have an opportunity to acquire more than a superficial knowledge of 
his new environment.
Part of the reason for this delay can doubtless be ascribed to his 
age and corresponding insignificance* To a greater extent, however, 
deterioration in the relations between foreigners and Chinese - apart 
from Shanghai - was reactivating resentments among the f,01d China Hands19 
and creating antipathies among the newcomers, like Lay* The in­
compatibility of the institutional and cultural systems had not been 
reconciled by the war nor by the treaties that followed* There had 
been a brief "honeymoon” as an aftermath to the "shotgun99 wedding, but 
disengagement succeeded by virtual separation (particularly on the 
diplomatic level) was the trend even before Lay arrived in the Summer
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of 1847.
During the months that followed his arrival, Hongkong was the 
focal point for the release of the frustrated hopes of the trading 
interests and for the storing up of unrectified insults (real and 
imagined) experienced by the officials at the various Treaty ports*
As far as is known, ^  H.N* Lay was not connected with the 
Establishment but, living in the home of Dr* Gutzlaff who was Chinese 
Secretary, he could hardly help but be involved in it* To the extent 
then, that the Establishment and most of the rest of the foreign 
community that was concerned to engage in legitimate intercourse with 
the Chinese (whose number in Hongkong, apparently, was not large) were 
isolated, to th&t extent were Lay's knowledge and understanding 
stultified*
In this respect the parallel between H.N* Lay's early career in
China with that of H.S* Parkes, does not hold good* Parkes arrived
32in China in October 1841, during a lull in the war* When large-
scale operations were resumed the following Spring, though he had 
been studying the language for barely six months, he was pressed into
31* It is conceivable that, like Parkes, young Lay might 
have been given simple clerical duties to perform in the Establish­
ment, for which he would have received extremely modest remuneration* 
At this level, personnel were not listed individually*
32* Lane-Poole, I, p*14* As indicated in n*_29, virtually 
all the information about Parkes has been taken from this biography*
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service* In this initial period he had considerable opportunity 
to gain firsthand familiarity with a portion of the coastal and 
riparian regions of the Central and Southern mainland* This con­
trast in the conditions under which first impressions of China were 
gained by these two youths does not appear very profound, but it 
may have some relevance to the contrast in their subsequent careers*
In several other respects, however, the activities of Lay and 
Parkes in their initial contacts with China were quite similar* The 
liasis of similarity derives from the fact that both were, in effect, 
wards of Dr* Charles G&tzlaff; that they lived in his home for an 
extended period of time and received from him the major portion of 
their early tuition in the Chinese language*
Gutzlaff was a native of Pomerania who had originally journeyed 
to Southeast Asia as a Protestant missionary in the 1820's* He had 
ultimately gravitated to South China where he became closely connected 
with the English community - emphasised by his marriage, successively, 
to three English women* From 1837 until his death in 1851, he was on 
the staff of the Superintendency* He had a high opinion of his own 
capabilities as a linguist and sinologue, which was not universally 
shared by his contemporaries, but it could not be denied that he was 
able to communicate effectively with the Chinese* Lane-Poole, who is 
sharp in his criticisms of the man, nonetheless notest "He knew the 
Chinese people intimately - perhaps better than any other man of these
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33early days,•..nyy
Whether because of his overhearing attitude or because of the 
force of the example of his own aggressive and energetic efforts, 
his students applied themselves assiduously to their linguistic 
studies. Gutzlaff apparently had little time to devote to formal 
tuition and while he would strive to carry out a programme of daily 
exercises, the pressure of Gutzlaff's commitments meant that the 
student was left to rely, for much of the time, on his own resources.
If Parkes' experience can be taken as an example, conditions in 
the evangelical missionary home were not conducive to the pursuit of 
other studies. One of the firm hopes of G.T. Lay for his son would 
thus seem to have been thwarted. Not only had the boy been forced to 
discontinue his formal education in England before he had become self- 
reliant in classical and scientific spheres of learning, but the 
opportunities open to him in Hongkong for developing these spheres 
were virtually non-existent.
n
In view of the dependent status of these wards of Gutzlaff, the 
incentive for them was to acquire a workable knowledge of Chinese as 
rapidly as possible. Other interests of spheres of learning were ex­
cluded by their economic circumstances.
There is, of course, a considerable temptation to fabricate an 
account of the personal influences which must have been impressed upon
33. Ibid. pp.55-56.
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Lay as a result of his association with the Gutzlaff family. The 
information available on Parkes' experience might serve as a guide.
But while it may be acceptable to find parallels in some of the 
experiences, personal relations are affected by too many sensitive 
zones of subjective evaluation. Five years separated the experience 
of Parkes and Lay. The youths were quite different in temperament 
and character and this would, presumably, have elicited quite 
different approaches from their foster-parents.
While the information on Lay is scarce for this period, there is 
a lengthy "memorandum", prepared by his "guardian", ^  for the young 
man's guidance as he was about to launch himself on his public career.
Although it is neither basically concerned with Lay's role in the 
British community, nor with intercourse with China, the memorandum is 
presented in its entirety as appendix I.
The memo discloses that Lay, apparently on his own initiative, 
had applied and been accepted for the position of interpreter to 
accompanyaUnited States' "mission" authorised to proceed to Japan to
A
seek to persuade the Japanese to adopt a more favourable policy with
34* FL ms. The manuscript is a copy in Lay* s handwriting, the 
copy bearing neither a signature nor a designation as to who the 
"Guardian" is. There can be little question, however, that the 
original was written by Gdtzlaff. Vide Appendix I.
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35respect to U.S. vessels plying the northwest Pacific. Its 
principal interest for this discussion is that it gives evidence 
of the tuition - apart from language-training - that Lay's 
"guardian” (undoubtedly Gutzlaff) sought to impart.
The counsel is heavy with the burdens of responsibility which 
the young man, several months short of his seventeenth birthday, was 
assuming. The religious emphasis, not unexpectedly, was primary.
Lay was reminded of his obligations "as the eldest son of [his] 
widowed mother". He was dbjured to take as his example his great 
ancestor (Horatio, Lord Nelson ?), who "was never a protege, but rose 
to the highest honours by individual exertions." He was made to feel 
that his "whole life may be humanly said to hinge on /his/ conduct" 
during this one opportunity.
The "guardian" followed with a lengthy discourse on the functions 
and methods appropriate to interpreters and on the conditions which 
Lay could anticipate in his dealings with Japanese "Mandarins". One 
passage of advice, near the conclusion, trite as it may seem, would
55* The expedition referred to here is that of Capt. J. Glynn, 
authorised by the officials on the spot, with the primary object 
of recovering seamen from the U.S. whaler "Lagoda." The vessel 
had been wrecked in the Japan Sea in Feb. 1848, and the survivors 
had been incarcerated by the Japanese. Cf. l^ler Dennett "Americans 
in Eastern Asia" (Reprint, New York 1941) P-251* There is evidence 
that the expedition also recovered some American seamen who had 
survived the shipwreck of the whaler "Lawrence" in I846. Cf. King, 
on.cit. p. 491 H. Cordier, "Histoire generale de la Chine" (Paris
1920) IV, p.135
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probably have but confirmed the young man's experience to date.
Whenever public duty calls you do not eschew dangers.
Never be disheartened, but always cherish courage, for how 
ill matters may look at the beginning, success will be 
awarded to the judicious and persevering.
Whatever contribution Lay may have made to the limited success
36
of the expedition, he did not have cause to "repine in vain".
When he returned, some weeks later, he obviously considered himself 
sufficiently qualified to set an independent course. The decision 
may have been influenced by the fact that Gutzlaff's second wife 
died during Lay's absence. Conditions were appropriate for a 
complete break.
In any event, Lay appears to have taken a qualifying examination
37for entry into the Superintendency in May 1849* On the 30th May
1849» Mr. A.R. Johnston, Sir J.F, Davis' Secretary, wrote the following
letter to Gutzlaffr
I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter 
respecting Mr. Horatio Nelson Lay, son of the late Mr. Consul 
Lay, and to inform you that His Excellency. •• .in consideration 
of the progress already made by that young gentleman in the 
study of the Chinese language, will recommend to the Right
36* The mission did not proceed beyond Nagasaki and the 
objectives other than recovery of the seamen became the basic 
objectives of Perry's mission of 1853-54* Dennett, op.cit. 
p.251 ff.
37* FL ms. There is a document in this collection which 
is a translation of an undated edict entitled "A fresh warning 
against opium". The document bears the legentl "Translated May 
1849 [signed] Horatio N. Lay." Unless it had the significance 
suggested above, tjiere would seem little point in his having 
preserved this particular sample of his work.
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Honorable [sic] Viscount Palmerston, that he should be placed 
on the establishment of Supernumerary Interpreter, on the 1st 
of June next, on an allowance of £150 a year.38
Lay was not officially notified of the confirmation of his
appointment until December 17, 1849* The notice contained the
following qualifications:
You are however clearly to understand that unless you con­
duct yourself in your new situation to the satisfaction of the 
Chief Supt, and shew not only that you are diligent in your 
studies, but that your capacity is such as is like [sic] to 
make you at some time a useful Public Servant, you must expect 
that your services will be discontinued, and in that case you 
will not be considered as having any claim to be employed in 
any other Branch of H.M. Service in China*
It will be necessary for you to procure a Certificate at 
the termination of each Quarter from Mr. Wade, shewing that you 
have attended with regularity to your studies in the Chinese 
Language.39
For a young man who had few alternatives, by reason of training 
and inclination, the notice was clear enough* That he developed a 
driving determination to succeed may be considered a normal response 
to the conditions of his tenure*
Having reached the starting point in Lay’s public career, an 
attempt can be made to draw some general conclusions about the for­
mative influences which conditioned his outlook and motivation with
38. PL ms. Victoria, Hongkong. Ho* 58. The copy available is 
the original of the notification.
39* Ibid. Johnston to Lay No* 130 Original ms. Fairbank "NSEQ" 
p.138 dates the appointment from Sept* 5t 1849« He cites "Return of 
Student Interpreters...., 1847-1872 presented to the House of Commons 
by Command, (London 1872)*" This date must be the date of confirmation 
of the appointment in London, retroactive to June 1.
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respect to that career. In the first place, it must be concluded 
that the attraction of "China” could not have been a dominant 
influence. If there had ever been the lure, for the youthful 
mind, of the "mysterious East”, and there might have been such a 
lure from 1839*41» it was shattered by the succession of blows 
commencing with the division of the family in 1641 and culminating 
with the death of his father in China in 1845• in this latter
respect, it should be recalled that young Lay was but nine years old 
when he last saw his father.
Secondly, when he was eventually propelled to China, it was, in 
part, in fulfillment of his father’s wish and, in part, it may be 
suggested, it was in terms of a substitution for the frustrated 
happiness of his mother. As a result of the misfortunes that struck 
the family, the responsibilities (very clearly crystallized in his 
Guardian’s memorandum of 1849) thrust upon Lay were to prove - and to 
surpass - the "fame" of his father and to establish the "fortune” of 
his family.
Thirdly, these conditioning influences affected a lad, who from 
the age of fourteen, was given little leeway to determine the direction 
of his own future. His formal, general education was over too early 
for it to have a vocational value for him. The environment into which 
he was transplanted in 1847 offered very little range for his develop­
ment. Virtually the only avenue to "fame" open to him was the public 
service. "Fortune”, under the best of circumstances in the vocational
sphere - in terms of his religious training, both in England
and Hongkong - could be acquired only slowly and painfully.
Finally, the extent of the impatience, the self-reliance 
40and the isolation^ that were being engendered in H.N. Lay can 
be measured by reference to his first public enterprise. After 
eighteen months of Chinese language study, at sixteen and a half 
years of age, he, a British subject, had the temerity to seek, 
and the fortitude to accept, a position as interpreter in the 
employ of the United States authorities, who were proposing to use 
his services in negotiation with the authorities of Japan.
It was with this background that H.N. Lay was taken into the 
China Establishment of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government inmLd-
1849.
40. There is nothing in the family records to indicate what 
happened to G.T. Lay [il], who disembarked with his brother in 
Hongkong in 1847* My surmise, based on a reference in a letter 
from G.T. Lay to H.N. Lay (JLL ms. July 10, 1845* "As George has
not a turn for Latin I do not care to have him troubled with it.
A good hand and a readiness in accounts would be of more importance 
to him.”) and on a reference by H.N. Lay of 1862 is that he was
taken into one of the smaller British firms as an apprentice clerk.
Chapter IV
In Her Majesty's Service - First Phase* 1849-1854*
It was exactly six years from the date of H.N. Lay's initial 
appointment as Supernumerary Interpreter to the date - June 1,
1855 - that Lay took up his appointment as British representative 
in the foreign inspectorate of the Shanghai customs system. For 
the purpose of evaluating various aspects of the developments in 
his career, this six-year period may he conveniently divided into 
two parts. The first part extend® to the Spring of 1854* &t which 
time he was given a temporary assignment as Interpreter in the 
Shanghai Consulate. The second part covers the whole period of 
his activities in the Shanghai Consulate where, in addition to being 
the Acting Interpreter, he was also posted, from July 1854* to the 
Acting Vice Consuls^,
Insofar as Lay was concerned, the first period, with which this 
Chapter will deal, was primarily one of his continuing apprenticeship 
in the China Service. In the second part, to be dealt with in the 
following chapter, Lay was provided with a succession of opportunities 
which, when exploited, enabled him to fill an increasingly significant 
role in the relations between Britain and China.
Chronologically, between June 1, 1849 and April 25, 1854* kay had 
four distinct assignments. He was carried, in the Office of the
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Chinese Secretary in the Superintendency, as Supernumerary 
Interpreter until 1852.^ However, on his own request, from 
March 3> 1851, he acted as Interpreter for the Hongkong Police
2
and Supreme Courts, which were arms of the colonial administration. 
When John Bowring, Canton Consul, served as locum tenens. in the 
capacity of Superintendent of Trade for Sir George Bonham, Lay 
was sent to fill the vacancy. He was assigned as temporary Junior
3
assistant on the Consular Staff and remained at Canton only a short
A
time when he was recalled to Hongkong on July 1, 1852, and sub­
sequently promoted to Second Assistant in the Superintendency,
After Bowring had taken his home leave and had returned to Hong­
kong in April 1854 aa successor to Bonham, he contemplated the appoint­
ment of Lay (at the age of 21) as Assistant Chinese Secretary in the
1, FO 17/187, No. 1 Bonham to Palmerston, Jan, 1, 1852.
Inclosure of Establishment List,
2, FL ms. Draft Lay to Johnston. 3rd March 1851- Original
Johnston to Lay, No. 20. Same date.
3, FL ms. Original, No. 4* Johnston (at the direction of "His
Excellency Major General Jervois") to Lay, 13 April 1852. FO 228/142
No# 6 Bonham to Bowring, 12 April 1852. In this correspondence Lay 
is described simply as an "assistant." In FO 228/154» Enclosure in 
No# 66 to P. Hughes, Assessor of Income Tax, 1 September 1853» in the 
"Copy of deductions for Income Tax, 1853* Vol. VI” Lay is listed as 
Junior Assistant at Canton from April 15 to June 30» 1852. There 
were two other assistants at Canton at this time.
4# ?:FO>17/l91« No# 64* Bowring to Malmesbury. July 1, 1852. 
Vide flfcifoa n#35
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5
Superintendency* However, a combination of home leaves and
sickness caused a shortage of qualified inteipreters in China which
£
became acute in the early months of 1854* response to
desperate appeals from the Shanghai Consul, R.B. Alcock, Lay was
7
sent to Shanghai*
As late as December 1854> the Foreigfi Office- assumed that Lay
0
was the Assistant Chinese Secretary in the Superintendency. In 
actual fact conditions at Shanghai induced Bowring to keep Lay at 
Shanghai and, consequently, he never did take up this position* The 
Effect of the developments at Shanghai on Lay’s subsequent career 
were to be profound. This, however, is a subject that will be 
considered in another context*
In the immediate context, having outlined the succession of the 
four posts actually filled by Lay in the first period, attention may 
be directed to the apprenticeship itself and to the broader framework 
within which Lay's development was taking place. Lay continued his 
language training, in the first post, under the direction of Thomas F*
n
Wade and under the surveillance of Gutzlaff until the latter1 s death
5* FO 17/215* Ho. 11, Bowring to Clarendon, April 20, 1854*
6* Loc. cit* Also No* 18, Bowring to Clarendon, April 29, 1854*
7. FO 17/213, No. 11. On.cit.
8. FO 17/211, No. I84, Clarendon to Bowring, December 8, 1834,
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in the Spring of 1851. Wade needs little attention by way of 
introduction to Sinologists. When Lay joined the Superintendency, 
Wade, then 51 years old, had been studying the language for about
9
ten years, and he was Acting Chinese Secretary. As required by 
Lay's letter of appointment, Wade regularly certified the
it
satisfactory progress being made by his charge. Gutzlaff, shortly
before his death, had also examined Lay and had certified as to his
competence, signifying perhaps that Lay was sufficiently prepared to
take up an interpretership.^
Apart from the time spent on his language study, Lay also
assisted with the routine clerical work in the Superintendency. In
addition, he was being called upon for service within the colonial
branch of the Establishment
The pressure of these other clerical duties may have been one
of the reasons why he took the initiative in seeking a transfer to
12the Police and Supreme Courts. As interpreter for the Court, his
9. PO 228/105* "Separate" Bonham to Palmerston, Feb. 15, 1850.
10. PL. ms. Draft. Lay to Elmslie. Canton, May 10, 1852. Copy 
was forwarded to Bowring by Elmslie along with other reports of the 
Canton staff. PO 228/142, Canton No. 71* May 29* 1852. PO 13/192* 
No. 98* Bowring to Malmesbury encloses a precis of the letter.
11. PO 228/105. "Separate" op.cit. Bonham, incidentally, also 
notes that Lay "has made a very sufficient progress in the language.
12. PL. ms. Victoria. Draft. Lay to Johnston, March 5* 1851*
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duties would be largely devoted to language work. The 
opportunities to do oral interpreting would also he much more 
frequent than in the activities in which he was engaged on hehalf 
of the Superintendency.
Other reasons which may have motivated his request would have 
derived from economic and personal considerations. The shortage of 
interpreters, that was to become acute in 1854* had not manifested 
itself in 1851. In the first place, the anticipated expansion of 
commercial and, by extension, diplomatic intercourse had not 
materialised at three of the five Treaty ports (Amoy, Foochow and 
Ningpo). At Canton, the exclusion of the foreigners from the city 
and the refusal of the Ch'ing Authorities (whether in their roles as 
imperial or provincial officials) to engage in communications with 
their foreign counterparts limited the humber of Consular interpreters 
required.
In the second place, partly as a consequence of the unsettled
and fluid condition of political alignments in Great Britain, partly
because the terms of the Treaty System of 1842-1844 did not provide
13for revision before 1854* &&d partly, as a reflection of the
personality of Bonham, the Superintendent of Trade, the period v v.
15* Earl Swisher 'China's Management of the American Barbariansn 
(New Haven, Conn., 1951) Ch.5, passim. The Crimean War and the 
Chinese view that consideration was not due until 1856, induced the 
Treaty Powers to postpone their efforts at revision until the later 
date.
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was one of quiescence in official intercourse. In these conditions 
the need for interpreters was at a minimum.
In the third place, there was in this period an adequate 
number of relatively qualified interpreters on hand who could relieve 
each other when leave or sickness caused a vacancy* Besides Parkes 
and Wade, the Meadows brothers (T.T. and J.A.T.), Wfijfedhurst, Jr*, 
and C.A, Sinclair were available. Since the Consul and/or the Vice 
Consul was expected to have or to be acquiring some proficiency in 
the language,^ on paper at least, the Superintendency was well 
supplied with interpreters. The prospects for promotion for a super** 
numerary interpreter were thus none too bright.
In the fourth place, the outlook for the future may have been
15temporarily dimmed for Lay by the personnel policy favoured by Honham.
As competence in language was considered an important qualification for 
service in the Consular offices in the Treaty Ports, men who acquired
14* The issue of language study as a qualification for advancement 
in the Service started to come to the fore as early as 1850. It was 
R.B. Alcock, Consul at Shanghai, who had no language qualification 
himself, who revived the question. FO 17/168. No. 60, Bonham to 
Palmerston, June 4t 1850.
15* FO 17/168. In addition to the foregoing despatch (No. 60) a 
succession of despatches (Nos. 65* 67, 72 and 75) sent by Bonham to 
Palmerston during July/August, 1850, is the source for the background 
information.
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this competence naturally expected to succeed to the higher 
appointments in the Consulates. It was not entirely a question 
of remuneration, for in terms of prestige "Interpreters”, as such, 
were looked down upon as rather junior members of the Establishment.
Bonham, on his part, while recognising that the Interpreters 
had a reasonable claim to advancement, was a career official. He 
felt it his responsibility to support the claims to advancement of 
the staff members who were unable or who were not obliged to acquire 
language proficiency. These men who endured the hardships of the 
China Service while rendering faithful service were, in his view, 
entitled to recognition.
The issues began to crystallise and come to a climax between 
1850-52, and eventually dame to be identified as the "Battle of the 
Interpreters”. In the early stages, Bonham attempted to find a 
middle ground by conceding privileges to the Interpreters comparable 
to those enjoyed by Vice Consuls and by supporting the claim that only 
those with language competence should receive preference in appoint­
ments to Consulships. At the same time, he indicated his intention 
to prefer non-interpreters for the post of Vice Consul but on the 
condition that they undertook to make progress in the study of the 
language.
John Bowring, who prided himself on his own linguistic abilities, 
gained increasing influence in the affairs of the Superintendency and
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16used this influence to support the Interpreters. After 1851» 
the balance shifted in their favour. On a direct appeal by
17Parkes to London, Parkes* claim to a Vice Consulship was upheld.
Prom the foregoing factors, it may be concluded that in 1851 
the path to an Interpretorship was not clearly illuminated. As 
long as Lay was a Supernumerary, his salary was £150 per annum.
18This salary was admittedly not sufficient to maintain a "gentleman”.
When it is realised that Lay, in all probability, expended some of
his salary for private tuition, his impatience to gain advantage
from his language study can be more readily appreciated.
After assuring himself that his request would be favourably
19received, Lay wrote to his Head, A.R. Johnston, x for permission to 
be "temporarily employed in the Police & Supreme Courts so far as my 
knowledge of Chinese may be available." He also made it very clear
that ”.... I have no wish to quit the Service...., and I trust that my
16. F0 17/192. No. 98* Bowring to Malmesbury, Aug. 12, 1852.
17. Lane-Poole, on.cit. pp. 183-185#
18. FO 17/190 [June, 1952]. Undated memorandum, Bonham (in
England on leave) to Malmesbury. Recommends increase to £200.
The increase appears to have gone into effect in 1852, but in a
Bowring memorandum on interpreters of Feb. 8, 1854 (FO 17/212), 
he still seems to be advocating an increase to £200.
19# FL ms. Draft. March 3» 1851#
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temporary employment will not prevent me from succeeding in my
proper turn to any Interpretorship which may fall vacant#• • .."
Approval was promptly granted and Lay remained in this employment 
slightly over a year*
The advantages Lay derived from this employment were two­
fold* He was ahle to devote most of his energy to duties that 
made use of his language training and it provided him with the 
means to augment his tuition in the language* Just after the 
termination of this employment, he reported that from July 1851 on, 
he had been responsible for ’’all the correspondence that passed 
between the Magistracy and the Chinese Authorities at Kowloong. • • •
[and] in addition [he had] translated all the Public Notices issued
20from the Magistracy."
In the same report, he also noted,
I have always studied with a Mandarin Teacher, of whose 
assistance I still [May 1852] continue to avail myself, afcd 
on my appointment to the Magistracy I engaged an additional 
one to instruct me in the Canton dialect - in which I had 
occasionally to interpret.21
Since the salary of a Supernumerary was conceded to be in­
adequate and since the engagement of one tutor could hardly have cost Lay
20. Vide antea, n.9
21. Loc.cit.
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22less than one-fifth of his annual salary, his ability to engage 
an additional tutor would lead to the conclusion that whether 
directly or indirectly his resources must have been increased in 
this post*
By pursuing this course, Lay placed himself in an advantageous 
position* He was able to make use of the training he had already 
acquired and he was able to channel his apprenticeship in the 
direction of further language training. The lack or limitation 
of opportunity for junior members of the Superintendency and of 
most members of the Consular staffs in the Treaty Ports to pursue a 
sustained course of language study was a disadvantage to them. The 
man with language training had, of necessity, to be assigned to more 
responsible duties and this in turn became a qualification for more 
rapid advancement in the Service.
If, as Lay’s letter requesting the transfer implied, he was 
expecting an early appointment to an Interpreter’s post or to a post
22. It is not clear to what extent staff members were expected to 
finance their own tuition. The implication in the quoted paragraph 
is that Lay paid his own tutors. In the summary of language study 
of members of the Superintendency contained in FO 17/192, No. 98»
Aug. 12, 1852, J.A.T. Meadows complained that he had expended a 
large sum without recompense. He did not enter the Service, however, 
as a Supernumerary. (Fairbank, "Trade", p.166, n.25 summarizes 
Meadows* report). F.E.B. Harvey, on the other hand, then 1st Ass’t. 
at Hongkong, acknowledges that he had been "rewarded" and "re­
imbursed" to his satisfaction for the expenses he had incurred.
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in the higher echelons of a Consulate, he did not reckon with 
the surfeit of Interpreters, nor with Sir George Bonham's sense 
of propriety. He had still to serve his full apprenticeship in 
the administrative structure of the Service.
Preparatory to his taking home leave, Bonham had arranged
23the appointments that were to be in effect during his absence.
As far as Lay was concerned, this led to his temporary appointment 
"to perform the functions of an assistant” at Canton to fill the 
vacancy created when Bowring, who was Consul at the Port, took up 
his duties as Acting Superintendent of Trade.
In one important respect Lay's new assignment was a "promotion”. 
His salary was raised, during his brief tenure of the post, to that 
of a Third Assistant - £270. At the same time, the assignment had 
its galling features. For a number of reasons, Canton was probably 
generally considered among the least desirable of the Consulates.
23* Fairbank,"Trade”, Vol.II, App.A. p.47 ff*> provides a table 
of the officials posted to the Treaty Ports from 1843-1858* There 
are several inaccuracies in the table since some data is derived 
from the London Foreign Office records which did not always keep 
up with, or reflect the changes made in the field. Thus, for 
example, Fairbank lists H. Oakley as Junior Ass't. at Canton from 
"1845 - Jaa* 19» 1857” whereas in 1852 he was 2nd Ass't. Also,F. 
Parish is listed as 2nd Ass't. in 1852, but during Bowring's absence 
he was Acting Vice Consul.
24. FL ms. Victoria, No. 4> Johnston to Lay, April 13f 1852.
FO 17/188, Victoria No. 3» Jervois to FO, April 14, 1852. Imple­
mentation of recommendation made by Granville to Bonham, No. 4»
Jan. 19, 1852.
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The cost of living was extremely high* The following remarks,
25from a letter of H.S. Parkes, sum up the prevailing situation,
Firstly, I have not been removed to this Port 'on 
permanent promotion', being employed here in precisely 
the same capacity as that in which I served at Amoy, 
and other Ports* The addition of £100 to my salary 
cannot I submit be considered as promotion in reference 
to my transfer to a Port, where my annual expenses are 
increased in a ratio of at least double that Amount; 
and where the inconvenience and discomfort of residence 
are so great that I should think nothing but the hope 
of rendering useful service to her Majesty's Government, 
and thereby obtaining a claim to promotion, would ever 
induce to the desire of being attached to this Consulate*
In addition, Sino-foreign relations at Canton were the least
satisfactory in comparison with the other Treaty ports. The city
was still closed to foreigners whose physical movements were
restricted to a very limited area* They were frequently subjected
to molestation and indignities*
More specifically for Lay, the opportunities for translation
work - whether oral or written - were not only limited because of the
refusal of the Ch'ing Authorities to communicate directly with
foreigners, but also because Parkes was the Interpreter of Canton.
This factor did not entirely preclude Lay from translation work, for
he did report on information about rebellious activities in the
vicinity of Canton, which was culled from the “Peking Gazette" and
25* FO 228/142, Canton No. 81. Elmslie to Bowring. June 12, 
1852. Transmits letter from Parkes, who requests an increment 
to his salary*
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local notices* Another unsatisfactory feature, to which Lay
26indirectly gave expression, was related to language training.
The language of diplomacy, on which Lay had concentrated, was
Mandarin and the Cantonese environment was not conducive to
the study of the Court "dialect.”
It did not take long for the unsatisfactory conditions at
Canton to impress themselves upon Lay. His dissatisfaction was
reflected by the fact that as soon as he learned (barely two months'
27
later) that a vacancy might occur at Shanghai, 1 he asked to be
appointed as the replacement. The extent of his desire to make
the move can be easily gauged, for he was willing to accept a
28posting to Shanghai as a Junior Assistant.
He did not officially record his dissatisfaction with Canton.
He made hie appeal on the ground that placement at a "Northern Port" 
would afford a better opportunity for developing his knowledge of 
the language. His application was not taken up because the vacancy
26. FL ms. Draft, Canton, Lay to Elmslie, June 9* 1852.
FO 228/142, Canton No. 78. Elmslie to Bowring, June 9* 1852 
encloses a copy of Lay's letter with recommendation for approval.
27. FO 17/190* No. 41* Bowring to Malmesbury, June 7* 1852. 
Reports that W.H. Fittock at Shanghai was offered post of 2nd 
Ass't. at Canton.
28. Vide antea. n.26
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29did not materialise at Shanghai.
His plea was not fruitless, however, for it led to his recall
30to Hongkong a few weeks later.^ G.S. Morrison had been trans­
ferred from Canton to Hongkong, but seemed to prefer the former 
location. Lay may also have been recalled to Hongkong as a result 
of the replies Bowring received to a canvass he initiated of the 
state of language proficiency of all Superintendency personnel.
From these replies, allowing for a certain lack of modesty on Lay's
part, it was apparent that Lay was among the four or five who were 
31most proficient.
Since two Supernumerary Interpreters were being processed for
29• FO 17/191* No. 64* Bowring to Malmesbury, July 1, 1852. 
Reporting that Fittock had declined the offer to transfer to Canton. 
Since Fittock was only acting second ass't. at Shanghai, the added 
inducement of a permanent promotion was not enough to attract him 
to Canton.
50. Loc.cit.
31. FO 17/192. No. 98* Bowring to Malmesbury, Aug. 12, 1852.
This despatch is Bowring*s long discussion on the subject, enclosing 
the lengthy summary of the reports received. Based on reports from 
all stations of the Superintendency (excluding the permanent Inter­
preters and the Consuls, who were apparently not expected to reply) 
of 17 replies, only two - Lay and J.A.T. Meadows - gave positive 
evidence of achievement and continued application. A few replies 
were equivocal, e.g. "good enough to get on locally”, "capable of 
doing common routine of office business.”
8 8
32appointment, and since T.F. Wade was promoted to Vice-Consul
at Shanghai, Lay could be a valuable member of the Hongkong staff.
In any case, Morrison and Lay exchanged locations in July 1852, and
Lay remained in Hongkong until April 1854*
From his recall, Lay carried on the duties of the Second
Assistant in Hongkong and although he may also have assisted with
the duties of the Chinese Secretary’s office, he was, at first, only
33
listed as a Third Assistant."  There were, nonetheless, several 
compensations to offset this.
Following the "depression" in the wake of the unwarranted 
initial optimism, the economic and social life of the new colony was 
beginning to develop and expand. Under Bonham, improvement in 
administrative organisation went hand in hand with improvement in 
the relations between the groups residing in the colony. The colony 
was a more attractive place to live in, in 1852, than it had been in 
1847.54
Having devoted himself to an intensive study of Chinese for five 
years, Lay was in a position to divert most of his energies to other
52. FO 17/194* No* 172, Bowring to Malmesbury. Dec. 18, 1852j
acknowledging FO Ho. 70» Oct. 21, 1852. Also noted by Malmesbury 
on despatch No. 98 cited above on Oct. 19» "I have just appointed 
two lads of 17 & 15 years of age as supernumerary interpreters".
35* FO 17/192, No. 121 Bowring to Malmesbury. Sept. 11, 1852.
34* Eitel, op.cit. CH. XVI, passim.
aspects of public affairs. The Superintendency at Hongkong was 
the focus for virtually all the China correspondence. Lay had 
the opportunity, if he were inclined to take advantage of it, to 
familiarise himself with all the issues affecting intercourse 
between Great Britain and China. Quite apart from the merits of 
the views expressed in them, access to the despatches and memoranda 
of Bonham, Bowring, Alcock and Wade would provide a fairly compre­
hensive tuition in the principles and practices of diplomatic 
service.
Finally, through close association, Lay was able to gain 
Bowring* s favour. As was indicated earlier in this Chapter, in the 
"Battle of the Interpreters", Bowring*s sympathies were with the 
linguists. Since he was impressed with the progress Lay had made 
in the language, he did not hesitate to bring his name forward for 
commendation whenever there was an appropriate occasion for doing so. 
Bowring also, apparently without confirmation from London, actually 
"promoted" Lay to Second Assistant, thereby increasing his salary to
35* Bowring had no sooner taken up the duties of Acting Superin­
tendent than he brought Lay*s name forward. FO 17/188 No. 1 
Bowring to Granville, April 19, 1852. "Mr. Lay who is appointed 
to the vacancy has left for Canton, and I am glad that in his case 
encouragement has been given to his meritorious study of the 
Chinese language...*."
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36£324* As soon as Bowring took over the duties of the Superin­
tendency in April 1854> after his return from home leave, he posted 
Lay to the more responsible (and more lucrative) position of Acting
Interpreter at Shanghai, and pressed London for a permanent
37promotion for him*
The compensations for Lay, in the long run, offset the failure 
of his first efforts to get transferred to Shanghai. He continued 
to fulfill responsibilities beyond those required by his official 
position, and officially, at least, did not complain* He did not, 
throughout the remainder of the period being considered, make any 
further formal requests to be transferred to any other post in the 
Establishment •
There was another, private, reason which may have induced Lay 
to be content with his position at Hongkong throughout this period*
36. Lay's exact position through much of this period seemed to 
be in question. In FO 17/192, No. 121, Bowring, op.cit.* the 
attention of the FO is drawn to the fact that Lay was receiving 
3rd Ass't*s. pay, though working as a 2nd Ass't. No formal notice 
of a change in status is recorded in Foreign Office despatches of 
the period. FO 17/212 No. 1, Bonham to Clarendon, Jan.l, 1854*
In the Establishment List enclosed in this despatch, however, Lay 
is listed as 2nd Ass't. at £324. Bonham must have had some 
question about this for in his No. 20 of Feb. 7» 1854 (before a 
reply from London to his No. 1 could have been received) he states 
he was only aware that Lay's appointment to Canton authorized Lay 
to receive salary at £270.
37* FO 17/213* No. 11, to Malmesbury, April 20, 1854
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Reference has already been made to the fact that two Supernumerary
70
Interpreters were added to the Establishment in 1852# Treaty
revision was in the offing. Since one of the objectives of the
Powers was to seek the opening of additional ports to foreign
trade, additional interpreters would be required.
These prospects and Lay’s increased remuneration were undoubtedly
connected with the fact that Lay’s next younger brother, William Hyde,
(the third of G. Tradescant Lay’s five sons) made his appearance in
Hongkong. The exact date of his arrival has not been established,
but on the next occasion that Supernumerary Interpreters were being
considered for appointment, in late 1855* W.H. Lay was offered a
provisional appointment by Sir G. Bonham. This was approved by the
39Foreign Office, in part because of the accomplishments of H.N. Lay.
H.N. Lay’s behaviour on this occasion, though the incident was 
of minor significance, gives some insight into the development of one 
important aspect of his character. At the same time that Bonham 
forwarded his recommendation, Lay forwarded a private letter directly 
to Lord Palmerston, who was Prime Minister - but not, at the time,
38. Vide antea n. 32.
39• 17/220, Unsigned office memo (appendix, probably by E. Hammond)
Feb. 1, 1854 notes that Bonham, "in a late dispatch [sic]” made a 
provisional appointment at £150. The writer "presumed” Clarendon 
would confirm it at £200. W.H. Lay was on the Establishment List 
for Jan. 1, 1854 as Supernumerary Interpreter (Prov.).
Forei^# Secretary - soliciting his support.^
It was not, however, the direct appeal which was distinctive, 
although an appeal of this sort coining from a 21-year-old junior 
staff member might in some circumstances seem somewhat presumptuous* 
What was distinctive was the terms in which the appeal was made*
Citing first the application being forwarded by Bonham to Clarendon, 
who was Foreign Secretary, Lay continued,
It is grounded upon a recommendation which, when Secy 
of State for Foreign Affairs, your Lordship in a despatch 
dated 18th November I846 was so kind as to make to Sir John 
Davis of ”two sons of the late Mr* Consul Lay” - I am in­
debted to your Lordship for my introduction into H.M.*s 
Service, and I venture to presume upon your Lordship!s former 
goodness to solicit that you will assist the present 
application with the weight of your powerful influence*
Your Lordship is well aware of the narrow pecuniary 
circumstances in which my Mother has been placed since my 
Father* s death - and your kind influence in the case of My 
brother will relieve her of one of a numerous family, which 
she has with my assistance to support.41
The documentation demonstrating that Lord Palmerston’s letter of
recommendation referred to herein applied to the two eldest sons of
G.T. Lay (H*N. and G.T.[ll]) has already been cited.^ It has also
been established that the two eldest sons did, in fact, proceed to
43Hongkong in 1847* It would be hard to credit H.N. Lay with ignorance
40. FO 17/209, Hongkong, Lay to Palmerston, December 19, 1853* 
41• Loc.cit*
42* Vide antea* Ch.II n,. 15? Ch.III p.S7 n.15? P*!f7 n.16 
43* Vide antea. Ch. Ill p.^/ n.28
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of the terms of the original recommendation.
In his letter to Palmerston, Lay must be considered to have 
sought deliberately to mislead Palmerston. Lay!s obvious intention 
was to have the original recommendation given in support of G.T.
Lay*s second son applied to his third son, without calling the 
substitution to Palmerston*s attention. The specific phraseology 
of Lay*s letter was such that it did not, technically, misinform 
Palmerston, but this is not the issue. In the context, it gives 
evidence of Lay*s willingness to adopt a suspect technique to further 
a personal objective.
It is possible, of course, that had Palmerston seen Lay*s letter, 
and recalled the actual circumstances of his recommendation, he might 
have been approving of Lay*s progress in the arts of diplomatic usage. 
Lay*s letter, however, was diverted^ and by the time it reached the 
Foreign Office, W.H. Lay*s appointment had. been confirmed. Although 
it thus had no bearing on the immediate issue, it would be interesting 
to speculate what reaction Lay* s letter might have Simulated among 
the permanent staff at the Foreign Office. This demonstration of a
44* The letter was forwarded to the Foreign Office on January 31* 
1854* with the following note added* "My dear Spencer [?]/ You 
know that Lord Palmerston does not interfere in F.O. patronage, and 
I have no doubt Lord Clarendon will appoint the best man, whoever 
he may be. - Pray therefore commit Mr. Lay*s letter to the basket 
or the pigeon-hole - as you may think fit./ yrs. truly (Sgnd) R.W. 
[Grey?]."
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willingness to circumvent "proper channels" might have elevated 
a few eyebrows in that Office*
Aside from the references to his family affairs contained in 
his personal letter to Palmerston, there is no information avail­
able about Lay's private life. It may be presumed that he 
corresponded with his mother and that, if so, the letters have 
perished* It is doubtful, however, that the record, if available, 
would provide much information of interest. Lay was under the 
burden of keeping his standard of living to the level of providing 
himself with the barest essentials. Until late 1852, at least, his 
income permitted him no leeway to do any more than this. Though he 
might have afforded a higher standard subsequent to the increases he 
received upon his promotion, he could not help but be conscious of 
the needs of his mother.
It is a moot point whether it was the quest for "fame" or the 
needs of "fortune" which motivated him most. Both unquestionably 
were responsible for the intensity with which he pursued his official 
duties and private training. On the evidence of his activities in 
public life and his achievements in acquiring a comprehensive know­
ledge of Chinese, it is difficult to see how he could have had much 
time or energy to indulge in personal fancies or frivolities. The 
consequences for the personal development of the individual were not 
always salutary.
On the one hand, Lane-Poole records the deficiencies in personal
development which Parkes, who was forced to pursue a very similar
45programme, felt in later life. On the other hand, one of the 
factors that prompted Bonham to recommend non-interpreters for 
"the more responsible posts of Vice-Consul or Consul”, was his 
opinion "that the close attention indispensable for a successful 
study of the Chinese language warps the mind and imbues it with a 
defective perception of the common things of real life.
At the conclusion of his years of "apprenticeship", as he was 
approaching his twenty-second birthday, Lay had established his 
credentials as a relatively highly qualified linguist and as a 
diligent and energetic junior administrator. Whether it be described 
as astuteness or craftiness, he was developing techniques useful to 
the art of a negotiator whose central purpose was to secure the 
immediate objective. The nature of his resources, his training, and 
his environment conditioned the development of his personality and 
character along very specialized lines, intensifying his self-reliance 
and social isolation and precluding him from understanding the outlook 
and values of men whose interest, and corresponding conditioning, were 
different from his own.
The limited intercourse between the British and Ch'ing Authorities, 
coupled with the fact that he was still a junior member of the China
45* Lane-Poole, op.cit. pp. 18-19. 
46. Eitel, op.cit. p. 258.
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Service, excluded him from playing any direct role in Britain’s 
relations with China. Indirectly, and however unintentional, 
he (and Parkes) were the prototypes of the earlier "programme" to 
fill the needs of a vital Branch of the Service. The deficiencies 
in the "model" served to influence new policies with respect to 
selection of recruits to the Service.
The circumstances and events, subsequent to his appointment as 
Acting Interpreter at Shanghai, which enabled him to play a more 
direct and more prominent role in British relations, may "be viewed 
as the Second Phase of his public career in Her Majesty’s Service.
H.N. Lay was not aware, of course, that 1855 was to see the end of 
his career in the China Establishment.
Chapter V
In H.M. Service - Second Phase* 1854-1355*
The second phase of H.N. Lay’s career in the China Service 
represents a clear transitional period in his career as a whole in 
East Asia. In the first instance, his assignment to Shanghai was 
understood to he only temporary.^ * In the second instance, at its 
commencement it was hardly anticipated that events would unfold in 
such a manner as to lead to Lay’s ”retirement” from the China 
Service within a matter of 15 months, when he was still only 22 
years old. In both instances, his extended residence at Shanghai 
and the severance of his connection with the China Service, the 
developments resulted from the interaction of the extra-ordinary 
conditions that prevailed at Shanghai and from the basic motivation 
that impelled Lay to pursue his private interests.
This phase of Lay's career began with his temporary assignment
to Shanghai as Acting Interpreter at £500, the rate at which it was
proposed to pay him as Assistant Chinese Secretary. The notification
to this effect was sent to the Foreign Office under date of April 20,
2
1854» though Lay was not officially informed until April 25* It 
ends with Lay’s succession to T.F. Wade as British Inspector of
1.F0 17/215* Ho. 11 Bowring to Clarendon. April 20, 1854*
2. FL. Hongkong No. 15* Medhurst to Lay. April 25, 1354*
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Shanghai Customs with a salary of approximately €1400 ( $6000).
Before considering the specific course of events which led to this
transformation in Lay’s career, a brief general survey of the
4
situation at Shanghai may serve as a useful introduction.
Shanghai, among the four additional Treaty Ports opened by the 
Treaty of Nanking, had developed, from the standpoint of foreign 
intercourse, the most favourably. Located at the apex of an ex­
tensive water-transport network in its hinterland and being accessible 
to, though protected from, the open sea, it was a "natural* entrepot
3. FO 97/99 (The bulk of the correspondence concerning the 
"Shanghai Duty Questions" and the Foreign Inspectorate were kept 
in a separate file at the FO. The correspondence for 1853/54 
was classified as 97/99 & 97/lOO. For 1854-1858> the correspon­
dence was classified as 17/309 & 17/310.) No. 77* Bowring to 
Clarendon. July 7* 1854* This despatch contains all the docu­
ments on the introduction of the Inspectorate. The agreement 
specified 6000". The estimated real value in terms of £ 
Sterling varied from between £1400 to £2000. The individual 
claims, with the context, will be cited in later notes.
4. On conditions and events at Shanghai, the fullest data is 
provided by Fairbank, "Trade". The beat analysis describing the 
reasons for Shanghai’s importance ia Rhoads Murphey’s "Shanghai* 
Key to Modem China". (Cambridge, Mass. 1953)* For detailed 
information on subjects covered in this and the following chapter, 
Fairbank "NSEQ" and Fairbank’s series of four articles (details 
in bibliography) published in the "Chinese Social and Political 
Science Review", Vols. mil-XXI (Jan. 1935 - April 1936). All 
five articles must be used with caution since there are numerous 
typographical errors in dates, etc., and in some instances the 
facts are confused. Morse, "Conflict" and Wright, "Hart" 
supply useful supplementary data.
99
5
for exports and imports.
The native population, with a high density in Shanghai and its
environs,^ was primarily occupied in light hand industry, agriculture
and fishing. Prior to its development as a focus for international
intercourse, it was devoid of any major significance as a cultural,
7
administrative or military centre. These factors combined to 
condition the population to a relatively passive acceptance of foreign 
intrusion and foreign intercourse.
To the extent, also, that the official centre of diplomatic inter­
course in the years prior to 1852 was nominally at Canton, it was 
possible to develop a positive pattern of contact with the Ch'ing 
Authorities responsible for Shanghai. The conflicts of interest were 
further minimised by the fortuitous circumstances that it was possible 
for the foreign intruders initially to occupy, for mercantile and 
residential purposes, sites that were ideal from their standpoint, but 
which were outside (literally and figuratively) the zone of native 
interest. Finally, the Ch*ing "official” assigned direct responsibility 
for "management of barbarian affairs" was, after about 1850, not a 
member of the mandarinate, but a member of a prominent Cantonese
5# Murphey, op.cit.. passim. Robert Fortune had recognised the 
potentialities of Shanghai even prior to 1847• cf. Wright "Hart", p.74
6. Murphey, op.cit. p.22.
7. Fairbank, "Trade", p. 357
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mercantile family.
Another factor to he home in mind when considering the
conditions of this period is that the actual physical impact of
the foreign intrusion was comparatively inconsequential. When Lay
9
arrived at Shanghai on May 1, 1854> the number of adult foreigners 
in residence, of all nationalities, was probably under 250.^
Before 1855 and the appearance of insurrectionary forces in the 
immediate vicinity of the city, the absence of any serious "external" 
threat seemed to encourage and intensify factionalism and strife 
within the resident community. Political (nationalistic), economic, 
moral and social cleavages were sharp and bitterly prolonged.
The new community, in embryo, was "international" and "cosmo­
politan", but the cleavages prevented all but the most essential 
programmes for integration and cohesion from being realised.^ Not 
even the capture of the native city by rebel forces in September, 1855
8. Wu Chien-Chang (commonly known as "Samqua"), although active 
at Shanghai from 1848, did not become "acting" Taotai until 1851. 
ECC p. 865*
9. NCH. No. 199. May 5, 1854* P. 168.
10. Fairbank, "Trade", p. 159 lists 214 for 1854; P» 422, after 
adjustments, suggests "less than 250". Morse, "Conflict" p. 546. 
For 1855 - 245.
11. These were only temporarily relaxed during the Fall, 1865* 
when the direct threat to the settlement appeared most acute. For 
some of the basic changes see Morse, "Conflict". Ch. XVIII and 
Fairbank, "NSEQ", p. 144»
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was sufficient to motivate the inhabitants to reconcile the deep 
antagonisms which beset the community, although the immediate 
threat did lead to some measures for collective defence* In ways 
which will be described in subsequent pages, the conflicts among 
the Chinese opened up a new sphere in which the foreigners were to 
extend the conflicts which existed among themselves*
When Lay took up his post at Shanghai, the special problems
that had been created by the spread of rebellion into the lower
12Yangtze plains were becoming delineated* Because of the outbreak 
of the Crimean War ideas of pressing for Treaty revision were shelved, 
although seeking for adjustment of differences - particularly in view 
of the presumed embarrassment of the Ch'ing government - was expected 
to continue*
As for the situation at Shanghai, it was necessary to formulate 
an arrangement which would regulate a complex set of incompatible 
relations* The complexity of the situation was aggravated because 
the rebel force which occupied the native city was a segment of one 
of the traditional Chinese secret societies - the Triad Society*
While the leaders of the faction professed to be associated with the 
Taiping movement, they acted independently* On their part, the 
Taiping Authorities, whose newly established headquarters were at
12. In their initial phase, the disturbances were viewed as part 
of the Taiping movement. The Taipings, however, did not make a 
move on Shanghai until several years later*
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Nanking, denied any connection with or responsibility for the
13insurgents at Shanghai*
The first consideration of the foreign officials was to secure 
life, property and jurisdiction in the foreign settlements. 
Officially a "neutral" policy was pursued. Since, however, the 
foreign settlement was contiguous to a substantial sector of the 
perimeter of the native city, Imperialist forces, unable to mount 
an effective frontal military offensive, were also precluded from 
establishing an effective siege of the rebels.^ The fundamental 
diplomatic dilemma was further complicated by the fact that the 
sympathies of the inhabitants of the settlement, foreigners as well 
as Chinese, were divided. In the event, the net effect was to pro­
long the stalemate between the insurgents and the Imperial forces. 
"Neutrality", in consequence, was the only shibboleth that could be 
invoked to befuddle the government and to preserve a hostile peace 
within the foreign settlement.
Of special, and doubtlessly paramount, concern to the majority 
of the foreign residents was the situation with respect to trading 
operations. Prior to the appearance of the rebels, a modus vivendi
13. The question of the connection continues in dispute. Morse, 
"Conflict", p. 458, and Fairbank, "Trade", p. 420, support the 
statement made here. Wright, "Hart", pp. 91-92 and n.8, p. 118 
(citing Favre) appears to support the contrary view.
14. For map. cf. Morse, "Conflict" p. 454*
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had been achieved among the trading community, the Chfing officials 
and the foreign officials. The resultant "system” permitted a 
reasonable flow of legitimate imports and exports. The arrange­
ments were such as to satisfy the Chfing officials, while the 
irregularities that did exist merely served to afford an academic 
differentiation between the "honest trader" and the "smuggler". The 
irregularities may have retarded, but they had not prevented, the 
growth in the volume of trade at the port.
The activities of the rebels did not, contrary to expectations, 
result in a cessation of the flow of commodities. There was con­
siderable fluctuation in price and exchange levels, but the major 
staples for export - tea and silk - continued to find their way to 
exporters. The sale of legal imports declined, but their distribution 
in to the interior was not seriously curtailed.
The factor that caused trading relations to become increasingly 
chaotic was that the rebel occupation of the native city totally 
disrupted the Customs administration at the port. The British Consul, 
R.B. Alcock, with the U.S. Commissioner, H. Marshall, sought through a 
"Provisional System" to preserve, by fulfilling its legal obligations, 
the treaty structure.
"Provisional" was an apt description. On the British side, it 
lacked Bonham’s positive support. On the American side, though the 
Commissioner was a forceful individual, he lacked both the prestige 
and the means adequately to enforce the system. In justice to official
104
U.S. policy, however, it may be noted here that the only revenue 
the Ch* ing government actually received for the period the system 
was in operation was a third of what had been levied on American 
traders. Since the foreign authorities were unwilling to use 
force to control their own nationals and since the Ch*ing attempts 
to do so were farcical, it was normal procedure to circumvent the 
regulations. The system succumbed in January 1854» in part because 
it was unworkable in any case, and in part because word reached 
Shanghai that the British Government was only willing to support it 
if it were applied to the entire trade of the port. As Fairbank 
cogently concluded, this condition, "so logical in London, was a 
mockery in Shanghai, for vessels of non-treaty powers were outside 
the scope of the treaties, just as they were beyond the weak grasp 
of the taotai, whose hands were tied by the enforcement of foreign 
neutrality.
In the succeeding months, conditions deteriorated in both the 
diplomatic and commercial spheres. Extensive aid (at the market 
price) was being supplied to the rebels by both foreign and Chinese 
elements in the foreign settlement. Off-season external trade was 
continuing and traders openly defied the efforts of the authorities 
to exercise any jurisdiction over it. The prospect of a jungle
15* Fairbank, "Trade" p. 436
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morality with its consequent disorder posed an obvious threat to
the security of the community and to the welfare of the traders.
The need to resolve the basic problems called for renewed exertion
on the part of the responsible officials.
These developments of 1853-54 taxed the resources and
energies of the officials of the British Consulate to the utmost.
T.T. Meadows, the regulai? Interpreter, left China for a home leave
to recover his health. The Consul, R.B. Alcock, was in poor health
16and was periodically confined to his bed. T.F. Wade, the regular 
Vice-Consul, had been required to take on the additional duties of 
the Interpreter, doubly burdensome because Alcock was without com­
petence in the language. The desperate appeal made by Alcock to 
Bowrlng for additional assistance would thus appear to have been 
warranted.
It has already been noted that Bowring selected H.N. Lay, despite
the short-handedness of the Superintendency staff because,
From the progress which Mr. Lay has made not only in 
the Chinese written language and Mandarin dialect, but also in 
the Canton dialect, he deserves a particular recommendation.
The able manner in which he has discharged his duties as first 
[sic] assistant does him also great credit....17
16. Fairbank, "Trade", p. 437*
17* FO 17/213* No. 11 Bowring to Clarendon, April 41 1854
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On the basis of his versatility in use of the language, there 
is no question that Lay was the most qualified candidate available*
Of the other interpreters who were no less competent, W.H. Medhurst 
was Chinese Secretary (scheduled to become Consul at Foochow), Parkes 
was slated to be Consul at Amoy, and Wade was already Vice-Consul at 
Shanghai* On the basis of seniority and relative competence, there 
were three other candidates who might have had a claim to the Shanghai 
post* C.A. Sinclair was Interpreter at Amoy, W*B. Gingell was Inter­
preter at Foochow and M*C. Morrison was Interpreter at Canton.
Bowring temporarily forestalled overt complaints from these last
three by the expedient of appointing Lay at a salary of £500* The
young aspirant, having worked as a first assistant at the second
assistant’s salary of £324, was not in a position to balk at an
approximate 60 per cent, increase* But the senior men who were passed
by could not help but be resentful. They were not only senior by
virtue of much longer service, but they were also considerably older
than Lay* At the same time,as the normal salary for Assistant Chinese
Secretary was £600 and the normal salary for the Interpreter at
18Shanghai was £700-800, Lay was undercutting the salary-levels 
of the Service* The undercurrent of feeling generated against Lay on
18* F0 17/225. No. 130, June 7;* 1855* Enclosing "Estimates 
for 1856". Bata on p. 18. The estimates were prepared at the 
beginning of 1855 (presented to H. of Commons, March 27, 1855) 
were projected from the rates prevailing at the time.
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this occasion was to grow in consequence of further "favouritism”
shown towards him by Bowring in the succeeding months.
But there were other sound reasons for the preference shown
to Lay. In fulfilling the duties, periodically, of First Assistant
he had the excellent opportunity of acquainting himself with all the
correspondence relating to the developments at Shanghai. In addition,
as recently as Februaiy-March, 1854 Lay had been a member of Bonham’s
entourage on the latter’s round of farewell visits to the Treaty Ports.
Thus, although the visit was a brief one, he also had an opportunity to
19acquire first-hand knowledge of conditions at Shanghai.
The years of language training and of administrative work and the 
knowledge acquired of affairs in China made it possible for Lay, in the 
weeks following his arrival at Shanghai, to exploit the succession of
20opportunities which opened up for him. Negotiations were in progress 
and decisions were being made to resolve the basic problems confronting 
the settlement. In his role as Interpreter, Lay was on the "inside" of 
most of the important negotiations and gained personal knowledge of the
19. NCH. No. 189* March 11, 1854* "Extra” reports departure 
of Bonham and suite (including H.N. Lay) on March 4»
20. F0 228/176. No. 40* Alcock to Bowring. May 1, 1854} No. 45. 
Same, May 23, 1854* These despatches and enclosures, most of which 
were eventually forwarded by Bowring to London, also document the 
commencement of Lay’s duties. Thus, Encl. No. 5 in the letter 
despatch is a translation by Lay of correspondence from Wu Chien- 
dhang to the three Treaty Consuls, dated May 5, 1854*
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"bases for the most important decisions. In some respects, the 
extent of his participation could not have been foreseen.
Generally, his duties would have been confined to the routine 
business of the Consulate* This would, of course, have included 
service to the Consul in his intercourse with his Ch' ing counter­
parts. To the extent that Alcock was actively engaged in 
negotiations and in decision-making, this gave Lay an exceptional 
opportunity. But an unusual opportunity also developed as a 
consequence of Bowring1s activities.
Bowring, along with Admiral Stirling, the senior British officer
in the Pacific area, had belatedly set out for Shanghai, with the
object of negotiating the issues affecting Shanghai, as well as of
making a probe on the question of Treaty revision. By the time he
reached Shanghai in mid-June, he learned that the American Commissioner,
R.M* McLane, had been unable to get any satisfaction from the highest
21provincial officials in the area. Bowring and McLane then decided 
to send the senior linguists of their respective missions to Tientsin 
in an attempt to open negotiations directly with Peking.
This deprived Bowring of his Chinese Secretary's (Medhurst) 
services. Since the local issues were very pressing - the heavy 
trading season was about to begin - Lay was employed as Interpreter 
in a series of "high-level” discussions that took place from mid-June
21. Swisher, op.cit. p. 205
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22to mid-July, when Medhurst returned.
These activities at Shanghai were the first occasion on which 
Lay came into direct contact with the higher Ch’ing Authorities.
A minor altercation that occurred about June 20-21 between the 
rebel and Imperial forces, in which some British units became in­
volved, also afforded an occasion for Lay to deal directly with 
Chi-er-hang-a, a Manchu official who was at the time the acting 
provincial treasurer of Kiangsu and who was shortly after promoted
o A
to the Governorship.
An official Ch'ing account of the altercation refers to Lay’s
25part in the denouement. J The Imperialists had claimed that the 
British had opened fire against their forces. According to the 
British account, the Imperial forces, whilst pursuing rebel forces,
22. The extent of Lay’s participation in these negotiations is 
reflected in Bowring’s despatches to the F0. These are all con- 
tained in PO 97/100 Nos. 55, 68, 69, 77, 81, 82, 98. June 12, - 
July 24, 1854 and in PO 17/213 Nos 72 and 74-
23. Swisher, op.cit. pp. 212-213* Memorial of Hsu Nai-dhao 
received at Peking, July 7> 1854* Quoted from IWSM. HF8j 9* 5-10>4 
In this, as in numerous other cases, Swisher translates only a 
portion of the memorial. I have consulted every entry in which Lay 
is mentioned in the IWSM. Where the item is given in Swisher, the 
entry will be designated, henceforth, as IWSM(S). Where my rendering 
is at variance, this will be noted.
24* ECC. p. 116.
25. IWSM. Balance of memorial cited in note 23 above, not in­
cluded in Swisher. HF8, 10, 4-12, 5* The two following paragraphs 
are a loose paraphrase of the text.
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crossed into the foreign settlement and their fire provoked a 
return of fire by the British. This was the version, naturally, 
that Stirling intended to send the Admiralty. For some un­
accountable reason, he desired an official Chinese version that 
agreed with his own.
A version, in Chinese, was prepared by the Consular staff end 
was brought by Lay to Chi-er-hang-a, with the "request” that an 
official copy of the draft be prepared for him to take back to 
Stirling. Without seemingly complaining about the substance of the 
draft, Chi-er-hang-a countered by asking that the Chinese be allowed 
to prepare an edited copy; the draft, as it stood, was incorrectly 
written and poorly constructed. Lay insisted that it could not be 
edited, upon which he was told that in its draft form it was un­
intelligible.
Lay was not to be put off and declared that unless it was accepted 
as presented, Stirling might lose face. In this event, the Admiral 
might feel compelled to re-open hostilities, which in turn would dis­
rupt the peaceful relations then existing. Lay subsequently got his 
26"communication’1, but he determined not to be embarrassed again. On
26. IWSM(S). pp. 213-215. Supplementary Edit. July 7» 1854. 
HF8; 13b, 8-14b, 10. I believe the document referred to, in 
English "translation”, is in FO 97/100 Wo. 68 Bowring to Clarendon, 
June 27, 1854* Encl. Wo. 7- Hsu to Stirling ("translated” by 
Lay) June 22, 1854*
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July 1, he wrote a memo to Alcock requesting permission to employ
a "Chinese writer of superior ability to those now employed,"
Within a week, Bowring reported that such a person had been 
27
employed.
In a later section of this chapter further information will be 
presented to elaborate on the question of Lay's relations with the 
Ch'ing Authorities. It is necessary first to mark the change in 
his status which was effected by the results of the negotiations in 
which he took part.
Three basic results were: that the local Ch'ing officials
concurred in the introduction of a degree of jurisdiction by the 
Treaty Consuls over the foreign settlementsj that the Treaty Powers 
agreed to enforce more effective measures of neutrality! that agree­
ment was reached for the introduction of foreign administration of the
28Shanghai maritime customs.
The last result affected Lay most immediately. The terms of the 
agreement called for the nomination by each of the Treaty Consuls, of 
one of their respective nationals, the three to act as a joint board 
of inspectors. To ensure that the Customs Administration would function 
under competent guidance and to prevent any suspicion of conflict of
27. PO. 17/213. No. 72. Bowring to Clarendon. July 6, 1854* 
Enclosing No. 55 to Alcock to Bowring, July 4* 1854» which, in turn, 
enclosed Lay to Alcock, July 1, 1854»
28. Fairbank "Trade", p. 450 ff.
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interest axising, Alcock, with Bowring*s approval, nominated Vade,
29his Vice-Consul.
The China Establishment was short-handed when Lay was posted to 
Shanghai as Acting Interpreter. It was not) to he deprived of one of 
its most able members. Partly because of his high regard for Lay, 
partly because he must have expected the early return of two other 
experienced staff members (Meadows and Harvey^), and partly because 
he knew that a number of supernumeraries were en route for China,^ 
Bov/ring approved Alcock* s appointment of Lay as Acting Vice-Consul 
(in Wade*s place) in addition to his assignment as Acting Interpreter.^ 
Though expediency played some part in this decision, Lay had had 
the opportunities and had demonstrated his abilities. Aside from the 
activities already referred to, Lay had prepared a "Memorandum res­
pecting the insurrectionary movement", based on data mainly derived 
f roil "Peking Gazettes." This impressed Bowring to the extent that he
29. FO. 97/100. No. 77* Bowring to Clarendon, July 7» 1854*
30. FO. 17/219. London Office memoranda between Nov. 1— 7, 1854
indicates that both Meadows and Harvey were expected to start back 
for China before the end of the year. Each, on request, was given 
additional leave.
31. FO. 17/215. No. 124. Bowring to Clarendon. Aug. 26, 1854
announcing the arrival of four Supernumeraries, Morgan, Hart, Hughes 
and Swinhoe at Hongkong.
32. FO. 97/100. No. 77 on.cit.; No. 82, Bowring to Clarendon,
July 12, I854 and FO. 228/l77. No. 58, Alcock to Bowring, July 13, 
1854* Arrangements per No. 82 approved by Clarendon. FO. 17/2^1 
No. 141. Oct. 10, 1854.
113
33transmitted it to the Foreign Office.  ^ It is also obvious that
Alcock, while he did not record the specific fact, must have been
satisfied with the way in which Lay performed his Consular duties.
Whilst Lay’s appointment as Acting Interpreter hdd not been
followed by overt resentment, two official complaints followed
this one. M.C. Morrison, who had been sent as Interpreter to
Canton when Lay was sent to Shanghai, made the only complaint
against the specific decision. He indicated that by qualifications
and seniority, he should have been selected as Acting Vice-Consul.^”
C.A. Sinclair at Amoy, who had been Interpreter since his employment
in the service in December 1843» also complained through his Consul,
35Parkes.
Morrison’s complaint was quashed by Bowring, whose action was 
3 6approved by the F.O. Bowring, however, felt that there was some­
thing to be said for Sinclair and referred the correspondence to the
33* FO* 17/214* No. 67« Bowring to Clarendon, June 27, 1854*
34. FO. 17/216. No. 133* Bowring to Clarendon, Sept. 8, 1854*
35* FO 17/215* No. 115* Bowring to Clarendon, Aug. 23, 1854*
36. FO. 17/211. No. 168. Clarendon to Bowring, Nov. [?] 1854*
FO 17/226. No. 37* Bowring to Clarendon, Jan. 20, 1855* Before
the FO’s authorisation to send him to Shanghai reached China,
Sinclair again complained at not having been appointed as Interpreter 
at Canton, which went to another younger man - W.H. Pedder, No. 4*
B. to C. Jan. 3> 1855*
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37F.O. with a recommendation for promotion. The number of com­
plaints may have been kept to a minimum by the fact that Lay's
38
salary does not appear to have been increased by his "promotion.
The complaints do suggest, however, that Lay was being viewed with 
disfavour by a number of his associates.
He did not have time to give much thought to such matters at 
Shanghai, where his talents were, at least, appreciated. This was 
the direct effect of both the immediate and subsequent results of 
the negotiations. It was true that many of the duties which Wade 
had to perform before the establishment of the foreign Inspectorate 
devolved upon the new agency when it went into operation. But the 
regular duties of the Vice-Consul were themselves heavy. Besides 
being charged with the direction of the "daily routine of the office", 
which included supervision of the servants, the Vice-Consul was
37* "Ibid". No. 184. Clarendon to Bowring. Bee. 8, 1854* A.W. 
Elmslie, who had been in the Service since its origin in 1842 and had 
never got a position outside Canton nor a more responsible office 
than Acting Consul, began a series of complaints about being overlooked 
commencing in May, 1854 (FO. 17/213/ No. 24). Bonham wrote a scathing 
memo about his lack of ability to the PO in July (PO. 17/214). 
Apparently on another direct appeal to London to be specifically 
considered for Shanghai, he was turned down (FO. 17/219# Unnumbered. 
Hammond to Elmslie. Oct. 6, 1854)*
38. No mention of additional salary is made in the despatches 
affecting his new appointment. It is also relevant, that eb & later 
date when requesting some back pay due to him, lie asked that it be at 
the Canton Interpreter's rate (£700) though he did not report to Canton. 
For citations vide pojfiea Ch. VE p./Jf n, 23-25.
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h.
responsible for the local correspondence respecting shipping,
customs, etc* He was further required to look after the "custody,
39maintenance and discharge of prisoners” ♦  ^ The expanded responsi­
bilities that accompanied the acquisition of fuller jurisdiction 
over the foreign settlement meant that the Vice-Consul’s labours 
were henceforth heavy throughout the year* They were no longer 
keyed to the simple ebb and flow of the trading season* When it is 
also recalled that the negotiations led only to proposals for more 
effective measures to enforce neutrality and that these were still 
to be implemented, it is clear that Lay had sufficient work to keep 
him fully occupied*^
There was an indirect consequence of the negotiations that had 
an important bearing on Lay’s career* The weight of the balance of 
"neutrality”, in diplomatic terms and as applied to the local situation 
at Shanghai * which tended to favour the rebels, now shifted in favour 
of the Ch’ing Authorities. On the one side, a formal triangular 
liaison was created between the Consulates, the foreign Inspectorate
39* The normal duties of the Shanghai consular staff, in a "normal” 
period, were outlined by Alcock in 1853* FO* 228/l6l* No. 4*
Alcock to Bowring, Jan* 30» 1853*
40. FO. 17/227. No. 59* Bowring to Clarendon* Jan* 30. 1855* 
Encloses No. 15* Alcock to Bowring, Jan. 23, 1855* (Quoted in part, 
pflstsra, pp. ^ 3-124*
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and the Ch’ing Administration. On the other side, viewing the 
trade of the port as a whole, most advantage was to be gained by- 
negotiating with the Ch'ing Authorities. It should be stressed 
that "neutrality1*was still the real as well as the nominal policy.
Until the end of 1854* amicable relations were maintained between 
the rebel leaders and the British officials.^ However, because 
the Shanghai rebels exercised no control over the hinterland trade 
and because the leaders proved incapable of developing a responsible 
administration in the area they did control, they gradually lost the 
sympathies of the local British consular and naval officials.
In the pursuit of his official consular duties with his 
characteristic intensity and energy, Lay became more and more 
identified with the Imperial cause. From July to October 1854, His 
behaviour may be taken as the ordinary, conscientious response of a 
young man seeking to justify the favour shown towards him. From the 
beginning of October, when Wade announced his intention to resign as 
British Inspector,^ the motivation for this conscientiousness was 
looked upon as ambition to succeed to this lucrative post.
41. See particularly exchange of correspondence between "lew-le- 
chiSfen ." (Liu-Li-ch’uan), one of the "Small Sword" leaders and Lay. 
In FO. 228/177, enclosures in No. 85 and No. 88, Alcock to Bowring, 
Nov. 14 and 18, 1854*
'*42. FO. 228/166. No. 172, Bowring to Clarendon, Oct. 9, 1854* 
Enclosing notice of Wade's intention to resign.
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The issues related to Wade's decision will be considered in 
detail in the next chapter as part of the background to Lay's 
appointment. The separation of the issues effected here is 
arbitrary for it would be impossible to demonstrate that Lay's be­
haviour was not influenced by the prospective opening* But it is 
also undeniable that Lay's behaviour was, on the whole, consistent 
with the policy Alcock felt himself compelled to follow and which, 
just as consistently, received Bowring's approval.
Alcock's determination to back up Wade (and the other Inspectors)
in customs matters aroused strong feelings against Lay, who was the
intermediary for much of his correspondence, as well as himself. No
amount of assurances from Alcock or Bowring to the Foreign Office
that the system was a boon to trade and the "honest trader", could
disguise the disaffection and antagonism felt by some segments of the 
43public.
The nature of the feeling toward Lay was expressed in the derisive
43 • Complaints appear regularly in the correspondence in the 
"NCH" during the latter part of 1854-55• One of the more vociferous
of the complainants, Sillar Bros., carried on a running attack, 
through London, from December 1854 through the fall of 1858 (cf.
FO. volumes on "Shanghai Duty Question"). Also cf. S.F. Wright, 
"China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy: 1843-1938", (Shanghai,
1930) P« 134» (Hereafter cited as: Wright, "Tariff").
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nickname applied to him - the "Boy Consul" .^ 4 events leading 
to the "evacuation" of the native city by the rebel forces, 
beginning with the determination of the French officials to end 
the harassment of their section of the foreign settlement, brought 
the hostility towards Lay to its greatest intensity.
During November and December 1854» the French attempted to 
dislodge the rebels by armed assault. The first attempts failed 
because the forces at their disposal were very small, because 
initially the British and American officials refused to cooperate 
in their policy, and because the first assaults were met by a 
spirited and determined opposition from the rebels. In time, Alcock 
overcame the reluctance of Admiral Stirling by arguing that the Anglo- 
French alliance in Europe committed the English to cooperation in 
China.
One phase of this cooperation apparently induced Alcock to
45expose himself at the "front"."' The incident elicited an open letter 
to Alcock, published in the "North China Herald", signed by "Censor". 
After chiding Alcock that the personal risk was his own affair and 
"laying aside the complicated bearing of this act upon [the officials1]
44- King, op.cit. p. 49*
45. NCH. No. 524. Jan. 20, 1855, P* 101. The incident is 
probably the one referred to in [John Scarth] "Twelve Years in China". 
(Edinburgh, I860), pp. 211-212.
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professedly neutral attitude towards all 'belligerents”, the 
writer adds that it cannot he ignored by the public for
it has to be considered that any chance bullet 
depriving them of your presence must for some considerable 
time at least leave their fate in a most critical con­
juncture in the hands of an inexperienced lad, your only 
assistant and representative. It is true they may com­
plain of some of your acts, but they have certainly no 
desire for such a change of masters as this. A change 
of measures would be preferable to a change of men at 
all; and failing this, they prefer enduring an evil of
whose extent and nature they know something to wishing
for a guardianship which of the two may prove much the 
worse and can hardly in any case be much the better. 46
In the following issue ”Jack Lackland” came to Lay* s defence.
He wrote that the British officials (Wade wad also involved in the
incident) ”are doing remarkably well”, and continued
The Acting Vice-Consul could console himself that 
the great Chatham shared with him, and defended, the 
atrocious crime of being a very young man; the ex- 
Vice, that he was responsible for his activity, 
pernicious or otherwise, to constituted authority.47
Perhaps stung by his critics, perhaps challenged by his supporters
and perhaps stimulated by an unusual favour shown him by Chi-er-hang-a
in the interim,^® Lay outdid himself in the final phase of the breaking
46. NCH. No.234, on.cit. p. 101
47. NCH. No.235* Jan. 27, 1855. p.105.
48. A strong letter, signed by Chi-er-hang-a, written to Bowring 
in support of Lay's nomination to the Inspectorate, is dated Feb. 
15, 1855. (FO* 17/227* No. 95, Bowring to Clarendon, Feb. 22, 
I855. Encl.I.). The action resulting in the recapture of the 
native city took place Feb. 17-18.
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of the siege. The rebels were completely surrounded and the only
escape route was through the foreign settlement. There was no
hope of a mass escape, but a group of foreign residents, partly
as repayment for the profitable relations they had had with the
leaders, and partly on humanitarian impulse, tried to assist the
leaders to escape.
Lay, leading a group of British marines and Imperial soldiers,
as much in the role of Commander as of interpreter, led the pursuit
which terminated at Woosung. Lay officiously used his authority
49to gain entrance to search foreign houses and godowns. One of the
principal rebel leaders perished. The other, although reported
50killed by the Ch’ing Authorities, made good his escape.
The consternation, particularly in the British community, was 
intense. It was not simply Lay’s aggressiveness that was found 
objectionable. But the whole idea, that British officials would co­
operate in an enterprise that could only end in an exercise of whole­
sale executions by the Imperial forces, was repulsive. On the first 
point, six months after the event, on an occasion when Lay was charged 
with threatening the ’’Indian residents” with ’’domiciliary visits to
50. FO. 17/251* No. 198. Bowring to Clarendon, June 1, 1855*
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search for and seize opium on their premises", a correspondent
to the NCH commented:
but there must surely be some mistake in this, or 
Mr. Lay must hold his life at even less value than the 
community do, as he must be aware, that, though while 
Acting Vice-Consul he might under certain circumstances, 
enter the house of a British resident by force, now that 
he has degenerated into a Chinese Custom-Officer, he 
might be shot for such an act, with as little ceremony as 
any other objectionable arrival that intruded 51
To emphasise his meaning he also mused that under American
custom, a person who behaved this way "would be lynched forthwith
52and perhaps scalped in addition."
The British officials were probably sensitive to the public's
reaction. In any case, when Chi-er-hang-a invited those who had
cooperated in the expulsion of the rebels to "a grand breakfast"
ten days after the re-capture of the native city, whilst the French
and Americans attended, "the British Consular Authorities, and a few
53others.... for some cause did not attend." ^
If the British Officials were unpopular with their compatriots 
and other foreign nationals, they had the approval of the Ch'ing 
Authorities. In addition to the banquet cited above, Chi-er-hang-a
51. NCH. No. 264. Aug. 18, 1855. Letter by "Ithuriel", p. 11
52. Loc. cit.
53. NCH. No. 240, March 3, 1855- p*124*
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wrote to Bowring that as a consequence of his report of the
incident and the part played by Alcock and Lay, to the Emperor,
the latter had enquired whether they could receive some mark of
recognition* The two declined because it was contrary to the
54terms of their service. ^ In the round of correspondence that
followed, the actions of both were approved and their rejection
of recognition commended by the Foreign Office as well as by 
55Bowring.
In Lay1 s case, Chi-er-hang-a was able to effect his purpose
in two ways* He continued to give unshake able support to Lay's
appointment as Wade's successor in the Inspectorate, despite
Bowring's continuous opposition* He also cited Lay favourably in
a memorial he wrote reporting the acceptance, by the French officials,
56of marks of recognition for their part in the recent campaign*
Whatever Alcock's private view of Lay's personality and character 
may have been, the official records indicate that he had the highest
54. PO 17/230. Ho. 171. Bowring to Clarendon, Hay 17, 1855.
Enclosures contain exchange of correspondence Between Chi-er-hang-a 
and Bowring* I have not located any reference to this specific 
subject in the IWSM.
55* Loc* cit* Clarendon pencilled a note on Bowring* s despatch 
"Entirely approve* Should express to Keih [sic] gratification of 
HMD at the intended favour*" Notice of FO's approval was sent to
Lay* "FL". Shanghai* Misc. No* 190. Robertson to Lay, Nov. 12,
1855*
56* IWSM* Included in memorial cited in hote 49*
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regard for his work as a public servant* Before the action against 
the rebels* when Alcock again appealed to Bowring for additional 
personnel - this time for a Vice-Consul - he noted that the absence 
of a Vice-Consul had "entailed a very serious increase of labour on 
those who remained, but especially on myself and Mr* Lay, acting in
[a] double capacity " He had also written in his request of the
previous April (1854) that
the work of this office is more than one person in 
those two capacities can possibly perform with justice 
to himself or the public service* ***But in justice to 
those who have of late been working with me, I am bound 
to state to Your Excellency, that nothing but the most 
hearty & zealous co-operation on their part could have 
prevented the accumulation of arrears of the most hope­
less kind; or enabled me to keep the business of the 
office from getting into a state of great confusion. 57
Some time after the action against the rebels, Alcock was even
more specific in his praise* In writing to Bowring that he was
granting a month's leave to Lay on the letter's request, Alcock
reported
In doing so, Y.E* will perceive I availed myself 
of the opportunity of recording the high sense I 
entertain of the zeal, ability and unwearied diligence 
with which he has, while under my orders, devoted him­
self to the public service* Believing it is
everyone'8 duty to do his utmost* ***I am not in the 
habit of calling attention particularly to the circum­
stance, - but the long protracted period of Insurrection 
and trial.•••at this Port has been altogether exceptional,
57* FO. 17/227. No. 59» Bowring to Clarendon, Jan* 30, 1855* 
Enclosing Alcock's No* 15» Jan* 23, 1855*
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and called for unusual exertions, especially on the part 
of the Interpreter charged, in addition, with the duties 
of Vice-Consul; and it is but a simple act of justice to 
give Mr* Lay the credit, who has so satisfactorily dis­
charged the trying duty of both offices *5®
Lay* s activities in connection with the temporary shift in the 
balance in favour of the Ch'ing government thus brought him into 
favour with those officials - Ch'ing and British - who were in a 
strong position to promote the next advance in his career* But 
this advance was not achieved easily* Partly because it was in 
order that Lay should be transferred from Shanghai, and partly to 
obstruct his appointment to succeed Wade, Lay was posted to a new 
assignment*
An extension of home leave to T*T* Meadows, who had also re­
jected the Foreign Office's offer to him to become Chinese Secretary
59in place of Medhurst, provided Bowring with an opening to satisfy 
both of his objectives with respect to Lay* He quieted M*C* Morrison 
by appointing him as Acting Chinese Secretary* Bowring expected Wade 
to take up this position, at which point Morrison would become 
Assistant Chinese Secretary - a promotion in prestige if not in 
remuneration* Lay was posted to take Morrison's place as regular 
Interpreter at Canton*^
58. FO. 228/195. No. 48. Alcock to Bowring. April 7, 1855.
Also enclosing copy of his letter to Lay of same date*
59* FO 17/219* Office Memoranda about Not 1-7, 1854*
60* FO 17/227* No. 70» Bowring to Clarendon, Feb* 3» 1855* Only 
a month earlier Bowring had recommended that W*H* Pedder be posted 
to Canton. FO 17/226. No* 4# Bowring to Clarendon* Jan. 3> 1855*
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This shift in position would mean that Lay would have received 
a substantial increase in salary (from £500 to £700) and that he 
would be removed from Shanghai so that he could not press his own 
candidacy for the Inspectorate. The appointment was recorded in 
February, 1855•
It is not feasible to formulate general conclusions about the 
progress of Lay's career for the period covered by this chapter.
Such conclusions would have to take into account factors that led to 
his appointment as British Inspector. These have not yet been 
dealt with adequately. Some limited conclusions specifically 
related to this phase of his career in the China Service can, however, 
be suggested.
It may firstly be noted that, in the exceedingly trying conditions 
which prevailed at Shanghai, Lay, youthful as he was, responded to the 
demands made upon him. His training and his temperament enabled him 
to carry out his duties and responsibilities in such a manner as to 
gain favourable notice from the Ch'ing Authorities as well as from his 
own superiors.
Secondly, Lay had the good fortune to become a principal participant 
in the formulative developments affecting a new stage in Sino-British 
relations. By virtue of his special ability as an Interpreter, he not 
only became an important link in the intercourse between the British and 
Ch'ing Authorities, but he also became an Interpreter in a broader sense. 
In this period, he was beginning to be considered as a "sounding board"
by both sets of authorities.
Thirdly, the notice he received for his efforts and for his 
energy generated hostility against him, as veil as commendation for 
him. Senior members of the Service and a large segment of the 
foreign community were unsettled by the relatively meteoric rise 
in his "fame and fortune" • Lay was not always directly responsible
for the opportunities that emerged, but there is nothing to indicate 
that he ever hesitated talcing advantage of them when they were 
available.
Lastly, the range and extent of his official and quasi-official 
activities continued to leave little time for non-vocational interests. 
Even when he had free time, according to Vade, at the beginning of 1855, 
Lay was assisting him in composing "a vocabulary of the Peking Dialect. 
His preoccupation with his vocational interests advanced his professional 
career, but the process did not include development in social maturity.
The foregoing conclusions have been characterised as "limited" with 
good reason. Some of them are subject to qualification in the light 
of the events that led to Lay's investiture as British Inspector of 
Shanghai Customs. These events can now be dealt with as part of the 
general account of Lay's career in the first phase of his service as a 
Ch'ing official.
61. PO. 17/227, No. 59 on.cit. Enclosure* Wade to Alcock, 
Jan. 22, 1855.
Chapter VI 
In the Emperor's Service* 1855-1858*
Within the limited sphere of British interests, H.N. Lay's role 
as a British official at Shanghai was that of a subordinate, in large 
part fulfilling the tasks assigned to him by his superiors. Thus, 
while he was a participant in events of some importance during much 
of 1854 &&& the early months of 1855 » his role could not be described 
as significant.
Various factors connected with the first phase of his career in 
the "Emperor's Service"however, provided increasing opportunities 
for Lay to exercise his own initiative. His role developed, 
correspondingly, in significance. The developments leading to his 
investiture as British Inspector, the functions he fulfilled as a 
member of the inspectorate and the impact of his activities, unofficial 
as well as official, had important consequences for both the British 
and the Chinese.
As for the first set of developments, reference has already been
1. In the Chinese scheme, the use of this expression might be 
questioned since the records provide no evidence that the Shanghai 
arrangement for use of foreign "inspectors" was ever brought to the 
attention of - let alone sanctioned by - the Emperor. In the few 
instances between May, 1855 and Feb., 1858 when Lay is mentioned, he 
is not given any title and his Chinese name is preceded by the 
customary k'ou (O ). Vide Chapter VII, n. 73*
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made to the fact that T.F. Wade, as early as October, 1854, had
2
notified his intention to resign as British Inspector* His 
decision was taken for entirely personal reasons and it does not 
appear that he even seriously thought, at the time, of whether or 
not there was anyone eligible to succeed him* Partly because 
there was a shortage of qualified staff in the Establishment and 
partly because Bowring insisted that Wade had to provide three 
months* notice, Wade deferred his resignation* He could not afford 
to alienate Bowring*s support, for one of Wade's expectations was to
3
be re-instated in the Consular Service.
Little was done about the question of Wade's successor until 
the turn of the year* E* Hammond, who had recently become Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the F*0*, and who was directly concerned with China 
affairs, was not enthusiastic about Wade's attitude* In January, 
however, Wade decided that he would resign at the end of April whatever 
the F*0* finally decided.^ His determination was fortified by the 
knowledge that in his view, supported by Alcock, there was a qualified
2* Vide anteas Chapter V, p.//6n. 42.
5* FO* 228/l66. Wade's memo enclosed in Bowring's No* 172 
Oct. 9. 1854.
4* For the general reaction of the FO to Wade's behaviour see 
notations on despatches and intra-office memos in FO 17/224 and 
FO. 97/100 most of which are reproduced in Fairbank, "NSEQ" 
pp. 132-134.
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5
person - H*H. Lay - available to take his place*^ The evidence 
that Lay was a candidate for the post thus seems to have been 
transmitted to Hongkong for the first time early in February, 1855*^
In the preceding chapter it was noted that Bowring sought to use 
the tactic of promoting Lay to the Interpretorship at Canton as a
7
means of thwarting Lay* s succession to the Inspectorate* Bowring
professed to be opposed to Lay because of his youthfulness and limited
experience, but it was also beyond question that he had committed
8himself rather strongly to the candidacy of W.H* Gingell* Bowring 
advised both London and Shanghai early in February of his plans for
9
Lay and although he used every means at his disposal to prevent Lay's 
succession to Wade, the forces arrayed against him defeated his purpose* 
In the first place, Bowring could not insist that Lay take up 
immediately his new post at Canton* A replacement for him at Shanghai 
was not available and it was more logical for Lay to leave with Alcock, 
whose move to Canton as Consul had been periodically postponed since 
early 1854*^
5* FO 17/227* Ho. 59* Bowring to Clarendon, Jan* 30# 1855* Alcock1 a
Ho* 13# 23 Jan* 1833 encloses Wade's notice to Alcock of 22 Jan*
6* FO 228/193 Ho* 21* Alcock to Bowring, Feb* 14, 1833*
7* Vide antea Chapter V pp* fX2--'i4
8. FO 17/227 Ho* 70 Bowring to Clarendon, Feb* 3# 1855*
9. FO 17/227 loc.cit* and Fairbank "NSEQ" pp. 138-39, citing FO
17/244 Ho* 38 Bowring to Clarendon, Jan* 26, 1836*
10. FO. 17/213. Ho* 16* Bowring to Clarendon, April 28, 1854*
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Secondly, Bowring could not break down Wade's and Alcock's 
support for Lay's appointment to the Inspectorate. In proposing 
Lay, Alcock wrote*
I would suggest. •• .if an interpreter can be spared, 
the expediency of nominating Mr. Lay, in preference to
any other person. From his services here he has had
the means of acquiring a familiar acquaintance with many 
local details as to Customs House Administration and past
events, without which it would be difficult for anyone
however able, to discharge the duties of the office 
satisfactorily. I may add, that the zeal, discretion and 
ability he has demonstrated while very much over-worked.... 
have been such as to give good warrant of his success in 
the office of Inspector.H
Wade, despite the fact that he was anxious to be relieved, at
Alcock's request, first delayed his formal resignation until April 30
and, ultimately did not tender his resignation until May 30, when it
12was certain that Lay would succeed him. In addition, not until
Alcock granted Lay's request for leave (one of Alcock's last official
acts as Shanghai Consul) - enabling Lay to remain in Shanghai - did
13Alcock notify Lay officially that he was to proceed to Canton. The
11. F0 228/195. No. 21 Alcock to Bowring, Feb. 14, 1855*
12. F0 228/195* No. 50 Alcock to Bowring, April 9* 1055*
13. Vide antea Chapter V n. 5®. his single letter to Lay,
Alcock a) granted his leave and thaib) officially informed him of 
his new post. Of even more significance is that Bowring's despatch 
to Alcock posting Lay to Canton was dated March 12, 1855 * the day 
before Bowring embarked from Hongkong for Bangkok. (F0 17/228.
No. 136, Bowring to Clarendon, March 12, 1855* F0 230/54 [letter
Book - Hongkong to Shanghai] No. 53 Bowring to Alcock, March 12, 1855*
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force of this proceeding is only to be understood in the light of 
the fact that Bowring's formal despatch*^ making the appointment 
must have been received by Alcock ten days or more prior to his 
notice to Lay*
Thirdly, Wade and Alcock countered Bowring* s opposition by
striking him in a vulnerable quarter* They professed to have
canvassed the mercantile community with the result that, in March,
Alcock reported*
Under the circumstances, having also ascertained with 
considerable certainty, that the objections your Excellency 
anticipated with the Community here, in regard to Mr* Lay's 
youth and supposed inexperience, would not be entertained;
& that the merchants themselves looked forward with dis­
trust to the appointment of a stranger to the Port, & were 
on the other hand well disposed towards Mr* Lay, as by far 
the most eligible successor to Mr* Wade which could be 
given themt 15
As this despatch must have reached Hongkong during Bowring's
absence, he was saved the embarrassment of seeming to oppose the views
of the small, but influential portion of the community which was usually
sympathetic to his policies* This testimony, coming so shortly after
16the revulsion felt against Lay in part reflects the division in the 
Shanghai community and in part attests to the strangeness of Lay's 
character* When Bowring did return and was forced to reach & decision,
14* FO 230/54 [Letterbook! Hongkong to Shanghai] No. 53
Bowring to Alcock* March 12, 1855*
15* PO 228/195 No* 29 Alcock to Bowring* March 8, 1855*
16. Vide antea Chapter V p.
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this report added another mark against his own nominee, whilst
adding a strong mark in favour of Lay.
Finally, whether or not Lay from the outset harboured the
ambition to succeed Wade, once he was formally entered by Wade and
Alcock as a candidate, he worked to bring the influence of the Ch'ing
Authorities to bear on Bowring. As a result of the associations
which he had built up with the Ch'ing Authorities, Lay was able to
persuade Lan Wei-wen, the acting taotai for Shanghai, and Chi-erh-
17hang-a to address a formal communication directly to Bowring to
17* The evidence that Lay made a direct solicitation for Chinese 
support for his application is substantiated by only one documentary 
sources a memorial of Ho Kuei-ch'ing (who was Governor of Kiangsu 
in 1855 and Governor General of the Liang Kiang from 1856) which 
reached Peking Aug. 2, 1856 [Fairbank, NSEQ, p. 142, gives the 
correct date of receipt in a footnote, but states in the text that 
the memorial was sent in July 1855* An obvious typographical 
error] specifically states that Lay "in a personal interview" 
made the request. IWSM. HF 29*25,3 - 23b,3• In identical 
passages, Wright in his "Tariff" p. 134 and "Hart" p. 112, states 
that the intervention was at "Lay's own request", but in neither text 
is a relevant source cited. That Lay did have direct access to Chi- 
erh-hang-a is confirmed by the letter's letter in which he writes, 
"During more than a year I have been at Shanghai, in the intercourse 
I have had with Mr. Lay, I have found him to be well versed in the 
state of mercantile relations. •• .and acquainted with the language 
and writing of China, moreover an enlightened person and one on whom 
perfect reliance can be placed." FO 17/227 No. 95 Bowring to 
Clarendon. Feb. 22, 1855« Enclosure Keih [sic] to Bowring 
(Morrison's translation) •
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18support his appointment. Bowring wrote directly to the Ch’ing
Authorities presenting his reasons for opposing Lay's appointment,
hut in the meantime Lay had further ingratiated himself with these
officials by the part he played during the expulsion of the in-
19surgents from the native city at Shanghai. In his letter, Bowring
did give himself an out, since he concluded:
But I have no intention or wish to interfere with the 
arrangement which your Excellency and Mr. Consul Alcock may 
deem most desirable, - and have stated my opinion that Mr.
Gingell's appointment would, on the whole, be more satis­
factory than that of a gentleman so much his junior in age 
and standing - I shall not refuse my consent to the 
acceptance of the office by either of the parties whom you 
may please to appoint.20
In the same despatch in which Alcock reported the views of the
merchants, he also reported that in an interview with the Ch'ing
Authorities after the transmission of Bowring's reply, the officials
21were still determined in their support for Lay. As suggested, it 
is unlikely that Bowring saw this despatch until mid-May. By that 
time, Alcock had reached Canton and was able to give additional force 
to the arguments in Lay's favour.
In the context of his transfer from the Consular Service to the 
Emperor's Service, therefore, Lay's duties at Shanghai terminated on
18. Loc.cit. Also includes copy of Bowring's reply.
19* Vide antea. Chapter V p Jf? and n.48
20. PO. 17/227. No. 95 Enclosure. Bowring to Chi-erh-hang-a.
Feb. 22, 1855-
21. PO. 228/195 No. 29 QP.cit. (n.15).
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April 9, 1855 the day Alcock turned over his office to his successor,
D.B. Robertson. Robertson was accompanied by C.A. Sinclair, who had
22been designated by the Foreign Office to take over from Lay. Lay
subsequently claimed that on Alcock's verbal instructions, he continued
to fulfill Consular duties at Shanghai as long as Alcock remained in
Shanghai, that is, until the end of April, and that his month's leave
23was therefore in effect from Hay 1* Although Lay's claim was suspect 
because Alcock actually left Shanghai on April 19, it vas not repudiated 
by Alcock.^ It was ultimately accepted by the Foreign Office and Lay 
vas paid salary from April 9 to May 31 , 1855, at the rate for the Canton
25
Interpretorship!
Lay had been forced into the expedient of extending his "leave” 
because Bowring was absent from Hongkong. From mid-March to mid-Hay 
Bowring was visiting the small kingdoms of South Fast Asia for the purpose 
of negotiating treaties with their rulers. It was not until he returned
22. FO. 17/211. No. 184, Clarendon to Bowring. December 8, 1854*
23. FO. 228/230. No. 107. Robertson to Bowring, June 30, 1856. 
Enclosing Lay to Robertson, June 7, 1856.
24. NCH. No. 249* May 5, 1855* P* 161. Alcock commenced his 
duties at Canton on May 5, 1855 (FO. 17/228 Sp. No. 24, Woddgate 
to Hammond, Hay 9, 1855), which is further evidence that he left 
Shanghai before, as Lay stated, "the last day of April."
25. FL. Shanghai No. 218. Harvey [VC] to Lay, July 22, 1856.
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to Hongkong and discovered that he had been out-manoeuvered that he 
bowed to the inevitable. Lay, on his part, had been determined not 
to resign from the Service and had refused to take Wade’s place with­
out Bowring1 s approval* This was conveyed to Lay at Shanghai on 
26May JO* On June 1, he notified Robertson that on Wade’s resignation
27as of May 31, he had taken up the duties of British Inspector.
As the foregoing phraseology suggests, Lay did not consider that
he had left the China Service, but rather that he had been seconded to
the Inspectorate* Bowring was inclined to give qualified support to
this interpretation of the British Inspector’s status, but the Foreign
Office taok a different view* Even though Lay was subsequently forced
28to accept the faot that he had ’’retired”, he maintained in later years
29that he had not become detached from the Service* The clarification 
of this matter by means of lengthy correspondence between China and London 
seriously affected Lay's early months in his new career*
£6* FL* Shanghai No. 52# Robertson to Lay, May 30, 1855*
27* FO. 17/231 No. 203* Bowring to Clarendon. June 7» 1855* 
Enclosing Robertson's No. 14* June 1, with Lay's letter as enclosure No* 3
28. In his letter of June 7> 1856 (vide antea n.23) pressing for
his back pay, Lay psed the expression ”1 ceased to belong to H.M.'s 
Service on the 1st of June 1855*"
29* FL. In the printed application for a C.B. that Lay submitted
to Lord Palmerston, dated November 26, 1862, he recorded the following 
”....1 was informed that my acceptance of this office would not debar 
me from re-entering the Consular Service at any future period. So 
long as I held the post of Inspector of Customs, I regarded myself and 
was looked upon by the British Authorities, as still belonging to the 
Consular Service "
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Before continuing with this subject, some notes on the early
developments related to the system may he helpful* J.K. Fairhank
and S*F* Wright, in their extensively detailed studies, deal with
30the conditions that led to its introduction. They describe the 
maimer in which insurgency - Taiping and localised forms - disrupted 
the patterns of trade; the venality of Ch'ing officialdom; the 
chaos and anarchy consequent upon the incompetent, inefficient and 
ineffectual administration of the maritime trade by the Ch'ing govern­
ment; the helplessness of responsible foreign officials - partly 
because of the multi-national make-up of the foreign community and 
partly because, in fact, they lacked valid legal jurisdiction - who 
attempted to bring order out of chaos; the predatory behaviour of many 
of the foreign merchants, taking advantage of the situation through use 
of bribery, smuggling and any and every form of unscrupulous practice* 
They also show how the desperate need of the local Ch'ing Authorities 
for revenue and the realisation among merchants with long-term interests 
of the need for order, were used by the officials of the major powers 
(Britain, the U.S. and France) to bring about the system of joint sino- 
foreign customs administration*
These were undoubtedly the basic conditions affecting the develop­
ment of the system* Yet, in this particular study on Lay's career, the
30* Especially Fairbank, "NSEQ" and "CSPSR" Vols* XVTIIt 4» XIX«
1 and 4 XXil; Wright, "Hart"* Morse, "Conflict", Ch* XVIII 
and "Submission", Chs* I and II, also contain much useful information*
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emphasis falls on other aspects of the early period of the Inspectorate 
of a more limited character* These aspects (also, of course, dealt 
with to some extent by Fairbank and Wright) are related to the political 
and legal status of the inspectors and the Inspectorate once it came 
into being*
The foreign Inspectorate had been in operation less than a year
when Lay - six weeks short of celebrating his 23rd birthday - succeeded
Wade* It had been brought into existence in time to operate for the
heavy trading season of 1854* so that Lay joined the "Staff" just as
another heavy trading season was approaching* At its inception, the
three foreign inspectors selected by the major Treaty Powers had been
M. Arthur Smith, T*F* Wade and Capt* Lewis M. Carr for France, Britain
and the United States, respectively* All three had been connected with
31their respective consular establishments.
By common, but unspecified agreement, since all the Inspectors
received the same salary and were technically of equal status, Smith
32was initially deferred to as the senior member* The reason for this 
was that Alcock had originally sought to have only one - French - 
inspector appointed, partly for reasons of economy and partly because 
the French, having the smallest trading interest, might be more strongly
31. FAirbank, "CSPSR" xxtl p. 70. Smith, however, was not a regular 
member of the consular staff, having been pressed into service against 
his wishes* Cf* C*B* Maybon and Jean Fredet, "Histoire de la 
Concession Francaise de Changhai"(Paris, 1929) P* 59 note (2)
32. NCH. No. 235* Jan. 27, 1855* P* 105.
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motivated to institute an impartial administration* Smith was a
mi Id-tempered, retiring man who, like Wade, was primarily interested
33in pursuing sinological researches* He carried on active functions 
for at least the first few months after Lay's appointment but because 
of poor health and because, perhaps, of Lay's more assertive 
personality, he seems to have curtailed his participation in the 
direction of customs tffairs up to the time of his death in September, 
1857.34
Shortly after Smith's death, the French Consul, M. de Montigny,
35appointed his Vice Consul, M*B* Edan, to succeed him* The latter 
was completely lacking in language qualifications* However, he appears
to have fulfilled some function and continued to hold the post until it
£
lapsed when the Shanghai system was superseded by the provisions of the 
Treaty of Tientsin*
Some information has been given about Wade and more will be 
presented when the functions of the Inspectorate are considered in detail. 
It may be well to note here, nonetheless, that during this period in his 
career, Wade demonstrated characteristics of the pugnacity and asser­
tiveness (towards both merchants and Chinese), which were familiar traits 
that developed among those who served with Alcock* This is not the
33 • Maybon and Fredet, op*cit* p*59 
34* Loc*cit*
35* Jean Fredet, "Quand la Chine s' ouvrait.. . (Shanghai, 1943) 
p* 284, claims Edan did not accept the post until 1838, but he was 
not always precise in his citation of dates*
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place for an elaboration of this point, but Wade, Harry Parkes and
H.N. Lay, all of whom demonstrated similar traits, are but the most
36obvious of those who served under Alcock*
The major qualification of Capt* Carr, the first American
Inspector, may possibly have been the fact that he vas free of any
connection with any of the American mercantile interests* Lacking
knowledge of the language and experience in commercial enterprise, he
vas at least noted for his urbanity* The record of his activities in
Shanghai is obscure, except that he appears to have left the city,
37shortly after Lay joined the "staff”, without any clear plans for the 
future*
Carr* s behaviour served indirectly to foster a personal antagonism 
between the Hev* Dr* Peter Parker (who had lived in China as a medical
36* All three were also products of Rev. K. Gutzlaff's training.
37. T* Dennett, "Americans in Eastern Asia" (Reissues New York, 
1941) P* 228, suggests by indirection that Carr did not leave until 
1857. However, "NCH" No. 270, Sept. 29, 1855, P*34, "Where is 
Mr. Carr? Has he left his post definitely?" A letter from a 
group of American merchants to Commissioner Parker, dated Aug. 5, 
1856, states, "no American Inspector has officiated for the last 
year." This and other U.S. records, cited from Records of the 
U.S* Department of State are to be found in Chinas The Maritime 
Customs* "Documents illustrative of the Origin, Development and 
Activities of the Chinese Customs Service*" Vol. VII, "Despatches,
Memoranda, etc " (Shanghai, 1940) (Hereinafter cited as "CMC"
with relevant volume number/ p. 22 ff.
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missionary, translator and charge d'affaires), and Lay, and to
provoke Parker to side with the American merchants who opposed the 
58Inspectorate* Parker had received the appointment while on home
leave as American Commissioner to succeed Robert M. McLane* Soon
after his return to Hongkong, Parker advised the Vice Consul at
Shanghai that during a visit with Carr in London, Carr had told him
59that he "probably will not return." On this information, Parker 
nominated his Private Secretary, David Olyphant Vail, a grandson of 
the founder of one of the more prominent merchant houses, to suceed 
Carr.^
Parker subsequently asserted that Vail and other "suitable persons" 
were rejected by the Superintendent^1 "under pretences worse than 
frivolous."^ There is no evidence of what the "pretences" were. In 
the first instance, as implied by the preceding paragraph, the reason 
may have been based on technical grounds. Parker's personal knowledge
38. "CMC VII" Parker to American merchants. 25 Aug. 1856.
PP. 32-34*
39. "Ibid" Enclosure, Parker to V.L. Marcy, Desp. Ho. 3# 25 JsJi. 
1856. "Exhibit A". Parker to M.V. Pish. 25/1/56. p. 24.
40. Loc.cit.
41. "CMC VII" Parker. 25 Aug. 1956. op.cit. The Superintendent 
was the Taotai Lan Wei-wen (See p&fieaf n.115)
42. Loc.cit.
141
of Carr's probable plans could hardly be binding on the Inspectorate 
o f f i c i a l s F r o m  the time intimation of Carr's resignation was 
received in Shanghai - early February, 1856 - until an exchange of 
formal correspondence could take place confirming the resignation, 
six months might pass*
As it was, just about six months after Parker's first attempt to 
appoint a successor, and in the midst of another intensive campaign 
against Lay and the Inspectorate system,a replacement was named* The 
Shanghai Vice-Consul, Dr* M«V* Fish, was appointed by the Ch'ing 
Authorities, apparently without official reference to Parker* The
AA
choice of Fish was criticised because of his limited qualifications,
45but he also had supporters in the mercantile community*  ^ He retained 
the post, Like Edan, until the system was transformed in early 1859*
Two things are clear from this review of the roster of inspectors 
who held office in the early period. Firstly, there was always at 
least one other inspector acting jointly with Lay during his tenure,
45* Cf* Fairbank, "NSEQM p*127, quoting from T.F. Wade memo in 
FO. 17/247 enclosure in No* 171 Bowring to Clarendon May 19, 1956, 
that the inspectors were required to give a bond reading in part "not 
to vacate such office, save and except, in case of sickness, in­
capacitating, without three months clear notice, in writing of such 
intention, under penalty of irjef. 500*f1
44. nNCH" No. 517, Aug. 23, 1856. p*14*
45* "Ibid”. No. 318, Aug. 30, 1856 p.18.
while for two and a half of the three and a half years of this 
tenure, there was a full staff of three inspectors* Secondly, the 
British Inspectors, Wade and then Lay, were in a special position 
vis a vis the Chf ing Authorities* Because of their language 
proficiency, limited as it may have been, they had a direct and 
continuing relationship with these officials* This experience gave 
them a qualification regarding knowledge of Ch’ing officialdom which 
was unique among foreigners in China at the time*
A different aspect of the structure of the Inspectorate that un­
doubtedly affected Lay's career, along with his attitude as to his 
status in the foreign community, concerns the salary stipulated for 
the inspectors* When the agreement was drawn up in 1854» the amount 
specified was six thousand dollars, local currency^ - consistent with 
the fact that the inspectors were to be considered employed in the
Chinese Service* Based on anticipation of normal rates of exchange,
47this salary would have been the equivalent of roughly £1,450 - a
substantial advance on the salary rate for the British Vice Consul at 
Shanghai, but less than the rate for the Consul*
If paid in one of the local currencies - the Carolus Dollars, which
46. PO 97/100* No* 77 Bowring to Clarendon. July 7» 1854* 
Enclosure No* 4 Woo to Consuls, 4 Jnly 1854»
47* For basic information on exchange values and fluctuating rates 
see Morse, "Conflict”, p*457 especially graph facing p*470.
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was "legal tender" for official transactions through the first
quarter of 1857 - the real value in terms of Sterling would have
been about £1,800 in July, 1854* Instead, however, of the exchange
rate reverting to the level prevailing prior to the rebel disturbances,
the Carolus Dollar continued to appreciate. By June, 1855» the
Sterling value had reached about £1,950 end. the value of the annual
salary of the inspectors for the next two years may have averaged above 
48£2,000. When it is also taken into account that the salary scales
for British Consular personnel were set in Sterling and that they were
adversely affected by the appreciation in local currency, the disparity
49between salary levels was even more pronounced.
The inspector's salary was thus a generous one for a public servant - 
particularly for a person like Lay who had been getting by with a salary 
for which the real value was probably well under £450. It was justified 
in part by the soaring cost of living in Shanghai, in part by the 
precariousness of the employment and in part by the absence of what in 
current terminology is referred to as "fringe benefits". Lay did not
48. [j. Scarth]. "Twelve Years in China" (Edinburgh, I860)
As Scarth left Shanghai early in 1855 > he quotes the original real 
value as £1500. PO I7/25O No. 174* Bowring to Clarendon. May 18, 
1855t quotes the appreciated real value as £2000.
49* F0« 17/226. No. 16. Bowring to Clarendon. Jan. 6, 1855*
Bowring, discussing salary complaints, notes that losses to British 
personnel in Shanghai in 1854 averaged 2
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give cause for complaint by flaunting his new-found prosperity*
After all, he continued to be the main provider for his mother and
50the three dependent children still in England. The size of his
salary, however, may have been a contributing factor in his somewhat
exaggerated conception of his office, for it was not long before
complaints were being made about his haughty and over-bearing manner*
This aspect was, of course, more significant in terms of
personalised, individual relationships. Another aspect of relations,
not less affected by personal factors, was dealt with, however, as an
institutional problem.
The agreement negotiated in June, 1854» incorporated provisions
which, in effect, tended to establish the jurisdiction of the Consuls
of the major Treaty Powers over the persons and actions of the foreign
inspectors. When the agreement was referred to London, the Foreign
Office, in a rather leisurely fashion, proceeded to analyse and evaluate
51the policy implications of the agreement. While these deliberations
50. Lay, at least, was still sending surpluses home to the end of 
1856. When he received notice (FL No. 218 Shanghai, Harvey to Lay,
22 July 1856) that a credit for his terminal salary (£90*7*5*) 
being held in Hongkong, he pencilled on the cover "transmitted home 
through Wade". His letter requesting transfer to "Bearer" was dated 
Shanghai Aug. 12. Lay also made another transfer of " $ 2000 from 
his Shanghai account on Dec. 27, 1856. cf. "JMA" II, A.2 (57) 981*982. 
(vide supra n.56).
51* Asfer as can be determined the Paris Government had no interest 
in Shanghai affairs. Washington was both disinterested and handicapped 
by a lack of public servants trained to advise on Chinese affairs.
Cf. Fairbank "NSEQ" pp. 161-162.
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were proceeding, a succession of reports of developments in China
forced the Foreign Office to define policy in fairly concrete terms*
The most important figure involved in these developments, whether
indirectly or directly, was T.F. Wade, the first British Inspector. It
was during Wade's tenure that formal representations were made to the
Foreign Office that, as a condition of its support of the Inspectorate,
the British should insist on the extension of the system to all the 
52Treaty Ports. It was Wade's decision to resign that activated the 
issue of control over appointments* It was Wade's claim to reinstate­
ment in the Queen's Service that partly determined the decision that 
Establishment personnel who accepted appointment in the Emperor's Service, 
completely and absolutely severed their connection with the Queen's
Service, and that re-instatement, if granted, was a matter of privilege
53and not of right. It was also during Wade's tenure - extending into
52. "NCH" No* 206. July 8, 1854» P*194* Leader article*
FO 97/100, under date of Dec. 21, 1854* a Liverpool East India and 
China Association memorial calls for uniformity at all the ports*
53* On receiving the report that Bowring had restored Wade to the 
Queen's Service (FO. I7/23I No* 231, Bowring to Clarendon, July 6, 
1855) the Foreign Office immediately wrote back that Wade was to be 
considered provisionally as a "temporary" member. (FO. 17/224*
No. 194# Clarendon to Bowring, Sept* 8, 1855)* It should also be 
recorded that the Foreign Office was faced with the prospect of 
losing several of its China consular staff* In the same despatch, 
which ultimately only applied to Lay, that defined the policy, the 
Foreign Office gave approved to the appointment of Gingell at Foochow, 
Lay at Shanghai (already approved) and J*A.T. Meadows at Ningpo.
(FO. 17/224 No. 193 Clarendon to Bowring, Sept. 8, 1855)*
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the period during which he was "breaking in" Lay - that two test 
54cases developed, which eventually led to the British Governments 
repudiation of those provisions which gave the Consul a "legal" juris­
diction over the foreign inspector. Finally, it was Wade (preceded 
by Alcock) who was the advocate - first from Shanghai and then from 
Hongkong) - who articulated and pressed the case for the expansion of 
the prerogatives and the extension of the jurisdiction of the
in8pector(s) against the joint onslaught of a hostile Consul and the
55more voracious element in the mercantile community*
Lay, it is true, was also indirectly and directly associated with 
these developments. He took up the fight when Wade left Shanghai at 
the end of June, but when he did, it was in the framework of decisions 
already made in response to Wade*s activities* Lay became the focal 
point for the main controversy for several reasons* The "friends" of 
the Inspectorate were, on occasion, hard put to condone his frequent 
manifestations of intemperate, officious and vindictive behaviour while
54. The test cases were those affecting the "Wynaud" and the 
"Paoushan". Cf* Fairbank, "NSEQ" p*145 passim.
55* "Ibid"* esp* pp*145> 156-57* Wade was carrying the burden 
of arguing the cases as late as April, 1856* By this time, Alcock 
was expected to be in London* FO* 17/246, No* 118, Bowring to 
Clarendon* Apr* 12, 1856*
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carrying on his official duties. From July 1855» Lay was left
isolated in Shanghai without any British official to offer positive
57support for the Inspectorate. The terminology of the despatches
58transmitted from London defining the official view of Lay's status 
(as successor to Vade) was sufficiently imprecise to permit the in­
ference that the Home Government recognised, but did not enthusias-
59tically approve, the Inspectorate system.
56. "NCH" Nos. 265-271# Aug. 11, & Oct. 6, 1855* passim: Jardine,
Matheson & Co. Archives, Cambridge. (Hereinafter cited as "JMA". The 
classification system used here will follow a code identifying the 
records according to a report prepared in 1957 by the then Archivist,
Miss E. Bartlett, entitled "Jardine, Matheson Archive, Notes on Content").
II.A 5# (2) (25) A. Perceval to Hongkong, 2 Sept. 1855* P*257#
57# Vade left Shanghai about June 30* "JMA" II A.5# (2) (23) Perceval 
to Hongkong. 29 Nov. 1855 P«301 ”1 wish Sir John was here to take Mr.
Lay's part who I think has been very much ill-used by our officials."
58. This despatch FO. 17/224 No. 193* Sept. 8, 1855» was trans­
mitted by Bowring to Robertson on Oct. 29 (FO. 230/54 No. 136).
Robertson, in turn, notified Lay of its contents on Nov. 12.
("FL" Shai. No. 191 Robertson to Lay).
59# "JMA" op.cit. p.301 (note 57* above). "From the wording of 
the despatch sent in to the Taoutae by our Consul.... the Chinese are 
led to believe that Mr. Lay has incurred the displeasure of his Govt, 
and Sir John for taking office under them and they have told several 
people as much." These reports were transmitted to London by Bowring.
FO. 17/235 No. 394* to Clarendon, 10 Dec. 1855* Robertson had also 
sent copies of the FO. despatch to the French and United States Consuls, 
which considerably annoyed Bowring. Cf. FO. 230/54 No. 155*
Bowring to Robertson Nov. 22, 1855•
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In addition to the problems arising* from these causes, Lay also 
found himself, and the Inspectorate, under attack from a Chinese 
quarter.^ The erstwhile expectant taotai, Vu Chien-chang (Samqua), 
encouraged by his British and American supporters, was engaged in fomen­
ting among Ch'ing officials and Chinese merchants opposition to Lay and 
the system.^
In mid-November, 1855» the text of the definitive despatch from
London reached Shanghai* By this time - having been in office less
than six months - Lay was so overwhelmed by the forces working to under-
62mine his position that he privately divulged his intention to resign* 
This knowledge provoked the intercession of those firms - not less 
voracious, perhaps, but they were at least inclined to be more far­
sighted - who preferred to carry on their operations in a setting of 
order rather than of anarchy* They caused Lay to postpone official 
notification of his decision to resign^ and they addressed a letter to
60* Lay had earlier developed some feeling against himself by an 
attack on a Chinese employe. Cf* "NCH11 No* 265* Aug* 25, 1855> P*15*
61. "JMA” II.A.5* (2) (25) p«301f Perceval to Hon^cong. Nov* 29, 
1855* WI s® sorry to tell you that Samqua has already returned to
Shanghae Foreign influence has been at work with him and he has
nearly undermined Mr* Lay with the late Taoutae and Lan, who has been 
appointed to succeed him* I do not know if Mr* Cunningham joins 
[Robertson, Beale, Harvey & Co.'] but I fancy so*.*.*I believe our 
officials and Mr* Beale are endeavouring to get Samqua again as Taoutae 
when two firms in Shanghae will do what they please at the expense of 
their neighbours*"
62* Loc.cit*
63. "JMA" II.A.5* (2) (23) p*305* Perceval to Hongkong. Dec. 2, 
1855* "....I have made [Mr. Lay] promise to remain at his Post until
we hear from Sir John..***"
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Bowring affirming their support of the system and, in effect, called
64
upon him to confirm a policy of positive support*
Bowring responded promptly and favourably, involving himself in
consequence in a bitter exchange of correspondence with his Consul, D*B.
65Robertson. In the menatime, Wu* s influence was neutralised. A 
report to Peking by the highest provincial officials substantiated 
charges on which Vu had already been condemned locally.Bowring* s 
curtailment of the hostile attitude of the Consular staff and the with­
drawal of Wu from Shanghai reduced the pressures sufficiently to cause 
Lay to decide to remain in office.
67One further intensive attack, spearheaded by the American merchants,
was launched against the Inspectorate in the summer of 1856. This attack
68was based on two major complaints and a minor one.
64* A copy of the letter to Bowring had been enclosed in Perceval* s 
of Nov. 29. Robertson forwarded a copy of the letter to Bowring on 
Deem.3 FO. 228/196. Ho. 108.
65* Bowring’s reply to Robertson on the merchants’ letter, asserting 
strong Government support for the system* PO. 230/54 No. 159* 11 Deo. 
1855* On copy sent to FO., there is a pencilled notation "too broad 
an interpretation.” (PO. 17/255* No. 394* Bowring to Clarendon. Dec. 
10 [sic], 1855)* A copy of Bowring*s despatch was not transmitted to 
Lay until Jan. 17* 1856. (”FL" Shanghai, Misc. No. 14* Harvey to Lay).
66. Cf. Fairbank, "Trade”, p.460 Note n., also Morse "Submission”, 
p*24, note 74*
67* However, "JMA” II.A.2 (37) 913 Perceval to Hongkong. Sept. 6, 
1856. "Mr. Hudson is nominally at the head of the movement but Mr. 
Cunningham & Mr. Beale are the real promoters of it."
68. "CMC VII" See note 37 above.
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The major complaints centred on the merchants’ contention,
firstly, that the system had been introduced as a temporary expedient
and, secondly, that the strictness with which Customs regulations were
being applied placed the merchants in Shanghai at a disadvantage in
relation to those at the other Treaty Ports. On the first complaint,
the argument was that with the restoration of stability, the Ch’ing
Authorities were in a position to manage satisfactorily using their
traditional methods. Taking advantage of the fact that, despite Bowring’s
69and Lay’s efforts, the system had not been introduced at any of the
other Treaty Ports, and of the fact that Lay's strongest supporter,
70Chi-erh-hang-a, had been killed in an action against the Taiping, the 
merchants advanced the premise that the system was strongly opposed by 
Ch’ing officialdom.
The second complaint constituted a more direct attack on Lay, though 
his name was not mentioned. What disturbed the merchants (it was asserted 
that these included Chinese as well as non-Chinese merchants) was that 
Lay was extending formal procedures of administration to include ob­
servance of Ch'ing regulations and was also expanding the surveillance
71functions of the Inspectorate in the effort to curtail smuggling. The
69# For Bowring's efforts, see esp. FO. 17/231, No. 220. To Clarendon, 
June 26, 1855; FO 17/232 No. 247* To Clarendon July 13, 1855* No. 263, 
Aug. 3, 1855*No. 302 Sept. 9, 1B55? FO. 17/234 No. 327. Oct. 12, 1855. 
For reference to Lay's efforts, see note 111 below.
70. "ECC" I. p.118.
71. Cf. Wright "Hart” p.113 Tor a catalog of some of Lay’s "reforms", 
though Wright tends to overstatement on behalf of the Inspectorate.
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merchants put their emphasis on the claim that this was causing a
diversion of the trade from Shanghai and was thus jeopardising the
investments made in real property in Shanghai as well as the port's
potential as a major entrepot.
The minor complaint concerned the continued absence of an active
72American Inspector from the three-man board. As it was the con­
cluding paragraph to the merchants' letter, it appears almost as a
postscript; as though the merchants were cognisant that an appointment -
73which some disapproved - was imminent.
The objective of the merchants was unequivocally expressed* "to
press earnestly upon [Commissioner Parker's] attention the expediency
and justice of abolishing the present system.
The attack proved ineffectual. On this occasion the British
Consular staff did not become involved. Fewer British firms associated
75themselves with the campaign. x The majority of British firms defended 
both Lay and the system (while continuing to call for extension to other 
ports) in a joint letter to Bowring, who repeated his earlier affirmation
72. See notes 37 and 43 above.
73* Notification of M.W. Fish's appointment was obviously made 
before Aug. 23, 1856. Cf. "NCH" No. 317 Aug. 23, 1856.
74* "CMC VII" Merchants to Parker. Aug. 5, 1855* P»30.
75* Morse, "Submission" p.28
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76of support* The American Commissioner, clearly in sympathy with
77his compatriots, had to recognise the curious situation. The system, 
unenthusiastically supported by the home governments of both Britain and 
the United States, whose representatives in China (along with those of 
France) had virtually imposed the system on the Ch’ing Authorities at 
Shanghai, was outside existing treaty provisions. In consequence, at 
this Juncture, the decision whether to extend or to abolish the system 
was an exclusively Ch'ing concern, A final factor that may have 
contributed to the curtailment of the attack was the development of the 
lorcha "Arrow” incident. The incident did not lead to the end of 
controversy at Shanghai, It did tend to direct attention away from Lay 
and to direct attention to treaty revision which could, as a result of 
the incident, be more confidently anticipated.
In the category of political and legal matters, then, Lay, as 
successor to Wade, was a focal point for the delineation of the status 
of the inspectors and the Inspectorate, His role was essentially passive, 
though his personality and behaviour tended to aggravate the conflict 
between the supporters and opponents of the system.
76, A complete sequence of the correspondence may be found in 
"NCH" No. 319. Sept. 6, 1856. No. 320, Sept. 13, 1856 and No. 325, 
Oct. 18, 1956.
77* "CMC VII." Paxker to Merchants Aug. 25, 1856. pp«52-34*
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Consideration of the actual functioning of the Inspectorate
can he dealt with briefly. Insofar as the Shanghai system was
concerned, Lay's role was much less that of an innovator, though
he was not above casting himself in this role, than that of a
regulariser of customs practices and procedures* Three examples
should clearly illustrate the point*
Firstly, a new set of customs regulations (resented by Consul
Robertson becapse he was neither consulted nor notified in advance)
78were issued on June 25, after Lay had taken office* However, Wade,
who was still in Shanghai, was largely responsible for the formulation
79of the regulations.
Secondly, Lay claimed to have introduced in 1856 the procedure
of issuing exemption certificates - a system whereby importers received
a credit rebate for duties paid on unmarketable goods re-exported to a
"foreign” port. As S.F. Wright has shown, the quasi-formal procedure
80was introduced by Alcock at Shanghai in 1852. In fact, while con­
sidered a privilege because not provided for by Treaty, the practice
78. FO. 228/196 No* 50, Robertson to Bowring, Aug* 9* 1855*
79♦ 17/232, No. 257* Bowring to Clarendon. July 28, 1855*
Enclosing Wade's report. Information is added at the end of the 
report.
80. Wright, "Hart" pp. 85 ff*} p.193} p.222. Fairbank, "Trade" 
I pp. 313 ff.} II P.30 (Ch. 17, n.16).
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can be traced to the early 18th Century, when all customs charges
81
were settled exclusively through Chinese "security” merchants.
Finally, about five months after Lay took office, the first 
harbour facilities for mariners were inaugurated on the approaches 
to Shanghai. Actually, strong representations had been made for 
the introduction of such facilities by the United States* Consul
Qp
before Lay took office. The survey work itself and the positioning
83of the first buoys were carried out by an American naval vessel. Lay
was responsible for persuading his Ch* ing superiors that the expenses
incurred were a legitimate charge on customs dues. The slow expansion
of services continued in the succeeding years under Lay's direction, but
84he is not entitled to credit as an innovator. ^
From these examples, it is apparent that the awareness of the need 
for the development of basic practices and procedures in customs admini­
stration antedated Lay's appointment. In this period of his career, Lay
81. Morse, "Conflict*' pp. 64-65j "Submission*pp.2-3*
82. "NCH" No. 252, May 26, 1855. Cf. also PO 17/254 No. 361, 
Nov. 12, 1855* Enclosures. Robertson to Bowring.
83* FO 228/196, No. 108, Robertson to Bowring Dec. 3* 1855*
(There is also additional confirmation in the recently published 
diary of G.H. Preble "The Opening of Japan? U. of Okla., 1962.
Cf. Review "JAS" XXII, 4, Aug. '63. p.484).
84* (Materials from the archives of the Elgin Estate - Broomhall, 
Dunfermline, Fife - which include a collection of Sir F.W.A. Bruce's 
papers, will be designated as "E/B") "E/B" Bruce Day-book (1858),
March 25*
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rarely anticipated the needs of the service* His energies were 
largely consumed in organising the rudiments of an effective ad­
ministration and in providing efficient facilities. Additional 
aspects of the Inspectorate and Lay's role in it will he indirectly 
touched upon while treating the specific question of his personal 
impact, and the responses to it, during this first phase of his 
career "in the Emperor's Service."
It is perhaps, hegging the question to consider Lay's personal
impact on the Foreign Office in London. Having left England in his
early 'teens, having been recruited into the China Service from Hong-
05kong and having not desired, for reasons of economy,  ^nor been com­
pelled, for reasons of health, to take a home leave, Lay did not have 
any personal contacts with officials at the Foreign Office. Although 
fairly frequent notices of commendation of Lay had been sent to London 
by Sir J. Bowring, up to the time of the assumption of his duties as 
Inspector, the definitions of policy were resolved without reference to 
him personally.
Particularly after the contretemps of Nov.- Dec., 1855» however 
Bowring again frequently commended Lay's services to the Foreign Office. 
On one occasion, he supplemented his commendation by passing on a portion
85* Vide antea n*50.
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of the contents of a personal letter from Lay in which Lay reported
on some private conversations he had had, on political matters, with
86a Ch'ing official. In early 1857* & long memorandum of Lay’s on
the operations of the Inspectorate was forwarded directly hy Bowring
8*7
to the Foreign Office* By the time it would have reached London, 
however, Basic policy decisions on proposals to be made during renegotiation 
of the treaty had been made and responsibility for carrying them through 
had been delegated to James, Earl of Elgin and of Kincardine* When Lay 
next became prominent in notices to London, commencing in mid-1858, it 
was through his association with the activities of Lord Elgin’s mission.
Turning from London to Hongkong, the relationship between Bowring 
and Lay comes to the fore. When Bowring opposed Lay’s appointment to 
the Inspectorate, while he was partly motivated by commitments he had 
made to other, senior members of the Queen’s Service, he appeared also 
to be motivated by a genuine feeling that Lay was not ready for the office* 
He may have resented the pressure Lay exerted on the Ch’ing Authorities 
to force his approval of the appointment, but when he gave his approval 
(presumably after having discussed the matter personally with Alcock) he 
gave in unreservedly* This was most forcefully demonstrated by the
86. FO 17/246 No. 91 > Bowring to Clarendon. Mar*. 1J, 1856* 
Enclosure.
87* FO 17/244 No# 65» Bowring to Clarendon, Feb. 6, 1857* 
Seven enclosures.
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unequivocal way he supported Lay's request to he considered as not
88having retired from the Queen's Service*
For several months, however, there was a lack of direct "communi­
cation" between Bowring and Lay* This may he ascribed to the fact 
that both were pre-occupied with their immediate problems* Bowring 
had been absent from Hongkong for over eight weeks* There was a 
large backlog of correspondence both from London, in which he found 
that his decisions with respect td the Shanghai "Arrears of Duty" 
question continued to be repudiated, and from Shanghai, where the first 
of the test cases - referred to earlier - was coming to a climax* In 
addition, in order to placate the disaffection generated by Lay's 
appointment, he had to urge the Consular chiefs at the other Treaty Ports 
to exert themselves to promote the introduction of the system at their 
respective ports*
Lay's pre-occupations have already been dealt with* It was 
significant that in his period of trial he did not personally solicit 
Bowring's assistance. Lay was probably still sensitive on the point 
of Bowring's opposition to his appointment but one might also venture 
to suggest that it was a measure of the sinification of Lay which im­
pelled him to use a roundabout method of getting Bowring to come to his 
defence*
88. "FL" Shanghai, No* 77* Bobertson to Lay. June 26, 1855* 
Fairbank, "NSEQ" p.159* points out that since be intended to do this 
for Gingell, he was obliged to do it for Lay.
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Be that as it may, in the period following the first crisis,
Bowring1 s determination to support the system at Shanghai was of
direct benefit to Lay. At the same time, Lay sought to fulfill
his duties in a manner that would vindicate Bowring’s support. The
effect of these influences was that Bowring*s confidence in Lay grew
appreciably and he inclined more and more to attach greater importance
to Lay’s role. Thus, in 1856, he wrote df Lay "There is no foreigner
in China who has equal opportunities for ascertaining the feelings of
the High Mandarins, and probably none who possesses so much of their 
89confidence!1 Nearly a year later, after ’’much personal conversation
with Mr. Lay”, he noted*
 among other advantages [the Inspectorate system] has
removed from the Superintendency and the Consul numberless 
questions which have been equitably settled on the spot, 
while at the other Ports the annoyances, vexations and 
embarrassments growing out of the habitual violation of the 
laws of China are a source of constant solicitude. Above 
all I could shew that it has associated the British name 
with honor and honesty, and has given us a status in the 
north of great and growing importance and more particularly 
so at the present moment.90
Though Lay is not specifically referred to in this portion of 
Bowring’s despatch, it is obvious that he is not alluding to the efforts 
of the French (M. Edan) and American (Dr. Fish) Inspectors.
The absolute confidence that Bowring had in Lay was epitomised by 
the fact that though Sir John had been delegated to an insignificant
89. FO. 17 /246 No. 91, op.eit.
90. FO. 17/264 No. 63. Bowring to Clarendon, Feb. 4, 1857.
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role by the appointment of Lord Elgin, he recommended to the latter
91that he should associate Lay with his mission. Lord Elgin, chary
of Bowring1 s advice, was slow in acting on the recommendation, but
92
ultimately Lay was invited to join the Mission.
Lay was fortunate in being able to re-establish a favourable
relationship with Bowring, for the relationships between himself and
the British officials at Shanghai were for some time reciprocally
antagonistic. The situation was much more complex than that of a
newly appointed Consul and a newly appointed inspector vying with each
other for primacy of status and jurisdiction. This conflict, which
was a legacy from Wade to Lay, was fed by unrequited ambition and
93passionate animosities.
On the one side, there is no question that the Consul, D.B. Bobertson, 
sincerely believed - and justifiably so - that the inspectors were 
encroaching on the Consul’s prerogatives as stipulated in the original 
agreement, though he was not always supported in his claims by his French 
and American colleagues. But associated with him on his staff were two 
men whose motives were not above suspicion. One of these men was C.
91. we/Bm Private. Bowring to Elgin. Aug. 8, 1857 $ "I have 
heard from Mr. Lay. He is delighted with the idea of being associated 
with your Lordship. His services will be invaluable.”
92. ,te/B” Elgin to Lay. April 9 [1858]* Copy enclosed in No. 90 
Elgin to Clarendon April 15, 1858.
93* Fairbank, "NSEQ" pp.143-144 presents a good account of the 
complexities of the animosities, but the "JMA" was not available to 
him when he prepared his monograph.
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Sinclair, one of the unsuccessful applicants for Wade's post, who had 
accompanied Robertson to Shanghai to fill the post to be vacated by 
Lay's transfer to Canton.
The other man was F.E.B. Harvey who, while on leave in England, 
was designated to fill the post of Vice-Consul at Shanghai. When he 
arrived in Shanghai, at about the time Lay assumed the inspectorship, 
he took up his residence in the home of T.C. Beale, arch-foe of the 
Inspectorate, of Lay, and of the house of Jardine, Mat he son & Co., and 
its supporters. At the start of the crisis of 1855$ A. Perceval, 
Shanghai partner of Jardine* s, privately wrote his chiefs at Hongkong*
Our Consul, I fear, is not the right sort of person 
for his position and I look upon him as merely a toady of 
Mr. Beale's, his Vice [Harvey] being the same and living 
in the house with Mr. B. They are making a set at the 
Inspectors of Customs.94
At the height of the crisis, Perceval was more explicit*
Messrs. Beale & Robertson are doing all in their 
power to get Mr. Lay dismissed by the Chinese Authorities 
and I understand to have Mr. Harvey appointed in his place.
This of course would be very annoying to me and to most of 
the community as Mr. Lay is strictly impartial and I have 
fears of the other who lives at Mr. Beale's house. You 
may fancy how far the Consul goes when you learn that at a 
farewell visit from the Taoutae [Chao-Te-ch'e] yesterday 
he said "Well have you dismissed Mr. Lay yet for if so I 
can appoint another man for you - " This the Taoutae told 
Mr. Lay 95
94* "JMA" II.A.5 (2) (25) Perceval correspondence, passim. 
Sept. 1855.
95* "Ibid”, passim. Nov. -Dec., 1855*
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Though it seems not to have been of any advantage to him, Lay
had at least one ally in the Consulate. His second younger brother,
W.H. Lay, was Supernumerary and Assistant on the staff.
On the other side, at least until early in 1856, Lay consistently
behaved in a manner which could not help but inflame the atmosphere.
In his mien and conversation he caused Robertson to feel personally
affronted. His immature, vindictive responses to any semblance of
criticism or opposition led him to discard even the simplest courtesies,
such as forwarding official notices from the Inspectorate office to
the Consulate.^
With the intercession of Bowring, the intensity of the conflict
between the Inspectorate and the Consulate gradually subsided. Robertson,
97at least, eventually was able to take a detached view of the crisis, 
but despite clarification of the respective jurisdiction of the two 
offices and despite changes in personnel, the antagonism between the two 
agencies continued for several years, to explode, periodically, in new 
crises.
There is not much information, apart from that already provided, 
that sheds light on Lay’s relationships with American and French officials.
96. FO. 228/195 No. 29 Robertson to Bowring July 6, 1855.
FO. 228/196 Same to Same passim.
97* FO. 59l/8 [Private] Robertson to Hammond 29, March 1964. A 
few years later, Robertson was to reverse his opinion again.
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Consul Murphy, while stationed at Shanghai, was energetic in support
98of the Inspectorate system. Whatever may have heen the unpleasant 
aspects of Lay*s personality, the Acting Vice-Consul, Dr. Pish, sub­
sequently became the American Inspector. Dr. Parker, when he returned 
in the capacity of United States Commissioner was at first nominally a 
supporter d>f the system, but as has been shown, because of clashes with
99the Chinese Superintendent and Lay, his attitude became distinctly cool.
He was not in a position, however, to promote the extreme measures 
advocated by the American merchants.
The French (Consul de Montigny, his assistant, B. Edan, and, sub­
sequently, the Minister de Bourboulon) tended except on one occasion to 
support the system^^ - and an expansion of jurisdiction for the board of 
inspectors - because it checked the operations of the unregenerate 
smugglers. The French probably pursued this course because their trade
98. FO. 230/54* No. 16. Bowring to Robertson. Jan. 24» 1856.
99* "NCH" No. 318* Aug. 30» 1856. p. 18. Correspondent "X" "As
it is no secret, there can be no treason in saying that the American 
Minister is avowedly opposed to the Custom-house....."
100. Morse, "Submission" pp. 26-27* "JMA" II.A.2. (37) Sept. 15,
1857* Perceval to Hongkong. The incident involved the trans­
shipment of a cargo of what was alleged to be "foreign" rice. The 
rice was shipped without permit, under the French flag (having been 
transferred from an American vessel.) Perceval comments "How the 
affair will end I know not but it is looked upon as in opposition to 
Foreign Inspectors [sic]." The incident took place while the French 
inspectorship was vacant as a result of Smith* s death. Lay had 
actually asked for approval of the shipment, but the Taotai was 
adamantly opposed.
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was nominal in any case and because unrestricted smuggling was in­
variably advantageous to the insurrectionary forces, whom the French 
usually opposed on the ground of their Protestant inclinations.
In much the same manner, most of the relevant factors connected 
with the relations of Lay with the non-official residents of the 
foreign community have been illustrated in the discussion of other 
issues. In the early period of Lay*s tenure, certainly, general dis­
approval was voiced with respect to his myopic antics In the long
run, those most ardently opposed to the system - a coterie of British 
merchants led by Bent, Beale & Co. and most of the American merchants - 
acted on the presumption that Lay’s defects were an inherent part of
his personality. Those generally favourable, or at least willing to
102
give lip-service to the system, ascribed the more serious of Lay’s
defects to the effect of the heavy burden carried by such an inexperienced 
youth. The former preserved an unceasing hostility toward Lay, while 
the latter sought by reasonableness and persuasion to encourage Lay to 
adopt more mature responses.
101. "NCH” No. 263. (Aug. 11, 1855) passim.
102. What basically seemed to distinguish the groups was that the 
former acted on the principle that what was generally accepted as 
’wrong” was ’’right” in China. The latter acted on the principle 
that what was proscribed, even in China, was only ’’wrong”, if the 
culpable party were caught. There is ample evidence to confirm 
this in ”JMA” II.A.2 (37) and II.A.5*(2) (23) covering the period 
1856- 58.
103. ”NCH”• 1855-1861 passim.
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One other aspect of community opinion of considerable significance 
has not been adequately evaluated in published studies on this period.
A comprehensive analysis of the positions supported by the publishers 
and editors of the "North China Herald" is too broad a subject for the 
purposes of this study. Yet, the weekly "North China Herald", serving 
but a small community, was an important opinion-forming element in that 
community.
Related to the immediate question, the editorial policy of the paper
can be simply differentiated into two periods, demarcated by a change in
the publisher and editor. H. Spearman, founder, operated the paper until
his death (aged 53) on Karch 22, 1856.^^ A new publisher and editor
105C.S. Compton acquired control from May 24, 1856. J
Under both publishers, the correspondence columns were open to the 
expression of all shades of opinion respecting the Inspectorate system 
and Lay, since he was the focus of controversy. Spearman, however, 
except for a brief period during August-September, 1855 - when he launched 
a direct attack upon Lay and coined the term "the junior autocrat" - in 
his leader columns expressed strong support for the system and adopted a 
conciliatory and sympathetic attitude toward Lay. Lay, however, 
nurtured his wounded pride to the extent that he did not reciprocate
104. "NCH" No. 295 Mar. 22, I856
105. "NCH" No. 304 May 24, 1856.
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Spearman’s gestures of goodwill. The Inspectorate did not resume 
supplying information, cut off during the period of attack, until after 
Spearman1 s death.
Compton, on his part, did not respond positively to Lay’s gestures 
of goodwill. His support of the system was equivocal and his criticisms 
of the inspectors (for which one could usually read "Lay”) were frequently 
phrased in terms suggesting hostility. This attitude was only moderated 
when it became apparent in October, 1858, that some form of foreign 
Inspectorate was to be introduced for all the Treaty Ports and when it 
was also fairly certain that Lay would become the chief foreign 
"inspector".
Apart from the obvious fact that Lay survived the ordeals and crises
of the period, whether caused by factors outside or inside his range of
control, another small item supports a conclusion that he was not a
completely "isolated" personality in the Shanghai foreign community. At
the first meeting of the Shanghai Literary and Scientific Institution
(which became transformed into the North China Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society in the following year), H.N. Lay was appointed one of the
107directors, of whom there were to be four.
"The formal relations of H.N. Lay with the Chinese authorities form
108a subject awaiting the industry of a master". This observation is as
106. "NCH" No. 428. Oct. 9, 1858
107. "NCH" No. 378. Oct. 24, 1857.
108. Fairbank, "NSEQ". p.141
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true at present, regrettably, as it was when first made over a quarter 
of a century ago* It is beyond question, as Bowring had stated, that 
Lay had opportunities for personal contact with Ch’ing officialdom 
that were not available to any other foreigner in this period of Sino- 
foreign relations* A student with limited qualifications, reading 
the readily accessible correspondence of the officials charged with 
foreign affairs in the Shanghai region through to about 1859* would be 
strongly tempted to detect Lay’s direct influence* The concepts, the 
lines of argument and, not infrequently, the turns of phrase, resemble 
patterns in the correspondence of British officials arguing for policies 
promoting the mutual interests of Britain and China*
It may never be possible to document such a correlation, but the 
evidence for Lay’s personal associations with the officials is decisive*
An indication of Lay’s relationship with Chi-erh-hang-a, the Kanchu 
general who became Governor of Kiangsu, has already been given* Besides 
his direct role in securing Lay’s appointment, it has been suggested that 
his action leading to the removal of Wu Chien-chang from Shanghai was 
more than a coincidence. In the early months of 1856, jointly with 
I-Liang, Governor-General of the Liang Kiang, he memorialised information 
derived from Lay about the Powers’ intention to press for treaty revision,
109* "IWSM" (S) pp.311-313. HP 12; 29,3-29b, 8 Memorial:
I-liang and Chi-erh-hang-a* Mar* 24* 1856.
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on Lay18 proposals for the acquisition and manning of a fleet of
shallow-water gunboats (citing their effective use against the
Russians in the Crimean War!) to be used against pirates and the
(Taiping) bandits,and on various complaints about discriminatory
and inefficient customs administration at Ningpo and Foochow. They
coupled this last point with Lay’s urging that the foreign Inspectorate
system should be extended to these Ports
Lay’s view of his success in his relations with Chi-erh-hang-a
are reflected in his report of an "offer of Ke's [sic] to take him as
112private secretary to Pakin." There is evidence that seems to con­
firm that a special offer of some sort was made. A memorialist, 
writing di^ ring the negotiations at Tientsin in 1858, asserted that it 
was on record that Chi-erh-hang-a "when he was in the process of re­
capturing Shanghai, tried by many means to get [Lay] into his clutches" 
and that he offered him a position as "private secretary to the Kiangnan 
Customs establishment" previous to offering him the position of 
Commissioner [inspector] •
110. "Ibid". HF 15; 5-5b>2, Memorial I-liang and Chi-erh- 
hang-a. April ]6, 1856. With Vermillion endorsement.
111. "Ibid". HF 15; 5t>i 8-6, 10s Memorial. I-Liang and Chi- 
erh-hang-a. April 24» 1856. For the unexpected consequences of 
this effort, see "NCH" No. 508 June 21, 1856. p.186.
112. "E/B". Bruce day-book (1858) April 12
115* "IWSM" HF 25* 52b, 9“55^»5* Memorial. Temporary junior
vice-president of the Board of Revenue, Sung-ch’in. June 17, 1858.
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Lay developed contacts with other imperially appointed officials^"^
in this period that helped to reduce the impact of Chi-erh-hang-a1 s
untimely death* Lan Wei-wen, who had been acting Taotai from July,
1151854 to May, 1855> resumed this office in December, 1855 and then
held the post until about mid-1857* It was he who was the medium of
communication between Lay and the higher provincial authorities#
Chao Te-ch*e filled the gap as Taotai between May - December, 1855*
Though he was an independent-minded official, he and Lay were on good
terms# He succeeded Chi-erh-hang-a as Governor and it was in large
part bacause of the earlier contacts between Chao and Lay that the
representatives of the four Powers were able to deliver notes, addressed
to the Grand Secretary Yu, to Chao at Soochow in February, 1858.^^
The last important official, with whom Lay was to have the longest
direct relationship, was Hsueh Huan, who was almost always referred to
in contemporary records as ’’Sieh”. Lay probably first contacted this
official when they were both engaged in operations related to the in-
117 nsurgents in aid around Shanghai# Hsueh became Taotai in 1857 and,
114* Basic factual information is taken from "ECC” with supple­
mentary data from Swisher’s section on "Glossary of Chinese Personal 
Names", pp. 703-76o.
115* "JMA" II.A.5 (2) (23) P*301 Perceval to Hongkong. See note 
41 above.
116. Details connected with this event are documented in the next 
chapter.
117* Swisher, op.cit. p.721 and Fairbank "CSPSR”(xixj:l) p.95
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after October 1858, received rapid promotion. The facts that he was
noted as a "liberal” and that he enjoyed "the powerful and understanding
support of Ho Kuei-ch* ing”, who had succeeded I-liang as Governor- 
118General in 1857» are reasons for the temptation to detect Lay's 
influence. Since, however, the more significant consequences of their 
relationship is more relevant to the next phase of Lay's career, further 
discussion will be postponed to the next chapter.
In the conclusion of this abbreviated survey of Lay's relationships 
with Ch'ing officials, it is perhaps important to remark that though 
Chinese merchants may have been disaffected by the stringent measures 
imposed under the Inspectorate,that though a merchant/official - Wu 
Chien-chang - sought to undermine the Inspectorate, and that though Lay 
had a reputation for being a hard, intemperate master over the 
Inspectorate's employees, (Lay was non-discriminatory where dishonesty or 
inefficiency was the issue), he was able to work effectively with, and 
sustain the support of, the provincial "career" officials. On the one 
hand, these officials were aware of the advantages - administratively and
118. Swisher, op.cit. pp. 722-23*
119* A very candid, but general appraisal of merchant attitudes
is to be found in Alexander Michie, "The Englishman in China "
(Hereinafter cited as Michie, "Alcock"). 2 vols. (Edinburgh 1900) 
Vol.I, ch. XIII, esp. p.250. The Chinese, as well as others, were 
incensed when in Aug. 1855» lay was instrumental - in a cavalier 
fashion - in having the opium trade absolutely excluded from Shanghai. 
Cf. Wright "Tariff" p.74} "JMA" II.A.5. (2) (23) P. 257} FO 17/232 
No. 301.
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120financially - which resulted from the operation of the system. On 
the other hand, allowing for an element of the "sinification” of Lay 
instilled during his intensive training, it may not be remiss to 
suggest that characteristics nourished in career officials may result 
in affinities of temperament and outlook, regardless of where the 
officials receive their career training*
Having completed the presentation of various aspects of Layfs 
connection with the Shanghai Inspectorate, it may again be queried 
whether it is valid to place too much emphasis on the point that this 
phase of his career was passed "in the Emperor’s Service”• The point 
is, of course, that he was employed in the provincial administrative 
structure, that the official British view was that he was an employe 
of the Chinese government and that, to many in the foreign community, 
he promoted the interests of that government to the detriment of their 
own (British) interests* But from another view, it must be accepted 
that the Central government had little knowledge of the "system" or of 
its implications, and the appointments of the foreign inspectors were 
not Imperially sanctioned. Besides this, contrary though it may have
120* "IWSM" HP 29} 22,5 - 25b, 10. Memorial. Ho, Kuei-ch'ing
Aug# 2, 1858> (A portion of this memorial, previously cited, is in 
Fairbank, "NSEQ" p.142.) The relevant passage! "For the last 
several years the customs revenue has been comparatively prosperous 
and this is due to (Lay's) efforts sternly to control smuggling and 
stealing. For this reason the successive Su Sung T'ai Taotais showed 
him favour and brought him under control and used him.”
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been to the technical interpretation of the Government in London, 
the British nominees took the view that they were being "loaned" from 
the Queen's Service. The conscientious performance of the functions 
of the inspector could not help but be of advantage to the Ch'ing 
government, but in bringing honesty, equity and efficiency to the 
customs administration, the inspector was fostering primary British 
interests.
There is no evidence to suggest that the provincial authorities 
were concerned with the subtle implications of the foreign Inspectorate 
during this period. They considered Lay, in particular, as a pliable 
instrument. He was to be used as a source of information about the 
attitudes, objectives and intentions of the foreigners, while also being 
used to control their trading and commercial operations. There is no 
suggestion that he was looked upon as anything but a representative of 
foreign interests.
In a sense, Lay was a "double agent". He was being used by Sir J. 
Bowring in the unofficial capacity of a political/diplomatic instrument. 
The discussion of these activities in this chapter has been restricted 
because firstly they were unofficial and, therefore, not directly rele­
vant to the main topic and, secondly, the cumulative and ultimate effect 
of these was to encourage Lord Elgin to try to get Lay to serve two 
masters simultaneously.
Chapter VII
Serving Two Masters - First Phase, 1858-59
The description of H.N. Lay as a "double agent" must obviously 
be qualified. He did not deliberately sell his services or his 
information within a setting of espionage. But he was receiving 
a salary from the Ch'ing government, for which he conscientiously 
performed a set of defined services, while he used his position to 
promote the interests of his own government. Whether he, and those 
who encouraged him, were justified or not in their assertion that by 
following this course he was promoting the interests of both govern­
ments, must always be a subject of dispute.
The reason for this is not so much that there was anything
enigmatic in Lay's character or in his own objectives. What was
enigmatic was the role in which he was cast by his two masters, the
British and Ch'ing Authorities, during this stage in his career. The 
enigma was inherent in the institution of the Shanghai foreign 
Inspectorate. Because the foreign Inspectorate was preserved, even 
during the development of increasing tensions between the Treaty Powers 
and the Empire, the enigma was preserved. The enigma was virtually 
institutionalised, as far as the British were concerned, when the 
failure to relieve the tensions - especially in the South - led to open 
warfare. The record of Lay's activities in fulfilling his role thus
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provides material for conflicting points of view#
Some of the evidence recorded in the preceding chapter can be
transferred to fit the context of the present problem# This will
serve as a foundation for crystallising the enigmatic character of
Lay's role in the events surrounding the Tientsin and Shanghai
negotiations of 1838#
When Lay made his recommendation about the acquisition of a
small flotilla of gunboats in 1836, he was expanding on proposals
which had been made to local authorities since at least the beginning
of the decade#^ In the first months after Lay took office, the
Taotais for Shanghai and Ningpo began to make arrangements for the
purchase and fitting out of steamers that could be used effectively
2
against coastal pirates and for suppression of smuggling# These
5
efforts were cut short by the opposition of the Central Government#^ 
Apparently to sidestep this opposition, some Chinese merchants of 
Shanghai assumed the initiative to underwrite a small flotilla -
1# Pairbank, '"Trade". Ch# XVTII. Also p# 421#
2. "JMA". II.A#5 (2)(23) Perceval to Hongkong. P# 258. Sept. 3»
1855.
3* "JMA", II#A.5 (2)(23) Perceval to Hongkong# P. 264. Sept. 19,
1855• "1 see no chance of selling a steamer here now for both the
Shanghae & Ningpo Taoutaes have got into disgrace for purchasing the 
•Confucius' & 'Paoushan'•"
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presumably for convoy duty.^ The flotilla recommended in 1856 by 
Lay was to be used, in addition, on the inland waterways to attack 
the Taiping strongholds.
In the state of sino-foreign relations in 1855/56, the attempts - 
notwithstanding the fact that they all failed - to encourage the 
Ch'ing Authorities to acquire "modern” naval armaments were not looked 
upon as constituting a danger for foreign interests* In fact, all 
the purposes cited were primarily directed toward the promotion of 
British interests that were officially supported. British naval 
forces carried the brunt of operations against piracy - operations,
5
which were a charge upon the British exchequer. It was the official
position, at least, that smuggling was destructive of the long term 
interests of British trade and commerce. One of the main objectives 
sought in the negotiations for treaty revision was for the opening of 
additional ports to trade, particularly a number on the Yangtze River. 
Such an objective could not be realised while long stretches of both 
shores of the river were in the control of, or subject to, the attacks
4* MJMAW. II.A.2 (37)* Perceval to Hongkong: No. 916* Sept. 9,
1856. "The Chinese Merchants (for their Government) wish to purchase 
5 or 6 steamers and also employ foreign soldiers - Takee sounded me 
about it several times....•” Perceval disapproved this initiative 
because Beale was to be the agent for the purchases in England.
5* The standard study on this subject is Grace Fox's "British 
Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832-1869”. (London, 1940).
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of Taiping forces.
Lay could and did press upon the Ch'ing Authorities the 
desirability of, and need for, the acquisition of these modem 
facilities - in terms of the advantages that would accrue to the 
Empire - as long as and as often as the advantages were also 
favourable to British interests. From the time of the "Arrow" 
incident, however, he did not take any steps that would place an 
instrument in the hands of the Ch'ing Authorities which could be used 
against the British.^ Whether or not he should have done so was not 
the basic issue. The basic issue was that, despite the change in the 
character of the relations between Britain and China, he continued, with 
the tacit consent of his government, as a Ch'ing employe.
Another side to the enigma of his situation is crystallised by 
reference to the memorandum which he gave to Bowring on February 6, 1857»
7
for transmittal to London; by which time it was recognised that the 
differences would probably have to be resolved by resort to armed force. 
The memorandum was written in reply to a despatch from the Foreign Office 
which enclosed a series of complaints from British merchants to the effect 
that the operation of the foreign Inspectorate was detrimental to trade
6. There are no further references in documents later than the 
citations already given. The idea that the Ch'ing government should 
acquire an adequate marine policing service was indirectly alluded to 
in the Tientsin Treaty (Arts. XLVI and LIII) and Shanghai "Rules" (10).
7* FO 17/264. Enclosures in No. 65 Bowring to Clarendon. Feb. 6,
1857.
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Q
at Shanghai*
Lay1s remarks and the information that he supplied repudiated 
these complaints. The total of the evidence (including figures 
showing the increase in revenue available to the Ch’ing government!) 
demonstrated conclusively that trade had expanded appreciably during 
the administration of the Inspectorate.
The enigma of the situation was strikingly illustrated by the 
formal statements made by the two officials concerned. The principal 
British Officer, Sir John Bowring, replying to the despatch on February 
4, presented a vigorous defence of the system, enumerated in superlatives 
its many advantages and advocated that the British Government should make 
its compulsory extension, to all ports open to foreign trade, a treaty
9
provision. The Ch’ing official, H.N. Lay, because of the obvious
benefits to the Ch’ing government, felt constrained to close his memo
with this statement!
I do not desire that anything I have said above should 
be considered as a defence of the Inspectorship system, for, 
as I have already stated to your Excellency, I would not 
consent to continue as Inspector of Chinese Customs, without 
the approval of or unrecognized by HMG.10
8. Desp. No. 234» Clarendon to Bowring. Dec. 9» 1856. Referred
to in FO 17/264 No. 63* Bowring to Clarendon. Feb. 4* 1857*
9. FO 17/264. No. 63. oo.cit.
10. FO 17/264. Enclosure in No. 65. op.cit. Underscoring as in
ms.
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The basic enigma of Lay’s position, already apparent at this 
stage of Sino-British relations, developed in complexity as 
successive steps led to armed hostilities* As far as Lay was 
directly affected, the first step was that corresponding to Bowring’s 
notice to Lord Elgin in August, 1857*/that Lay would be "delighted 
with the idea of being associated with your Lordship* The "idea"
would appear to have originated with Bowring rather than with Lord Elgin, 
for before Lord Elgin made a concrete offer to Lay, some nine months later, 
he investigated every possibility of using a regular member of the Queen’s 
Service.^
In the interval, Lay took what opportunities there were to make a 
favourable impression, yet he was discreet in his acts. Thus, when 
information was being sought about the transport of tribute grain to 
the North,^ Lay privately supplied Wade with relevant information to 
bring up-to-date a lengthy report that the latter had first prepared in 
1852. This information, which was useful in planning a schedule of 
operations, was passed on "privately", of course, to Lord Elgin. ^
An unforeseen opportunity developed after the fall of Canton in
11. "E/B" Bowring to Elgin. Private. Hongkong. Aug. 8, 1857*
12. Vide posts a p ./£•! ff.
13. "E/BrtWade to Elgin. Private. Hongkong. Oct. 31» 1857*
14. "E/B" Wade to Elgin. Private. ' Hongkong. No^ 12, 1857
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December, 1857* The Powers decided to make one final diplomatic
approach before the Allies in military action - Britain and France -
undertook to launch a campaign directed towards Peking.
As Shanghai was the most northerly of the Treaty Ports and as
friendly relations had generally characterised intercourse between
foreign and Ch'ing officials in the area, it was felt to be the most
suitable place from which to have correspondence transmitted to Peking.
When the couriers, the Vicomte de Contades for France and Laurence
Qliphant (Lord Elgin's private secretary) reached the city on February
20, Chinese New Year observances were still in progress. Consequently,
no official of Imperial standing with access to Peking was on hand. In
consultation with their Consuls, de Montigny and Robertson, respectively,
it was agreed that they should form a party to proceed to the provincial
seat at Soochow to deliver the notes directly to the Governor, Chao
Te-ch'e. The official party was composed of the couriers, the Consuls,
15and the acting American Vice-Consul, A.L. Freeman, with the staff 
interpreter for each of the Powers represented.
15. Swisher, op.cit. p.377* n.14. For these events, as well as 
for others, Swisher is needlessly obtuse in his identifications of 
non-Asian personalities. Thus, he refers to "de Contrades" and "Robinson" 
and professes to be unable to identify the Frenchman "Min-t’i-ni". The 
British staff interpreter on this occasion was J.A.T. Meadows, a highly 
qualified linguist vho vacillated between choosing a career in public 
service or in commerce.
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The formal despatches of Oliphant and Robert son state that at
the last moment these gentlemen extended an invitation to Lay to
accompany them* On the mission's return, both highly commended the
services he rendered*^ The French had initially vigorously opposed
Lay's participation, but had been forced to bow to Oliphant's 
17insistence* At the same time, while it was recognised that Lay 
(partly through a fortuitous development) had greatly facilitated the
16* Since this is the first occasion to refer to one of Lord Elgin's 
official despatches, it may be noted that for this period the official 
correspondence used was that in the Elgin archives at Broomhall* Lord 
Elgin's collection included* original drafts of all despatches from 
Lord Elgin; copies of the drafts; letter-book copies of all 
despatches; originals of correspondence and memoranda sent to the 
Foreign Office; Lord Elgin's copies of all despatches sent from 
London and from various officials at China stations; registers of 
all correspondence received and sent* All despatches - and 
enclosures - were reconciled with those printed in the "Blue Book”,
BFP [257l] "Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special 
Missions to China and Japan, 1857-1859*" In the citations which 
follow, only omissions from the "Blue Book" of particular significance 
are noted*
"E/B” No. 61 Elgin to Clarendon* (Lord Malmesbury had replaced 
Lord Clarendon at the FO but the news had not yet reached Lord Elgin)* 
Ningpo March 18, 1838* Enclosure* Oliphant to Elgin* Shanghai 
March 5» 1858. Robertson's despatch to Elgin (Shanghai No. 2, March 
5, 1858; was only delivered to Lord Elgin when he reached Shanghai and, 
presumably in consequence of its being "dated", was not forwarded to 
London*
17* Fredet, op.cit* p. 223* Also H* Cordier,"L'Expedition de 
Chine de 1857-1858" (Paris, 1905). p» 310 where an extract of 
Contades* report to Baron Gros, of Feb. 27, is reproduced.
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contacts and the business with Chao Te-ch'e and his retinue, it
was charged that, in one of the ceremonial exchanges, in order to
curry favour with his Ch'ing employers, he subverted the sovereign
prestige of Great Britain.^®
H.B. Horse, whose information on the period contains numerous
inaccuracies, and who was not overly sympathetic toward Lay, ascribes
19the incident not to any perfidy on Lay's part, but to a "blunder"•
20Oliphant quickly developed a liking for Lay, which may have pre­
judiced his judgment about him, but extracts from a confidential report 
he sent to Lord Elgin, just a few days after the return from Soochow, 
emphasised the significant contribution made by Lay*
...The more I saw of those upon whom the principal charge 
of matters would depend the more anxious I felt for the 
result and as I was determined to omit no precaution, at the 
last moment, it most fortunately occurred to me to take Hr*
Lay* Mr* Robertson thoroughly agreed with me in the ex­
pediency of this measure. It was most justified by the 
result, not only do we owe our entire success to his tact 
and good management but it was the greatest comfort to have 
some really sound advice always at hand - the conduct of some
18* "NCH". Ko. 397. March 6, 1858, p. 127 and No* 398, March 13,
1858, p* 130* Antther account is given by a "Correspondent" to the
"Times0. April 29/30, 1858.
19* Morse, "Conflict" p* 509, n*84* One of Morse's inaccuracies
appears in his preceding footnote (p* 508, n. 83) where he writes
"He was still borne on the list of the British Consular service, and 
at the same time was the servant of the Chinese government...."
20* L* Oliphant. "Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission...."
2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1859)* For the account of the Soochow trip 
vide I, pp* 189-213*
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of our party rendering this doubly necessary* • • .No 
opposition was made to our entering the city, and in 
consequence of Lay's former friendship with the 
Governor everything passed off smoothly.... Robertson 
did his best, but is as timid as a mouse [il. There 
is an account of our trip in the Paper [NCHj, but it 
is inaccurate and ends with a story about Lay and the 
Governors' cards, vh has been invented since our 
[interview?] by somebody who is jealous of him. I 
think I can detect the quarter from whence it emanated.
Considering the position that Lay occupied, it would have been
difficult to avoid censure from some quarter. What is perhaps more
interesting, is that in the covering report of the Ch'ing Authorities
transmitting the notes of the Powers to Peking, no mention whatsoever 
22was made of Lay. Both sides, it would seem, were anxious to foster
the enigma of Lay's dual role.
The diplomatic party]*: having achieved a "first" in sino-foreign
relations - an official reception in the temporary provincial capital -
acceded to Governor Chao's urging that the representatives leave,
23immediately on the completion of their official business. Oliphant,
however, took a two-or three-day tour of the environs of Soochow, with 
24Lay as guide. ^ A week after their return to Shanghai Oliphant set
21. "E/S*. Confidential* Oliphant to Elgin. Shanghai, March 9# 
1858.
22. IWSM [s]. HP 18, 16b, 10-18, 10. Memorial* Ho and Chao:
Recorded March 10, 1858.
23* Loc. cit.
24• Oliphant, op.cit. I. pp. 207-213*
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off to rejoin Lord Elgin, who was slowly proceeding up the coast
visiting some of the potential as well as established Treaty Ports,
at Ningpo. It is conceivable that the favourable impression Oliphant
gained of Lay was a factor in Lord Elgin's invitation to Lay three 
25weeks later. ^
Most of the factors that contributed to Lord Elgin's decisions on 
this point were related to necessity rather than to choice. Given the 
comprehensive character of the diplomatic-military operations set in
motion, an absolute minimum of two qualified interpreters was required,
26for Lord Elgin's staff. When the Allies were ready to commence
operations there were, in non-religious fields of activity, only eight
or nine British subjects who were sufficiently qualified to fill the 
27openings. There was no indication that Lord Elgin ever contemplated 
using missionaries, although the plight of the other Powers with respect 
to linguists left them no other alternative.
25# T# Walrond, ed. "The Letters and Journals of James, Eighth 
Earl of Elgin". 2nd ed. (London, 1873). p. 232.
26. Lord Elgin sent Bowring an urgent appeal for additional student 
interpreters as soon as he reached Tientsin. As he commented ’"Messrs. 
Wade and Lay are very useful but I cannot multiply them indefinitely". 
"E/B". Enclosure, June 4» 1858, in Elgin to Malmesbury No. 122, June 
10, 1858.
27. The basic information is derived from leads supplied by a 
retrospective article in the London "Standard”, May 19, 1883 (quite 
possibly written by Sir T.P. Wade). Cf. also "Times" March 23/24» 1858. 
King, op.cit. p. 55» quotes portions of the "Standard" article without 
citing the date. Additional notes on eligible interpreters in 1858 in 
review article of S. Osborn's book "The Past and Future of China" 
(Edinburgh 1859) "Times" Nov. 9* I860.
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Among those who were qualified, T.F. Wade had been simply trans­
ferred from the Hongkong Superintendency to become Chinese Secretary 
of the Mission. The occupation of Canton under an Allied Commission
forced Lord Elgin to assign H.S. Parkes to act as translator and
28political representative on the Commission. C. Alabaster, a super­
numerary, who had given early promise of proficiency, was delegated to 
accompany Yeh to Calcutta. W.H. Medhurst, Jr. was Consul at Foochow.
Why this should have excluded him is not clear. M.C. Morrison was in 
too poor health to undertake the arduous duties the assignment entailed. 
Sinclair and Gingell, who had served as interpreters, were not experienced 
in the "court dialect” and were not a match for the remaining three 
candidates.
J.A.T. Meadows was Acting Interpreter at Shanghai and was a competent
linguist. A linguist was required in Shanghai, but the failure of Lord
Elgin to consider him as a candidate may be related to Oliphant's private
29report of his visit to Soochow.  ^ Sinclair, who had previously been 
Interpreter at Shanghai could easily have been removed temporarily from 
his post at Ningpo.
Thus, when Lord Elgin reached Shanghai about March 25, the eligible 
candidates were reduced to twos T.T. Meadows, Vice Consul in charge at
28. Lane-Poole, I, p. 276.
29. Vide antea pp.
Ningpo and H.N. Lay* Thomas Meadows undoubtedly possessed all the
necessary technical qualifications* He was competent in the "court
dialect", he was an erudite scholar on Chinese affairs, and he was
familiar with the forms of intercourse appropriate to contacts with
30Ch'ing officials♦ His candidacy, however, was prejudiced by several 
considerations *
Although Meadows subsequently denied any complicity on his (or
his brother's) part in the deed, Lord Elgin apparently believed that
he had engineered reports which appeared in the "North China Hetald"
favouring Meadows* appointment as interpreter to the Mission before
Lord Elgin had reached Hongkong* The first of these stated* "We hear
it reported in several quarters that Mr* T.T* Meadows and Mr* H*
Parkes...* are to be attached to Lord Elgin's Embassy to P e k i n . A
month later the following was published!
The selection of Mr* T*T* Meadows as one of the 
interpreters.••...is a matter of more notice than the 
simple announcement* [There follows a long, sympathetic 
review of Meadows' "The Chinese and Their Rebellions".].
With such views of Mr* Meadows' writing, it follows 
naturally that we look upon his selection £o± the important 
post he is to fill,, as a happy augury of the course which
30. "Standard" May 19, 1883* "Times" Nov. 9* I860. T.P. 
Carter "The Invention of Printing in China...." (New York, 1925), 
p. xiii highly commends Meadows for a monograph he prepared on 
this subject for Lord Elgin in 1858. The original manuscript is
in the Elgin collection at Broomhall. Meadows was one of the few
men in the China Service who had attended university.
31. "NCH" No. 357, May 30, 1857- p.174
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the Minister of England will adopt towards China; a 
course, founded not on temporary expediency, hut on 
"broad and great principles; firm, temperate and just.^
"Firm, temperate and just" they may have appeared to "the
33Leading partner of a large Shanghae house" hut the course was not 
the one contemplated hy the "Minister of England"*
Meadows, innocent though he may have heen of the promotional 
campaign on his hehalf, did not improve his chances when he gave 
expression to his opposition to the foreign Inspectorate system* One 
of his charges indirectly impugned the honesty and integrity of the 
foreign inspectors* "**.*on passing through Shanghai a year ago, 
the representative of a large and old established house volunteered 
to me.***that he could, through his Chinese people 'arrange for' duties
34under the foreign inspectorate, just as he could before its existence. • *"^T 
Lord Elgin's instructions on this subject left much to his discretion* 
But Wade was his chief adviser on Chinese affairs and Lord Elgin became 
convinced that aside from practical advantages - a reliable source for
32. "NCH" No. 361, June 27, 1857, p.190.
33* "E/B" Meadows to Elgin* Private. Ningpo, April 15, 1858.
Meadows asserted that it was only in Mar. 1858, that the "NCH" editor 
informed him who had been responsible for the published reports of 1857*
34* "E/B" Enclosure in No* 44, Elgin to Clarendon, Feb* 27, 1858.
Meadows to Bruce, Feb* 2, 1858* Only a portion of Meadows' views on 
the Inspectorate system was included in the published version in the 
Blue Book. For confirmation of Meadows' charge, cf. "NCH" No* 521,
July 21, 1860, p.115. [n.34] Also FO 228/220 Nos. 90. 91. (May 13 and 
May 14, 1856) Robertson to Bowring. Reporting discharge of inspectorate 
employe who had advertised to ship passengers and cargo on private 
account•
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indemnity payments and a dependable revenue to effect the regeneration
of the central administration - the British Government had an obligation
to prevent foreign interests again victimising the Ch* ing government as
35had occurred in the case of the "Arrears of Duty” question. In
addition, when Lord Elgin reached Shanghai, he could not help but
acknowledge that he was impressed with the relatively prosperous
36condition of the port. He would, therefore, be more receptive to
Bowring's recommendation:
I thank you for your note of 30 ult£. I am pleased to 
find that Shanghae presents a picture as prosperous and 
promising as I represented to your Lordship. I believe much
is due to the Inspectorship, - & wish it were introduced at
Canton where now there is utter disorder in the collection of 
the duties & will continue to be unless we lend co-operative 
aid.57
A final consideration which purportedly decided Lord Elgin against
Meadows was the letter’s failure to prepare some memoranda "....of your
opinions on the various topics which are likely to furnish matter for
38negotiations with the Chinese Gov’t " which Lord Elgin had per­
sonally requested. When it was already too late, Meadows excused himself
39on the ground of pressure of over-work and physical indisposition. x
55. "E/B
56. "E/B
57. "E/B’
58. "E/B'
59. "E/B
No. 149 and No. 150. Elgin to Malmesbury. July 13, 1858. 
No. 89* Elgin to Clarendon. April 15, 1858.
Bowring to Elgin. Private, Hongkong, April 5, 1858. 
Elgin to Meadows aboard "Furious”. May 20, 1858.
” Meadows to Elgin, Ningpo, June 26, 1858.
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But Meadows could not express himself on any subject unless it were 
voluminously, and it was apparent that his views were irreconcilable 
with those held by Lord Elgin.
It is possible that Lord Elgin did not decide to extend the in­
vitation to Lay until he had had a chance to make a closer appraisal 
of him at Shanghai. Meadows believed that Lord Elgin, who did not 
deny the statement, had made a commitment to himself.^ If this 
were true, it must have been a very qualified commitment, however, 
for Meadows was refused leave to accompany Lord Elgin from Ningpo to 
Shanghai. ^  Since Lord Elgin must have been anticipating either
immediately entering into negotiations at Shanghai (the notes delivered 
at Soochow set March 31 as a deadline) or proceeding to the mouth of 
the Peiho, it could have been awkward not to have Meadows on hand.
This would suggest that Lord Elgin was strongly inclined to the 
selection of Lay but that he felt under the necessity to appraise all 
the other candidates within the China Service before making his formal 
approach to Lay. At the same time, he was compelled to rationalise 
the selection of a Ch'ing employe. Lord Elgin was not in a position 
to restore Lay to a permanent post in the Queen's Service. Yet he
40. "E/B" Meadows to Elgin. Ningpo, April 15, 1858 and Elgin's 
reply, May 20, 1858.
41* "E/B" Bruce day-book. Entry for Pri. March 19, 1858.
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could not ask Lay to jeopardise his career in China hy forcing him 
to resign from the Inspectorate*
Before dealing with this rationalisation, which was still being 
formulated after the negotiations at Tientsin had begun, the factors 
favouring Lay's selection, besides those originating directly from 
his activities, should be dealt with* There should be no need to 
re-capitulate Lay's qualifications* The additional years of direct 
intercourse with Ch'ing career officials had improved his ability to 
employ the "court dialect"* Since the basic objective of treaty 
revision was the improvement of conditions for carrying on trade and 
commerce, the knowledge and experience at Lay's disposal were unsur­
passed by any other public servant in China in 1858* Apart from his 
technical qualifications, Lay's candidacy was supported by a number of 
influential people.
Wade, Oliphant and Bowring have already been mentioned* Bowring's 
recommendations may not have been all that helpful. The longer Lord 
Elgin was in personal contact with Bowring, the less he was willing to
42
acknowledge that anything Bowring recommended should be taken seriously. 
Whether Parkes, when he was eliminated, made any direct recommendation
4 3
on Lay's behalf is not known, but Parkes did have a good opinion of Lay.
42. "E/B" Frederick Bruce to Lady Augusta Bruce (his sister).
Shanghae, April 3, 1858. See Appendix II for full text of this letter.
43* Lane-Poole, I. p.276
The majority of the merchant leaders at Shanghai may not have looked 
favourably on the selection of Lay. Some were not reluctant to
voice their disapproval publicly.^ But the leaders of the
45"respectable” houses were the hosts to many of the Mission staff• 
Alexander Perceval, the senior director of Jardinefs, who had been 
a steadfast supporter of Lay, was still at Shanghai. The influence, 
if any, was probably remote, but Frederick Bruce, Lord Elgin’s brother, 
and second in the "chain of command”, had been a colleague of G. 
Tradescant Lay in the early days of the China Establishment* Bruce 
having been attached to the Colonial Administration at Hongkong when
G.T. Lay was Consul at Foochow and Amoy successively during 1844/45*^ 
Finally, Robertson’s animus of the first period of contact had all but 
disappeared. At any rate, when Oliphant suggested that Lay should join 
the Soochow retinue, Robertson "cordially concurred" and he supported 
Oliphant against French opposition.^
Whatever were the considerations - and they were undoubtedly complex 
ones - that motivated the Ch'ing officials (of whom the principal one 
was Hsileh Huan), they granted Lay's request for leave to accompany Lord
44. "NCH" No. 402 April 10, 1858 p.146.
45* Oliphant had been 'hosted' by Mr. Moncreiff - one of the Jardine's 
group. FitzRoy had a close liaison with Jardine's and, of course, Wade 
was "persona non grata" to the Bent, Beale & Co., faction.
46. Eitel, op.cit. p. 220.
47* Vide antea p./7?
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48Elgin to the North. Lord Elgin, at least, might have interpreted 
this as a recommendation.
When all things were considered, then, Lord Elgin had little choice, 
but the selection nonetheless had to be rationalised. The first 
foundation stone in the process was built into the terms of Lord Elgin's 
invitation*
It would be very satisfactory to ipe if you could make 
it convenient to accompany me in the Furious on my present 
expedition to the North, as I consider that y. acquaintance 
with the system of the Chinese Customs House & y. familiarity 
with the language would be of material assistance to me at 
this con juncture. 49
Lay could not (nor, of course, had the slightest desire to) refuse
this "invitation” from the Queen's principal officer in China. There
were, however, no conditions specified. Lay was not a member of the 
50Mission and the evidence discloses no offer at any time, while Lord
Elgin was in China, of pecuniary remuneration. Indeed, the despatch
to London in which Lord Elgin enclosed copies of his letter to Lay and
Lay's grateful acceptance, stipulated that Lay "holds the office of
51Foreign Inspector at the Port of Shanghae." It is also significant, 
perhaps, that after referring to Lay's "tact in dealing with the Chinese",
48. "E/B" No. 90. Elgin to Clarendon, April 15* 1858. Enclosure.
Lay to Elgin, April 9» 1858.
49. "E/B" "Ibid." Enclosure Elgin to Lay, April 9, 1858.
50. Oliphant, 1, pp. 16-17• Footnote. Oliphant is in error not only
as to date, but also in the assertion that Lay held any titled appoint­
ments dating from Shanghai.
51* "E/B" No. 90 April 15, 1858. Underlining added.
191
Lord Elgin reversed the order of his reasons for his selection.
Lord Elgin’s draft despatch was at first marked "separate", as
though the affair were not really official business and also because *
this designation usually signified that the despatch was not to be
released for public perusal. The copy to the Foreign Office was
sent without this designation, but the Foreign Office must have been
sensitive to the situation, for this despatch was not included among 
52those published. Thus, the "invitation" and the "compliance" to 
use Lay’s word, were consummated on the last day prior to Lord Elgin’s 
departure for the North.
Although there is a considerable body of printed material on the 
developments of the campaign and the negotiations associated with the 
treaties concluded at Tientsin and Shanghai, there is still no single 
account that is exhaustive, accurate and objective in recording these 
developments. The account that follows, of necessity, is confined 
essentially to an analysis and appraisal of Lay's role. In this res­
pect, it is convenient to deal with the period from the departure of 
Lord Elgin's Mission from Shanghai on April 10, 1858, to January 1, 1859» 
the date on which the entourage that visited Hankow returned to Shanghai, 
as a unit. It is also convenient to classify the discussion of Lay's 
role under three headings: the continuing stages whereby his dual
52. Nor, of course, were the enclosures published.
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function of serving two masters was rationalised* the extent of
his influence as a policy-malcer during the course of two sets of
negotiations; and Lay’s performance as interpreter and negotiator.
Because of the conflicts between the diplomatic and military 
53heads, the confrontation between the Allies and the forces of the
Empire was delayed for several weeks after the "Furious" (the
Ambassador’s flagship) left Shanghai. On the journey and while the
vessels were anchored in the Gulf of Pechili, Lay was occupied in
entertaining his associates by recounting his experiences with the
5 A
Ch'ing Authorities at Shanghai, ^ and in assisting to prepare a draft
text of a comprehensive treaty, "the new and the supplementary in one.
Commercial regulations in full detail - with option for revision every 
55seven years
During the period of delay and until the Allied advance was 
temporarily suspended at Tientsin, Lay's activities were essentially 
those of an interpreter for the British forces. The fact that the
53. The subject is a fascinating one, but cannot be documented here. 
Almost a century after the events, the Navy was still fighting the 
engagement. Cf. D. Bonner-Smith and E.W.R. Lumby, eds* "The Second 
China War, 1856-1860* ([London] 1954)* last word has yet to be 
written on the subject.
54. "E/B*. Bruce Day-book. Monday, April 12, 1858.
55* "E/B". Bruce day-book. References for both May 7 and May 8,
1858, refer to drafting of treaty. Quoted entry under latter date.
The entries starting with May, 1858 through the day-books for 1859
and I860, are written in Spanish. Bruce had served several years in 
Consular establishments in Latin America.
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military forces were inadequately supplied with competent interpreters
was a fortunate circumstance for Lay, for by dint of providing essential
services for both branches of the expedition, he was enabled to appear
56detached from the conflict between those branches. He was one among,
but not exclusively one of, the diplomatic branch - a type of role in
which he was becoming an admirably proficient performer.
Despite diplomatic controversy on the question of the Ch'ing
representatives' (Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na) credentials, the preliminary
rounds of the negotiations were able to get under way precisely because
Lord Elgin had not accredited Lay as an official member of his Mission.
The Ch'ing Authorities, whether responding because they had an intimation
57of what was expected of them, or because they wished cleverly to exploit
t>
a situation which might rewound to their advantage, took the fatal step
58of requesting Lay to consult with them. The request from the Imperial 
Commissioners was doubtless also affected by the refusal of Lay to discuss 
the problems with respect to the credentials or to the demands made by the
56. "E/B". Elgin to Seymour, Aboard "Furious” May 20, 1858. "I
send this note by the hand of Mr. Lay and beg to put him at your disposal 
if he can be of service.” Seymour did make extensive use of Lay and 
remembered him handsomely when Lay applied for a C.B. in 1862.
Vide chapter on 1862. Lay was also interpreting for Elgin. Cf. "IWSM" 
W p p .  470-471.
57. "E/B" No* 153 Elgin to Malmesbury. June 18, 1858. Cf. also 
Oliphant I pp.343-44*
58. "E/B” No. 129 Elgin to Malmesbury June 14> 1858. Enclosure. 
Imperial Commissioners to Elgin. June 5> 1858. Cf. also Bruce day-book. 
June 5* which notes "Lay is going as a Chinese employe."
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59British with any other officers but the Commissioners.
Whatever may have been the subtleties of the initial manoeuvres 
the Commissioners, in their reports to Peking, from the outset of the 
direct consultations referred to Lay as the Assistant Chinese Secretary 
for the British Mission.^ At Tientsin, however, he was initially 
treated with special consideration, even to the extent of being con­
fidentially informed of all that had passed between the Commissioners
and the Plenipotentiaries of the other three Powers at their respective
6iintroductory meetings.
Lord Elgin on his part, during the first days of consultations with 
the Ch’ing Authorities, may have been convinced that he had achieved his 
objective of having Lay accepted as a "Chinese employe” whose prior ser­
vices gave ”him a claim to the confidence of the Chinese officials greater
62than perhaps any other European possesses.” In reviewing for the 
Foreign Office the events of that early period, however, when Lay by his 
behaviour left no doubt as to the interests he represented, Lord Elgin
59* "E/B" Bruce day-book. June 5> 1858. On June 4t Bruce notes 
that the Ch'ing secretaries told Lay they would visit him on the morrow. 
It was after his refusal to carry on discussions with them that the 
Commissioners' request was sent.
60. ”IWSM” HF: 27,5-28,8. Memorial. Recorded, June 7» 1858* 
Swisher, pp. 480-81, only gives first five lines. Continuation 
refers to first interview with ”Han language assistant official Lay.”
The Commissioners do not mention their request for Lay.
61. ,te/B” No. 129> op«cit. Enclosure* Lay's report of conversations 
with Pien on June 7* Marked "confidential” not published in Blue Book.
62. "E/B" No. 133 on.cit.
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specified, that he acceded to the Commissioners' request "to send my
63Assistant Interpreter Mr. Lay”. y On June 12, following complaints 
from the Commissioners ah out Lay's unbecoming behaviour towards them 
on June 10, a communication was sent by Lord Elgin - prepared in an 
English draft by T.F. Vade for transcription into Chinese - in which 
reference was made to the despatch of the ”U[nder] S[igned's]....ass't 
Chinese Sec^ Mr. Lay to wait upon their Excellencies on the morning of 
the 6th inst.”^
Prom June 10 until the conclusion of the negotiations at Tientsin
on June 26, Lay's role was confined to that of serving the British
Mission, although Lord Elgin retained his conception of the role he
wished Lay to play. Whereas prior to June 10, Lay had on a number of
occasions visited the Commissioners' Yamen unaccompanied by any other
foreigner, after this date he was always accompanied by at least one
6*5other member (usually Wade or Bruce) of the British Mission. In fact, 
he appears to have become so closely identified with the Mission that at 
one point there was speculation within the Mission that Lay would accompany 
Bruce when the latter carried the signed treaty to London for ratification.1
63* "E/B” No. 129 QP»cit. June 14» 1858.
64* ”E/B” No. 134 Elgin to Malmesbury, June 18, 1858. Enclosure
Elgin to Commissioners June 12. 1858. Although it was in reply to a 
complaint from the three high officials, the communication was addressed 
only to the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang end Hua-sha-na.
65* The citations are too numerous to list. The assertion is derived
from a correlation of Oliphant, Elgin's official despatches and Bruce's
day-book.
66. "JMA" II.A.5 (2)(2J) P 372. Robert Jardine (A. Perceval left 
Shanghai about April 27-28) to Joseph Jardine. July 5» 1858*
mThat this was only speculation and that Lord Elgin intended that
Lay should resume his career in the Ch'ing service was clear before
the Mission departed from Tientsin. It was while the Mission was
still at Tientsin that Lay was given the task of impressing upon the
Ch'ing Authorities the need for the prompt assignment of suitable
officials to Shanghai to negotiate a supplementary codicil fixing the
details of commercial relations. Lay, on Lord Elgin's instructions,
went so far as to recommend, specifically, Chao and Hsfleh, the two
67officials with whom he had the most cordial connections. Since it 
was virtually inconceivable that these negotiations could have been 
carried out without the presence of Lay and since there would be no 
justification for retaining Lay as a member of the Mission once it had 
returned to Shanghai, the Tientsin initiative implied that Lay would be 
reverting to his former role.
The reversion was achieved with a minimum of time wasted but it 
required a further exercise in rationalisation. In September, Ho Kuei- 
ch'ing felt it expedient to explain Lay's position as follows:
H.N. Lay is the most crafty of the barbarians. In 
the winter of [1854-] 1855> the former governor, Chi-er- 
hang-a sent a [communication] to the said chief [Bowring] 
to employ him as Shanghai Customs Commissioner with
generous pay. [.... ] The said barbarian was afraid of
being disliked by [the] various [#•••] barbarians, so he
67* "IWSM" HP 28: 52, 3-52 b,5# Memorial of Kuei-liang and others.
Recorded, July 10, 1858. Refers to visit from Lay of July 1, 1858.
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also accompanied them to Tientsin and made a great 
display of violence and ingratiated himself with 
the barbarian chief [ElginJ in order to show his 
public spirit. When he returned to Shanghai he 
was as compliant as ever in our employ. "Who bells 
(the tiger; can remove the bell5” so we must con­
tinue to hold him responsible for all the barbarians.68
Lay, actually, had lost no time in "reporting*to Hsueh the results
of the negotiations at Tientsin and in urging him to solicit Ho’s support
69for the recommendation made before the departure from Tientsin. By
the time Ho transmitted the whole of Hsueh’s report, the decision had
already been made to give approval to the idea of opening discussions on
the supplementary treaty, but the discussions were only to serve as part
70of a general policy of prevarication.
The delaying tactics employed by the Imperial Court had the indirect
result of expediting Lay’s resumption of his role as a Ch’ing official.
When Lord Elgin became aware in late July that formal negotiations were
to be delayed, he decided to visit Japan with the object of negotiating
71a treaty with the Japanese. He did not, however, take Wade with him.
68. IWSM HP 30* 45”b> 9-46,4* P*522. Extract from Ho Kuei-ch’ing
memorial. Recorded in Peking Oct. 5, 1858.
69* IWSM HP 29, (Extract) 23,3-23b,3* Eo Kuei-ch’ing memorial.
Recorded. Aug. 2, 1858.
70. Two edicts were issued on July 15, 1858, in reply to the
Commissioners’ memorial of July 10, 1858 (cf n. 68). One to the Grand 
Secretariat (Swisher, p.516) and one to the Grand Council, which in­
cluded more detailed instructions on the policy to be pursued.
HP 29: 8,8-8b, 10.
71. IWSM HP 30* ll,l-12b,4« Ho Kuei-ch’ing memorial. Recorded
Aug. 8, 1858.
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It is true that Wade was not qualified (nor was Lay, for that
matter), to act as an interpreter in Japanese* This would not
necessarily have prevented him from playing an effective part in
negotiations* The crux of the situation, rather, was that as informal
discussions were taking place in Shanghai, an official, qualified
member of the China Mission had to remain there to work out the
numerous details with the qualified Ch’ing representative - (according
72
to Lord Elgin’s analysis) Lay* Thus, precluded from accompanying the
Mission to Japan, on the one hand Lay was obliged to resume the burden
of his responsibilities as Inspector and, on the other hand, he was
ejected, in the discussions, to act as adviser to his employers*
In this situation, as in the situation at Tientsin, the local Ch’ing
officials accommodated themselves to Lord Elgin’s manoeuvres* The
reports to Peking, while sometimes equivocal as to Lay’s function, in-
73variably identified him as an official representative of the British*
The most striking example of this pattern may be found in the events 
connected with the formal negotiations. Lord Elgin directly requested
72. Wade and Lay may have wished to accompany the Mission to Japan, 
but Elgin also had to limit his entourage because of lack of accommo­
dation. "E/B” No. 164* Elgin to Malmesbury. July 30» 1858.
73* In the communications of the officials dealing directly with the 
British covered by IWSM HF: 23-31 (end of May to end of Nov., 1858)
Lay is identified as an interpreter, a linguist, as the "assistant 
Chinese Secretary" and even as an English "chief”* While in the summer 
of 1858, it was officially reported that he had been appointed to an 
office in the customs, no official Chinese title is ever attached to 
his name.
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the Imperial appointees to permit Lay to sit on the tariff commission,
which was agreed to.^ In the report of these specific discussions,
the Imperial officials noted that Ho had appointed Hsiieh and Vu Hstt
(expectant prefect at Shanghai) as the Ch'ing representatives to carry
on the discussions with Wade and Lay as the representatives for the 
75other side.
As final evidence of the rationalisation of Lay's role, effected 
in the period of treaty negotiations, it is worth quoting at length a 
memorandum prepared by Bruce at the behest of the Foreign Office, after 
his return to London, respecting staff changes to coincide with the 
commitments entailed in the new treaty. Bruce’s recommendations must 
have been primarily based on ideas discussed with Lord Elgin before the 
former's departure from Shanghai in mid-July, 1858. Any additional 
information at Bruce's disposal could only have been based on corres­
pondence that left Shanghai no later than mid-August.
... .It would have been desirable to have joined with [Wade] 
at first, Mr. Lay, who speaks the Mandarin dialect with 
fluency, and possesses in a high degree the power of seizing 
the ideas of his Chief, and of conveying them in the form 
best calculated to insure their reception by the Chinese.
But I am informed that he is likely to be called on by the 
Chinese Government to organize their Custom-houses according 
to the plan adopted at Shanghae and so successfully admini­
stered hitherto by Mr. Lay himself. It is not expedient
74* ”E/BM. Enclosure in No. 189. Elgin to Malmesbury. Oct. [l6],
1858. Elgin to Ch'ing officials.
75* IWSM. HF 505 42,2-43^,5* (p*42* lines 8-9 for the specific 
reference). Memorial of the Manchu Commissioners and Ho Kuei-ch'ing.
Recorded Oct. 5, 1858.
that he should be induced to decline this task, for 
the employment of an able and upright foreigner in 
an important branch of Chinese administration is the 
first step towards the regeneration of the Empire; 
and will greatly facilitate our future intercourse.
I can state that in bringing Hr. Lay so prominently 
forward in the negotiations at Tientsin, and in 
placing him in a position to suggest confidentially 
to the Chinese the course they should pursue, Lord 
Elgin hoped that the idea of retaining him as their 
adviser in foreign questions would present itself to 
the minds of the Chinese Commissioners.76
Willingly or unwillingly, as the memorials of the officials attest,
they were the recipients of Lay's advice - advice not infrequently
formulated by Lord Elgin. As the latter confided to Lady Elgin: "I
have also through a secret channel (Lay) had the hint conveyed to them
that if they do not give me full satisfaction at once I am capable of
going off to Tientsin again - a move which would no doubt cost their
77heads to both Kweiliang & Hwa Shana.”
The last important development in this period, Lord Elgin's journey 
up the Yangtze to Hankow - a concession granted in exchange for a 
modification of the clause relating to the permanent residence of a 
minister at Peking - typifies the enigma of Lay's dual role. There is 
nothing to indicate whose initiative was responsible for his joining the
76. FO 17/306. Memorandum signed by Bruce as at London, Oct. 21, 1858.
77• mE/B". ms. Elgin to Lady Elgin. Entry under date of "Shanghae. 
Sunday 10th Oct, 1858”. Elgin felt the Commissioners were becoming 
obstructive and he also was disturbed by news of unsettled conditions 
in and around occupied Canton.
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exclusively British expedition of armed naval vessels. There were
good practical reasons, if he were to become the organiser of all
treaty port Custom-houses, for his acquiring knowledge, in his
capacity as an Ch'ing employe, of the inland port. He doubtless
gained valuable knowledge in this connection, but his principal
functions were carried on in the capacity of British interpreter
78whether the contacts were with Ch'ing or Taiping officials. Official 
records may one day, perhaps, disclose that he was simply on a "busman'b” 
holiday.
The by-play that was going on between the Ch'ing and British 
officials with respect to the nature of Lay's role did not extend to the 
representatives of the other Powers. To them, whether at Tientsin - 
where the Russians were included with the French and Americans - or at 
Shanghai, insofar as Lay's activities infringed on what they conceived 
to be their respective interests, he was an agent of the British Govern­
ment. Their communications, whether censorious complaints as at 
Tientsin or unstinted commendation as at Shanghai, were always addressed 
to Lord Elgin and never to the Ch'ing Authorities.
The by-play was taken up by the non-official sector of the foreign 
community. Those who had been anti-Lay in the pre-treaty period
78. ftE/B" No . 1. Elgin to Malmesbury. Jan. 6, 1859* Incorrectly 
noted as Jan. 5 in Blue Book,"Mission” p.440* Also IWSM. HF 345 
23b,6-25,5* Sheng-Pao and Weng T'ung-shu memorial. Recorded Feb. 21, 
1859.
79identified him as an official in the employ of the Ch'ing government.
At the time, and especially after the repulse at Taku in 1859 of the
Allied missions seeking to proceed to Peking to exchange ratifications,
they discerned his nefarious hand in all the restrictive provisions
80incorporated in the 1858 treaties* In some evaluations, Wade was
tarred with the same brush, since he too had received generous emoluments
81
in the employ of the Ch'ing.
Those who had been pro-Lay - with one notable exception - identified
him simply as an important member of Lord Elgin's Mission* When he
received special notice, it was to call attention to his masterly tactics
in thwarting the crafty efforts of the Ch'ing Authorities to nullify
82Lord Elgin's objectives. The one exception, referred to above, was
the house of Jardine, Matheson & Co*
The temporary successors to Alexander Perceval were James Whittall 
83and Robert Jardine. Jardine, who was normally a resident of Hongkong, 
was unfavourably disposed toward Lord Elgin, possibly because of the 
latter's undisguised antipathy toward expatriate merchant princes. This
79* [Scarth] op.cit. pp. 309-310.
80. "Overland Friend of China" (about July 22). Letter from corres­
pondent dated July 20, 1859* "London and China Telegraph"!’ Sept. 14,
1859. P* 461. "London and China Express"I , Oct. 10, 1859* P*515 
[Scarth] op.cit. p. 314* Michie, op.cit. p.337«
81. The "Friend of China" and [Scarth] above, both include Wade.
82. Cf. especially. "Times" Sept. 13, pp.8-9* Based on correspondence 
from Tientsin of June 26. Vide also King, op.cit. p.50.
83* Perceval left Shanghai about April 27-28. "JMA" II A.5 (2)(23)
P 352. 4 May 1858 James Whittall to Joseph Jardine. The earliest corres
pondence that has been noted from Robert Jardine is dated from early 
July, just prior to the return of the Mission from Tientsin.
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appeared to have an indirect effect on the relations between Jardine 
and Lay, for while Whittall and Jardine in letters to Hongkong 
frequently referred to written and oral contact with Wade and G.H. 
FitzRoy (an attache with the Mission) throughout the events from April 
to November, 1858, Lay was not mentioned at all.^
The attitudes described above help to explain the disparity in 
interpretations of the extent of Lay’s influence on the formulation of 
policy. In his own literary productions (pamphlets and letters to the 
press), particularly those published from I864 on, Lay tended to 
exaggerate his own influence.
As far as basic policy was concerned, the public record is con­
clusive as to who made the decisions. Private correspondence provides 
additional confirmation that the decisions in China were made by Lord 
Elgin and that the decisions with respect to those issues which became 
the crucial ones - the permanent residence of a minister at Peking and 
the "opening" of the interior to foreign commercial enterprise - were 
made before Lay was in a position to exert any significant influence.^ 
His counsel and his assertive voice were undoubtedly heard, but since his 
own ideas were derived from his seniors in the public service (Wade and
84. "JMA" II.A.5(2)(23) P 553 May 5, 1858 P 359, May 29, 1858} 
P 375, July 7, 1858, passim.
85* Vide pa»leau Appendix II.
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Parkes, and thus, indirectly, Alcock), they were not singular* It
also taxes credibility to assume that Lord Elgin's decisions would
hinge upon the ideas expressed by a young man in his twenty-sixth year*
In this connection, a more credible analysis of the question could
be based on a division between substantive and procedural policy* In
the substantive sphere, Lay's influence in formulating secondary, as
distinct from basic, policy was of much greater significance* His
specific contributions to the formulations of the general commercial
provisions of the Tientsin Treaty are obscure, though it is certain
86that he assisted in the procedure* Wade was also in attendance when
these provisions were under consideration and while his experience as
Inspector at Shanghai had been brief, he had continued to be the advocate
of policies laid down during his tenure*
Lay's contribution to the supplementary provisions formulated at
Shanghai was much clearer* In the first place, his labours were publicly
87acknowledged by the three envoys* In the second place, his first-hand 
knowledge of the commodities exchanged and his familiarity with the body 
of statistics accumulated over the four-year period of the Inspectorate 
made it possible to adapt the provision for a five per cent* ad valorem
86. "E/B" Bruce daybook* Entries for May 7 and May 8, 1858. In 
the former entry Bruce refers to "Lay”.
87* "E/B” No* 203* Elgin to Malmesbury. Nov* 6, 1858* No* 205*
Same to same* Nov* 8, 1858* Enclosure from Wade and Oliphant to Elgin. 
Nov* 6, 1858, No* 207. Same to same. Nov. 8, 1858. Enclosures* Gros 
to Elgin. Nov. 3» 1858 and Reed to Elgin, Nov. 6, 1858.
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tariff to a comprehensive itemised list of imports and exports with
common sense and realism.
But it should be recorded that others also contributed significantly
to the supplementary provisions. S. Veils Williams, whose knowledge of
the commodity trade was at least as comprehensive as Lay's, was also an
active member of the "commission". His invaluable contribution was
88acknowledged at the time, but perhaps because the supplementary
provisions rather surreptitiously legalised opium, the American emphasis
on participation has been down-graded. Vade too was a member of the
"commission"• The record of his contribution has been obscured largely
because every effort was made to give the impression that most of the
initiative for the provisions came from the Ch'ing side. In fact, among
Lord Elgin's private papers, there is an English memorandum which purports
to be the draft of proposals put forward by the Ch'ing Authorities. The
89draft, with marginal notes, is a joint production of Wade and Lay. ' One 
may conclude that the obvious origin of the memorandum dictated that it 
should never become part of the official record.
88. "E/S" No. 203. Op.cit. Enclosure. Vade to Elgin. Nov. 5*
1858 and Bennett, op.cit. p*323*
89- "E/Bm Reference to the "Ch'ing memo" was made in an undated memo 
prepared by Wade, included in No. 192, Elgin to Malmesbury. Oct. 22, 
1858. The ms English copy of the "Ch'ing memo" is undated, does not 
bear the usual signification that it is a translation, does not have a 
corresponding Chinese text among Lord Elgin's papers, and is not listed 
in Lord Elgin's official register of communications received. The ms 
is in Wade's handwriting, with interlinear and marginal notes in Lay's.
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It is of course important to emphasise these points for, while 
even some of Lay's contemporaries were inclined to exaggerate his 
contributions, many of those who continued to reside in China during 
the balance of his relatively brief career were not so inclined to 
forget the contributions of their compatriots or colleagues.
Thus far, the problem of the opium trade has in this study been 
all but deliberately ignored. This, of course, is a consequence of 
the peculiar character of the trade - officials on all sides refused 
to acknowledge its existence, while equally on all sides, it was con­
doned. The Inspectorate system did nothing to alter the situation.
On one occasion early in Lay's tenure, the Taotai had sought to have a 
tax imposed on opium landed or stored at Shanghai. This had aroused
such a hue and cry that the attempt was abandoned. The result, however,
was that the Taotai and Lay collaborated to prevent non-Chinese from 
having anything to do with the trade within the confines of the 
Inspectorate's jurisdiction. In addition, customs' launches were
stationed at Woosung for surveillance to ensure that non-contraband or
90other contraband articles were not smuggled through the opium market.
90. F0 228/196. Robertson's despatches to Bowring, No^. 55
(30/8/55), 56 (2/9/55), 65 (27/9/55) and 91 (6/11/55). For Bowring's 
views on this series of events cf. FO 17/232 No. 501 to Clarendon, 
Sept. 9, 1855* for the Government's policy cf. FO 17/242. Clarendon
to Bowring Nos. 10 (2/1/56) and 4® (8/2/56).
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Throughout 1856 to early 1857» several more attempts were made
to levy a tax on opium, usually coupled with a false rumour that
91Imperial authorisation of the impost was imminent ♦ The last of
these, well before the treaties of 1858, elicited from Lord Elgin the
following comments:
 the Chinese authorities are putting a duty on opium
as a means of raising a Revenue* This, if true, points 
to a solution of one of our greatest difficulties.92
The objective of British policy in this regard from pre-Nanking 
Treaty days had been to persuade the Ch'ing government to "legalise” 
the trade. Because of fiscal and commercial considerations and because 
the British Government was in no position to enforce the Imperial ban on 
the trade, the position had been that as long as the trade was carried 
on outside the zones of treaty port jurisdiction, it was beyond the range 
of official knowledge.
This was the British attitude that continued to prevail at Tientsin 
in 1856. However, W.B. Reed, the American Envoy, following what he
conceived to be his instructions, notified the Imperial Commissioners*
that he intended to include a provision in his treaty citing opium as a 
contraband commodity. When Lay received this information from his Ch'ing
91* "JMA" II.A.2 (37) A. Perceval to Jardine's Hongkong. No. 893 -
14/7/56; 928 - 7/10/56} 941 - 21/10/56; 954 - lO/n/56.
92. "E/S" Ms . Elgin to Lady Elgin. Extract from entry for May 15,
1857.
93. Fairbank, "Trade". Ch.13, passim.
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informants and transmitted it to Lord Elgin, the latter sent Brace
to discuss the question with Heed and Putiatin (who was heing capricious).
Lord Elgin subsequently visited both envoys to dissuade them from
94referring to opium in their treaties.
It need only be pointed out here that although Lord Elgin per­
sonally found the trade reprehensible, he nevertheless convinced Heed 
that it would be both injudicious (in that virtually every major American 
house depended for its existence on the opium trade) and hypocritical 
(since the Americans would take advantage of the British treaty and since 
the American government would not police its nationals to enforce the ban) 
to carry out his intention. Lay later claimed that no discussions on 
the issue took place at Tientsin, but he was careful to refer only to
the absence of any reference to the subject in the printed Parliamentary 
95Papers.
There is nothing among the official or private papers connected with 
British activities at Tientsin to indicate that the subject was mentioned 
in the discussions between the Ch'ing and British officials. When the 
tariff schedule was being discussed at Shanghai, opium became a pivotal 
topic. The initiative appears to have come as much from the local Ch'ing 
officials, who were desperately in need of additional revenue to be used
94* "E/B" No. 124 (Confidential) Elgin to Malmesbury June 10, 1858, 
enclosing, as well, Bruce's confidential memo, of the same date, reporting 
on his visit.
95, "Times". Oct. 22, 1880 (6c). Letter from Lay.
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to combat a mounting Taiping resurgence, as from either Lay or Wade*
At first the issue hinged on the amount of "tariff” to be imposed;
the minimum demand of the Ch’ing officials was higher than the five
per cent, ad valorem specified by the general treaty* With the arrival
of the Imperial Commissioners, prohibition again became the order of the 
96day* Ultimately, however, at the last discussions, the sanction of
the Imperial Commissioners coincided with a concession made by Lord Elgin
on the resident minister issue* But it is clear that Lord Elgin's
concession was in exchange for authorisation to make the Yangtze trip
97and had no connection with the opium question* The sanction of opium
96* The uncertainty as to whether opium would be included is 
reflected in "JMA" II.A*5 (2)(23)* Letters of Robert Jardine and
James Whittall to Joseph Jardine from July through October, 1858*
Jardine's at Shanghai was receiving information directly from Wade 
and FitzRoy. Prior to the arrival of the Imperial Commissioners at 
Shanghai, Ho Kuei-ch'ing memorialised recommending removal of pro­
hibition on opium ((IWSM(S) HF 31? 18,9-19^,1* Recorded Oct* 9* 1858)).
The edict replying to this indicates that the Commissioners were 
instructed to preserve the prohibition ((IWSM(S) HF 31? 21b,6 - 22b,9,
Oct. 13, 1858)). After the arrival of the Commissioners, Ho again 
memorialised recommending legalisation. (Vide jgagfe. n*98). In 
his letter of Oct. 20, 1880, vide antea n*95» Lay insisted opium was 
included on the initiative of the Chinese* Lay's assertion was con­
firmed by Oliphant in a supporting letter which appeared in the "Times", 
Oct. 25, 1880 (10c).
97* "E/B" No. 216 (and enclosures) Elgin to Malmesbury, Nov. 5,
1858 [sicj. Although drafted prior to despatches bearing lower 
numbers, the length of this despatch and of its enclosures suggests 
that it was delayed in preparation.
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was thus an independent Ch'ing decision and one can only surmise that
the Imperial Commissioners, convinced of the rational arguments in
favour of this step, hoped it would he interpreted as part of the
98price of Lord Elgin's concession#
In this respect, if in no other, Lay was a champion for the good
name of Lord Elgin# Throughout the remainder of his life, Lay defended
Lord Elgin as well as the "British" in general against the charge that
"legalisation" had been forced upon the Chinese under the threat of
British guns# He had a tendency to manipulate the facts, but his basic
99argument was valid.
To have ignored altogether any reference to this issue, which has 
always received an unwarranted amount of attention in accounts of this 
period, would at best have been indiscreet. Perhaps the only effect of 
this reference is to substantiate in a negative way the limited scope of 
Lay's influence on the formulation of substantive policy#
98. "IWSM" (S) HP 31j 33b, 6 - 36, 2. Ho Kuei-ch'ing memorial,
recorded Oct# 19« 1858# Ho again indirectly recommended the legalisation
of opium and noted that removal of "the opium prohibition or not [.... ]
is neither here nor there to the barbarian chiefs or barbarian merchants" 
(extract, Swisher, p. 530). When the Ch'ing negotiators memorialised on 
the tariff settlement, they made no mention of opium, but included notice 
of the Yangtze trip. This last so infuriated the Emperor that had any 
news of the opium arrangement seeped through, it might well have been 
considered to be of secondary importance. "IWSM" HP 32} 15*8-18,6. 
(Swisher, in full pp# 539-542) • Memorial and edict both recorded Nov. 24,
1858. The full text of the settlement does not appear to have reached 
Peking before the end of. January, 1859* cf. Swisher, pp. 548-552.
99* In addition to his defence of 1880, Lay responded to the charges 
of the anti-opium publicists throughout the period 1891-1895* Besides 
numerous letters which appeared in the "Times", he composed and published 
a "blue book": "Note on the Opium Question" (London, 1893)*
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The extent of Lay* s influence on procedural policy ought also 
to be evaluated from two vantage points* There was a whole range 
of procedural policy which was exclusively the prerogative of the 
diplomatic and military chiefs of the Allied expedition* There 
was another range, encompassing the actual negotiations, in which 
Lay's influence, as far as the British were concerned, was a pre­
dominant feature*
The ability of the diplomatic and military chiefs to work out 
mutually agreeable tactics and strategy was affected by jealousies
and conflicts of interest which seem to be customary features of
100operations of this kind* One aspect only of Lord Elgin's approach
has a direct bearing on the evaluation of Lay's behaviour, especially 
during the diplomatic negotiations at Tientsin*
Lord Elgin embarked on his duties as chief of the Special Mission 
in 1857 • extremely sensitive to the strictures of his critics in Britain* 
In the fane of violence and the threat of insurrection during his terms 
successively as Governor of Jamaica and Governor-General of British 
North America, Lord Elgin had refrained from the employment of repressive 
police action and had opted for a policy of conciliation to foster res­
ponsible self-government* His opponents tended to disparage the
100* As Elgin noted, the situation was "novel" in one respect, 
"•••• it has rarely happened that a civil Englishman in a situation 
like mine has been held back [by?] the unwillingness of the military 
or naval authorities to act* The more ordinary difficulty is that 
of restraining them." "E/B" Mss Elgin to Lady Elgin* Entry June 1, 
1858.
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salutary effects of his policy and to charge that he lacked sufficient 
fortitude and determination to employ extreme measures to protect the 
vital interests of the E m p i r e . S i n c e  Lord Elgin was still a 
comparatively young man, eligible in many respects to be considered a 
potential prime minister, he set out determined to disprove the alle­
gations of his critics.
While he was thus anxious to demonstrate his capacity for fortitude 
and determination, he was too much the sensitive and cultured aristocrat 
to permit himself to lose his sense of proportion or, once he had become 
acquainted with it, to blind himself to the social and cultural achieve­
ments of Chinese civilisation. In consequence, he periodically felt 
repugnance when, as was all too often the case, he found the predatory 
and avaricious members of the foreign community oblivious to the cultured 
sensitivities of their unwilling "hosts”, and when the military forces
associated with his mission indulged in needless violence and wasteful
102destruction of life and property.
Nonetheless, by the time it was possible for him to proceed to 
Tientsin, he was prepared to brook no opposition to a speedy fulfillment
101. **e/B” Bruce to Elgin. Private. London. Nov. 8, 1858. "One 
satisfactory result of the Eastern expedition has been the putting
your character for decision and firmness beyong question  The
most ignorant and malevolent are forced to confess now that the exis­
tence of the qualities they professed to call in question, is put 
beyond a doubt.” Cf. Parkes to Lockhart, March, 1857• Lane-Poole, 
op.cit. I, p.285«
102. "E/B” Ms . Elgin to Lady Elgin. Letters-joumal 1857-'58
passim. No. 86 Elgin to Clarendon April 9t 1858.
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of his diplomatic mission. On May 27, he tactfully tried to suggest
to his military colleague, Admiral Seymour, that he desired to have
additional forces called up from their Hongkong-Canton station so that
they would he available should it be necessary to press an offensive 
103against Peking.  ^ In the atmosphere prevailing, the Admiral chose 
to ignore the tactful gambit and only acted after Lord Elgin addressed 
a formal request to him on June 1.^^ By his attitude and his action, 
therefore, Lord Elgin conditioned the atmosphere in which the Tientsin 
discussions - which did not officially commence until June 4 - were to 
take place.
The relevance of these matters to Lay’s subsequent behaviour in 
his contacts with the Ch’ing Authorities is self-evident. Prom his
103. "E/B" Ms . Elgin to Lady Elgin, June 1, 1958* "However, 
the present plan is that we remain here to treat with the new 
Commissioners if they have sufficient powers, and if they have not 
we shall move on to Pekin when the Troops arrive."
104. Adm. 50/281. Adm. Seymour to the Admiralty. June 1, 1858. 
Enclosure. Elgin to Seymour. June 1. Enclosure. Seymour to Elgin. 
June 1, noting that troops would be sent for on June 5* That the 
request was sent was noted by both Elgin and Bruce. "E/B" Elgin to 
Malmesbury. Private. June 4"th, 1858 (Elgin also noted* "The French 
Admiral has already sent for his land forces from the South....").
ms. Elgin to Lady Elgin June 4* Bruce to T.C. Bruce (a younger
brother) June.1-4, 1858. "We don’t know whether a further advance 
will be necessary to obtain the substance of the concessions we ask.
The Fury starts to-day for Hong-Kong to order up as many troops as can 
be spared, so as to employ force if necessary, tor strengthen 
negotiations "
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earliest meetings with them, before relations had become strained,
Lay sought to impress upon them the need for urgency in arranging 
a satisfactory treaty at Tientsin and the consequences that would 
follow if Lord Elgin were dissatisfied with the pace of the 
negotiations•
Lay’s own attitude and actions, as reflected in his behaviour, 
were highlighted by three periods of crisess June 8-11) June 24-26$ 
a brief, but distinctive, crisis again on June 26* The first crisis 
centred on the desire of Lord Elgin that the accredited Ch'ing pleni­
potentiaries should acknowledge formally, at the earliest moment, those 
of his general terms of settlement which they were prepared to negotiate 
without reservation* He was ready to accept limited delay for three
reasons* He wished to be absolutely certain that the Commissioners
106understood the implications of the terms* He was determined that
the formal documents should bear a seal attesting to the "full powers"
107of the Commissioners* He felt that the Admired would not agree to
105* "E/B" Ho. 129* Elgin to Malmesbury. June 149 1858*
Enclosing copies of reports submitted by Lay on his meetings* See 
especially report for June 6 in which Lay informed the Chinese 
secretary Pien that troops had been sent for and added "if they pre- 
fered war, why, they would have it." The threat was again repeated 
on June 8*
106. "E/B" Bruce day-book. June 5» 1858. No. 153* Elgin to
Malmesbury. June 18, 1858.
107* Walrond. jop.cit* p. 252*
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a resumption of the military offensive until the requested re­
enforcements arrived
Lay discovered from his first "unofficial" contacts that the 
officials were quite aware of the implications of Lord Elgin’s terms,
and that their strongest opposition was against the resident minister 
109provisions. At the start, he ascribed their tactics of vacillation
to a design on their part to "use barbarians [the Russians and Americans] 
to control barbarians [the British and French]". He adopted the 
technique utilised by all his experienced compatriots, and since adopted 
by Lord Elgin himself and acted the part of "the uncontrollably 
fierce barbarian". He aggressively pressed the British advantage 
according to the dictum, "keep your superiority never be beat even in 
chaffing."111
108. "E/B" ms. Elgin to Lady Elgin. June 1, 1858.
109. "E/B" No. 129 op.cit. Enclosure. Lay's report on meeting of 
u^ne 6.
110. Walrond, op.cit. p. 251.
111. "E/B" Bruce day-book. April 12, 1858. Elgin expressed a
similar attitude on June 5» 1858. Walrond, op.cit. p.251. That Lay 
was extremely aggressive has been confirmed by his own reports as well 
as by those of the Ch'ing and other foreign participants in 1858. His 
conduct, however, was not exceptional. Cf.j e.g. "IWSM", HF 60i
It3-3*6. Memorial of Kuei-liang, Heng-fu and Heng-ch'i (Ch'ing
negotiators in I860). Recorded Sept. 6, I860. Esp. p.5, lines 5-4 
"••••additionally on this occasion, the Barbarian Chief Farkes' 
arrogant disposition was twice as extreme as that of Wade and Lay 
previously."
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It was true that the Russian envoy, Count Putiatine, through
insinuation, and the American envoy, Heed, through ineptitude, were
giving the Commissioners and their subordinates the impression that
the envoys would use their good offices to intercede on behalf of the
Imperial interest. However, Lay1s efforts were so far successful
that after three days of discussions, he extracted a promise from the
Commissioners that on June 9» an official communication, conceding Lord
Elgin's general terms in essentially the same form as they had been pre-
112sented, would be ready for transmittal to Lord Elgin,
The fundamental reason for the Commissioners1 vacillation, however, 
was not disclosed to any of the foreigners at Tientsin and it was some 
time after all the treaties had been signed and the missions had with­
drawn from Tientsin that the full story became known to them. The 
fundamental reason was that as a result of the sponsorship of one of the 
Court factions, the Emperor agreed to recall from enforced retirement,
the aged and enfeebled Ch'i-ying to act as chief Imperial Commissioner
113to take precedence over Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na.  ^ Ch'i-ying had 
been one of the principal negotiators during the 1842-1844 treaties and
112, "E/B" No, 129 ou.cit. Enclosure. Lay's report.
113• "IWSM” [s] HP. 24* 1»6. This was an "additional” edict
(though not specified as such by Swisher. p*476) to Grand Secretariat 
of June 2, 1838. Cf, also edict to Grand Council of June 3» which 
defines Ch'i-ying*s terms of reference, HP 24* 9B,3 - 10,2.
(Swisher pp. 476-77)-
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had made a favourable impression upon most foreigners during the
period of his direct intercourse with them. This, in part, had
led to his fall from favour when the Hsien-feng Emperor succeeded
to the throne in 1850.
By June 5» at the latest, Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na knew of
Ch'i-ying's appointment and that he was en route to Tientsin
While informing the envoys of his imminent arrival, however, the
115Commissioners did not inform them of his appointment. When
Ch'i-ying reached Tientsin, on June 8, he assumed the guise of a 
disinterested venerable statesman concerned to spread goodwill and 
to persuade the envoys that the Emperor’s benevolence would be more 
bountiful if the missions were to withdraw from Tientsin.
114. "IWSM" [s ] HP 24* 21,4 - 21b, 6. Further memorial Kuei- 
liang, et.al. Recorded June 6, 1858.
115. For reasons why Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na decided not to in­
form the plenipotentiaries, see previous citation. The first official 
notice the British received was a verbal statement made at the meeting 
of June 11. Vide pprfga p. 3 a?* On the first communication addressed by 
Ch’i-ying to Elgin on June 9» Wade specifically called Elgin’s attention 
to fact that Ch'i-ying did not assume title of Imperial Commissioner. 
"E/B" No. 126. Elgin to Malmesbury, June 12, 1858. (4 Enclosures) 
Enclosure 1. * pp-
116. "E/B" No . 126. Op.cit. Enclosure 3* June 9* Memo of Wade and 
Lay on their visit with Ch’i-ying. Lord Elgin’s initial reaction, like 
that of the other envoys, was favourable to the news. "E/B" ms.
Elgin to Lady Elgin. June 9 "Keying.... who is supposed to be friendly 
to the barbarians has been restored to his rank and has come down here - 
this is proof that there is at Peking a sincere desire to settle matters 
pacifically."
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Ch’i-ying*s true status was at no time revealed to the envoys and it
was only in the aftermath of the crisis, just prior to his ignominious
retirement from Tientsin, that Ch’i-ying notified Lord Elgin that he
117had a status at least equal to that of the other Commissioners*
Ch’i-ying’s arrival and the Commissioner’s assertion that their 
official seal had not yet heen received, diverted Lay on June 9 from 
pressing for the promised communication* He and Wade were also occupied 
in ceremonial interviews with Ch’i-ying and, in view of his non-official 
guise, side-tracking his efforts to have a personal meeting with Lord 
Elgin.118
Prom June 9» though, the suspicion grew in British quarters, at
119least, that Ch’i-ying’s function was to impede and delay the negotiations*  ^
Lay professed to believe that Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na were trying to show
117. "E/B" Ho . 126. Op.cit. Enclosure 4. June 11, 1858. Ch'i-
ying to Elgin. See also "E/B" Ho. 130. Elgin to Malmesbury, June 14, 
1853* Enclosure 1, Commissioners to Elgin, June 11, 1858* (This and 
one other communication of the same date (which does not appear to have 
been forwarded to the Foreign Office) are the only ones which include 
Ch'-ying's name - in last position - as one of the Commissioners*
None of Elgin's communications to the Commissioners included Ch'i-ying's 
name in the address*
118* "E/B" No* 126* 0£*cit. Enclosure 3* June 9- Also ME/B” No. 133*
Elgin to Malmesbury June 18, 1838* In the latter despatch, Elgin made it 
clear he was determined not to meet with Ch’i-ying* The memo in the 
former despatch recounts how Ch'i-ying mistook H*N. Lay for his father,
G.T* Lay, whom Ch'i-ying had met during the events of 1842-45* Ch’i-ying's 
sight was failing and it is true that the Chinese homonyms for father and 
son were similar, "Li T’ai-kuo", but their "ming-tzu's" were different*
119* "E/B" No* 124* on.cit* Lay's reports covering interviews of June 
9 and June 10* Also Bruce day-book. Entry for June 10, "Atribuye 
esta hesitacion a Kiying y al influjo y consijos de les Russo [sicj*"
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that they were resentful of, and were being intimidated by, Ch’i-ying1 s 
120presence* Lay also claimed that, following Ch*i-ying’s arrival,
he became conscious of signs of popular hostility to himself and of
the development of a generally menacing attitude among the natives, who
121had until then been docile and cooperative toward all foreigners*
This pattern was strikingly similar to the behaviour of the Cantonese 
populace (during, as well as after, Ch’i-ying’s sojourn there) whose 
demonstrations of hostility, it was known, had been fomented with 
official connivance. Finally, among a large quantity of official docu­
ments which had been seized from Yeh Ming-ch’en’s yamen when that worthy 
was captured, were found copies of Ch’i-ying's memorials which elucidated
for the Tao-kuang Emperor Ch'i-ying's use of dissimulation in his relations
122with the "barbarians”.
120* Oliphant ^op.cit* I, 355*
121* Oliphant, op.cit* I, 377* "E/B" Bruce day-book. Entry
July 3 [TranslatedJ*"For the most part the occurrence of popular 
disturbances was coincident with Ch'i-ying’s arrival and disappeared 
with his departure.” Lay, "Opium", pp* 12-13» cites the incident, 
but in writing 35 years later, he confuses the sequence of events*
122* "E/B” No. 26. Elgin to Clarendon* Feb* 4» 1858*
Enclosed a copy of the memorial that was subsequently to be used to 
intimidate Ch'i-ying. In No* 60 Elgin to Clarendon, March 18, 1858, 
was enclosed a memo of Wade's, summarising the content of the docu­
ments seized* At this point it is again relevant to note that Elgin’s 
attitude was being strongly conditioned quite some time before Lay 
joined the party*
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Thus, in his first visit to the Commissioners * compound on June
10, Lay indirectly warned the Commissioners that serious consequences
would follow unless the natives' hostile actions immediately ceased and
he demanded that the promised communication be delivered to him the same 
123day. On the latter point, the Commissioners demurred on the ground
that they had not yet received the proper official seal. This objection 
was nullified by the British concession that this would not be required 
on this preliminary document. The officials were finally forced to 
agree to have the communication ready by mid-afternoon. When Lay returned, 
despite his giving clear indications of his impatience, he was detained 
for several hours. When a communication was finally presented to him 
early in the evening, it turned out to be but a simple formal request for 
delay and Lay refused to accept it.^^
At this juncture, Lay became the "uncontrollably fierce barbarian" 
in earnest. Having lost complete control of his temper (which he con-
123. *e/B" No. 129 op»cit. Enclosure 6.
124. "E/B" No. 134* Elgin to Malmesbury, June 18. Enclosure 1. 
Copy of Imperial Commissioners and [sic] Ch'i-ying to Reed. June 11. 
According to Elgin (Enclosure 3) Lay had been prof erred "a paper in 
which several material changes had been introduced." It was this 
that provoked his anger. Cf. also "Journal of the North China Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society". (JNCBRAS) Vol. XLII (Shanghai, 1911) 
"The Journal of S. Wells Williams" edited by F.W. Williams, p.81.
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feased to Lord E l g i n ) , h e  castigated the Commissioners and using
insolent and violent language, he threatened them with immediate
126resumption of hostilities, with Peking as the objective. He then
stormed out of the compound, passing Count Putiatine, who had an 
appointment with the Commissioners and who had, while waiting in the 
corridors, overheard some of the sound and fury emanating from the 
inner chambers.
The Ch'ing officials were momentarily panic-stricken for they inter­
preted Lay's remarks to mean that an attack would be launched immediately 
against Tientsin. Receiving assurances from Count Putiatine that he
considered Lay's behaviour shocking and that he knew positively that the
127
British were in no position to launch any kind of immediate offensive, 1 
the Commissioners set afoot a two-pronged diplomatic counter-offensive.
125. In the official British accounts, though Putiatine's testimony 
was widely circulated, Lay's behaviour was made to appear more deliberate. 
In the draft of Elgin's communication to the Commissioners following the 
incident (vide >€gea n. 130), one passage with deletions in brackets 
reads "Mr. Lay, as he has reported to the U.S. [expressed in strong terms 
his indignation at the manner in which he had been trifled with, and he] 
warned the [impl.] Commrs in emphatic terms." That he reported his 
behaviour correctly is attested by the entry in Bruce's day-book ("E/B" 
June 10) "[Lay] habla fuertamente k ellos [sobre?] la su a mala fe."
126. "E/B" No. 127 op.cit. Enclosure 6.
127* "JNCBRAS" XLII. Williams, p.59 [Some of the dates indicated 
in the edited text are inaccurate].
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They reported to the Russian and American Envoys their consternation
at Lay's behaviour and requested that these Envoys address Baron Gros
128and Lord Elgin on the subject* They complained directly to Lord
Elgin about reports reaching them of acts of robbery and violence being
129committed against the natives by British forces*
It would be difficult to conceive of Lord Elgin condoning Lay's
loss of self-control* He was in no mood to receive reprimands, however,
from either Reed, the only one of the other envoys lacking in savoir faire*
or the Commissioners* Consequently, he authorised a letter to be drawn
up for delivery to the Commissioners on June 11, in which he justified
Lay's impatience, confirmed the substance of his threats to them, and
demanded that the promised communication be placed in the hands of the
bearer of his letter (only Wade was specified by name)*^^ He also
addressed a scathing rebuke to Reed, first bluntly reminding him that
the matter was none of his business, and then noting that
in consideration of the interest *l_ you must necessarily feel 
in the progress of a negotiation of as you have informed me 
you propose under the most favored nation clause to claim the 
advantage for y£ countrymen, I have carefully enquired into the 
language held by Mr* Lay* * • •
128* "IWSM” HP 25* 16b, 5-17b, 4* Memorial of three Commissioners* 
Recorded June 14* This request has been documented in all the standard 
studies based on official records of the four Powers*
129* Loc*cit* and me/Bw Communication* Three Commissioners to 
Elgin* June 11, 1858* (Wade's translation)* As far as it has been 
possible to determine, the only copy of this communication is that in 
the Elgin Archives*
130. "E/B" No* 134* QP*cit* Enclosure 3* Elgin to Kuei-liang
and Hua-sha-na only* June 16, (English draft prepared by Wade).
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I find that the language was entirely conformable to the 
instructions vh he had received from me for his guidance*
I have therefore thought it proper to direct Mr* Wade to 
wait on the Imp* Commissioners & to acquaint them that 
for the language in question they must hold me & not Mr*
Lay responsible*131
Lord Elgin also approved a tactic which, it was hoped, would 
force the retirement of Ch*i-ying from the negotiating team. When 
Wade accompanied (unofficially?) by Lay went to transmit Lord Elgin's 
letter, he carried a copy of one of Ch'i-ying1 s most compromising 
memorials* Finding him, as anticipated, present with the other 
Commissioners at the interview, he produced the memorial and, after
132the contents were read, turned it over to Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na. ^
ljl* "E/B” No. 134* QP»oit* Enclosure 2* Elgin to Reed. June 11*
132. There are a number of conflicting reports as to who presented 
and as to who read Ch'i-ying's memorial. In a long printed memo 
("E/B”) - circulated in Shanghai after the debacle of June, 1859 - 
"signed” "T.F.W.” the writer (Wade?) was non committal. According to 
Kuei-liang, Hua-sha-na and Ch'i-ying, Wade produced the memorial and 
it was presented for the Commissioners to read it themselves*
"IWSM" (S) HF 25* 18b,6-19b,7* Memorial of the first two Commissioners,
Recorded June 14* Also, HF 25* 22b,5-24,5* Enclosing copy of letter
from Ch'i-ying to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in memorial of indictment of Ch'i-ying. 
Recorded June 15* For this period, at least, Swisher's translations 
should be carefully checked* e.g., compare virtually identical sections 
of Chinese text of HP 26, lb,7-3b,6 (Swisher, 498-500)} 3b,7-4*,3
(500-501)} 5»10-6b,6 (502-503). Swisher's translations not only vary
in phraseology, but there are radical variations in the meaning he has 
derived from the identical textual material.
Hsu op.cit. p.41 (p.227, n.105) remarks that the official record; viz* 
Oliphant, I, 359, Morse, "Conflict", 521, and BPP [2571] 534 ascribing 
the memorial to 1850 was "probably owing to a misunderstanding of Wade's 
introductory note.**.” is borne out by the printed memo just cited. In 
this ”T.F. W[ade]” writes ”[the Commissioner's terror] was increased by 
the production of a memorial drawn up by Kiying in I845.... ”
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According to a later report, nthe old intrigant waa from that moment 
set aside, returned to Peking, was tried, it is hard to say for what 
offence, and was condemned to s u i c i d e . B y  ten in the evening, 
the communication, which had been the cause of the crisis, was in the 
hands of the British.
This recourse to extensive detail to reconstruct the atmosphere 
and sequence of events during this first crisis has been necessitated 
to correct an interpretative error propagated by the earliest editors 
of Lord Elgin's private letters to Lady Elgin.
Since 1872, a version of an extract from Lord Elgin's entry of 
June 12, has been quoted by every defender of Lord Elgin and, appositely, 
by every Anglophobe, anti-imperialist and Lay-detractor, as evidence of 
Lord Elgin's revulsion at the behaviour of his negotiators - the 
principal one to that date being Lay. The printed extract is re­
produced here in its entirely. An extended extract, transcribed from
the original manuscript, is, because of its length, reproduced in an
135 appendix. ^
I have gone through a good deal since we parted.
Certainly I have seen more to disgust me with my fellow-
countrymen than I saw during the whole course of my 
previous life, since I have found them in the East among
133. "T.F.W." Memo [July, 1859] p.12
134. "E/B" No. 130. Elgin to Malmesbury. June 14. 1858. 
Enclosure I.
135. Vide Appendix III.
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populations too timid to resist and too ignorant to 
complain. I have an instinct in me which loves 
righteousness and hates iniquity, and all this Keeps 
me in a perpetual boil.136
In the first place, T. Walrond, the editor of the public edition
deserves only mild censure. He was not a specialist in Chinese affairs.
Nonetheless, he chose to use for his text, though he was in possession
137of the manuscript, an edition, privately printed in 1864> compiled 
by Lady Elgin and Lord Elgin's last private secretary. This earlier 
version, without editorial comment, had the advantage of being de­
personalised. Later writers, without careful reference to the day to 
day events, related the distorted extract of Lord Elgin's remark to the 
crisis of June 10.
In the second place, recognised scholars who have produced studies 
on the period have either (a) failed to examine the day-to-day develop­
ments with minute attention to chronology, or (b) ascribed the evidence 
of the public record to a manifestation of chauvinism on Lord Elgin's 
part, or (c) avoided the obvious inconsistency by disassociating their 
general account of the developments from their specific evaluation of
136. Walrond, op.cit. pp. 252-253*
137* "Extracts from the Letters of James Earl of Elgin, etc. etc. 
to Mary Louisa Countess of Elgin 1847-1862". (Privately printed. 
Edinburgh, I864) 266 p. A copy of this book was being offered
by a second-hand dealer in Great Britain in 1962.
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Lay’s role during the crisis*
In the third place, there were specific incidents, completely 
unrelated to the negotiation crisis, which were responsible for 
provoking the emotional outburst recorded in Lord Elgin's letter- 
journal* The complaints of the Commissioners to Lord Elgin con-
139ceming the activities of a contingent of British troops were valid* ^  
Yet it was also true that British officers in Tientsin were being 
molested by the inhabitants* On June 11, the day preceding the 
entry in the letter-journal, Capts* Dew and Saumerez complained of 
being "hooted and fretted"^^ and, in addition, the former was relieved 
of his cap and dog*^^ However, a punitive expedition requested by 
Lord Elgin, organised with Lay as interpreter, exceeded the bounds of
1 AO
discretion in humiliating the Chinese.
136. The implications of the extract in Walrond rankled Lay at least 
for 20 years* In his "Note on the Opium Question” (1893) P»12, he 
wrote, "It must have been about this stage that Lord Elgin made the
entry in his diary He was then getting his treaty too easily, and
could afford to indulge in the luxury of sentiment."
139* Vide antea n.129. See also Elgin's remarks contrasting the 
behaviour of the forces in I860 with that of 1858. Walrond, p* 335» 
July 14* Walrond has omitted a sentence* After "There seems to be 
really no plundering or bullying", Elgin had written "It shews how much 
depends on the Chiefs in such matters*" ("E/B"* ms* July 14*)
140. Adm* 50/281* Report from Adm. Seymour to Admiralty. June 12, 
1858.
141* Oliphant, op.cit. I, 378*
142. Adm. 50/281. op.cit* June 12. Oliphant, op.cit* I, 381.
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Thus, while Lord Elgin could he remorseful about the "fighting
and bullying” and the "almost brutal” behaviour to which lie was a
143party in the negotiations, his revulsion - expressed on other
occasions as well as on June 12 - was a reaction against the generally
domineering, arrogant and contemptuous attitudes of his "fellow 
144creatures*”
The remaining two crises at Tientsin were of a different kind*
Luring June 24-26, after having given the impression that they would
concede everything, the Commissioners tried by every means to avoid
having to sign a treaty that included the resident minister clause*
Every device, such as appeals to the other envoys and efforts to find a
Chinese (among others, a member of the American staff) who would act as
145their interpreter, was ineffectual* Despite these numerous attempts
to frustrate the British, Lay maintained his equilibrium and using his 
knowledge of Chinese customs, with the cooperation of Bruce, he was en­
abled to convince the Commissioners, only a few hours before the hour
143* "E/B* ms. Elgin to Lady Elgin* June 29, 1858. (Cf*
Walrond, ou*cit* pp. 253-54)*
144* Vide Appendix III*
145. "JHCBRAS", Williams, "op.cit" XLII, pp. 73-74* "E/B"
Ho. 157 and Ho. 142. Elgin to Malmesbury (with enclosures) July 3 
and July 5* "E/B" Bruce day-book, entries for June 24 and 25* The
day-book also includes a day to day record of meetings with the 
commissioners following the June 11 crisis* Lay attended every 
meeting, but on each occasion was accompanied by either Wade or Bruce.
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scheduled for the formal signing, that they had no alternative hut 
to capitulate
The final crisis was a minor one which occurred during the cere­
monial signing on the afternoon of June 26. Lay observed that the 
Commissioners neglected to affix their seals to the separate article 
covering the indemnity provisions of the treaty. Following a brief 
exchange with the Commissioners, they affixed their seals to this 
section.
Lay's activities during the negotiations at Shanghai as distinct 
from those at Tientsin elicited nothing but official commendation. This 
was perhaps partly due to the fact that the formal negotiations dealt 
with less sensitive issues and partly to the fact that he could fill 
the same function for Lord Elgin at Shanghai without the necessity of 
being attached in any obvious way to the official mission. There was 
no need to account for his behaviour in any official reports. Probably 
the most significant factor effecting Lay's behaviour after the conclusion 
of negotiations at Tientsin, however, was Lord Elgin's wish (recorded only 
in private) that Lay should become an influential official within the
146. King, op.cit. p.50. The first time the details appeared in 
print was as an addendum to Lay's obituary notice in the London "Daily 
Chronicle”, May 7» 1898*
147* "Times”. Sept. 13, 1858, by a correspondent from Tientsin, 
June 26.
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Ch'ing administration* He expressed his general concern to Lady 
Elgin, "Even now I have no doubt that the whole Treaty may be made 
a failure if incompetent people cure appointed to carry it out."^^
If Lord Elgin's concern was to be set at rest, Lay had to behave in 
such a way as to assure that the Imperial government would consider 
his appointment desirable as well as expedient*
To the extent that Lay's role was conditioned by, and was re­
flected in, the pursuit of essentially British interests, its enigmatic 
character was obscured* It was thus possible for those who utilised 
his services - his two masters - to rationalise his behaviour and to 
exaggerate his functions* This makes it even more difficult to define 
precisely the extent of Lay's influence during this phase of his career* 
As the preceding account indicates, the more intensively the events, 
issues and personalities are examined, the more it appears that Lay's 
influence was very limited* He was still, in 1858, a subordinate 
official, albeit an almost indispensable one, to both his masters*
Vhile this evaluation, thus far removed from the actual events, 
might be accepted as the valid one, it remains nonetheless true that 
Lay was a focus of attention at the time* He became one of the best- 
known foreigners in the Empire - though some high officials believed him
148. nE/B" ms* Elgin to Lady Elgin. Sept. 25, 1858
23 5
149to “be a Chinese. He could hardly have become better known among
the foreigners on the China coast, but his frequent citation in 
despatches, both of officials and of correspondents, led to his name 
and his deeds being widely publicised in Great Britain. Thus, he was 
on the threshold of both fame and furtune when he returned to Shanghai 
from the Yangtze trip on January 1, 1859* But his position as servant 
of two masters was dependent on a rationalisation that had yet to be 
tested fully. The next series of tests commenced shortly after his 
return.
149* For example, see "IWSM" HP 26t 12b, 1-13,5* A further
memorial from Prince Kung. Recorded June 23, 1858. The entire
memorial is a castigation of Lay's behaviour, recommending that he r
either be summarily decapitated or sent to the capitql for punish- 
ment. See also, the translation of a recently authenticated 
memorial (vide. Banno, op.cit. p. 67 and p. 271* n.6l) referring 
to the negotiations of 1858 which appeared in NCH No. 4^9* July 23* 
1659* pp* 202-203* Tk® memorialist, like Prince Kung, described 
Lay as a native of Kuangtung ("Kia-ying Chauw). The NCH gives the 
author as "Yin Yan-yung". The correct name, per Banno, is Yin 
Chao-yun. It would be quite possible to mistake the character for 
"chao" for the character for "yen/yan/". chao- ^  yen-
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Chapter VIII 
Serving Two Masters - Second Phase* 1859*61
Before continuing with the specific account of the effect of Lay’s 
efforts to fulfill his enigmatic role as a servant to two masters, from 
the beginning of 1859 until he left Shanghai in April, 1861, on leave 
of absence, it would be relevant to focus attention on the changing 
milieu in which Sino-British relations developed after 1858« Some of 
the changes to be considered - stimulated primarily by developments 
away from China, e.g., the emergence of Victorian "liberalism", the 
accelerated pace of industrial and technological development, the 
Crimean War, among others - had by their impacts helped to generate the 
1856-58 phase of the confrontation between China and "the rest". Neither 
the insignificance of the lorcha "Arrow" and the Abbe de Chapdelaine 
(the French priest judicially "murdered" in 1856) incidents, nor the 
dissimulated non-belligerency of the United States and Russia should obs­
cure the fact that aggressive and expansionist forces were pressing on 
all the surfaces of a seemingly inert mass.
The treaties of 1858, with respect to foreign influence, formalised 
a partial awareness of changing patterns. The immediate effect of the 
treaties was, even before the exchanges of ratification (scheduled to 
take place within a year of sighing), a self-propelling cause and effect
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implosion. Geographically, it was not just a handful of new treaty 
ports that were to be opened. It was literally China that was to be 
opened - given further symbolic significance by the Yangtze trip. It 
was not just a widening of the crack of formal diplomatic relations 
that was to be effected. It was Peking (despite Lord Elgin's concession 
in November, 1858), the political centre of the Empire and of the 
Imperial structure that was to be the focus of diplomatic intercourse.
The terms of the British treaties, in particular, reawakened in 
many the dream, made dormant by the post-Nanking frustrations and the 
"depression" of 1856-58, of unlimited opportunities for economic enter­
prise. The dreamers in China, it is true, were temporarily overshadowed 
by those (dreamers, paradoxically, of a different sort) who saw in greater 
opportunity, greater competition and in greater competition less 
opportunity for large, short-run profits. In this connection, also, 
the built-in provisions for the extension of the regulatory administration 
of trade encouraged the hope of some and the misgivings of others - but 
for both the augury was for radical change.
Of less direct interest in this study is the subject of religious 
endeavours. Lay was not officially concerned with the question, though 
there is evidence to suggest that, privately, he was not unsympathetic 
to the objectives of some segments of the religionists in the foreign 
community* the implementation of new opportunities for religious 
endeavour had a slower potential for being realised and British official
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policy was that of relative indifference (if not outright antagonism1) 
toward the propagation of Christianity* Nonetheless, though for some­
what different reasons, the religionists contributed to the general 
atmosphere of anticipatory expansiveness in the foreign community*
In another vein, even if the seemingly inert mass that was the 
Empire was continuing in its lethargic ways, the tempo of significant 
activity on the part of foreigners was gaining in velocity* Viewed 
against the pace of development prior to 1856, the activity of the 
succeeding two years was at least notable for the energy expended, if 
not for a lengthy list of tangible achievements. The movements of armed 
forces and embassies, the "campaigns", the treaties - with Japan as well 
as with China - the tortuous peregrinations of Imperial entourages and 
the Yangtze trip itself, agitated the mills of popular interest. The 
feuds, the vendettas, the personalities were not less numerous, less 
tempestuous, nor less idiosyncratic than they had been, but in the ex-
1* On the Governmental level it need only be recalled that there is 
but one Article (Tientsin! VIII) in the Agreements of 1858-60, simply 
calling for toleration for the practitioners of the Christian religion* 
The Article (Tientsin! IX) providing for authorisation to British 
subjects to travel in the interior under passport referred only to those 
interested in pleasure or trade. On the personal level, Bruce on his 
return to England being informed of his appointment as Minister to China 
wrote! "I shall keep clear at present of missionaries, but I hope to 
be spared to give these fanatics a bit of wholesome advice after I close 
my connection with that blessed country. My opinions are in favor of 
converting Christians to Buddhism." ("E/B" Bruce to Lady Augusta 
Brace. 22/11/58).
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panded and increased activity, new formations began to emerge and 
personalities began to be submerged.
A more significant change, however, was that related to the mani­
festations of the altered balance of forces between foreigners on the 
one side and the Chinese and Manchus on the other. On the corporate 
level, the mid-19th Century represented a plateau in the progress of 
nationalistic ferment. The contest to be chief among equals or equal 
among the chiefs was being pursued with the effect of differentiating 
the sheep from the goats. The "Arrow War" provided conclusive evidence 
to the powers associated with it of the complete vulnerability, militarily, 
of the Chinese Empire. The awareness of this condition, apart from in­
creasing the wariness of the Powers toward each other, fostered the 
acquisitive propensities of those involved and further prepared the ground 
for the extension of fields of special interest.
On the individual level, there was also a change in the behaviour 
patterns of foreigners. There had long been an under-current of resent­
ment against the pretensions of the elite of the Celestial Empire and most 
foreigners, at mid-century, were convinced of their own superiority even 
if they were too fearful, on the whole, to put it to the test beyond the 
limits of treaty right, business discretion and gunboats. The backwash 
of the victories of 1857-58 - before the moderating effect of the debacle 
at the Taku forts in June, 1859 - supplemented by a much larger number of 
gunboats, released most of the inhibitions of the foreigners. They began 
to flaunt openly their superiority, to indulge in untrammelled ridicule
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and to magnify the volume of their bellicosity*
That the vast majority of Chinese and Manchus were unaffected by 
what seemed so obvious to foreigners (the Japanese might well be in­
cluded) is not so extraordinary* The quantitative scope of the physical 
threat was relatively inconsequential except in the extreme northeast 
where the object of Russian policy was patently to appropriate large 
expanses of sparsely populated Manchu territory. The casualties of 18 
months of hostile confrontation, which in total included barely a fort­
night of armed engagements, were numbered in the low thousands* Only 
two miniscule areas - Canton and Taku - suffered appreciable destruction 
and moderately intensive occupations. Against the quantitative threat 
of the various native rebellions, the minor, temporary successes of the 
foreign "rebellions” were not sufficient to upset the equanimity of the 
elite’s ethno-centric self-esteem.
A handful of Imperial officials, (mainly those in continuous contact 
with concentrations of foreigners over extended periods) who grasped the 
significance of the moves of the occidentals and who sensed the proverbial 
” hand-wri ting on the wall”, were unable, as well as reluctant, to 
communicate their insight to the myopic eyes and the plugged ears of the 
Court. In the event, the fact that perceptive officials could grasp and 
sense the changes set in motion aohieved little more than to mislead well- 
meaning foreigners (e.g. Lay) into the belief that the need for adaptation 
would be rapidly recognised by a large segment of the elite.
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The final aspect of the changing environment that warrants 
consideration concerns the character of the foreign community. The 
numbers of those described as permanent, male adult residents, "China 
Hands" as it were, remained exceedingly small* At the beginning of 
1859* the total for all nationalities at Shanghai was still just 
barely 400 , and for the whole China seaboard (excluding Macao), it
3
was still under 2,200*  ^ But two factors basically altered the at­
mosphere of the environment.
Firstly, although not identified as permanent elements, the armed 
forces constituted a continuing augmentation of the foreign community* 
Concentrations at focal points - Hongkong, Canton and Shanghai - were 
generally above 2,000. Numbers in themselves, except as members of 
the other ranks tended to become a source of mercenaries in the inter­
necine struggle, were of less import than the fact that the contingents 
brought into the communities groups of officers - men often from 
distinguished families* The normal structure of the social milieu in 
which, previously, consular and diplomatic personnel had loomed large,
2. Morse, "Conflict", p.346. But Morse*s figures are unreliable.
It is evident that his figure for 1858 for Hongkong, for example, 
includes the whole "European" population of men, women and children. 
Cf. "NCH" 455, 16/4/59. p.146. At the end of 1859, the European
population at Shanghai, including women, was 568. Cf. "NCH" 495,
2l/l/60. p.11
3. Morse, "Conflict", p.346. Qualified as in preceding note.
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was re-oriented for the time being* Secondly, a perceptible change 
was taking place in the character of the main body of "China Hands".
A new generation of career-conscious managers and staff were filling 
the vacancies caused by decimation or by withdrawal from the ranks, 
of the old pioneers and adventurers and filling the new openings in 
the more firmly established old houses, which were increasing in size, 
in complexity of operations, and in aspirations for respectability.
The importance of this change - evident by 1859 ~ can be inferred 
from a plea by Frederick Bruce to the Foreign Office at the end of I860:
But pray choose [supernumeraries] of liberal education 
and gentle extraction - A Consul requires good maimers both 
to secure his position with his own countrymen, and to get 
on well with the Chinese. Consuls can't compete in point 
of living with the merchant princes but the representatives 
of these latter are generally as deficient in education as 
they are flush of cash - & they yield willingly to the in­
fluence of a man who is a gentleman.4
Bruce, of course, was not alluding specifically to H.N. Lay, but 
to his own consuls* However, Lay, who had been causing Bruce almost 
as much difficulty as some of his Consuls, was precisely the type of 
public servant nurtured in China whom Bruce was inveighing against*
The preceding discussion of the changing environment may help in 
defining a sharper focus for perceiving the nature and evaluating the 
significance of Lay's activities after the return from the Yangtze trip,
4* FO 17/339* Bruce to F.B. Alston. Private. 3l/l2/60. (Seen 
by Russell 29/3/61)*
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which had lasted almost eight weeks* The immediate and projected 
scope of his functions represented an addition to his responsibilities 
and an enhancement of his status* Yet, the other changes taking place 
had the effect of making his own relative position less significant and 
of obscuring the fundamental enigma of his dual role*
A. Serving the Imperial Authorities
In resuming the account of specific developments, the activities 
of his two major functions, officially administrative servant of the 
Imperial authorities and unofficially political and diplomatic agent of 
the British plenipotentiaries, will continue to be differentiated. All 
that can be noted in defence of this approach is that the principals 
themselves sought to accomplish this objective as long as it suited 
their respective purposes. The essence of the enigma was precisely 
that when the two functions were assumed by (or assigned to) one person, 
they could not be differentiated.
Since S.F. Wright has treated, definitively and exhaustively, al­
most all major aspects of the organisation, the administrative structure, 
the customs policies and regulations, and the delineation of the limits 
of legal jurisdiction developed during the early years of the infant ser-
5* Oliphant, II. p.466. Mentions six weeks* However, the
entourage left Shanghai on November 8, and the Mission suite returned 
on Jan* 1.
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vice under Lay's administration, this account will be restricted*
The account presented here will concentrate on correcting some of 
Wright's inaccuracies, which have a bearing on interpretation of 
Lay's administration, and on giving additional data to clarify the 
motivating forces conditioning his behaviour*
The history of Lay's appointment as Inspector-General can be 
recorded briefly* Although Rule 10 of the supplementary "Tariff and 
Rules" negotiated in the Summer and Fall of 1858 employed the deliberately 
phrased proviso that the "high officer [of the Chinese Government] will 
be at liberty, of his own choice, and independently of the suggestion 
or nomination of any British authority, to select any British subject 
he may see fit to aid him****" in the discharge of functions related to
7
the "Collection of duties under one System at all Ports", it was certain
0
that Lord Elgin desired the appointment of Lay* It was just as certain
6. Wright, "Tariff”* Chs* II-III. Wright "Hart”* Ch. IV-V, VII- 
VIII* The second work repeats much of the earlier work verbatim* Wright 
in the later work, however, shows more consideration for the influence 
of Lay's activities* Morse, "Submission”, Chs* I-II, VII, is good for 
definition of issues, but there are many factual errors.
7* M. Banno, "China and the West” (Cambridge, Mass*, 19&4)* Shows how 
the Ch'ing Authorities sought to re-interpret the concept of the High 
Officer mentioned in Rule 10 to circumvent the concession for residency 
of foreign ministers at Peking* There is no question that in its 
original framework it was meant to refer to an official who would be 
charged with seeing that a uniform system for collection of duties was 
implemented. Some foreigners assumed the "High Officer" would be a 
Chinese or Manchu, but it seems fairly clear that the envoys in 1858 
thought of him in terms of a foreigner or at most a figurehead for a 
foreign Inspector-General*
8. Vide antea Chapter VII pp./^V^TT Vide n*ll6*
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that on the British side, apart from Wade, the Ch'ing Authorities, 
as much as they may have valued Lay's positive qualities (knowledge 
of language and of customs' affairs and his three and one half years' 
relatively successful management at Shanghai), had no other choice.
The United States and French agreements incorporated identical language 
on this point except for specifying the correspondingly appropriate 
nationality,^ hut there were no Americans (apart, possibly, from S.
Wells Williams who, though he periodically served the U.S. diplomatic 
missions, was committed basically to missionary enterprises) or French­
men who could be considered remotely eligible.
Thus, within weeks after returning to Shanghai and well before the 
treaty could formally come into force, Lay was launched on setting up 
the programme for extending the foreign Inspectorate of the Chinese 
Imperial Maritime Customs S e r v i c e . I n  the absence of an official 
appointment, it may have been more than simple coincidence that his 
initiative coincided with two important developments. On the one hand, 
it is quite probable that Lay was informed by Hsueh Huan^ (and/or the 
taotai Wu Hsu) of Ho Kuei-ch* ing's efforts to have an Imperial Commissioner-
9. Wright, "Hart". p.134.
10. FO 228/281. Misc. To and From Bruce, I860. Documents in case 
of foreign employee, J.R. Hooper hired Jan. 15, 1859» dismissed July, 
1859. Also "NCH" 482, 22/10/59, P»47.
11. In the contemporary documents Hsueh Huan was almost always 
referred to as "Sieh". S.F. Wright refers to him as "Hsieh".
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12ship to deal with foreign (trade) affairs established at Shanghai.
Were this to be approved, Ho and Hsueh would have the authority to 
commence implementation of the rules of trade. On the other hand, 
the news that Frederick Bruce was appointed as permanent minister, 
which only reached Shanghai on January 22,^ meant that direction of 
British policy in the implementation of the treaties would be under 
the control of one who was fairly thoroughly familiar with and com­
pletely sympathetic toward the concept of a foreign Inspectorate. It 
was not long before the quasi-official character of his first acts, 
still authorised in his capacity as British Inspector at Shanghai and 
directed at enlarging the customs staff at that port, were accorded 
broader official sanction. At about the time that an edict announcing 
the Court's qualified approval of the rules of trade, accompanied by 
another authorising the transferral from Canton of the office of the 
Imperial Commissioner for foreign (trade) affairs and its bestowal on 
Ho, reached the Viceroy's yamen,^ Taotai Wu - closely allied "politically"
12. Banno, op.cit. p.93 ff. and n.2, pp.286-87. These efforts 
had begun in November, 1858.
13. Walrond, op.cit. p.307*
14. "IWSM" HF 33* 29b,10-33b,3. Edict to Grand Sec. Recorded
Jan. 29* 1859* Swisher, op.cit. pp.551-552, gives translation of
an additional Edict to the Grand Council ("IWSM". HF 33* 33*7-34^,1)
of the same date outlining the same information.
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as well as officially with Ho and Hsueh - wrote to Lay instructing
him to hire persons "of character and respectability", with a three-
15year guarantee of salary, for the customs service. ^
Since Lord Elgin had undertaken at the end of January to visit
Hongkong and Canton again, Lay became the courier for the Imperial
Commissioners* verbal communications conveying the news contained in
the E d i c t s I t  also gave Lay an opportunity to make overtures
17locally for Customs staff and, on Lord Elgin's decision to return
18home with most of his mission, to solicit the assistance of some of
19his aides to recruit additional staff directly from Great Britain* ^
15* Pamphlet. "Letters, etc. from the Imperial Commissioner Ho, 
and other Chinese Authorities, relating to the Foreign Customs 
Establishment." (Shanghai, I860), (Hereinafter cited as: Pamphlet.
"Letters, etc."). Vu Hhii to Lay, 19/2/59* (Copy, without three 
appendices, included in FO 17/359 Ho. 187. Bruce to Russell, 29/10/60).
16. "E/B" No. 25. Elgin to Malmesbury. 26/2/59* Walrond, op.cit.
p.509. In the despatch Elgin referred to a letter having been trans­
mitted through the Consul, B.B. Robertson. In his report to Lady Elgin, 
he wrote that Lay had brought the letter.
17* "E/B" Wade to Elgin. Private. 14/3/59* Wright "Hart",
pp.136-137 dates the commencement of Lay's activities from an appoint­
ment in Sept. 1859* It was actually common knowledge that H. Tudor 
Davies had been appointed by Lay as Shanghai Commissioner in May.
Cf. "NCH" No. 459. 14/5/59. Also "LOT" 1/8/59, p. 387.
18. On Elgin's decision to return vide erftm pp. (^>'497
19* There are many notices that FitzRoy was acting as a recruiter. 
For Oliphant, cf. "LCE". 24/II/59, P*2.
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Lay did not remain long in the south as he had a special despatch
20to deliver from Lord Elgin to Ho* As soon as he got back, he learned
that, as he wrote privately to Lord Elgin, "Ho has given me fresh
author!ty to select more officers for the various Customs’ establishments
and has in fact formally invested me with ’plenipotentiary powers’ in
21regard to all Customs* arrangements.” Wade, transmitting Lay’s letter 
elaborated:
I am sanguine that so far as trade goes we shall have little 
to complain about* Ho, you see, desires the Treasurer, Wang 
[Yu-ling], and the Judge Sieh, to write to Lay that he is 
'much gratified' with the proposition 'to engage good men for 
employment at the different ports' and says he places the 
administration of the Customs for the next 5 years entirely 
in the hands of 'Inspector Le', who accordingly writes to 
FitzRoy to engage more hands *22
Lord Elgin, in the meantime, had had second thoughts about Lay's
burst of energy. He wrote from Singapore:
As regards your own matters let me urge you to be cautious.
If you make yr. system very expensive it will lose a great 
recommendation both in the eyes of Chinese & foreigners.
Depend upon it [sic] is much easier to enlarge than to con­
tract an establishment - I feel too sincere an interest in 
yr. success to withhold from you my opinion on this point.^ 3
20. "E/B” No. 28. Elgin to Malmesbury. 7/3/59*
21. ”E/B” Lay to Elgin. Private, 25/3/59* This apparently was 
in reference to Wu Hsu's notice to Lay of 26/2/59* Contained in 
Pamphlet. "Letters, etc.” as Item 2.
22. "E/B” Wade to Elgin. Private, 50/5/59*
25. "E/B" Elgin to Lay. Private, 15/3/59*
24
Lay, having been further stimulated by Ho's directives just 
prior to receiving Lord Elgin's letter, acknowledged it, but was
OA
completely silent "as regards [his] own matters."
There is no evidence that accounts satisfactorily for the nature
and timing of the next step in the process of formalising Lay's
position as executive administrator of the Customs service. This
25
step was marked by an "order", issued on May 23, 1859, ‘by Ho directly
to Lay appointing him Chief Commissioner (or, as Lay rendered it,
26according to occidental usage* Inspector-General) of Customs for all 
treaty ports. It included the earlier provision for a tenure of five 
years and assigned Lay "the task of establishing at all treaty ports a 
Custom House on the Shanghai model." This was followed two days later - 
indication, perhaps, of the alacrity with which Lay responded to the 
formal appointment - by an agreement which, in addition to stipulating 
conditions customary in public service appointments, provided for a
24* "E/B" Lay to Elgin. Private, 4/4/59*
25. "PL" Ho to Lay. May 23, 1859* (in Chinese) Lay's copy
has noted on cover "Rec'd May 24, 185911* The "official" translation
in Pamphlet. "Letters, etc", bears the legend that it was trans­
lated by T.P. Wade and certified a true copy by J.A.T. Meadows. This 
point has some significance because Wade did not arrive in Shanghai, 
being in Bruce's suite, until June 6. If it were just a matter of 
getting a translation, Meadows could have provided just as satisfactory 
a one as Wade.
26. Wright, "Hart", p*136 and Morse, "Submission", p.35*
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27considerable increase in salary.
Mounting pressures for the introduction of an Inspectorate system 
28at Canton may, in part, account for the nature and timing of Ho's
formal appointment of Lay. The former's jurisdiction, as Imperial
Commissioner, included Canton. Lay was still only British Inspector
at Shanghai, the earlier authorisation to him to extend his activities
having been notified by provincial officials. At the same time, it may
be recalled that a suggestion was made during the preceding summer that
29
Lay might be susceptible to bribery. In this respect, developments 
in the diplomatic sphere were approaching a crisis in May, 1859* Since 
the other reasons which may account for Ho's action are related to these 
developments, they will be dealt with in a later portion of this chapter.
27* "PL” Lay received an "i-tan" on May 25 $ 1859» but the writer 
carelessly failed to translate it or make a copy. In H.H. Lay, "The 
Foreign Office and Our Policy in China” (n.p., Feb. 1868). Supplement 
containing correspondence referred to in the pamphlet (n.p. ,ndj 
(Hereinafter cited as Lay, "F.O." and Lay, "F.O.Sup."). P.18. There
is a reprint of Lay's letter to the "Morning Post" 22/1/68 in which he 
refers to his loss of an £8,000 salary. Also, Lay's termination 
settlement in I864 would confirm this figure. Cf. Wright, "Hart", 
p.250. However, his 1859 salary as I-G was 12,000 tls. (£4,000).
Cf. p W
28. Wright, "Hart", pp. 137-140• The earliest request ma$e by the 
Ch'ing officials for Lay's services was in Heng-ch'i to Wu Hsu.
22/5/59 (Cf. Pamphlet, ^Letters, etc." Item 4)« The request 
specified a foreign inspector to oversee the opium revenue!
29. "IWSM" HF 25* 32b,9 - 33b,5. Temp. Jr. Vice-President of
the Bd. of Rev. Sung-Ch'in Memorial. Recorded 17/6/58. This was 
included in an Edict of the same date to Hua-sha-na and Kuei-liang.
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No public notice appears to have been given of Lay's new appoint­
ment* There were, after all, some singular aspects to the situation* 
Firstly, while consistent with the intention of Rule 10, the new 
treaties were not yet in force* Secondly, Ho's action, in the event, 
represented a unilateral setting-aside of the multilateral agreement of 
June, 1854» which had established the Shanghai foreign board of 
inspectors, without any consultation with any of the representatives of 
the other parties who had participated in that agreement. This 
seriously exercised the French Consul and the French Vice-Consul. The
latter, in particular, who had since early 1858, held the position of
30French Inspector concurrently with his consular post, was incensed,
for Lay's appointment led to the prompt termination of the appointments
of the two other Shanghai Inspectors with three months' severance pay
31in lieu of notice. The French Consul was the only one to raise ob-
32jactions of an official character, but these were ignored by both his 
own and the Ch'ing Authorities.
50. The intensity of Edan's resentment can be measured by its 
duration as indicated in "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private. 6/3/60. 
"In spite of my entreaties Lay has not manage'd the susceptibilities 
of the French in the C. House establishment & I think they will give 
us trouble about it. Edan [Consul, by this time] resents having 
been turned out - & protects French smugglers in every way."
31. J. Fredet, "Quand La Chine s'ouvrait.*." (Shanghai, 1943) 
pp.302-303. Wright, "Hart", p.136.
32. Fredet, op.cit* p.253»
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33Except for continuing to recruit new personnel , Lay did not
undertake to expand his activities until late September. In the
first instance, he was precluded from doing so until the treaties
actively came into force. The Ch'ing Authorities were free to do as
they wished, but foreigners were not obliged to adhere to the treaties
until they were ratified. The failure to effect the exchange of
ratifications, as a result of the repulse at the Taku ports, further
34delayed implementation of the new Customs provisions. Lastly, 
before news of the exchange of the ratification of the U.S. treaty
35reached Shanghai, Lay was physically incapacitated for about a month.
The renewal of a state of limited non-intercourse between Britain 
and France and the Empire, occasioned by the Taku affair, continued 
until the Court was forced to capitulate as a result of the second Allied 
expedition of July - October, I860. However, as commercial relations 
were not proscribed by either side and as ratifications of the U.S. treaty 
had been exchanged, the legal basis for the opening of some new ports and
33* Among those recruited in this period was Robert Hart. Having 
declined to accept a position directly from the Ch'ing officials at 
Canton in May, 1859» he negotiated with Lay. ((J. Bredon, ”Sir Robert 
Hart” (London, 19095 PP» 51-52.)) With the authorisation of Bruce, 
he resigned from the Consular Service as from June 30, 1859*
34* The need for retrenchment was specified by Lay when J.R. Hooper 
was given notice. For documentation, cf. antea n.10. Lay to Hooper. 
20/7/59.
35* The incident is described in greater detail, and documented, 
below. Videpp.*fll~303 and n. 150-153*
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the imposition of some new dues, was established, Bruce went so
far (and further, a year later), when Lay returned to action in
September, 1859 > as to circularise the consular officials enjoining
3 6them to cooperate in the introduction of the new system# Most of
the following five months was devoted to opening Inspectorates at
Canton and Swatow.
Under the circumstances, Lay’s official status, nonetheless,
remained unchanged throughout the balance of 1859 and the early part
of 1860# For a brief period in the summer of I860, however, after
the second expedition was getting under way, he "withdrew, for the time
37being, from all connection with the Chinese Customs#• and he "ad-
20
vised other British subjects in the Service to follow his example#"
Lay professedly took this action in response to an Order in Council,
39gazetted in mischievous terms by the Shanghai Consul, T.T# Meadows,
40who was as inflexibly opposed to the Inspectorate idea as ever, and
36# FO 17/314* No# 48 Bruce to Russell# 2l/ll/59* Enclosure.
Bruce to Consulates# 28/9/59* Out of deference to the British and 
French, the U#S# Envoy, J.E. Ward, excluded from implementation those 
provisions of the U#S# Treaty not initially negotiated by the U.S.; 
e#g# new tariff schedule, etc# Also, an Edict closing trade to 
"aggressors" was issued as a desperate measure in Sept# 1860# Cf#
"BPP" "Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-60" [2754]
LXVI, pp. 207-08.
37* Morse, "Submission", p#33t u.29* quotes Lay to F. Wilzer. 18/8/60#
38. Wright, "Hart”, p.147*
39* "NCH" No. 519* 7/7/60, p. 106. Consular notification dated 7/7/60#
40. "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private. 22/10/59* "[Meadows] can’t
understand your not having adopted his free trade views. He is very 
jealous of the influence Lay, etc. will gain over the Chinese 
authorities - the very thing which makes the system desirable, sets 
ambitious Consuls against it."
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in the face of warnings from senior British law officers in Hongkong.^”
That Lay became conscience-stricken at a time when he was badly in need
of a holiday and when it coincided with cm opportunity to get married,^
should also not be overlooked, especially as a month after his wedding,
he acceded to Bruce's "official letter requiring him & his Custom house
to go on....", hostilities notwithstanding,^ and resumed his functions
on September 20.^
Despite an endless succession of problems and obstacles, Lay's
achievements as Inspector-General, coupled with recommendations from 
45Wade and Bruce, commended themselves to the Ch'ing Authorities who were 
familiar with his work* Soon after the exercise of authority at Peking 
was restored to a normal routine, steps were taken to "soothe the 
barbarians" by institutionalising the new order of Sino-foreign relations.^
41. "E/B". Bruce to Elgin. Private. 17 & 18/9/60.
42. Lay left Shanghai on July 13» the first quick passage after
Meadows' notification of July 7* He "withdrew" on Aug. 18 (Cf. antea 
n.37) > was married Aug. 21 (Cf. "The Overland Register" [Hongkong"] 
25/8/60, p.133) and returned to Shanghai on Sept. 17 (Cf. "NCH" No. 530, 
22/9/60, p.150). Lay may have arranged his journey, of course, to 
enable him to consult the legal officers at Hongkong on the 
applicability of Meadows' notification.
43. "E/B". Bruce to Elgin. Private. 17 & I8/9/6O.
44* Morse, "Submission", p*33» n.29, quotes Lay to Wilzer. 20/9/60.
45* FO 17/350 No. 14* Bruce to Russell. 12/3/61. Enclos. Wade to 
Bruce, U/l/61, and Bruce to Wade. 17/l/6l.
46. Vide j&esfea. Appendix XV.
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As part of this process, upon the recommendation of the officials who 
had worked closely with Lay, an Imperially sanctioned appointment, 
issued under the seal of Prince Kung (the Hsien-feng Emperor’s brother 
who had been delegated to manage relations with the treaty powers) con­
firmed Lay as Inspector-General, using much the same terminology as Ho's 
commission of May 23, 1859*^
48Lay received his copy of the appointment on March 2, 1861. An
English translation was published in the "North China Herald" a week 
49later.  ^ This is additional evidence, if any were required, to support 
Wright's contention that H. Cordier mistranslated the German of the report 
of Count Eulenburg, Prussian envoy in China, who was seeking to arrange 
diplomatic intercourse for his country, which led Cordier to assert that
47• "ISMM" i) 71* 32b,6-34*3* Hsueh Huan. Memorial. Recorded 
16/1/61. ii) 34,4-34b,l. Edict, same date instructing Kung to act. 
iii) HP J2s 16b,5-17^*2. Prince Kung and others (including Heng-ch'i, 
ex-Hoppo of Canton, who worked closely with Lay in the latter part of 
I860), Supplementary memorial. Recorded. 24/1/61, enclosing the 
basic text of the Commission forwarded to Lay on Jan. 21, 1861. Kung, 
in the memorial, acknowledged the memorialists' indebtedness to Ho's 
text.
48. Wright, "Hart", p.151, probably based his assertion that Lay 
received the notice in February on the fact that advices from Tientsin 
usually reached Shanghai in two to three weeks. However, Lay's 
correspondence came through the overland Ch'ing service. On this 
occasion, transmission spanned the Chinese New Year and thus accounts 
for the fact that Lay's copy ["FL", ms*] has the notation* "Received 
2nd March 1861".
49. "NCH" No. 554, P.59. 9/5/61.
251
50Lay had divulged an intention to decline the appointment. Lay did
not decline $ it is doubtful that he even considered it as an offer,
but rather simply as the confirmation of Ho’s action when he was
51Imperial Commissioner.
By early March, however, Lay had decided upon taking a leave of 
52absence, disregarding an "invitation" from Prince Kung, conveyed in
53a private letter from Heng-ch'i, to visit Peking for consultations.
Lay observed the formalities of making a request for his leave, but em­
barked from Shanghai well before an official reply could conceivably
50. Cf. Wright, "Hart", p.158, n.119, for French and German texts 
and for full citations of sources.
51* Hsueh Huan1 s memorial, cited above (n*47)» contains the suggestion 
that it was Lay who solicited the request that his commission should 
receive formal confirmation directly from the Court. "
52. Bruce, in Tientsin, was aware of his decision by March 15.
Vide jwfaa. n.55.
53• H.N. Lay, "Our Interests in China" (London, I864) (Hereinafter 
cited as Lay, "Interests.") pp. 6-7. It is generally alleged that 
the invitation was for Peking. Assuming it was Lay who notified the 
editor of the "NCH" upon receipt of the private letter, that led to 
the public announcement of March 9» (vide antea. n.49)> this was what 
was understood by Lay. None of the official Ch'ing documents that 
this writer has seen, however, specifically states "Peking". They 
refer specifically to Tientsin, or generally "to the north" or "up 
here", with a Tientsin dateline. The significance of the point is 
that it is another indication that, based on British interpretations 
of Lay's importance, the British anticipated Ch'ing intentions. That 
these anticipations were not soundly based was borne out by the 
experience of R. Hart who, instructed by Lay to proceed to Peking in 
his stead, was expected by the Ch'ing officials to proceed no farther 
than Tientsin. Cf. Wright, "Hart", pp. 198-199•
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54reach him. ^ In refusing to postpone his leave until he had made at
least one visit to the North, he discounted blandishments of a most
55serious nature sent to him by Bruce.
In carrying out the various activities related to his role as an 
official during this period, Lay's administration was marked by con­
siderable achievement and by the crystallisation of a broad range of 
unresolved issues. Lay's identification, in this connection, with 
official British interests (real and imagined) incontrovertibly had its 
impact on the character of the new Inspectorate. His objectives, in 
promoting Imperial interests (according, of course, to occidental 
standards), had a corresponding impact on conditioning the limits of 
British interests, both official and private. It is within these terms 
that the achievements and the unresolved issues are to be considered.
The achievements of Lay's administration can be made to fit into 
four categoriesi staffing, structure, operations, extension. Prom his 
earliest assumption of independent responsibility, Lay sought to recruit 
men of calibre, whose integrity in seeking to avoid conflicts of interest - 
political or pecuniary - could be relied upon. There was a limitation 
to the degree of immediate success he could achieve. There were numerous
54* Prince Kung acknowledged, and provisionally granted, Lay's 
request under date of April 7$ 1861. Cf. Lay, "Interests", p.5* Lay 
and his wife left Shanghai on April 7* Cf. "NCH" No. 559 > 13/4/61, p. 58.
55. Lay, "Interests", p.8.
2S$
openings: when the new treaties of 1858 were fully implemented, as
many as fifteen ports might he "opened". The supply of suitable 
candidates in China to meet the prospective need was scarce. In 
consequence, he gave his first attention to acquiring the best 
qualified candidates for administrative ("indoor") posts, taking less 
care - at the outset - in selecting those for ("outdoor") posts 
requiring less responsibility.
One major source, for the type of men he was looking for, was
H.B.M. *s Establishment in China. Lay could not draw heavily here,
since the Establishment had also to expand, but had to confine himself
to recruiting from the middle and junior ranks of the different services
(diplomatic, colonial, consular). As the U.S. and French establishments
of career public servants were little more than nominal, for practical
purposes these did not provide any source of qualified candidates. For
political reasons, Lay ultimately found it expedient to appoint some men
from these services, men of unquestioned probity, but lacking almost every
56other qualification.
With but one or two possible exceptions, Lay did not draw any
56. Vide /mtea, p. 157 and n.67-68, and p.467
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57recruits from the mercantile community for the "indoor" posts.
The salary scales for foreigners were moderately higher - for com­
parable ranks - than the scales in the British Service, hut they were 
still relatively low for qualified men in private employ. The obvious 
susceptibility to criticism to which men drawn from private employment 
would be subject, may also have acted as an inhibiting factor in re­
cruitment from this source.
For his main source, as has been noted, Lay had inaugurated a 
programme of recruitment of men from Britain. As it turned out, the 
programme itself proved premature. Just as the new recruits (most of 
whom were young and some of whom were married) were beginning to arrive, 
the repulse at Taku occurred. This necessitated some retrenchment and 
created the problem of caring for those for whom, in the event, no positions 
were available. In the uncertain interim, while provision was made by 
Lay for a "Guarantee Fund" to meet claims which any of the recruits might
57* G.B. Glover who was taken on from the outset as Deputy 
Commissioner at Canton was an American, recently arrived from the U.S. 
and who had business training. FO 17/315 No. 58 Bruce to Russell, 
6/12/59* Enclosure (extract) Wade to Bruce. 6/12/59* reporting from 
private letter from Lay. Also cf. FO 228/267 No. 41* Winchester to 
Bruce. 22/10/59 and No. 50* Same to same 25/ll/59* Actually Jardine*s 
was negotiating to employ a "Glover" whom they believed had turned down 
an Inspectorate appointment. ("JMA" II.A.2. (37)> J* Whittall to 
Hongkong. 16/7/59 - No. 1272 and 1/8/59 - No. 1280). One of the 
recruits for the Canton office was a "C.S. Matheson" who, conceivably, 
had some connection with a member of the mercantile firm.
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make should it become impossible to fulfill his contract,these 
people were left adrift as a responsibility on the community•^  As 
no charges were ever made against the fund, it can be assumed that 
all eventually found gainful employment in the Inspectorate or other 
local enterprises, or returned to Britain*
The significance of this pattern is that Lay conceded that the 
Inspectorate should reflect a ’•European” profile.^ But, despite the 
constant urgings of Bruce, who understood that if the system were to 
have any chance of survival it would need the active cooperation of 
the Americans and French, and that, therefore, the foreign staff should 
not be overwhelmingly British,^ Lay seemed incapable of voluntarily 
drawing on other than British sources. No attempt appears to have 
been made to recruit new staff from countries other than Britain. Lay 
only accepted the principle of senior appointments on a nationality 
quota basis when the issue was forcefully raised by the American Envoy, 
John E. Ward, in discussions with Ho, and when Ward pressed his views 
directly upon Lay.^
58. ”CMC”. Vol.I, pp. 255-240. Circular No. 27 of 1870 (First Series) 
(Extract). Explanations regarding Guarantee Fund from Robert Hart.
31/12/70.
59« "LOT" P.98. 30/l/60 (From a Shanghai correspondent).
60. "JNCBRAS" XIII. Williams, p.220.
61. Wright, "Hart", p.143.
62. "JNCBRAS" XIII. Williams, p.220.
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Lay*s policy created difficulties, but it also had its salutary 
results. The irritation engendered by the extension of the system 
elicited a constant barrage of bitter complaint and criticism, but 
the latter was almost always tempered by the qualifications that the 
senior (British) staff were honest, conscientious and, at least, 
basically impartial and that some tolerance should be shown in the 
face of the youthfulness (sometimes alluded to as a back-handed compli­
ment, as Lay himself was still under thirty) and inexperience of these 
officials.
One aspect of Lay*s recruitment policy has a bearing on the
definition of his personality. By I860, three of his four younger
brothers (G.T., W.H., and W.T.) were in China. The eldest of these
three had come out with Lay in 1847» and was in China again in I860,
65after a visit to England.  ^ Lay had been responsible for getting the 
second brother, after his journey to China in 1852, an appointment as
/  I /'c
supernumerary. ^ The third reached China in 1859» and after his
65. Of the existence of this brother there is not the slightest
question, i) There is a letter in the possession of Mr. John L. Lay
of Pickering, Ontario, addressed by "Angelina" (H.N. Lay* s only sister) 
to ’"My dear Brother George" from London 26/2/57* ii) The "NCH" traced 
the movements of G.T. Lay from Southampton until his ultimate arrival
at Shanghai. ("NCH" No. 518, p.102, 50/6/60).
64* For the early account of V.H. Lay, vide antea. Chapter IV,
pp.?/-2*.
65* "NCH” No. 493» 7/l/60. p.2 W.T. Lay arrived at Hongkong on
29/12/59.
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arrival, he was accepted, following Lay's sponsorship, by Bruce as a
supernumerary - on the condition that he would not defect to the
Inspectorate! In fact, Lay did not recruit any of his Brothers into
the Inspectorate, although the last arrival of the three, W.T., did,
with Bruce's acquiescence, accept an Inspectorate post when Lay was
on home leave in 1862.^
The implication, perhaps intended, was that if Lay was not .
willing to use his influence on his brothers' behalf, he was unwilling
to compromise the position of the Inspector-General for private reasons*
Further substance is given to the implication by the fact that when he
was involuntarily forced to appoint personnel who were less qualified
6*7than he desired, one was the brother of U.S* Minister Ward, and the 
other was the cousin of Secretary of the French Legation, Count 
Kleczkowski.^
Lay's achievements in organising an effective structure can be 
dealt with expeditiously* The Shanghai "model", with modifications, 
introduced after the elimination of the Board of Inspectors (May, 1859)*
66. FO 228/520* Miscellaneous to Bruce. W.T. Lay to Bruce 5/6/62. 
F0 17/351. No. 56. Bruce to Russell 23/4/61. 17/375 No. 170 
Bruce to Russell. 22/ll/62. Vide also App. VI E. (May 26, 1862).
67. Wright, "Hart", p.144* W.W. Ward was appointed commissioner 
at Shanghai.
68. Lay, "Interests", p.5 Kung to Lay. 7/4/61.
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in its "indoor” structure resembled the British consular pattern.
The distinctive aspect, if such it may be called, was that all the 
positions of responsibility were assigned to foreign personnel. The 
jurisdiction technically exercised by Ch*ing Authorities was through 
channels separated from the Inspectorate. The parallel structure^ 
in the Chinese tradition, provided a convenient instrumentality for 
circumventing unpleasant situations. Whichever organ was under 
pressure, in a given instance, could shift responsibility to its 
counterpart. During the formative period, before lines of authority 
had been fully defined, with reference to both the inter- and intra- 
govemmental patterns, the arrangement was an advantage to the new 
service, since it enabled Lay and the other foreign officials to shunt 
aside direct attacks. It also had the disadvantage that there was the 
appearance - and the reality - of conflicting policy and inefficient 
direction.
Much of what effectiveness was achieved through structural 
organisation, as recently implied, was contingent on the qualifications 
of the staff. Inefficiency could be excused in the face of integrity, 
but the defects of the "outdoor” structure combined deficiencies in 
facilities with deficiencies in the character of the personnel required 
to carry out the essential functions of the service. Measured in terms 
of the expansion of trade (which should be differentiated into increased 
trade at Shanghai, revival of trade at Canton and legitimisation of a 
longstanding smuggling trade at Swatow) and the expansion of the structure,
2 5 9
the degree to which functions were effectively carried out was 
commendable. Nonetheless, incidents involving clashes between 
traders and service personnel occurred regularly. When violence 
was a feature of the clash, Chinese were usually the victims. As 
often as not the merits of a case were subordinated to the charge 
that the staff was saturated with rabble.
The lack of adequate wharves, of established inspection stations, 
and of public warehouses for storage and bonding made the tasks of 
surveillance and inspection that much more difficult. In addition, 
the topographic and hydrographic features of the regions in which the 
ports were located along with the precedents which had developed in 
conjunction with special anchorages for opium-receiving vessels, con­
tributed to the difficulties of organising effective arrangements for 
the control of trading and shipping. Lay’s achievement in this sector 
of structural organisation was rather in the direction of gaining the 
cooperation of the diplomatic officers of the Treaty Powers to control 
their own nationals than in the direction of solving problems of cus­
toms administration.
The problems of enforcement and of policing measures were not only 
aggravated by the personnel factor and the lack of adequate facilities, 
but also by the complexities of the diplomatic/military position. 
Activities designed to develop an effective policing service could be, 
and usually were, construed either as a cover-up for the Ch’ing 
Authorities to acquire material for the prosecution of the war or as
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placing within reach of those authorities facilities which would be
69used for this latter purpose. Lay had plans in 1856, and again in 
18599 to commence the building up of such a service, but on each 
occasion the plans had to be shelved and reliance placed on token 
facilities. In this situation, as in the one just previously cited,
Lay had to fall back on the pressures that could be exerted through 
the diplomatic envoys.
The evaluation of Lay’s achievements in the third category, 
"operations”, must be more equivocal than in the two that have preceded. 
If "operations" be defined to include the formulation of policies and 
of rules and regulations, the effective implementation of workable 
political and administrative relationships with different interest 
groups - public and private - and the realisation of the "larger” ob­
jectives envisaged by the proponents of the system, Lay’s specific con­
tributions - constructive and obstructive - are diffused in the complex 
of the issues and in the effects of the activities of the many other 
principal contributors.
Basic policy was embodied in the treaty settlements to which Lay 
admittedly contribtfced. But his unique contribution was essentially a 
mechanical one - classification of commodities exchanged in the export/
69* Merchants, individually so as not to impugn the "respectability” 
of ferms, had no compunction about selling arms and equipment to any 
who wished to purchase them. When it was put to use, the buyers and 
not the sellers were contemned.
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import trade and determination of values for computing specific duties.
The articles on commerce in the main treaty and the rules of trade in 
the supplementary treaty were the products of the accumulated ex­
perience of diplomats, administrators and merchants. On occasions when 
the initial responsibility for formulating administrative regulations 
fell to Lay; i.e., at Shanghai in 1855 and. 1859* at Canton in 1859» 
for the opening of the Yangtze trade in 1861, many of the provisions 
could not be implemented because they were either unreasonable or 
impractical. His ineptness, when he relied exclusively on his own 
resources, not only aroused the antipathy of the mercantile community, 
which had to submit until adjustments were ungraciously introduced, but 
it also, in the Yangtze situation, provoked Lord Elgin to outbursts of 
despairt "He brought me yesterday a set of rules for the Yanktze [sic] 
trade after a week of preparation, and it really was a veiy sorry pro­
duction."^^ And, "....I must say neither in [the indemnity] nor in the
71Yanktze matter do I find Lay very fertile in expedients."
Insofar as workable relationships were concerned, Lay was successful, 
at least until his departure, in maintaining partisan personal support for 
himself and in retaining official support for the Inspectorate. The
70. "E/S" Elgin to Bruce. Private. (Joumal-letter, since mails 
to Tientsin were still unscheduled. 7-ll/l2/60.) [December ll]
71. "Ibid" 15-19/12/60 [December 15]
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support, however, was generated as a consequence of the unsatisfied
interests of the supporters rather than as a consequence of any
measurable achievements due exclusively to Lay* It should not he
necessary to detail the reasons for the unceasing opposition and
antagonism of the merchant communities* The imposition of more
rigid and more extensive controls, unreasonableness and inefficiency
aside, while conceded in principle to be desirable as a means of pre-
72venting cut-throat competition for extra-legal favours, could not
help but be a chronic irritant to those who unabashedly had but one object
73- unrestricted profit. x Their sense of oppression was so strong that 
there were some, after the Taku affair, who wishfully anticipated a 
renegotiation of the treaties which would discard the Inspectorate idea
7/1
and which might even sanction "free trade".
Another factor fostering irreconcilable conflict between Lay, along 
with most of those he selected to serve with him, and the merchants was 
that, particularly after the 1858 treaties were settled, the former were 
intent on defending the rights of the Chinese whilst the latter were as
72. "NCH’* No. 493 Supplement n.p. 7/l/60 Cf. Also "E/B". Elgin 
to Bruce* Private* Dec* 21, I860 to Jan* 3» 1861* Reporting con­
versation with Whittall [Jan. 5] Same to same. 9/1/6O. [sic, 
should be 1861 ]. Reporting conversation with Sir Hercules Robinson, 
Governor of Hongkong*
73# Michie, op.cit. II* Ch* XIII.
74. "JMA" II.A.2 (37) Whittall to Hongkong. 15/4/59 (1228)
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insistent that the government should, as a precondition of cooperation,
fulfill its obligations* Lay in his enigmatic position, along with
the Inspectorate structure - officially instruments of the Empire, but
dependent for their continuance on the quasi-formal sanction of the
foreign plenipotentiaries - were easy targets for merchants* disaffection#
The merchants were never so patriotic as when trade was threatened or
slack# Between 1859-61, conditions of trade in season and out of
season, were at best almost always uncertain#
On this last point, Lay may have developed a personal grudge against
Jardine* s • He was an unfortunate victim of maladministration of funds
by a Chinese Shroff for another firm (Moncreiff, Grove & Co#) for whom
Jardine*s acted as administrator in liquidation proceedings# Lay had
deposited a substantial quantity of silver bars (value of Tls# 14,500
75c# €5,000) "for safety not bearing interest” with the firm# Jardine*s,
after careful investigation and with legal advice, decided that none of
7 6the remaining assets included any portion of Lay*s deposit and he was
77required to execute a Deed of Release#
75* Loc#cit# Underscoring in ms#
76. "Ibid". 26/5/59 (1235).
77. "Ibid". Max. 1, I860 (with P.S. of Mar.3) (1402). On 6 Maxoh,
Whittall wrote that recovery would be impossible (1412). Actually 
until July, 1859» I»&y a**d Whittall were still on fairly good terms.
Cf# "JMA” II.A#5(2)(25) Whittall to Joseph Jardine. March, 1859 & 
II.A.2 (57) Whittall to Hongkong, July 1859* la December, I860, Lay
complained that Jardine* s "gives him a great deal of trouble at pre­
sent...” ”E/B” Elgin to Bruce# Private. 21/12/60 - 3/l/6l. [Dec. 2l].
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The reasons for Lay's record of "success” in effecting worth­
while relationships between the Inspectorate and public authorities - 
with one vitally important exception - are as obvious as the reasons 
for his poor record with the merchants* The exception is represented 
by distinguishing between senior officials and their subordinates. The 
distinction applies to both Ch'ing and foreign officials.
At the senior levels, among the Ch’ing, the considerations dictating 
the support of Lay and the Inspectorate were fiscal, administrative and 
political* The experience at Shanghai from 1854-1858» which was more 
widely publicised during the latter part of the period, offered fairly 
conclusive evidence that a larger share of customs revenue could be 
channelled into the coffers of the higher authorities if collection were 
administered by a foreign Inspectorate. Whatever may have been its 
short-comings in the eyes of foreign elements, the arrangement provided 
the most effective means yet devised for bringing the foreign merchants, 
at any rate, under control. It was, in view of the advantages, the 
least odious of the concessions that had to be granted to "soothe the 
barbarians." To the extent that an official of any given rank could be 
convinced that the function of the Inspectorate would not jeopardise the 
traditional prerogatives of his office, he was prepared to tolerate Lay’s 
officiousness and the limited operations of the Inspectorate's minor evils.
In this respect, Lay benefitted briefly from the fact that the early 
stages of the Inspectorate's institutional growth were usually ill-defined* 
But wherever (as at Swatow from the start) or as soon as (as at Shanghai
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and Canton in late I860) the fundamental character of the institution
manifested itself, - a centralised agency directly responsible to and
literally accountable to Imperial authority at Peking - successively
higher ranks of officials grew antagonistic and obstructive* Thus,
at Swatow, which in any case in the first instance was subject - in
the traditional manner - to the Governor-General's fiat, the inception
of the foreign Inspectorate aroused the hostility of the whole body of
78 **officialdom in that community* Hsueh Huan, at Shanghai, whose
offices by I860 included that of Imperial Commissioner for the southern
ports, governor of Kiangsu and acting Governor-General of Liang Kiang,
and who had been one of the most consistent supporters of the new system,
started to become hostile and obstructive as control of Lay and the
79Inspectorate's operations gravitated toward Peking* Heng-ch'i, as
Hoppo at Canton having early appreciated the personal advantages which
would accrue from a systematic collection of customs revenues, had co-
80operated in the establishment of the Inspectorate at that Port* When, 
however, Heng-ch'i was posted to Peking, he sought to obstruct the con-
78. "LOT" 17/3/60 p.171; 27/4/60 p.243? 28/5/60 p.290.
79. "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private. 7-11/12/60.
80. Local opposition of subordinate officials became so vociferous, 
however, that Heng-ch'i tried to exculpate himself from the accusation 
of having volunteered his cooperation* Cf. FO 228/267* No* 39 
Winchester to Bruce. 17/lO/59«
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solidation of the Inspectorate's operations under the control of the
81highest ranking Imperial officials#
It would be misleading to conclude that it was entirely personal 
interest that motivated the attitudes of individual Ch'ing officials.
In fact, the more the Inspectorate was fashioned into a foreign-style 
administrative institution, reflecting the modest progress achieved 
under Lay* s direction, the more the basic incompatibility between it 
and Confucian-style institutions was crystallised. In the formative 
period here being considered, virtually every achievement was offset 
by the addition of new problems.
When analysing the development of relationships between Lay and 
foreign officials, in conjunction with Inspectorate operations, a 
modification in the distinction between senior and sub-ordinate levels 
should be taken into account. The diplomatic branch was, per se. the 
senior level of the civil establishment. It was unnecessary for Lay 
to cultivate the support of the British diplomatists on behalf of the 
Inspectorate idea. Once they had familiarised themselves with con­
ditions at the Treaty Ports, Lord Elgin and Frederick Bruce were not 
only as strenuous as Sir J. Bowring had been in supporting the idea, 
but they also elaborated the conception of the Inspectorate's functions
81. Wright, "Hart", pp. 19B-199* Cf. antea n.53*
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to the extent that they viewed it as a cornerstone of Sino-foreign 
relations. As the problems and difficulties of the extension of 
the system multiplied and accumulated, and these problems were ever 
more frequently directed to the authority of the envoys for solution* 
Lord Elgin, if not Bruce, flagged in his faith in Lay and in the system*
[Dec. 7] Lay is rather in a bad way overwhelmed by the 
difficulties of the task he has undertaken [sic].
* * * * * * * *
[Dec. 11 Apropos efforts to work out arrangements on 
the indemnity question]....but Lay was here yesterday and 
raised so many difficulties that I almost despair of finding 
a solution. I confess I am getting very low about the whole 
affair. With you bottled up at the North Pole, and [T.T.]
Meadows here to make mischief the prospect is as bad as 
possible....[the indemnity, the Chinese officials* hostility, 
the merchants* opposition and] - then you have the French and 
American officials who require to be bribed into toleration 
of the system by fat places being made for useless retainers.
These difficulties are enormous and I do not think Lay is the 
man to cope with them.®2
w  V M  w  v  w  vr
I confess I am not very sanguine as to the possibility of 
the system being made to work.®3
Removed by distance and time from the immediate pressures, Lord 
Elgin* s sanguinity was only slightly restored*
82. "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private. 7-ll/l2/60.
83. "Ibid". 21/12/60 - 3/1/61. [Dec. 21.]
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As regards the Customs House and Hebei questions I 
hold much the same view you do though perhaps not quite 
so absolutely - I am impressed by the enormous diffi­
culties of maintaining a system which has everybody 
[including "our own govt because it dislikes trouble"]
against it* Practically, I am desirous to support
it, and therefore I have taken care to point out how 
essential its maintenance is to the payment of our in­
demnities 84
Bruce, who had the continuing responsibility for resolving out­
standing issues, was firmer in his support*
Perhaps the most important step taken, is the 
nomination of Mr* Lay.****as Inspector General..*., and 
the recognition of the Imperial Government of the Foreign 
Customs Establishment. [If the objectives of the In­
spectorate idea are to be realised] It will require 
considerable tact on his part, and a loyal support from 
the agent of Her Majesty’s Government to enable him to 
render all the services to China, his position will admit 
of his conferring, for it will excite the jealousy of 
other, even friendly foreign Powers.... .my experience in 
the Levant and China shows me, that national vanity and 
petty jealousy determine the actions of foreign Ministers, 
far more than sonorous abstractions of civilisation and
progress I hope her Majesty’s Government understands
therefore that this question has now a political as well 
as a pecuniary aspect, and that your Lordship will not 
hesitate in authorising me, to support the Establishment, 
against the clamours of those interested in smuggling, 
and in spite of the anomalies and difficulties which 
surround any attempts to define the powers of the Chinese
84* "Ibid". 28/2/61 (From Galle). Bruce had appealed for Elgin’s 
uncompromising support in a private letter from Tientsin, 29/12/60. 
(Copies of a few of Bruce’s private letters to Elgin,are in Foreign 
Office files. This one may be located in 228/281).
263
Custom-house though I do not despair of finding a
satisfactory solution for them.®?
Doubtless the motives ascribed to the French and American
officials by Elgin and Bruce were, in part, justified? more so if
the reference were to the subordinate officials. Because of the
small amount of the French trade, however, the primary interest of
the French was in terms of the Inspectorate* s revenue for indemnity
payments rather than in its administrative direction or operation.
Except for the assertion of the right of national representation on
the foreign staff, M. de Bourboulon, the French Minister, consistently
86
followed the lead of the British envoys in commercial matters. None 
of the records investigated thus far contain the slightest suggestion 
that he harboured any ill-feeling towards Lay or that he was a party 
to the obstructive activities of his Shanghai Consul, B. Edan.
The situation with respect to the American envoys was somewhat 
different. Apart from the mutually aggressive antagonisms that were 
a regular feature of the relationship between Lay and the influential 
body of American merchants (who usually acted in combination with dis­
affected Britons), successive envoys were predisposed to be suspicious
85* "Ibid". Bruce to Bussell. Private. 5/2/61. Tientsin.
(Several of Bruce's private letters to Bussell, I86O-64, can be found 
in the Public Hecord Office under classifications FO 17/ and 30/22/49»50« 
This last classification is a more recent designation for the collection 
cited by Costin as "G.D. 22/49” •
86. FO 17/314 No. 48. Bruce to Bussell. 2l/ll/59.
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of English behaviour. The particular attitude of John E. Ward is
relevant to the present discussion# Summing up his experience after
a confrontation with Lay, he reported!
that coming to China with strong anti-English prejudices, 
it was natural that 1 should sometimes have imagined that an 
effort existed to thwart our views, and a reluctance to 
concede to us that to which we were justly entitled# In­
vestigation and experience have alone been required to remove 
all such erroneous impressions on my part*®?
Ward was also in a delicate position since the prestige of the
Americans had suffered because of the conditions under which the exchange
of ratifications of their treaty had taken place# As much of the
criticism originated among the British, when a head-on clash between Lay
and the U*S« Consul at Canton materialised with the introduction of the
foreign Inspectorate, Bruce was fearful that Ward would be compelled to
88“come down four-square11 on the side of his compatriots.
87. "E/B". Ward to Bruce. Private. 5/12/59. (Also of. FO 17/315- 
Unnumbered despatch* Bruce to Russell* Secret and confidential*
19/12/59)* This passage, in quoted text and paraphrase, appears in a 
multiplicity of forms in numerous despatches* The U*S* Secy# of State 
transmitted it to the FO, which sent it on to Bruce* Ward had already 
quoted it to Bruce in a private letter and Bruce sent it along to the FO* 
The text here differs from the “original” (Ward to Secy* of State cass, 
No# 25* 10/12/59* Cf. a^gUea n#94) only in that the grammar has been 
polished* The discrepancy in dates is unexplained, since in the private 
letter of 5 December, Ward specifically stated that he was quoting from 
his “despatch to my own Government “
88. FO 17/315. No. 49. Bruce to Russell. Confidential 22/ll/59.
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However, Lay was alerted to the fact that Ward was on his way
to investigate the conflict and he was all but instructed by Bruce,
89privately through Wade, to do everything possible to placate Ward*
Lay’s success was attested to in the most positive manner by Ward in
a private letter to Bruce (which included the above-quoted extract
from an official despatch to the U*S* Secretary of State)*
I am happy to inform you that I was met by Mr* Lay 
in the spirit which you foretold, and all difficulties have 
been satisfactorily adjusted*
• •••were it possible for me to remain in China, it would be 
a source of great pleasure and satisfaction to me to co­
operate with you to the full extent of my power, in carrying 
out your policy, which, as expressed to me is as judicious 
and humane to China as it is wise to other Governments.90
In defence of Ward, against the general charge of the French and
Americans being subject to bribery, and of Lay against the possible
charge that he was a mere tool of the British envoy, the following
report from Wade to Bruce should suffice*
To remove all jealousy, Lay has appointed Mr* Glover, 
an American, the Commissioner at Canton91 •••• Mr* Ward 
pressed for Mr. Hunter [?], but Lay demurred to appointing
89* FO 17/314* No* 48* Bruce to Russell. 2l/ll/59*
90. ”e/B" Ward to Bruce. Private* 5/12/59 (Vide antea n.87)
91. G*B* Glover had originally been assigned as acting Commissioner, 
pending the arrival of FitzRoy, who was to have been Commissioner.
(Cf* Wright "Hart”, p*143)* Instead FitzRoy was slated for Foochow, 
but actually went on to Shanghai where, late in I860, he relieved
H. Tudor Davies, who had applied for sick leave.
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any Minister's nominee and Mr. Ward gave way admitting 
that he had no rights to interfere and that the selection 
of the person to be employed must rest entirely with Mr.
Lay.92
In his own defence, especially after his brother received the
appointment as Commissioner at Swatow, Ward officially recorded that
he had "recommended no individual American Citizen for any appointment
nor have I used any influence to secure the appointment of any one...",
but he had secured the commitment that one-third of the Commissionerships
94should be held by Americans.
Further evidence of the extent to which American officials, acting 
in a diplomatic capacity, were prepared to support the Inspectorate system 
was indicated by the action of the Charge d'affaires, after Ward's 
departure, Flag Officer C.K. Stribling. Ward had taken the position 
that the new tariff and rules, though an integral part of the American 
treaty, were derivations from Articles in the English and French Tientsin 
treaties and, therefore, could not become operative until the latter
92. FO 17/515• No. 58* Bruce to Russell. 6/12/59» quoting Wade 
to Bruce, same date, underscored as in original. As Wade's information 
presumably came directly from Lay, the evidence should be accepted with 
reserve.
93* "CMC" VII, p*41 (Extract: quoted from "Records of the U.S.
Dept, of State, Despatches, China," Vol. XIX. No. 6. 26 March I860.
Ward to Secretary of State).
94* "Ibid", pp. 35-36. (Quoted from "Records " as in n.93*
Vol. XVIII. No. 23. 10 Dec. 1859* Ward to Secretary of State).
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95treaties entered into force. Possibly through an oversight, Ward 
failed to proclaim the new tariff and rules in force before his 
departure from Hongkong in Mid-December, I860, although Elgin's
official proclamation (Tientsin, Nov. 20) of the coming into force of
96the whole treaty settlement was gazetted in Hongkong on December 11.
American merchants sought to take advantage of Ward's failure to
97act by claiming they could not be bound by the new treaty and rules.
Stribling, however, apparently acting on his own initiative, notified
U.S. nationals that Ward's intent had been clear. Despite the absence
of an authorised U.S. version of the new tariff and miles, they were to
be considered in force, with the English Treaty text serving as the
98official version, ad interim. If there was any British initiative
95. "HCH" No. 545. 5/l/6l p.2. Letter of C.K. Stribling from
Hongkong 25/12/60, printed under notice of U.S. Consul Smith.
96. Printed Document. Issued by Colonial Secretary's office, Hong­
kong. Government Notification No. 139* It is possible that this 
notification was not distributed until after Ward left. However,
"NCH” No. 541 8/12/60 p.194* carries a reprint of Elgin's proclamation
of Nov. 20 from an "Extra" dated Dec. 6. A regular mail steamer left 
Shanghai on Dec. 7 (Cf. Supplement to "NCH" No. 541 > a*P.) and since 
the trip to Hongkong “rarely exceeded three and one half days (i.e.
GN 159 is dated ll/l2/60), Ward very probably had knowledge of Elgin's 
proclamation.
97. "E/B". Elgin to Bruce. Private. 2l/l2/60 - 5/l/6l. [Dec. 27].
98. Vide antea. n.95*
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stimulating Stribling* s action, it does not appear to have originated
99with the British envoys.
Uniformity and conformity in the attitudes of the envoys had been 
achieved relatively quickly and easily. By being willing to seek 
workable relationships with the envoys, Lay had facilitated their co­
operation in finding bonds of common interest in relation to the 
Inspectorate - each preserving the opportunity to rationalise his support 
in terms of Msonorous abstraction." By contrast, the Consular officials 
for personal, professional and practical reasons were disinclined to be 
as indulgent towards the Inspectorate and Lay, who for essentially the 
same reasons was unwilling to bend to what he considered the whims and 
fancies of Consular officials*
Commencing with the expansion at Shanghai, the operational problems 
that had first emerged when the Inspectorate was initiated at that port 
were re-activated and were followed by the crystallisation of identical 
problems at each successive port to which the Inspectorate was introduced* 
the pattern varied only to the extent that a particular Consul was more or 
less aggressive or that personal factors injected an emotional charge into 
the resultant clashes*
The operational problems were almost all rooted in the fundamental 
question of the respective jurisdictions of the Consuls and the foreign
99* Vide antea. n*97» As indicated, the first notice of the complaint 
was registered Dec* 27. Lay left Shanghai on December 23 and could not,
therefore, have been on hand when Stribling wrote his letter of December
25.
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officers of the Inspectorate, complicated by the corollary question 
as to whether the latter were accountable for their acts officially 
as part of the Imperial apparatus (behind which they usually had to 
retreat when hard-pressed) or individually as nationals Such
specific issues as the right of Consuls to be consulted in the 
formulation of regulations, to be in direct communication with the 
native officials of the customs establishment and to have absolute 
judicial authority over the behaviour of their nationals (whether as 
merchants, functionaries, etc.) derived from the basic question. Wade 
and Lay had established the questionable precedents of arbitrarily 
formulating operational regulations, of precipitously promulgating 
them and of autocratically administering them. These techniques were 
continued by Lay and his appointees, with a few independent contributions 
by native Chfing officials, acting on their own initiative, thrown in. 
Consuls, in the day to day business of their offices, found their 
authority, as it had come to be exercised in China, being ceaselessly 
encroached upon.
Sufficient notice has been taken of the attitude of the French 
Consul at Shanghai to obviate the need for further elaboration of his 
position in the present context. The British Consul, D.B. Robertson, 
who had been bullied into submission on the Inspectorate issue by Sir
100. Vide antea Ch. VI
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John Bowring in the contretemps of 1855-56* was succeeded by T.T.
Meadows, as acting Consul, in July, 1859 The record of Meadows'
feelings towards Lay and his views on the Inspectorate, as well as 
his disagreement with British policy in general, has already been 
cited* He left nothing undone in his efforts to assert the full 
authority of his office. Neither reversals of his decisions by Bruce 
in Inspectorate cases, nor reprimands, abated his struggle to preserve 
what he sincerely believed to be the prerogatives of the Consul* His 
effectiveness in opposition to Inspectorate operations, disruptive as
it was, was hampered because of the extremeness of his views* Thus,
Bruce, somewhat consoled, could writei
It is not safe in the present [rebel] crisis to leave
him here, and even those, who, like Webb [senior in Bent,
Beale & Co.], supported him in the Custom house quarrel, 
do not hesitate to express themselves in this sense.102
Meadows, however, could not be quickly moved by either Bruce or
Elgin. He had been posted to the new "Siberia” of the China Service,
New Chwang (Meadows, himself, did not think of this post in this way),
but the opening of the port had to be delayed until the Spring thaw of
1861. Lay left on his leave before Meadows was relieved at Shanghai
101. "NCH" No. 469 25/7/59, p.202.
102. "E/S". Bruce to Elgin. Private. J1/q/60 (FO 228/281).
105. Meadows was succeeded by W.H. Medhurst, Jr., who was as militant 
in the defence of Consuls' rights as his predecessor.
277
Although similar issues arose at Canton and Swatow, the same
sort of crisis did not materialise in the relationships between Lay
and the local British officials* Firstly, at Canton, Lay apparently
made the effort to accord some recognition to the acting British Consul,
C.A. Winchester"*^ and went so far as to consult with him during the
105early phases of the introduction of the new system* ^ Secondly at
Swatow, the office of the Inspectorate was set up before that of the
Consulate.^^ Because of this, the initial test cases, representing
107the clash of interests, passed to the Courts at Hongkong, with the
result that judgments were handed down that were usually detrimental to
108
the Inspectorate. Thirdly, the temper and views of Winchester and
104* FO 228/266. No* 6. Winchester to Bruce* 11/5/59* Winchester 
took over from Alcock until Robertson arrived at the end of July 
(vide antea. n.101). No. 28. Robertson to Bruce* 3/9/59* Robertson 
advised Bruce that he was taking home leave, upon which Winchester again 
became Acting Consul*
105. FO 228/267. No.38, 12/10/59 and No. 43, 7/ll/59. Winchester 
to Bruce*
106. Lay, having been authorised by Gov.-Gen* 1. Lao to extend the 
Inspectorate to Swatow (Pamphlet, ”Letters, etc.” Item 9* Lao to Lay, 
17/12/59)» proceeded there directly from Canton about mid-January, I860. 
(Cf. ”LCT" 17/3/60, p*17l)* The British Consular Office was not 
established at the time* (Cf. ”LCT” 12/5/60, p*267
107. ”LCT” 26/3/60, pp* 194-95* Quoting Hongkong "Daily Press”.
108. ”LCT” 12/5/60, p.267, and 6/6/60. p*315* Also "E/E" Elgin to 
Bruce* Private* 9/1/60. [Sic. s/B '6l]* ”1 asked Sir H[ercules Robinson] 
yesterday what had been the result of Lay's action - and I was sorry to 
hear him say that not only has Lay been cast in heavy damages but that 
the Chief Justice, who was most indignant with the jury in the murder case 
[wherein an English merchant-vessel captain fired into an Inspectorate 
boat killing a Chinese], considers the verdict to have been altogether 
right and Lay's conduct [in seizing a ship's papers as security for payment 
of duties] quite unjustifiable.” Incidentally, this and other evidence 
refutes Wright, "Hart”, p. 144* that ”The establishing of a Customs House
at Swatow presented no difficulties.....”.
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of G.W. Caine, who was first Consul at Swatow, were moderate and were
amenable to the authority of the envoys* Both these men professed
to be favourably disposed to the idea of the Inspectorate, though they
also felt that they were entitled to more than was being conceded to 
109them. Fourthly, it appeared that if one Consul, regardless of
nationality, assumed the mantle of aggressive protector or challenger, 
the others were quite prepared to remain on the sidelines* Thus, at 
Shanghai, the American Consul, despite the attitude of the American 
merchant group, was not involved in any altercation, of record, with 
Inspectorate officials* On the other hand, at Canton, where the 
American Consul, O.H* Perry, briefly played the role of a Meadows, the 
British officer did not engage in public controversy.
Finally, by mid-1860, Bruce* s patience appeared to be at the end 
of its tether* The mildest, and in fact quite constructive, criticism 
of some of the Inspectorate* s operations put forward by Winchester 
resulted in an exchange of correspondence which drew from the latter this 
protestationi
I fully appreciate the motives for supporting the customs 
system. I have throughout given it the frankest support. I 
am satisfied that without laying myself open to any imputation 
of disobedience of instructions or even want of cordial support
109* FO. 228/266-267* Despatches from Canton consulate to Bruce,
1859» passim. Also”E/BM. Winchester to Bruce. Private. May 4 and
May 9, I860. And FO 228/295* Despatches between Swatow (G.W. Caine) 
and Bruce, I860, passim.
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of them I might have assumed a lower tone - which would 
have made the task of the Customs people much less easy 
here than it has been.110
Where Bruce had to deal with an inexperienced and "junior" career 
official like Caine, who complained that he was at a loss to know how 
to fulfill his functions properly, the former was startlingly auto­
cratic in his responses
I have no sympathy with the pedantry that leads 
Consuls to stand aloof from the members of [fhe foreign 
Inspectorate].
XKXXXXXX
I have to instruct you to act in [a co-operative 
spirit] and I warn you that in any recommendation for 
promotion to important posts, I shall consider an a 
necessary qualification that the Consul should have 
shown tact & a [friendly] disposition to act harmoniously 
with the Foreign Inspector. H I
Backed in this manner, the relative achievements of the Inspectorate 
officials loom large, for in the long run the brunt of merchant opposition 
which, if anything, increased, was directed at the cooperating Consuls and
110. "E/B" Winchester to Bruce. Private. 4/5/60. Underscored 
as in original.
111. FO 228/293* No. 6. Bruce to Caine. IO/9/6O. "Friendly" 
has been deleted in Bruce's draft.
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112the sympathetic envoys.
The openly aggressive and vitriolic hostility of the U.S. Consul 
at Canton was short-lived. Within several weeks after the contest 
began, John E. Ward appeared on the scene. He conciliated the 
disputes by supporting the Inspectorate on most substantive matters and 
the Consul on procedural arrangements.^^ Operational problems related 
to the complex conditions of trade at Canton continued to plague all the 
officials concerned, but conflicts between the establishments were, 
during subsequent developments, of minor proportions and more subdued.
From a different point of view, one specific aspect of the general 
problem should be referred to. A common complaint of the Consuls was 
that the introduction of the foreign Inspectorate interposed an additional 
major obstacle to the development of direct communications between them-
112. Lord Elgin after his return from Peking in I860 took up 
residence in the home of James Whittall, Senior in Jardine's. Elgin's 
host took advantage of the opportunity to harangue him frequently.
"E/S" Elgin to Bruce. Private [Dec. 11 ] "Whittall spoke to me for an 
hour yesterday about the confiscations and other grievances." [Lee. 21 ] 
"He then indulged in an hour of abuse of the Custom House....."
[Dec* 27] "Whittall made another violent assault on me this morning." 
For Jardine's full-fledged assault on the Canton Consulate and on Bruce, 
cf. "JMA" Letter-Books ([Local) 27 Aug* 1858 - 14 Jan* I864* Also 
II.A.2 (34) Item 3* Bruce to Jardine's [A. Perceval] 7/5/61.
113* FO 228/267* No* 64* Winchester to Bruce. 25/12/59*
Enclosing copy of Ward to Perry. 12/12/59* (Copy also appears in 
"CMC" VI, pp. 81-84.)
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selves and their native counterparts. Up to a point, Lay was pursuing 
a deliberate policy that gave substance to the complaint, in accord with 
an attempt to strengthen the lines of centralised authority, which it 
was presumed would work to the advantage of both the high Imperial 
Authorities and the diplomatic envoys. Numerous hypothetical questions 
may be posed as to whether or not this was beneficial for promoting 
relations between Chinese and foreign interests. Answers to the 
questions must be contentious. By the same token, it would be contentious 
to try to evaluate Lay's position in terms of "achievement".
Within the limited sphere of operations covered by Lay's activities 
up to the Spring of 1861, working relationships between the Inspectorate 
and the foreign governmental officials were, at least, placed on a footing 
of more effective co-ordination. That Lay made some gestures "to act 
harmoniously" with sub-ordinate ranks had, it may be concluded, some 
salutary effect. Many of the points at issue were simply de-activated, 
however, because they were in the process of being resolved by the 
political and judicial agents of the home governments. In the interim, 
the fires of ambition and animosity were dampened by the envoys.
The commitment of the envoys to support of the new system was an 
asset which Lay exploited, but what could not be exploited in the pre­
vailing conditions of 1859-61 was publication of the "larger" objectives 
which motivated that support. First and last, all objectives were 
motivated by self-interests stability, indemnity and prestige. First 
and last, the "larger" objectives were the result of the rationalisation 
of British interests at a lofty level. As long as they were kept at that
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level, the other envoys had no other recourse hut to associate them­
selves, albeit privately, with them.
The concept of the Inspectorate as an instrument which could be 
utilised to promote a transformation in obsolete Imperial patterns 
can be traced in the correspondence of Sir John Bowring. Lord Elgin 
disdained the man, but accepted the legacy of many of his ideas. In 
producing "his" treaty, Lord Elgin, ever conscious that fulfilment of 
its provisions would be dependent on a transformation taking place from 
within the Imperial structure, authorised the inclusion of articles and 
rules which could serve as a rationale to foster a transformation. In­
sofar as he could, he manipulated the activities of those responsible to 
him in a manner which would encourage their selection for pivotal posts 
in the pattern he envisaged.
An Inspectorate system^^ supported, but in no way controlled, by 
the cooperation of a (the) major Power(s) could ensure fulfilment of the 
legitimate obligations and rights of all foreign interests. Constituted 
as a territory-wide centralised administrative agency, it could be a model
114* The statement of the "larger" objectives as presented here 
is not to be found in any single document. Its formulation is based 
on a multiplicity of views and comments scattered through a) memoranda 
of Bruce submitted to the Foreign Secretary in 1858 b) private letters 
of Elgin to Lady Elgin and to Bruce c) official despatches and private 
letters of Bruce to Russell, d) private letters of Bruce to Lady 
Augusta Bruce and to Elgin, e) Lay's published writings ("Interests" 
and "F.O." and "F.O. Sup"., and f; despatches of Anson W. Burlingame 
to U.S. Secretary of State Seward.
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for re-organisation in the other branches of government, A highly- 
principled, dedicated and experienced executive, having access to and 
having the confidence of at least one faction of the highest officials 
in the land (through, for example, the provision in Art,V)^^ could be 
expected to exert a most beneficial influence on the cultivation of 
friendly international relations and on the acceleration of the 
acceptance of modem occidental standards in political, social and 
economic activities. By tying the indemnity to a remunerative activity 
administered by the Inspectorate and by scheduling a programme of ex­
tended payments, Lord Elgin hoped to create an interlocking framework 
of entrenched interests that would assure the support of the principals 
(the home governments, the foreign merchants and the Court at Peking) 
for a long enough period of time to enable the Inspectorate to be accepted 
on its merits. This vision was so "large” that (if it was at all 
practical) it could materialise irrespective of the powers of endurance 
of the incumbent dynasty.
This vision of the "larger” objectives did motivate the dedicated 
energies of those like Bruce and Lay, who had reluctantly assumed the
115. Vide Appendix IV, however
284
responsibilities of the pivotal p o s t s . T h a t  the vision existed 
also goes far to explain the progress that was achieved, as well as 
some of the failuress failures of impatience and intemperance in the 
face of the petty motives of small men with small ideas who, by their 
behaviour, obstructed "progress” and jeopardised the realisation of 
the vision* And withal, the crusaders were denied the inspiration 
that comes from drum-beating and bugle-blowing, for crusaders were not 
in order among the political and pecuniary realities of 1859-61.
Lay* s achievements in the final category of operational activity 
can be easily evaluated in quantitative terms* The system at Shanghai 
was expanded and elaborated* It was introduced tinder official auspices
116. "E/B” Bruce to Elgin. Private. 24/ll/58, informing him of
his appointment as Minister* "My feelings of dislike to the post 
are as great as ever, but I look upon it as the greatest difficulty 
& therefore the greatest honor in the profession & if I fail, I 
have the consolation of feeling that I have never sought it nor 
represented myself as equal to it."
The most specific reference pertaining to Lay is included in a 
printed, posthumous (1898) "Statement of Mr. Lay's Services", 
prepared as part of an application for a Civil List pension for his 
widow. "In 1859 > Lay accepted the post of Inspector-General 
of Chinese Customs, mainly at the request of Lord Elgin, instead of 
coming home on his Staff." (FL ms. Enclosure in letter from 
friends of Lay to A.J. Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury. June, 
1898). The earliest intimation of this appears in a letter written 
by Lay to the "Morning Post" under date of 27/l/68. (Lay, "F.O. Sup" 
p. 18) "At the request of the Chinese Government, and of Lord Elgin, 
and at the officially expressed wish, as the blue book will show,
of the United States' Minister, I became Inspector-General "
It is of some note that this assertion was made after the death of 
both Elgin and Bruce.
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117at Canton and Swatow* 1 Lay also, responding to urgent appeals
from Peking that he undertake the project, as his last official act
before his departure in 1861, in addition to naming his locum tenens.
118appointed a Commissioner to introduce the system at Tientsin.
This last port had been added by the Convention of Peking (i860), to 
the list of ports to be opened. In this, as in other categories, 
the limits of his achievement are perhaps a more noteworthy feature 
of his activity.
Since trade was permitted to continue after the Taku affair under
117. According to Hart, the first invitation to establish a foreign 
Inspectorate at Canton was extended by Lao, the Gov-Gen11. and 
Heng-ch'i, the Hoppo, in May, 1859* (Cf. Hart's Inspector-General's 
Circular Ho. 25, 1869* Reproduced in full as second part of Appendix 
D in Morse, "Subjection", pp. 4^9 ff.)» In "Pamphlet" "Letters, Etc." 
Item 8, pp. 12-14* there is what is described as a supplementary 
memorial by Lao, written in late November, 1859» which Lao reports
his initiative. ((This may be the same document as "IWSM" (Swisher, 
pp. 642-43) HP 45* 37*3-37^*9* Recorded 2l/l2/59 - though there are
marked differences in the translation)). For Swatow, cf. "Pamphlet" 
"Letters, etc." Item 9* to Lay 17/12/59* and App.II, Lao to Lay. 
15/1/60. Also cf. "IWSM" (Swisher, pp. 643-45) HP 46* 17* 9-19*1 •
Lao and Ho. Joint Memorial. Recorded 6/1/6O.
118. Lay, "Interests", p.5 Kung to Lay. 7/4/61.pp.6—7f "Tsung- 
How and Hangki" to Lay, Feb. 1861. According to a despatch of de 
Bourboulon's to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (28/6/60),
Lay was believed to have inspired Ho to consider the possibility of 
opening a Chinese Custom House at Macao. Cf. H. Cordier, "L'Expedition
de Chine de I860" (Paris, 1906), p.206. There is no record of any
official action directed toward implementing this proposal.
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119the terms of the old treaties and since Swatow was to be opened,
by agreements reached after the exchanges of the ratifications of the
U.S. Treaty, when Lay was ready to resume his activities in September,
18591 five ports besides Shanghai were "eligible" for the introduction
of the Inspectorate* Establishments had been set up for Canton and
Swatow by February, I860. Between February, I860, and Lay*s rather
innocuous parting gesture of March, 1861, no attempt appears to have
been made to extend the Inspectorate to any of the other "eligible"
120ports. The absence of achievement in this connection assumes
greater significance when it is realised that there was every reason
to believe that at the conclusion of the expedition projected for July-
September, I860, between six to eight additional ports would be opened.
Concomitantly, this would have required promptly setting up a similar
number of Inspectorate establishments: "one uniform system shall be
121enforced at every port."
119* In addition to previous citations, cf. also "IWSM" (Swisher, 
pp.607-09) HF 41* 4»2-7b,10. Ho. Memorial. Recorded 1/8/59• The 
fact that on the occasion referred to, Lay and Edan were summoned poses 
an unresolved problem: either Edan was still considered a member of
the Shanghai Board of Inspectors (which was not Lay’s view, apparently) 
or Lay was considered a more influential British representative than 
any of the members of the British Consular staff.
120. At the end of I860, arrangements were being made to open the 
Yangtze| viz.. preparation of regulations and preparation for a second 
expedition to Hankow, this one to awe or blast all officials - Ch’ing 
and Taiping - into acquiescence. Because there could be no Ch’ing 
guarantee for the security of Inspectorates, Shanghai was designated the 
port of entry and exit for Customs* purposes.
121. Phraseology of "Rule 10".
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Obviously, the dearth of even minimally qualified candidates
was a major deterrent to rapid extension of the system. Having in
mind, also, the time that would be consumed training staff, under the
most propitious circumstances, extension would only proceed slowly.
But these factors alone do not explain adequately the absence of any
extension after February, I860.
The factors that help to provide an adequate explanation are
numerous and have many ramifications. Under the circumstances, they
can only be enumerated with but a minimum of definition.
Firstly, the Inspectorate was introduced only at those ports where
the initiative was sanctioned by the senior Ch'ing official in the region
in which the ports were located. (in this regard, Tientsin followed the
pattern). It was, in fact, a fortuitous circumstance that the Liang
Kuang Governor-Generalship was briefly held by a Chinese official who
was willing to follow Ho Kuei-ch* ing's lead. The Manchu official who
became Governor of Kuangtung was dubious as to the merits of the
122Inspectorate system. His memorial setting forth his views drew from
the Court a comment on the anomaly of paying foreigners in Ch’ing service
123at the very time foreigners were mounting an expedition against the Court. ' 
The three senior Manchu officials who held authority over the regions in 
which the remaining three ports (Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo) were located,
122. "IWSM" HF 52* 31k»6-34b»10. Kuangtung Gov. Ch*i-fing.
Memorial. Recorded 30/6/60.
123. "IWSM" HF 52: 42,3-42b,9* Edict. 3/7/60. (Sic. Refers to
preceding as "yesterday Ch*i-Jing memorialised....")
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while not referring directly to correspondence circularised by Ho,
who hinted at the possible desirability of temporarily using "high
officials” to arrange suitable customs administration,memorialised
to the effect that their own local officials would be all that would
125be required to cope with any foreseeable problems* It is quite
certain that at the beginning of I860, Lay intended to extend the 
Inspectorate to these other ports* It also appears certain that 
because of indications of hostility, the plans were postponed*
Secondly, a major deficiency in the early structure of the system 
impeded its development* In effect, the Inspector-General was a one- 
man institution* Each Inspectorate was a local agency whose staff and 
operations were chargeable to what, in the first instance, was a local 
revenue* In this respect, the operations of the Inspector-General* s 
"office" could not be expanded to meet the expenses of extension without 
making heavy inroads on revenue needed - especially in the case of the 
Liang Kiang, in which region the tempo of rebellion was increasing -
124. "IWSM" (Swisher, pp. 639-40). HP 45* 10b,7-12b,2.
125. "IWSM" (Swisher, pp. 645-47) HP 461 28b,6-30,10. Min-che 
Gov.- Gen*l. Ch*ing-tuan, Foochow Tartar Gen*l* Tung-shun and 
Fukien Gov* Jui-pin* Joint memorial* Recorded 15/l/60. The 
memorial is more directly concerned with the opening of a Treaty port 
on Taiwan. The establishment of an Inspectorate on Taiwan was not 
tinder consideration by Lay* The general attitude expressed has been 
taken by this writer to be applicable to the other three ports within 
the jurisdiction of the officials.
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for local purposes* Until, or unless, allocations for indemnities
or for transmission to the Court could be reduced, there was reluctance
to appropriate funds to finance the Inspector-General's functions* At
the end of I860, Lay was trying to reconcile the fiscal (avaricious, in
Lord Elgin's view) needs of Hsueh Huan and the political needs of Lord 
126Elgin* In the long run, the situation could be expected to rectify
itself, but in the short run it had a restrictive effect.
Thirdly, dealing with the difficulties - old and new - in the three
ports at which Inspectorates had already been established, occupied a
considerable amount of Lay's time and energy* Perhaps, if he had been
able to give the whole of his individual attention to the Inspectorate,
he might have achieved more* As it was, his not unreasonable personal
127interests and the demands made upon him by the British envoys - to 
which he could not refuse to respond - occupied another quite considerable 
amount of his time and energy. Yet it may be contended that the diffi­
culties that had to be overcome were of such dimensions that one man 
devoting himself entirely to the task would have had more than enough to 
do, without, at the same time, deliberately adding to the range of his 
responsibilities•
126. "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private* Dec. 7-11, Dec. 15-19» I860.
"As regards the Customs, the theory of the Chinese Administration seems 
to be this - that officers may cheat as much as they please but that no 
allowance can be made for legitimate expenditures." [l5]»
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Fourthly, insofar as major factors are concerned, the unsettled 
and chaotic political, diplomatic and military situation had a tendency 
to discourage energetic prosecution of the extension of the system. 
Materially and psychologically, the environment was in a condition in 
which logical consistency in decision-making was almost impossible• No 
scale of priorities, whether based on the interests of trade, diplomacy 
or patriotism, could be conceived which would not create dilemmas of 
responsibility or loyalty. The problem was as acute for "Chinese* as 
for foreigners, but for the foreigner, pressed more than any other to 
sit on both horns of the dilemma, the compulsion to inertia would be 
understandable. High Ch’ing officials, removed from the apparatus of 
the Court, could be exonerated from complicity in the Taku affair of 
June, 1859, and in provoking the need for an expedition in the Summer of 
I860, but all Ch1 ing officials were tainted by the affair of September, 
I860, during which a flag of truce was violated and several members of 
the Anglo-French truce team were executed or died as the result of 
maltreatment while incarcerated. These were not the ingredients for 
feeding the springs of single-minded dedication.
The final major factor is one whose implications extend well beyond 
the focus of the immediate topic; the reasons why the Inspectorate was 
not introduced at all^six "eligible" ports up to the time of Lay*s 
departure. The limits of achievement are a reflection of the limitations 
of the man. The range and complexity of difficulties stemming from 
institutional factors might, in their cumulative effect, have been over-
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128riding in circumscribing the limits of possible achievement. None­
theless, unique limitations stemming from shortcomings in Lay1 s 
personality and deficiencies in his qualifications immeasurably reduced 
his effectiveness.
He was unable, all things considered, to arouse either respect or 
strong personal allegiance to compensate for his youthfulness and relative 
immaturity. His customary responses to criticism took the form of 
spiteful and vindictive behaviour. His knowledge and experience in 
general administration were negligible, accounting perhaps for an apparent 
inability to delegate or share authority and responsibility. His know­
ledge and experience in customs^ matters, largely conditioned in the 
first place by the untypical character of the China trade and in the 
second place by the untypical character of the Shanghai pattern, res­
tricted his capacity to make adequate responses to the variety of complex 
customs^ problems, complicated almost beyond comprehension by the attempt 
to pour a new occidental potion into an old Confucian bottle. Although, 
in some particulars, he may have been in advance of most Europeans in his 
understanding of things Chinese and may have been the one European in whom 
the "Chinese" had most confidence, in relative, realistic terms, his under­
standing was severely deficient. The fact that Inspectorates were only
128. Lay asserted, in early March, 1861, that further extension was 
unwarranted in the light of the instability of the dynasty.
Vide Appendix V A.
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introduced at three ports - and none after February, I860 - could be 
taken as a partial indication that, premature as the evaluation may 
seem, the man had reached the limits of his capacities*
B. Serving the British Envoys*
The evaluation is premature not so much because subsequent events 
positively confirm it, but because the activities of his second role - 
unofficially diplomatic and political agent of the British plenipoten­
tiaries - which in time paralleled the activities of his first role, 
have yet to be discussed. The profile of his second role bears a 
subtle, but unmistakable resemblance to the profile of his first role, 
not in the manner of a Jekyll and Hyde, but more nearly in the manner of 
a prosaic Milton.
The treatment of Lay's activities in his capacity as Inspector- 
General has touched directly upon the dilemmas of his position within 
that limited context. The evidence and the discussion have not only 
indicated, however indirectly, the presence of an enigma insofar as he 
sought to serve the "Chinese” interest, but indications have also been 
given of the basic enigma of M s  position as servant to two masters.
The account of M s  efforts to serve the interests of M s  own Government 
through its emissaries, Lord Elgin and Bruce, should by direct evidence 
fill out the pattern of the enigma.
It is well to begin this section by irrefutably establishing that 
Lay was not, in the course of these activities, officially employed by 
the British Government according to any precise definition of the phrase.
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Even Lay, who insisted on holding the view - repudiated by official 
129statements - that while he was British Inspector at Shanghai he 
was still a member of the British Service seconded to the Board of 
Inspectors, was forced to acknowledge that when he was appointed In­
spector-General (for him this meant May 25, 1859) his "official 
connexion with H.M. service ceased by virtue of a clause in the treaty 
regulations’* ^ ^
The special circumstances of his association with the mission that
negotiated the British Treaty at Tientsin have been described in an
earlier chapter. Although Lay in 1662 claimed, ’’the only acknowledgment
that I have received has been the medal granted to me in common with other
131members of the Embassy,” he had in another sense received a very 
tangible Acknowledgment”. But Lord Elgin was still rationalising the 
enigma of Lay1 s dual role so that while this "acknowledgment” would nor­
mally be interpreted as establishing that Lay was a member of his 1858 
mission, the method and terms of the "acknowledgment" specifically denied 
that connection. Thus, in July, 1859» six weeks after his return to 
England (and a full year after the Tientsin negotiations), Lord Elgin 
wrote an "official" to Lord John Bussell which closed*
As Mr. Lay is not in Her Majesty's service I had no 
claim on his time & exertions and I venture to recommend the
129* Vide antea. Chapter VI pp./3£ 
130. Lay. "C.B. Statement”.
131* Loc. cit.
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sum of £500 be given to him as an acknowledgment on the 
part of Her Majesty^ Gov't, of the value of the aid 
afforded by him to the British PP in his negotiations 
with the Chinese Commissioners.132
Lord Russell's approval was given, instructing Lord Elgin to
make the payment and to charge the amount to the account of his 
133special mission* A few weeks later Lord Elgin wrote to Lay*
Allow me to request your acceptance of the enclosed 
Bill of Exchange representing the value of £500... .which 
I have been authorized. .* .to offer you*
I am aware that this..**is an inadequate reward for
the valuable assistance you gave to me ,but as I know
of no other form in which I could acknowledge your service^
I have been induced to request the permission of the 
Government to place the sum at your disposal *134
The sum authorised was, perhaps by coincidence, roughly equivalent 
to the amount of salary Lay would have had to forego if his leave from 
the Board of Inspectors from April-July (the three months of the 1853 
campaign and Tientsin negotiations) had been granted without pay* How­
ever this particular incident is to be interpreted, Lay continued to play 
m  assigned diplomatic/political role for Lord Elgin and for Bruce as 
well after he received his formal commission from Ho as before: but
except for an occasional citation in despatches or private communications 
to the Foreign Office, he was not treated as having any British official
132. ,fE/Bn Unnumbered* Elgin to Russell, 2/7/59•
133• "E/b  ^Unnumbered* Hammond to Elgin, 6/7/59*
134* "E/BM Elgin to Lay. Private. 26/7/59*
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status by the representatives of the Government nor did he receive 
any sort of "acknowledgment", until 1863, for his services.
The character of the functions assigned to Lay by the envoys 
underwent a succession of changes as a consequence of changes in three 
sets of conditions. The first set concerned the changing conditions 
under which Sino-British relations were carried on during the relevant 
period. The second set has to do with the effectiveness of Lay in 
fulfilling the functions assigned to him. The discussion of this 
point will include some consideration of Ch'ing attitudes and responses 
to Lay's alternate role. The third set is related to changes in the 
situation with respect to alternative choices among available personnel.
There was a change in the relationship between Lord Elgin and Lay 
just after the return from the Yangtze tript a change the effect of 
which was to place upon Lay a greater responsibility for representing 
political interests by means of quasi-formal procedures. This aspect 
of Lay's assigned role remained essentially the same through the 18- 
month period of January, 1859 - July, I860. Between early July and 
early December, I860, Lay was inactive in the diplomatic/political sphere. 
He was used extensively by Lord Elgin, when the latter returned to Shanghai 
from Peking, but the Embassy, the instrument for carrying on diplomacy in 
relation to outstanding political issues, had been moved to the north and 
its functions restored to the authority of Bruce, who had taken up winter 
quarters in Tientsin. Bruce had some very definite ideas about the 
diplomatic/political role Lay could (should)play in the diplomatic environ-
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135ment then being prepared at Peking. Because Lay went on leave,
however, he did not on this occasion take on this role.
Lord Elgin* s plans at the beginning of January, 1859> were in- 
136definite. He was, quite naturally, anxious to be reunited with
his family. As it was, almost two years would have elapsed by the 
time he could get back to Britain. Nevertheless, he was unwilling 
to leave until he had exact information as to who would suceed him 
and as to when his successor could be expected. Also, while his 
first appraisal of the prospects for favourable responses from the 
Ch'ing Court had been optimistic, serious doubts based on information 
from Canton and rumours circulating in Shanghai, quickly led to dissi­
pation of his buoyancy. Consequently, when he set out to add the 
pressure of his presence to settlement of the unsatisfactory situation 
at Canton, he left the rather strong impression that he would return to 
Shanghai, despite having learned of Bruce's appointment to suceed him,
135* Bruce's ideas were embodied in several private letters he 
wrote to Elgin and Lady Augusta Bruce in the first half of 1861, 
but the most comprehensive expressions are in an ultra private 
letter to Russell of 28/4/60 (P0 30/22/49) and,TE/B" Bruce to Russell. 
Private. 5/2/6I.
136. The basic information contained in this portion of the chapter 
is well documented in BPP. [2571 ]» in Oliphant, II and in Valrond, 
op.cit.
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157to resume discussions with the Imperial Commissioners*
When Elgin made the decision, at Canton, to set off for home without
returning to Shanghai, he concocted a number of plausible reasons to
justify it* One which he did not specify can be partly inferred from
his own records of the period* He did not apparently reach his decision
158until after Lay appeared on the scene*  ^ It was true that the favourable 
news that Lay brought about the more cooperative disposition of the Court 
and the seeming restoration of the Shanghai-stationed Imperial Commissioners 
to a position of influence, coincided with the encouraging progress of the 
punitive expeditions active in the Canton region*
157 • There is some inconsistency in the evidence on the point of 
whether Lord Elgin made it clear to the Commissioners before he left 
Shanghai that they were to expect him to return. In the official 
despatches to the Foreign Office and in his letter to Lady Elgin from 
Shanghai, the reference is to the action to be taken by ”1 (or my 
successor)". But in his communication to the Commissioners ("e/b”
No. 23. Elgin to Malmesbury. 2/2/59» enclosing Elgin to Commissioners, 
Shanghai, 25/l/59) no such qualification is stated and it is also 
clear from Oliphant, II, p. 475» that it was not until he reached Canton 
and accepted the unofficial report that Bruce was already en route, 
that he decided not to return to Shanghai to resume the negotiations with 
the Commissioners. The Commissioners, however, despite the fact that 
Lay did not personally transmit the official notice until late March, 
knew of the decision within four days, for their report of conversations 
between an agent, Huang Chung-yu, and Lay in Hongkong was recorded at 
Peking on March 1. "IWSM" HF 34* 50b,7-52,1* Further memorial.
138* Oliphant, loc.cit* did not mention the exact date that Elgin 
made his decision. According to"E/B" ms. Letters journal, as of 
Feb. 22, the day before Lay arrived and five days after he heard the 
incorrect report of Bruce’s movements, Elgin wrote: "I trust that this
visit [to Hongkong] may be the wind-up of my affairs, and that the 
English mail may decide me to start at once for home." As of Feb. 26, 
the mail had not yet arrived. When he recorded on March 3 the receipt 
of the mail he noted that it "brought me not a word either from Frederick 
[Bruce] or about his plans....” (Cf. Walrond, op.cit. p.310)
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The news Lay brought was in the form not only of an official 
communication, entrusted to him by the Ch'ing Authorities, but it also 
included Lay's personal report of the results of his private (or quasi­
official, in his Ch'ing role) contacts with these officials. This 
seeming demonstration of the confidence enjoyed by Lay and his apparent 
self-confidence in his own ability to influence the decisions of the 
Imperial Commissioners, was apparently all the additional justification 
Lord Elgin required. He repeated the pattern of early June, 1858, en­
trusting to Lay the delivery of his official reply and elevating him to 
the rank of personal emissary charged with representing British policy. 
That there should be no doubt about Lay*s function - even as a Ch'ing 
official - Lord Elgin requested the cooperation of Admiral Sir M. Seymour 
in expediting the movement to the north of the small contingent of gun­
boats which were due to accompany Bruce after his arrival. Lord Elgin 
concluded:
Should the Admiral see fit to act on my suggestion...
Mr. Lay will be able to point to the gun-boats, as they 
successively arrive at Shanghai, in proof of the deter­
mination. • • .to insist on the faithful execution of the 
Treaty. It may be hoped that my letter and his represen­
tations thus supported, will have the desired effect....139
One of the other reasons for Lord Elgin's decision to return home
was his expectation that Bruce would have left on his way back to China
by the end of January. He was uneasy when he learned, at Singapore, that
159* "E/B" Ho. 28. Elgin to Malmesbury. 7/3/59* Enclosure Elgin
to Seymour. 1/3/59*
299
Bruce’s movements were delayed. In sending Lay this news, Lord Elgin 
added the instruction* "You must keep the Commissioners in a fitting 
condition and let them understand that he will he at Pekin at the proper 
time to exchange ratifications
There may not have been any formal arrangement defining this 
reversion of Lay to his 1858 Tientsin role, hut other evidence corro­
borates the change. Between the time of his return to Shanghai, after 
his consultations with Lord Elgin, and the imminent arrival of Bruce,
Lay addressed reports of his activities and the situation respecting 
the activities (or lack of them) of the Imperial Commissioners directly 
to Lord Elgin as frequently as opportunity afforded. In a ten-week 
period from late March to early May there were at least four such reports. 
Further, in his contacts with the Gh'ing Authorities despite his new status 
and functions in the "uniform system" ap&ratus, he resumed the guise of the
A.
uncontrollably fierce barbarian, behaving with, as Lay would have it, a
"firm hand, though, it may be, gently, - and with four armour (to their
eyes) always buckled on 1, act [ing] invariably as if we fully expected 
142bad faith", ^ and by thus behaving, again earning the epithet of being
140. "FL", Elgin to Lay. Private. 12/5/59*
141* "E/B" Lay to Elgin. Private. Identifiable dates for 25 March,
4 April and 25 April. These letters, and the second half of a fourth 
bearing Lay's signature (probably written early in May) were located 
among Elgin's papers in a bundle marked* "Papers recovered from wreck 
of Malabar I860". Bruce started receiving reports from Lay on May 1, 
1859* (Cf. "E/B" Bruce Day-book. Entry for 1/5/59).
142. "E/B" Lay to Elgin. Private. (Unidentified date).
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"extremely hateful".
When Bruce finally did arrive in South China at the end of 
April, having met very briefly with Lord Elgin at Galle, administrative 
preparations to transfer the Superintendency of Trade and ministerial 
functions to the north and diplomatic considerations of acting in 
concert with his French (and American) colleagues, prevented him from 
leaving Hongkong until late May. In the interim and later at Shanghai - 
because Bruce refused to enter into face to face communication with the 
Imperial Commissioners or other Ch'ing officials - Lay acted as Bruce's 
alter ego. However, it was just a few days before Bruce reached Shanghai 
that Lay was appointed Inspector-General, a development which appeared to 
have some influence on Lay's interpretation of his own functions. In 
the subsequent meetings with Bruce, Lay was also trying to argue the 
Ch'ing case els to why Bruce should defer his journey north, while at the 
same time advising him, emphatically, not to be deterred from using the
144most forceful measures - if needed - to consumate his mission to Peking.
143. "IWSM" HF 36* 12b,8-14*6. (Swisher, pp. 557-58 has only 
translation from 13b,3 to end). Four Imperial Commissioners* 
Memorial. Recorded. 11/4/59*
144* This information is based on a manuscript of extracts covering 
a number of page3 among Elgin's papers at Broomhall. The extracts 
are positively from correspondence of Bruce, to an unidentified 
person, in the form of a letter-journal for the period of June 6 
(when Bruce arrived at Shanghai) - July 5* 1859 (when Bruce left 
Pehchili to return to Shanghai). The relevant entries for this 
citation appear under the dates for June 7> 9> 10 sod 11 •
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145With the departure of the "plenipotentiary’’ Imperial 
Commissioners and Bruce, there was no significant part for Lay, who 
remained at Shanghai, to play. According to the Commissioners, they 
had deliberately set out to discourage Lay from accompanying Bruce to 
the north because they were fearful he would, as in 1858, secretly 
make mischief It must be presumed that the main tactic, not indi­
cated to the Court, consisted of commissioning Lay as "I*G." It is 
quite possible that as another tactic, he was appraised of Yin Chao- 
yun's memorial setting him up as a marked man if he were to make another 
appearance in the north and especially if, as the Ch’ing Authorities 
believed, the mission’s passage to Peking was going to be resisted. 
Whether or not these were the reasons, the Commissioners further alleged 
that Lay was unwilling to accompany Bruce, even after Bruce had asked him 
to and that, in consequence, Bruce refused to pay any attention to Lay’s 
representations on the Commissioners' behalf.
145* This expression is used to indicate the distinction between 
the regular post of Imperial Commissioner that had been transferred 
from Kuangtung to Kiangsu and the specially appointed Imperial 
Commissioners from the Court*
146. ”IWSM” HP 381 31b>8-32b,9. Pour Commissioners. Memorial.
Recorded. 22/6/59*
147* The translation of Yin's memorial did not appear in the "NCH” 
until July 23 (vide antea Chapter VII, n.149) but Lay could have be­
come familiar with its contents (in Chinese or in English translation) 
at an earlier date.
148. ’IWSM” HP 38s 31b,8-32b,9, QP.cit
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It is possible that in his intercourse with the Ch'ing Authorities,
Lay may have behaved in such a way as to justify their interpretation,
but from Bruce's reports there is no evidence that he was at any time
annoyed with Lay. Bruce continued to discuss personally with Lay the
various policies which might be followed and on the day he left he wrote
to Elgin that the man he would most regret not having with him in the 
149north was Lay.
Before the full impact of the repulse at Taku could be felt, Lay 
was inactivated by the knifing attack made upon him. A mob, in one of 
the less reputable sections of Shanghai, excited by rumours that foreign 
sailors were kidnapping natives for a French-registry vessel loading emi­
grants, had accosted and were beating into insensibility a European. Lay 
and the Rev. John Hobson, English Chaplain, who were taking an early 
evening stroll, on coming upon the scene, sought to intercede. Finding 
their efforts unavailing and warned that they might also be attacked, they 
fled. They became separated in flight (Lay, the younger and speedier,
outdistanced his companion), the Chaplain being taken into refuge; but
150the assailants, who were never officially identified, caught up with Lay. 
By the time the latter was discovered by a member of the foreign police
149. "E/B” Bruce to Elgin. Private. 15/6/59•
150. nNCHw 1859-1860, passim. Fairly substantial rewards were 
offered for the capture of the attackers. F0 228/274 No. 21
T.T. Meadows to Bruce 5l/8/59* Only one alleged suspect was taken 
into custody ("NCHM No. 475 5/9/59* P*18) But there is no report 
of his being charged.
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151force, he had already received several knife thrusts in the abdomen* ^
152For a day or so following, Lay was not expected to survive, but three
153weeks later he was reported recovered, and just over two months later, 
he made the sea passage to Hongkong*
When he was again fit to work, there was no urgent need for his ser­
vices as a diplomatic functionary, partly because new policy directives 
had not yet been received from the home governments and partly because 
Bruce did not intend to make any new move except from a "position of 
strength". In this situation Lay*s energies were directed toward ex­
tension of the Inspectorate.
Once he started to work in this direction, his time was so completely 
occupied by the difficulties encountered that he was not available for the 
early period of critical diplomatic manoeuvering preceding the second Arrow 
War expedition. Bruce expressed his disappointment to Elgin. "It has
151. The factual information is culled from the depositions of 
witnesses printed in "NCH" No. 471* 6/8/59> P«2 A correspondent to
the "Friend of China" (reprinted in "LCT". 17/lO/59» p.507) purported 
to believe Lay had been singled out because of the animosity of the 
local populace and officials towards him. The "Times" reference to 
the incident, however, (leader [W. Cooke or L. Oliphant?] 21/4/60) 
described Lay as "the most popular European in China". For a summary 
Chinese account cf. "IWSM" HF 41* 44,6-47^,6. Ho Memorial. Recorded
22/8/59.
152. "JMA" II.A. 2(37) Whittall to J. Jardine. 31/7/59. Also Capt. 
Baylis to Hongkong. Same date. "LCT" 27/9/59. p.484. "We are informed 
by private letters that Mr. Lay is so much injured that his medical 
attendant gives but little hopes of his recovery."
153. "NCH" Ho. 437. 20/8/59, P.10. "IWSM" HF 42, 25,4-26,10. Ho. 
Memorial Recorded 5/9/59* On 26,5 Ho refers to Lay and the other[s] 
as having recovered* Several eruptions occurred on July 29 during 
which a few men were killed and several wounded.
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been a misfortune that during the last three months Lay has been in
the South,,.. "^4
Lay’s absence during this period had an unexpected result. The
vacuum was partially filled by the initiative of some wealthy Chinese
merchants who were facing the double threat of Taiping resurgence and
renewal of the foreign war. The contact man for the group was ”Takee”
(Yang Pang), who held almost the same relationship vis a vis the Shanghai
area Ch’ing officials as Lay did to the British envoys, with the exception
that Yang Fang carried on his liaison through the Shanghai senior of
155Jardine’s - James Whittall. ^  After Lay got back to Shanghai on March
■j c / T
31, he resumed his diplomatic/political role for Bruce and then very 
briefly for Lord Elgin. But because there were no ’’plenipotentiary” 
Imperial Commissioners on hand and because the Ch'ing officials no longer 
relied on him exclusively, his activities had much less significance than 
they had had. a year earlier.
In giving his explanation of why he did not invite Lay to join him 
in I860, Lord Elgin still adhered to his earlier concept of the role Lay 
should play*
154* ’’Ibid”. 6/3/60. Lay had, in fact, been in the south since 
October and, further, did not return to Shanghai until March 31*
135* These developments, from the Ch’ing records, are ably dis­
cussed by Banno, op.cit. pp*71-73* The part played by Jardine's 
is briefly noted in Whittall's letters to Hongkong. ”JMA” II.
5(2)(23)• Feb. 16 and Apr. 17, I860.
156. PO 30/22/49* Bruce to Russell. Private. 28/4/60. "E/B”
Bruce to Elgin. Private. 28/4/6O, 30/5/6O end II/7/6O. (the last 
letter was sent to Elgin after he had started for the north).
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I have also sent for Parkes. I do not take Lay, 
because I hope that he may be employed as the adviser of 
the other party# He is a Chinese official, and when they 
are thoroughly puzzled, I hope that they may look to him 
for counsel# This would go far to secure a satisfactory 
settlement of our difficulties.157
Taking into account the changes that were already evident, in 
order for Lord Elgin*s esqjectation to have been considered realistic, 
it would have had to have been based on the corollary expectation that 
Lay would soon be enabled to exert his influence directly in Peking# If
Lay were to have the expected influence, then as a "Chinese” official it
was also necessary to avoid again having his identity become indis­
tinguishable from that of any other junior British functionary. Thus, 
the pendulum of the enigma was again swinging in the opposite direction. 
When Bruce proceeded to Peking following the cessation of hostilities and 
conclusion of peace, Lay did not join his entourage. When Lord Elgin 
returned to Shanghai, he dealt with Lay, for the most part, as though the 
latter were a Ch*ing official.
By the time the fine points of his Ch*ing position were defined and
he was invited by the Ch*ing Authorities at Peking to associate himself 
with other Ch*ing officials who had functions in the central government 
apparatus, Lay*s own conception of the role he should play decided him 
against responding to the invitation. Without either Lord Elgin or Bruce 
directly on the spot to exert personal pressure on him, he was able to
157. "E/B" ms. Letters-journal. 5/7/60. There were some reports 
that Lay was to accompany Elgin. Cf. ”LCT”. 27/6/60, p. 529*
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dismiss the one and ignore the other* The immediate reaction of both 
these men to this disruption of their grand designs was strong* Lord 
Elgin, since he was helpless to do anything about it, was filled with
■ICO
disappointment. Bruce, while he thought he could influence Lay, was
159filled with consternation, and, after he discovered Lay had gone, with 
strong resentment.
In the last analysis, the matter of Lay’s effectiveness in fulfilling 
his diplomatic/political role must seem to have been relatively unimportant. 
His function in the process of resolving the problems plaguing Sino-British 
(and/or Sino-foreign) relations, though vital to the process, was not of 
the kind that could exercise a decisive influence on policy and, therefore, 
the success or failure in resolving the problems could not be ascribed to 
him. But another facet of the enigma of his position was that the British 
envoys (who did possess "full powers") and the Ch* ing officials in the 
Shanghai region (who did not possess "full powers") both tried to use Lay 
as though he could exercise a decisive influence.
158. "E/E" Elgin to Bruce. Private. 16/5/61. "I am very glad Lay
has seen [sic] Kang [sic] but I am somewhat alarmed at the determination
he has made to come home on leave."
159* Lay, "Interests", p.8.
160. "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private. 25/5/61. "I am much annoyed
at Lay going home without coming up here - the Prince w^ have done any
thing he wished & who knows by next year whether the position will be
the same? - I believe his health is very bad - this is his only excuse -
but the climate of Peking is so different from that of the South of
China, that I know of no better sanatorium." (By July, Bruce*s opinion 
of Peking*s climate had changed a bit, but he wasn’t thinking of Lay 
then).
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Lay could and did, with greater or lesser precision, interpret 
the basic positions of each side to the other. The Ch’ing officials 
contacted by Lay clearly understood British intentions. What they did 
not seem to understand was that Lay, fully alive to their problems, was 
unable to alter the envoys' determination to carry out those intentions.
In this connection, Bruce partly exonerated the Shanghai group from com­
plicity in the Taku affair* firstly, because he felt, legitimately, that 
Lord Elgin had committed himself to modifications in British policy (viz., 
non-exercise of the permanent residence option) and then had left without
resolving other points which the Imperial Commissioners hoped to have 
l6lmodified* secondly, because of Lay's contact with the group, Bruce
had had a clear indication that his mission could expect to be obstructed 
162at Taira. The other result was that Lay also was absolved of res­
ponsibility for the failure of the preliminary "negotiations".
While the analyses made by Bruce and Lord Elgin (in the framework 
now of his second special mission of I860) were penetrating enough to en­
able them to understand Lay could not be held personally responsible, they 
could not understand that the role which they expected him to fill was a
161. "E/B" Bruce to Robert Bruce (a younger brother) 5/2/60. Among 
the brothers, Lord Elgin was known as "Jack".
162. Hsueh confided to Lay in the utmost privacy "that the hostile 
party had got round the Emperor and that they required another lesson 
at Tien-sin & that if they were well-founded the Commissioners would 
recover their influence and things go right -" ("E/B". Extract from 
Bruce letter-joumal for 12/6/59)* Bruce had been warned of what to 
expect before he left Hongkong by R. Hart, who had submitted a lengthy 
memorandum to him. (Cf. Morse, "Conflict", p.575)*
308
false one* Lay was as ineffective in acting as counsellor to or on 
behalf of the Ch'ing officials in the same measure as they were in­
effective due to their lack of power to exercise a decisive influence
163on formulation of policy at the Court# The impersonal confrontation
of incompatible concepts of diplomatic/political intercourse on a
governmental level could not be avoided despite the best understanding
that might be achieved among a few individuals# Lay and Hsueh Huan, in
particular, had achieved a remarkable rapport in their mutual contacts
and it was the latter, on the eve of the second mission who, in almost
l 6a
the identical terms he used on the eve of Bruce's mission in 1859? 
recognised the dilemma on the governmental level and the enigma on the 
individual level# There were doubtless personal and partisan objectives 
which affected Hsueh* s appraisal of the situation, but he was candid in 
his agreement that the basic issues could only be resolved by the appli­
cation of physical force against the Court.
163* This lack of power was especially marked in May - June, I860 
when Ho Kuei-ch'ing proved incapable of stemming the Taiping 
resurgence and was speedily relieved of all his offices# Banno, 
op*cit> pp# 45-46, 110#
164* Lay prepared a highly confidential memo describing a series of 
four meetings he had with the Ch'ing officials between April 1-20.
("E/B" Bruce Day-book. Under April 20, Bruce reported a three-hour 
discussion between Lay and Hsueh, immediately after which the latter 
purportedly was to set out for Peking)# Bruce sent a copy to Russell 
(enclosure in F0 30/22/49* 28/4/60) and one to Elgin ("e/b "# Private.
50/5/60)# Except for one or two minor changes and the omissions of the 
names of the Ch'ing officials, Lay included this memo as "Appendix B" 
in his pamphlet "Interests". The matter referred to here appears on 
p. 71
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This appraisal was also an indirect admission of the relative 
ineffectiveness of "both Lay and himself to fulfill the functions 
assigned to them "by the envoys and the Court respectivly. Part of
Lay13 ''ineffectiveness" in I860 was due, of course, to his extended
\
absence from Shanghai, But it would also be consistent with the
foregoing analysis to suggest that the Ch'ing reliance on the attempt
to negotiate a modus vivendi through the Chinese merchants was another
manifestation of the limitations of his position. Another one of the
ironies (numerous as they appear to be) of the general situation was
that, partly as a result of fortuitous developments and partly as a
result of the success of allied arms, Hsueh's position and relative
165influence increased while that of Lay's tended to decline  ^- develop­
ments which may also have been related to Lay's decision to go on leave.
The third, and final, set of changes that affected Lay’s functions 
is related to the greater opportunities which opened up for making 
alternative choices in employment of available personnel. In 1858, the 
number of men who were linguistically qualified and who had some knowledge 
of local affairs was extremely limited and the demand was much greater 
than the supply. Quantitatively, by early I860, the pressure of demand
165• Robert Hart, who Lay recommended as one of his locum tenens 
in 1861, and who eventually succeeded Lay in I863, gave an appraisal 
of the ultimate impact of the changed relationship. (Cf. "E/B" Bruce 
to Russell. Private. 2/2/64. Enclosing copy of Hart to Sir F. Bruce 
I4/1/64• Notation on cover of Bruce's transcribed copy* "Circulated
to Cabinet")• "Vide" Appendix IX,B.
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slackened, especially because of the Taku affair, and the supply of 
young trainees substantially increased. A few of the younger men 
who had first journeyed to China before 1856 were becoming sufficiently 
competent to fill administrative posts and a number of those of the 
"class" of 1857-58 were proving adequate to carry out minor liaison 
duties.
Thus Lay's services could be dispensed with in 1859* and in I860
not only was it possible for Lord Elgin to "send for Parkes", but when,
later, Bruce wintered in the north, he was able to keep Wade with him
at Tientsin while a relative "unknown", T. Adkins, could be left at
Peking on his own to make the preliminary arrangements for the permanent 
166embassy. Lord Elgin having found Parkes, during the second expedition,
"one of the most remarkable men [he] ever met" and having also decided
167
that he was at least theeiual of Lay in his facility to speak Chinese,
brought Parkes back to Shanghai. The longer his association with Parkes
continued, the higher was his regard for him, leading Lord Elgin finally
i6dto describe him as "our best man". When Lord Elgin left Shanghai for
Hongkong to conclude the last business of his second mission, he again took 
Parkes along despite the fact that Lay was at Hongkong and despite the fact 
that Parkes was urgently needed to assist in the arrangements being made
166. Three "senior" men, Wade, Parkes and Morrison, were all able 
and willing "to remain alone at Peking...." Walrond, on.cit. p.373*
167. "Ibid." p. 353
168. "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private. Dec. 15-19* I860 [Dec. 15].
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for "opening" the Yangtze to regular trade.
Lay was so enmeshed in Inspectorate difficulties that he seemed 
not to he aware nor resentful of the changing patterns affecting his 
position and function. At this juncture, he even appeared grateful to 
be able to share some of his responsibilities and to accept recommen­
dations from Parkes on Customs collection procedures connected with the
169Yangtze operations. Lay was beginning to give indications that for
a time, at least, he wished to be free from serving any master.
This brief presentation of a few of the aspects of Lay's diplomatic/
political role does not do full justice to the part he actually played in
the events of 1859-61. His own claim that he "was employed by Sir F.
Bruce in his political relations with the Chinese - being in fact the
medium of his communications with the Chinese Govt - to an extent not
imagined by the Foreign Office, and which it [was his misfortune that he]
170did not take care should be duly known", was one of the few he made on
his own behalf that was not an over-statement. Sir H. Parkes, almost a
decade later, also testified to the nature and extent of Lay's activities.
[Lay] quitted [the China] service for that of the Chinese 
Gov't in 1855* "but he continued to be consulted and employed 
both by the late Lord Elgin and Sir F£ed Bruce, in the most
169. "E/B" Parkes to Elgin. Private. 9/4/61. Lay, as Parkes noted
in his letter, was already homeward-bound from Shanghai.
170. FO 17/462. Lay to Hammond. 19/l/66. Lay had written to 
Clarendon on Jan. 13, submitting himself "as a candidate for the 
Secretaryship of Legation at Pekin, which is about to be vacated by 
Mr. Wade."
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confidential manner, throughout the operations in China which 
extended from 1857-1861.171
However, Lay's energy and his willingness to accept the functions
assigned were, alone, inadequate to resolve the enigma of his position
and to compensate for his personal limitations. The enigma, heretofore
copiously if not lucidly defined, was an inherent characteristic of the
embryonic stage of Sino-foreign relations. Lay, having acquired well
above-average qualifications in a very few specialised functions, offered
one of the rare ingredients for promoting the development of those
relations. Perhaps an appropriate analogy for Lay's function would be
that of the food in the seed which nourishes the fledgling and then
dissolves. The analogy may have further application in that this food
has a composition which precludes it from becoming identified in the self-
sustaining plant. Thus it could appear to "one of the highest living
172
authorities on China (not Sir John Bowring, I need scarcely say)", 
writing in retrospect some three and a half years after the events re­
viewed:
Secondly,  I have always said, that Mr. H.N. Lay
is a person of no influence with the Chinese, but only the 
creature of an accident and ill-fitted even for Custom­
house chief-inspectorship.
171. FO 262/188 No. 104. Parkes to Clarendon. 31/7/70.-
172. Quoted by London Correspondent "A.W." in "China Mail", 
Supplement, n.p. March 3* 1864* The identity of the "authority" 
is not known. The paper records the date of transmission as 
Dec. 11, but on internal evidence, the report could not have been 
sent before Jan.11.
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These last remarks have been formulated with reference to Lay's 
diplomatic/political role, but they could with almost equal relevance 
refer to his role in the Inspectorate - as a foreign servant in Ch'ing 
employ. This, in turn, opens the way for refocussing on the parallel 
patterns of the two profiles. The nature of the functions he was 
called upon to fulfill and the enigma of his efforts to serve two masters 
were exhausting Lay's resources. The concluding evidence upon which 
this evaluation is predicated is to be found by taking a closer look at 
his decision to take home leave.
The only reason which Lay would divulge to Bruce and Prince Kung
was related to the wounds he had received in July, 1859, almost a full
173twenty months earlier. '
Considering all the activities he was engaged in between October,
1859, March, 1861, which included at least two other trips to Hong­
kong and getting married, even Bruce was incredulous that Lay should 
plead his injuries of 1859 as an excuse.^*^ Prom the point of view of 
the British Minister accredited to the Manchu Court (which was not the 
perspective that predominated among the majority of foreigners - especially 
British - taking an active interest in Chinese affairs in early 1861), it
173* Both Morse, "Submission", p.139 and J. Bredon, op.cit. p.59 
asserted the knifing took place in 1861 and that it was the immediate 
cause of Lay taking leave. After I863, Lay and Hart, each for his 
own reasons, desired to foster this impression.
174. Vide antea. n.l60.
was inconceivable that any responsible person could excuse himself
from the difficulties of his office and the positive opportunities
175opened to him on such a relatively feeble pretext. It was only
when he discovered that Lay was not as indispensable as he had
believed, that he was able to concede that the general state of Lay1 s
176health justified his taking leave* When, indeed, all the reasons
- actual and probable - for Lay’s decision axe taken into account, the 
matter of his physical health does not stand out as being of primary 
importance*
Factually, Lay wrote an extremely frank letter to Lord Elgin
177divulging the principal reasons for his decision. Confirming
Count Eulenburg’s report of his private discussion with Lay, the main
reason, expressed in its simplest terms was that, based on Wade’s per-
178sonal appraisals conveyed privately to Lay, Lay considered the Manchu 
prospects for survival very poor and he did not intend to be too closely
175. FO 17/351 No. 45. Bruce to Russell. 9/5/61.
176. FO 17/353 No. 85. Bruce to Russell. 7/7/61.
177* Vide aciTea. Appendix V A for full text.
178. The only portion of Wade’s letter available are the extracts 
quoted by Lay. Another record to confirm that these views originated 
with Wade is in ”LCT”, I3/5/6I, p*267, where the following appears:
”The China Mail” affirms on ’good authority’ [Lay? or possibly Hart via 
Lay?] that the Government of Peking is in a state of confusion and that 
Mr. Wade writes that the dynasty will be utterly destroyed, or in the 
expressive language of the ”China Mail”, ’ go to smash’, if the Emperor
delays his return much longer.” Wade privately wrote a long letter on
his views to Elgin in July, 1861. An extract relevant to this subject 
is reproduced in Appendix V B.
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identified with a dynasty whose demise might he imminent* He
estimated that within a year (the term of his leave), the issue of
survival or death would be resolved and he would be in a stronger
position to carry out his dual role in the Ch’ing service once proof
of its vitality had been given.
Although he did not mention this to Lord Elgin, Lay was presumably
aware that Wade, too, was seeking to arrange some sort of leave that
179would permit him to take up again his sinological pursuits. Wade
had additional, different reasons for being dissatisfied with his 
position, but the important point was that he was also prepared to 
divest himself of his responsibilities in order to satisfy his special 
interests.
Another reason divulged by Lay in his letter was that by taking 
leave it would give him "an opportunity of explaining at home what the 
Foreign establishment is”. Lord Elgin could hardly have considered 
this flattering to himself, besides which, though there was some oppo­
sition to the Inspectorate idea expressed in the press and Parliament,
180it was receiving the fairly influential editorial support of the "Times',1 
and favourable notices in other periodicals.
179. FO 17/351 No. 26. Bruce to Russell. 9/4/61. Enclosing 
Wade memo dated 15 March 1861.
180. Cf. especially leaders of Jan. 9> May JO and June J, 1861 - 
all printed before Lay had reached England.
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Apart from what is on the record, Lay had other strong reasons 
for desiring to take a home leave at the earliest opportunity. He 
had heen in China, without having had a home leave, from the time of
his arrival as a fourteen-year old boy in I847. He had not seen
his widowed mother throughout this period. He was the eldest of
her children and the first to take a spouse, one whom she may not as
yet have met.^^
It would not have been unusual, either, if Lay had felt the need 
to renew his acquaintance with the occidental world. Most of his 
knowledge of the changing character of his homeland - economic, social, 
technological - was acquired at second hand. For a high functionary, 
one of whose primary objectives was to encourage the introduction of 
occidental achievement into China, his lack of firsthand knowledge in 
all probability, would have made him feel, at best, uncomfortable.
In this vein of probable reasons, the attitude of his wife, almost 
ten years younger than he, may have had some influence. According to 
a family tradition she was a strong-minded woman who, if she was to 
bear children, desired to bear them under conditions in which the best
181. Lay married a daughter of the eminent sinologist, Dr. James 
Legge. The Legges had left England for China, in the summer of 
1859.
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facilities were available.
When all these reasons - factual and probable - are taken into 
account, no one, nor all together, seem compelling enough to explain 
the precipitousness of Lay’s decision. If, however, these reasons 
can also be viewed as rationalisations of a mental fatigue induced 
by the dilemmas and enigmas of his dual role, the compulsion to be 
extricated from an impossible situation, impersonal as well as per­
sonal, when translated into the decision, provides it with a greater 
degree of reasonableness.
This discussion can be fittingly concluded by reference to the 
following three selections. The first is a prognostication made by 
the leader-writer for the "London and China Telegraph" when commenting 
on Lay’s part in introducing the Inspectorate at Canton in 1859*
It is particularly unfortunate for British prestige 
that the man who takes the lead in it acted as interpreter 
to Lord Elgin. Truly, no man can serve two masters.
This he has lately attempted, and, if we mistake not, will 
soon lose both.183
The second selection, albeit an introspective appraisal confided 
by Bruce to one of his sisters, is in point of time and content strikingly 
relevant to Lay. It was written from Tientsin on January 7i 1861:
182. The writer is indebted for this suggestion to the late Mrs. 
Frank Lay. The tradition has some support in that a daughter was 
bom to the H.N. Lay’s on Jan. 30» 1862, in London. ("LCE" 10/2/62, 
p.183). Family records show that the first of their nine children 
was a boy (G.T. Lay) who was stillborn. The time factor can be 
reconciled if this child was actually the product of a four - or 
five-month miscarriage in China.
183. 15/12/59,
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[isolation in a high office] is a severe trial on one’s 
spirit and energy - I don’t think one gets as much credit 
for sticking to it as one deserves - It requires a peculiar 
temperament & a deal of endurance not to get tripped and 
broken by the difficulties that surround one, the want of 
appreciation of them in England & the absence of relief 
derived from new faces and new topics - There is not a mail 
which does not carry some decision of mine, in which I stake 
on imperfect information my avenir & credit, and which may 
not be laid hold of against me by those who trade on 
criticizing apreb coup the actions of a man who must act, 
often where he would avoid doing anything, if he could.184
The last selection is an indication of Lay's attitude during the
early part of his home leave. It is part of a precis of a letter he
wrote on October 7» 1861, to his personal business agent in Shanghai:
Acknd. receipt of pamphlet cont[ainin]g Chamber of 
Commerce’s list of grievances. I am come home for rest, 
and am therefore (beyond just keeping one eye open) pro­
foundly indifferent as to Customs squabbles - may both 
parties enjoy their fun!185
When Lay and his wife embarked from Shanghai on April 7i 1861, it 
seemed to have been accorded no more attention than that usually found 
in notices of passengers on departed vessels.
184* "E/B" Bruce to Lady Augusta Bruce. 22/ll/58.
185* Precis, extracts and copies of letters and memoranda made by
H.N. Lay in a register marked "Private”, covering the period October 
7, 1861 - November 10, 1862, while on leave in England. (Herein­
after cited as* Lay, L.R.) Transcripts made by this writer from 
the manuscript kindly loaned by H.N. Lay's great-granddaughter, Mrs. 
A.G. Pocock, Keeper's Cottage, Moor Park, Famham, Surrey.
Chapter IX
Serving Two Masters - third phasei 1861-1862
H.N. Lay arrived in England, after an unbroken absence of fourteen
years, early in June, 1861,^ just short of his twenty-ninth birthday*
The lads who had been sent off by an impoverished widow had justified
the risk undertaken when she used the meagre grant accorded her from
public funds, in recognition of her deceased husband's services, to launch 
her two eldest sons on careers in China* H.N. Lay, at least, had more 
than compensated for the almost total obscurity that enshrouded his next 
younger brother.
Neither his fame nor his fortune were of spectacular proportions,
but not only was he the high-salaried Inspector-General, albeit on leave,
of the "Celestial Empire's" Maritime Customs Service, he was also a man
of property - having invested the surplus at his disposal in land and
2
building in the Shanghai Settlement* Though his holdings were not 
large, property values had appreciated considerably (concurrently with 
a commodity-price inflation) as a result both of the growth of Shanghai 
as a commercial and military "entrepot" and of the large refugee influx, 
occasioned by the increase of rebel activity after 1859* In a sense, 
also, Lay was a protege of Lord Elgin whose public image, tarnished by 
the 1859 Taku affair, had been restored by the victory at Peking in I860*
1. "E/B Elgin to Bruce. Private. June 10, 1861* Also "LCE" III (June 186l)
455.
2. Periodic references to Lay's holdings appear in Lay: "LR" in the notes 
of his letters to "Moncreiff" who acted as his agent* This was probably 
George Moncreiff of Moncreiff, Grove and Co., a small British firm which 
failed in I857-58.
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While Lay18 name might not have been too familiar to those not interested
in the China trade, he was included among a coterie of China career-
official s who were usually noticed favourably, in contrast to consistently
3
unfavourable comment on Lord Elgin, in the leader columns of the "Times”• 
Relative to his position at the start of his career, then, he was still a 
young man who had already "come a long way"*
Layfs return, nonetheless, was perhaps most notable for the lack of 
public attention it was accorded. This belies, to some extent, the 
frequent assertion that recognition of his stature as a public figure 
encouraged him to exaggerate his own importance. ^ At the same time, it 
would be well to recall that the world did not look the same from London 
as it did from Shanghai. This was especially so in two respects at least 
in the Spring of 1861. With respect to occidental affairs, European 
statesmen were barely recovering from the crises connected with events on 
the Italian peninsula, when they were confronted with the war between the 
Union and the Confederacy. With respect to China affairs, the military 
and diplomatic victories of 1858 had been all but obliterated by the repulse 
of 1859 and the easpedition of I860.
3# "Times”, 1860-61, "passim”. Also "E/B". Elgin to Russell. Private.
Apr. 21, 1861.
4* Bredon, op. cit*. pp. 70-71* Also Wright, "Tariff” p. 170. Both refer 
to "Flattering” notice and reception. There was ample notice, especially 
in late 1862 and I863, but little of it was flattering. They also refer 
to his award of a ”C.B.", but he did not receive this until several months 
after his return to China in 1863*
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Lord Elgin, although hardly more than a secondary "hero", had arrived
home several weeks before Lay and was, in general, being acknowledged and
feted in a manner befitting his station* As far as those entitled to
acclaim on grounds other than eminence, the limelight had shifted - not
5
without the encouragement of Lord Elgin himself - to Harry Parkes* There
was thus little reason why Lay should be the focus of attention*
Although there was no public acknowledgement of his return, he was
afforded opportunities to put himself forward had he been so inclined*
From the time Lord Elgin learned that Lay was on his way back, Elgin
supported his own position against the objections raised by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, W*E* Gladstone, to the manner in which the indemnity
£
payments were being arranged and to pressures brought by salt merchants,
who had members of Parliament petitioning on their behalf to have salt
7
removed from the contraband category,1 by advising the complainants that 
if they remained unconvinced they could soon discuss these matters with the 
man who was most competent to deal with them. Lay did visit Lord Elgin 
on a number of occasions during the first few weeks after his return and 
he was in touch with a delegation of the salt merchants.
5* Parkes did not actually return until 1862 - Lane-Poole, op.cit. I, 4^5 - 
but he was the popular "China hero" for the prominent part he had played 
in the expedition of I860. He was supposed to have returned in 1861, but 
Bruce delayed his leave* For Elgin on Parkes, ”E/BH Elgin to Bruce.
Private. June 23, 1861*
6. me/B" Elgin to Gladstone. June 1, 1861.
7* "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private. June 10, 1861. Also FO 17/364* Russell
to Mr* J. Tollemache, M.P. June 22, 1861* For meeting of Lay and Tollemache
vide "E/B” Elgin to Bruce, Private. June 23» 1861*
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However, he does not appear to have developed any regular liaison with any 
Government department.
Another channel opening to Lay is referred to in a letter from Lord 
Elgin to Bruce. Lord Elgin, almost with a note of chagrin, reported that
Lay had declined his invitation to attend the annual dinner meeting, at the
Crystal Palace, of the Society of Arts, at which function Lord Elgin was to 
preside, because Lay had a dinner engagement with the Times "expert” on
g
China, Wingrove Cooke; the very man whom Lord Elgin felt was responsible 
for that journal's hostility towards him! Here again a significant contact 
did not have the immediate result of bringing Lay to public notice.
Finally, while it has been asserted that the condition of Lay's health
was not a primary consideration in his decision to take leave during a 
critical phase of developments in China, he was not, in fact, well. As 
indicated at the close of the last chapter, several months after his return 
to England, he was still disinclined to involve himself in the controversies 
publicized by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Chambers of Commerce, because he 
had "come home to rest". Several months later still, before it was 
absolutely certain that he would be called upon to remain in England to act 
in an official capacity for the Manchu Imperial Government, he intended 
requesting Prince Kung for an extension of his sick leave because he did 
not feel sufficiently recovered from the exertions of his last three years
Q
in China to resume the burdens of his official responsibilities.
8. "E/B" Elgin to Bruce. Private. June 23, 1861. 
9* Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Jan.10, 1862.
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Despite his wish to he free of involvements, he had assigned himself one 
important project for the period of his leaves to solicit from eminent British 
legal authorities formal opinions, to which HMGr would become bound, on the 
limits of legal and political jurisdiction affecting the personnel (especially 
Mforeigners”) and operations of the Foreign Inspectorate system.*^ At the 
very beginning of October Lay confined his initiative to this project, but 
the resumption of this activity coincided with the receipt of a series of 
letters from his two "locum tenensM, FitzRoy (permanently stationed at Shanghai) 
and Hart^ (who, after several weeks residence at Peking, had set out on a 
tour of all the ports where Inspectorate offices had been opened). The latter, 
in particular, bombarded him with requests for his advice on new problems as 
well as old and with an intimation of a new major project for which, even 
while Lay remained in Britain, his services would be required*
The new problems were essentially a magnification of the old problems 
that had arisen in the operations of the Inspectorate system when it was 
initiated at Shanghai. There was not much that Lay could do from England 
about the problems, whether old or new. They arose from day to day develop­
ments and could not be postponed pending exchanges of correspondence. The 
frustrating consequences of referring to distant decision-makers, the stock- 
in-trade of harassed diplomats, was one of the principal reasons for the 
clamour being raised by the Chambers of Commerce.
10. Lay, MLR". Lay to Hart. Oct. 7 and 26, 1861
11. Loc. cit.
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In most instances| such as in the problems connected with the extension
of direct Inspectorate operations to Treaty Ports on the middle reaches of
the Yangtze, he could but register his disapproval on the grounds that the
12programme of extension was premature# In other instances, on problems
such as methods of dealing directly with Prince Kung, he would expiate on
13general principles; as when he wrote to Harti '
".... I am so afraid of Kung1 s doing the wrong thing during your absence.
He ought To have you by his side To coach him and watch him daily# I think
he is hardly able To run alone yet# And don*t trust him or Wanseang further
than you can see hinT[sic].»»
In still other instances, in which the problems seemed to strike at
what Lay considered the foundation of the Inspectorate system, he was
unequivocal in laying down "the law”# Thus, in countering proposals for the
establishment of mixed tribunals composed of Consuls and local Ch1ing officials
to deal with alleged infractions of customs arrangements, Lay threatened to
resign if such tribunals were instituted.^
Many of the problems, however categorised, resulted because of the lack
of clear policy directives from the Home Government to the British Minister,
F.W.A. Bruce.
12. Lay, MLRH Lay to Hart. Jan.8, 1862 
1J. Loc. cit.
14* I*ay, "LR" Lay to Hart. March 26, 1862# Appendix VI, A.
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Since the Inspectorate was an instrument sanctioned, if not imposed, by the
Treaty Settlement, Lay decided to discuss with the Foreign Secretary, Lord
John Russell, and his Under-Secretary, A.H. Layard, the difficulties created
15by the Government’s dilatory behaviour* Lay’s approach, of course, coincided
with the flood of merchant protests, but these protests had been transmitted
along with a series of official despatches and personal letters from Bruce
at Peking reaffirming his own unequivocal support for the Inspectorate and
inviting, though not demanding, an official statement confirming in specific
terms the principles which he was using as guides for his on-the-spot 
16decisions* Lay’s presence in London appeared to have the effect of changing
an attitude of apathetic indifference to one of active prevarication. When
the Foreign Office was armed with a sufficiency of lengthy memoranda from Lay,
17Lord Elgin, Bruce, Wade and Hart , it commenced during the first quarter of
1862,embodying, in a succession of despatches, formulations of policy based
10
on the representations and interpretations advanced by these gentlemen*
Their views were usually opposed to the special pleadings of merchants and
Consuls and tended to defend the inherent, as well as the treaty, rights of
19the Imperial government.
15. "Ibid." Lay to Hart. Oct. 26, 1861 and Dec. 10, 1861.
16. FO 17/557* Bruce to Russell, passim. FO 30/22/49* Bruce to Russell.
Private, esp. Dec. 2, 1861.
17* Much of the information on this topic was presented in BPP (5104) Further 
Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China. With an Appendix. (London, I863).
18* FO 17/380. (Domestic Various - 1862), esp. Board of Trade to Foreign 
Office, Feb. 2, 1862. Also FO 228/318. Despatches. Russell to Bruce. 1862
19* "Vide antea" n.16 and 17
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Lay’s memorandum (ostensibly confidential), which had been written in
response to an invitation from Hammond with Lord Bussell1 approval,
included a scathing denunciation of the leading merchant houses in China,
citing a series of alleged infractions in deliberate defiance of customs
regulations and administration. It was typical of Lay’s partisan "style";
intemperate in language and clever in presenting evidence that was
20inferential rather than incontrovertible.
The new project, as distinct from the problems, was only an intimation,
because in one series of letters which Lay received in one batch from 
21Hart the latter reported both the qualified approval and then the
subsequent retraction by Prince Kung, for Hart’s proposal to form a para-
naval flotilla, to be employed partly to assist in the suppression of
rebellion (especially of the Taipings on the Yangtze) and partly to
constitute the enforcement arm of the Customs’ Inspectorate. Lay’s reaction
to Kung’s ambivalence is significant. He replied to Hart*
Certainly, the enlistment of Foreigners on the scale [originally, 
ten vessels, with a total complement of about 270 foreigners] you propose 
by the Ch. Govt, is g^very, very serious question, and I don’t wonder 
that Kung hesitates.
20. FO 17/367* Hammond to Lay. Dec. 12, 1861. Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. 
Jan. 8, 1862. "Ms" of Lay’s memo in FO 17/380.
21. Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Oct. 7, 1861.
22. Loc. cit.
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Lay was probably not fully aware of the more immediate and, perhaps,
more cogent reasons for Kung’s hesitation* the continued instability of the
dynasty in the face of the I860 defeat; the intensified rebel activity,
which in its turn was nourishing the growth of quasi-autonomous regional
powers; the Hsien-feng Emperor’s deteriorating health (the report of whose
death reached England as Lay was composing his acknowledgement of another
series of Hart’s letters). His own reservations, however, were sufficient
to lead him to exercise extreme caution, at the end of October, in pressing
inquiries as to the feasibility of the scheme from the standpoint of soliciting
support from HMG in Britain.
But in the weeks that followed, on the premise that the scheme might,
23in fact, prove acceptable, Lay broadened his terms of reference when he 
presented his questions for the opinions of his legal consultants. He also 
corresponded with Captain Sherard Osborn, erstwhile commander of Lord Elgin’s 
flagship, HMS "Furious”, during the first mission (1857-59)* about the 
possibility of his becoming the principal officer of the proposed force. ^  
Through his contacts with Wingrove Cooke who, in his professional capacity, 
concurrently acted as one of the initial legal advisers in Lay’s projected
list of consultants, Lay was able to sound out the editor of the "Times”,
John T. Delane, on policies toward China which he would be prepared to support
through the leader columns of the paper.^
23* Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Dec.10, 1861.
24. "Ibid". Lay to Hart. Oct.26 and Nov.11, 1861
25. "Ibid". Lay to Hart. Nov.ll, 1861
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As noted, the activities connected with this project were peripheral*
Despite the fact that he learned that the wheels of the gods, "civilization”
and technology notwithstanding, ground almost as slowly in London as in 
26Shanghai, Lay's success in achieving his major objectives was noteworthy*
On the diplomatic front, the case (which had culminated in his lengthy
memorandum on customs1 questions) he presented to Layard, and subsequently
to Hammond, who Lay felt, was inclined to favour the merchants, paralleled
the Board of Trade's concurrence in Bruce's interpretations of policy on
27issues related to trade regulation and to customs administration* On the
legal front, the consultants completely and unanimously supported, in their
formal opinions, Lay's position. They affirmed the legal immunities of
foreign (British) personnel employed in the Inspectorate for acts carried
out as agents of the Imperial authority. They affirmed, in essence, the
primacy of the political arena, with the representatives of the ”head” of
each state the adjudicators, as the "court” of final appeal when
28interpretations of jurisdiction and rights were at issue. Since these 
opinions were subscribed to by the Attorney General, who was also one of the 
Law Officers of the Crown, and by other prominent jurists, the decisions 
were formally transmitted by the Foreign Office to the Embassy at Peking*^
26*"Ibid”. Lay to Hart. Jan.8, 1862. "But things move here as slowly I think 
in many respects as they do in China*"
27* "Vide antea" n*18
28. Lay, "LR". Lay to FitzRoy. Jan.9, 1862. For fuller discussion of legal 
question: Wright, "Tariff" pp. 216 ff*
29* FO 17/375* No. 176. Bruce to Russell. Dec. 2, 1862. Acknowledging 
receipt of Opinions.
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The subsequent effect of these basic decisions, with some of their
corollaries, was to strengthen immeasurably the position of the Inspectorate.
(A year later, it was even further strengthened when the American Minister,
Anson W. Burlingame, combined the decisions of his American predecessors
with those of the British jurists to produce a statement of concurrence with
30\the official British interpretation. )
Lay had, understandably, felt elated with the success of his efforts.
There were other causes which made him feel somewhat buoyant during this
period of his leave. One was the evaporation of the crisis, which had been
precipitated by the Mason and Slidell (Trent) Affair, in Anglo-American 
31relations. As the threat of war subsided, Captain Osborn was able to give 
qualified acceptance to Lay's tentative offer of the command of the proposed 
flotilla.52
Another cause for his buoyancy was that on January JO, his wife had 
given birth to a daughter and both were doing well.^ This was an 
encouraging development since their first child had not survived.
Some developments, however, were not so encouraging. Lay was still 
not in good health. Part of the delay in achieving more expeditious action 
from the Foreign Office and from the jurists had resulted from an illness of 
Lay's which had incapacitated him for more than a fortnight during the 
holiday season.
30. Morse, "Submission", p. 137 and his Appendix A. p.426. Burlingame to 
American Consuls. Peking, June 15, I863.
31* Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Jan.8, 1862. "E/B". Russell was more cautious. 
He did not mention the passing of the danger to Bruce in a private letter 
until March 12.
32. Lay,"LR". Lay to Hart. Jan.8, 1862.
33* "Ibid" Lay to Osborn. Apr. 16, 1862.
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Another development which unsettled Lay was the emergence of indications of
34 ^conflict among the top-ranking British members of the Inspectorate* Lay
was himself partly to blame for this, even though the direct cause was the
culmination of several unforeseen factors*
The root of the difficulty was that when Lay enticed H* Tudor Davies
from his post as Chief Magistrate at Hongkong to take up the newly created
post of Commissioner at Shanghai in 1859> he had made a verbal commitment
35
to Davies that no one other than Lay among foreigners was to be his superior*
In a sense this established the precedent that the Shanghai Commissioner was
to be considered the Msecond in command11 among the foreign contingent* This
was tacitly confirmed when, in taking his leave, Lay designated FitzRoy,
acting as Davies1 "locum tenens" at Shanghai, along with Hart, as joint
Inspectors-General during his absence. The joint appointment was virtually
an absolute necessity, for FitzRoy was without any proficiency in Chinese;
as was Davies, for that matter. Layfs leave-taking action was subsequently
confirmed in June 1861, through the Tsungli Yamen, but because of Hartfs
qualifications and the fact that he developed direct personal contact with
Prince Kung and other senior members of the Tsungli Yamen, as well as with
the high-ranking Chfing officials in the Treaty-port provinces, Hart*s was
36
the pre-eminent influence.
34* "Ibid". Lay to FitzRoy* Jan*9> 1862 and to Hart. Jan. 10, 1862.
55. "Ibid". To Hart. Jan. 10.
36. "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private. July 8, 1861. For two interesting versions
of Hart*s influence in late 1861, cf. l) F0 17/357 No. 85. Bruce to Russell. 
Oct. f?), 1861. Enclosure of despatch by Tsungli Yamen on Hart (part of this 
appeared, in "NCH" No. 588, Nov.2, 186l). 2) F0 17/370 No. 9 Bruce to Russell. 
Feb. 23, 1862. Enolos. No. 5> extracts of private letter from Hart to Wade.
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Davies was supposed to return to Shanghai late in 1861, and Lay was
anxious to have him do so because FitzRoy, having taken the brunt of the
merchants* and Consuls* attacks, wished to return to Britain for a short
leave, Davies, however, refused to return unless he were placed on at
37least an equal footing with Hart. Since Lay had already decided to delay 
his own return until late Summer, 1862, and since it would have been folly 
to remove or "demote” Hart, apart from the fact that Hart held his commission 
directly from the Tsungli Yamen, Lay had no other recourse but to try to 
persuade Hart to accept Davies as his co-equal. Lay acknowledged that he 
was responsible for the situation. He praised Hart in sincere terms and 
made it clear that he would rather work out a pecuniary settlement of Davies1 
contract, which still had two and a half years to run, than to do anything 
that would cause Hart to leave the service. He nonetheless indicated his 
strong feeling that the status issue was one largely of form, and acceptance
38
of Davies would in no way detract from Hart*s pre-eminence or his influence.
An immediate crisis on the issue was avoided. Davies* father became
seriously ill and this, coupled with the fact that his wife was reaching an
advanced stage in pregnancy, forced Davies to postpone his departure even
39before a reply was received from Hart.
37- Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Jan.27, 1862.
38. Loc. cit.
39* Davies* father*s illness dated from early January. The decision to 
postpone his departure for the reasons given is referred to in loc. cit.
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In the meantime, also, FitzRoy had been prevailed upon by both Lay and Hart 
to remain in China through 1862. But Hart also made it clear to Lay, before 
learning of Davies1 difficulties, that he was firmly opposed to a foimal, 
technical arrangement that could give rise to a division of authority or 
responsibility.^ Not only did he feel that whatever the form, he would be 
the one who would be held strictly accountable to the Tsungli Yamen, but also 
that an arrangement sanctioned thus far removed from the actual seat of power 
could not help but have an adverse affect on the smooth functioning of the 
executive. He did not absolutely refuse Lay*s recommendation; but the very 
act of his procrastination was transparently a refusal, for his reply could 
not reach Lay before the end of June, by which time Lay should have been 
preparing to return to China to resume his office*
As an isolated sequence of events, the differences indicated might appear 
not to have had much importance* Additional differences that materialised as 
other sequences developed contributed to a pattern of unabated friction* This 
seemingly minor pattern was, however, partially interlaced in a pattern of 
much larger dimensions, the formation of a para-naval force* Since this project 
was one of major proportions, impinging upon many interests, it must be the 
centre of attention.
40. "Fiytns. Hart to Lay. n.d. (c. May, 1862). Two folded sheets are all 
that are extant, numbered successively f,4" and tt5”* Hart is vigorous in 
stating that since he needed the direct authority from Prince Kung, he 
solicited his direct appointment. Having been given the authority, he was, 
in consequence, held solely responsible; therefore, he needed to retain 
complete authority! The letter, from specific reference, was written while 
Hart was collecting the first instalments for the flotilla at the more 
southerly ports - before he proceeded to Shanghai in late May or early June*
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Yet the importance of the relationship between the principal architects - 
Hart and Lay - as a factor in determining the manner in which the project 
was promoted, should not be overlooked*
Whether or not Lay’s initiatives in making enquiries about the 
feasibility of the flotilla project were stimulated by continuous encourage­
ment from Hart is not certain. It is certain that Hart probably expressed 
a much more optimistic view of the prospects in November. In acknowledging 
Hart's 4th November, Lay wrote, "I suppose your first instalment of money 
for the Steamers will reach me by the second mail in May or first in June*
I shall not give orders for more vessels at one time than I have money 
actually in hand to pay for.
In his subsequent letters, Lay did not refer as specifically as this to 
any stimulus from Hart* Yet in almost every letter Lay sent to Hart, he 
alluded to some aspect of the scheme and as early as March 10, 1862, he 
was advising Hart of the formal authorisations that would be required from 
the authorities of China and Britain if the project were to be built up on
in
a firm foundation. He had already presented a number of questions to his
legal consultants and, more immediately, had arranged an interview with
4.5Lord Palmerston in order to discover what his attitude would be.
41* Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. Jan. 8, 1862.
42. Lay, ’’Interests", pp. 9-10. The reference to this letter in Lay "LR" 
is extremely brief - phrases very tersely strung together*
45» "LR". Lay to Hart* March 10, 1862* This is specifically noted in
this source, but is not referred to in "Interests". Also referred to in 
Lay's letter of March 26, "vide" Appendix VI, A.
Under any circumstances such an approach would probably have been made,
but Lay felt a particular concern at the time. Not only was he anticipating
a parliamentary debate on China in which he felt certain the Inspectorate
was to be attacked,^ but Parkes, who had returned on leave, was one of the
lions of the season and in public appearances was condeming the political
45and moral degeneracy of Chfing officialdom. ^
Lord Palmerston was evidently not affected by Parkes in the same way 
as Lay. On April 10, Lay was able to write to Hart, "Lord Palmerston 
would look well on our 'projet' I think" This letter was sent off but 
a few days before a hastily composed note from Hart arrived, dated at 
Canton 27 February, with the information that on that day the Governor- 
General of the Liang Kuang, Lao Ch'ung-kuang, had received a directive 
from Peking to pay the first instalment of Canton's allotment for the 
fitting out of a flotilla to be acquired from Britain.^
44* He had been anticipating the debate since early Jan. "Parliament is 
prorogued to the 6th February, Mr White •••• late Silk Inspector at 
Shanghai, is I believe to head the attack on the customs". Lay, "LR".
To Hart. Jan. 8, 1862. For the debate* Hansard's (Third Series) Vol.
CLXVIII (1862) pp. 29-81.
45 • ,1LCE" IV. Mar. 12, 1862. pp. 228-29* Parkes was given a hero's reception 
when he arrived at Dover on Feb. 27* As reported in "LCE" on Mar. 26, he 
was special guest, that month, of the Royal Geographical Society. He was 
awarded the K.C.B. in the May Honours' List.
46. Lay. "LR."
47* "Ibid". To Hart. Apr. 26, 1862. "Vide" Appendix VI,B. Lay had written 
to Osborn on Apr. 16 that the note arrived with "yesterday's " Marseilles 
Mail.
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As Lay started giving more attention to the problems that would have
to be dealt with in organising the flotilla, the lethargy of which he had
complained in October and again at the end of January, gave way rapidly
to a reactivation of his aggressive assertiveness. He had, also, made
alterations in his personal plans in anticipation of the approval for the
flotilla project, scheduling his departure from England for early 1863
. 48
instead of late summer, 1862.
While Hart's notice led Lay to alert Osborn to start his making
49inquiries respecting his release from his naval command, Lay's actions
did not take on an "official" colouring until, on April 28, he had in hand
50the first instalment remitted by Hart from Hongkong on March 14* In 
addition to a covering letter for the bills of exchange, Hart wrote a 
somewhat lengthy and pompous despatch, in the best tradition of stilted 
officialese, instructing Lay as to the objectives for which the money 
was being sent. Accompanying this despatch was an equally lengthy memo­
randum, setting out in detail, descriptions of vessels, composition of
51personnel for each vessel, costs, etc.
48. "Vide" App. VI A.
49* I»ay, "LR". To Osborn. Aprf 16, 1862.
50. Hart sent off three letters under date of March 14* i) "No.3*M 
"Separate" ("vide" Appendix VI,C.l) with "Memorandum" "Enclosure in No.
3 Separate", ("vide" Appendix VI, C.2)* Copy of this located in "E/B" 
in Bruce's collection; ii) number 4* which presumably was the covering letter 
for the bills of exchange* copy not located; iii) "No*5M. Copy not located, 
but acknowledged in Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. May 9» 1862. (For major 
passages of Lay's letter, not included in "Interests" pp. 11-13* "vide" 
Appendix VI D.l).
51. "Vide" Appendix VI Cl and C2.
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As these despatches reached Lay just after a mail for China had closed, 
he did not reply until a fortnight later, ^  by which time he had had ample 
opportunity to formulate his views on questions raised by Hart*
At this juncture, it may be well to pause to consider, by way of a 
more pointed introduction, the pattern for the ensuing discussion of the 
project*s development* The subject has been dealt with moderately 
comprehensively by the following: two Parliamentary Blue Books (1863 and 
I864) *H.N. Lay (I864 and 1868) 5 H.B*Morse (1918); S.F. Wright (1938 and 1950) 5 
J.L. Rawlinson (1950)^. A short and rather inconsequential monograph, 
based almost entirely on printed sources, was privately published by H.N.
LayTs son-in-law, G.M. Spence - probably in 1957• Despite the intensive 
researches of Wright (sources in English) and Rawlinson (sources in 
Chinese), a considerable body of primary source material related to the 
project does not appear to have come to their attention* Some of this 
material is located among the more obscure holdings(e*g* Law Officers* 
reports, F0 17/Domestic Various, Miscellaneous Embassy and Consular files) 
of the Public Record Office*
52. i*e., May 9* Layi "Interests” pp.11-13*
53« "BPP"* i) (3057) "Correspondence respecting the employment under the 
<«*«kittr*ement of China of Officers in the Naval or Military Service of Her 
Majesty” (London, 1862)* ii) (3271) "Correspondence respecting the Fitting 
out, dispatching to China and ultimate withdraw!, of the Anglo-Chinese 
Fleet under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn; and the Dismissed of Mr*
Lay from the Chief Inspectorate of Customs". (London, 1864)* Lay*s, "Interests* 
and Lay, "F.0*" and Lay, "F.O. Sup.” Morse, "Submission"* Wright, "Tariff” 
and "Hart". J.L. Rawlinson, "The Lay-Osborn Flotilla".Papers on China 
(Harvard Committee on Regional Studies), IX (Apr* 1950)• The merits and 
demerits of these sources will become apparent in the citations that follow.
Much of it was scattered in private holdings of the descendents of the
5 a
Bruce and Lay families. The quantity of this material, which provides 
detailed data for several of the significant aspects of the project is 
so voluminous that only a small, representative portion can be incorporated.
The quantity is a reflection of the complex of interests and influences 
that were crystallized by the project. Developing, as it did, in the 
extremely fluid settings of domestic conditions in both Britain and China 
and the equally fluid structure of international relations, the flotilla 
project, however briefly and however inconclusively, became a focal point 
for innumerable conflicts of interest. To deal exhaustively with the 
subject, therefore, would require at least one full-length volume. In the 
event, the discussion presented here will in effect consist of little more 
than an abstract. The purpose will still be to concentrate on Lay as the 
focal point and, beyond this, to seek to clarify the basic interest and 
influences that are discernible.
The conflict of influence was becoming apparent even before Lay 
received Hart’s despatch of March 14* Lay did not begrudge Hart’s ini­
tiative and youthful exuberance, but he was apt to be more sceptical about
the motives and abilities of the new Regency that took over from the
Regency set up on the Hsien-feng Emperor’s death, by a ’’coup d’ etat" in
the Pall of 1861.
54» bulk of Lay’s private papers was deliberately destroyed by Lay’s 
youngest son, Prank Lay, when he and his family moved to smaller quarters 
while attempting to avoid the “Buzz-bombs” of W.W.II. Information from 
Mrs. Prank Lay during an interview with the author in 1957*
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Lay intimated that he considered it desirable for the Inspector-General
(I.G.) and, by extension, his "locum tenens", to spend as much time as
possible at Peking, where he could exercise a direct and continuous
55influence on the central organ of government. In a later, rather candid
exposition of his conception of the position of the I.G., Lay wrote "...
as the Pfoong yew Q ancl confidential adviser of the Prince, he is
by courtesy entitled to equal respect & consideration with the Highest
56officers in the Empire." In other comments, he indicated that he felt 
Hart did not have a proper appreciation of the I.G.'s role and, in 
consequence, was in danger of detracting from the influence of the office. 
Layfs constant theme was his concern with the necessity to develop and 
strengthen the structure of central authority.
Lay's early comments were not so much critical as they were 
pedagogical. He did not query Hart!s dedication to the "large ideas" 
of rejuvenating and enlightening the Chfing metropolitan executive, but 
Hart's reports suggested that, in his pursuit of on-the-spot solutions to 
pressing local problems which he encountered in the course of his visits 
to the Treaty Ports, he was losing sight of the "large ideas".
Lay also had occasion to take exception to another of Hart's tendencies 
a somewhat unrealistic optimism with respect to fiscal matters.
55* Lay, WLR". Lay to Hart. Jan.8, 1862 - referred to twice. 
56."Ibid". March 26, 1862.
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As an example, in converting taels to pounds sterling, Hart employed the
57nominal exchange rate of 3*1* To make matters worse, he asserted
(probably in haste) that the total of 600,000 tls. authorized to be
collected from "various” ports would realize £250,0001 Lay pointed out
that the real rate in Shanghai was normally about 3*3*1> while taels used
for exchange at Canton and Hongkong were frequently quoted as dearly as 
584*1* In this respect, Lay was not immune from excessive pessimism. In 
reporting to Osborn the amount initially approved, Lay specified that the
600,000 tls. would realize £ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 However, for such difficulties,
Layfs solution was simple. He urged Hart to try to collect 1,000,000 tls., 
and suggested that even this might not be enough.^
One other potential for conflict was manifest in the formative period 
of the project. Lay had already written Hart - at about the same time 
that Hart received news of the approval of the project - that he expected 
to be given the fullest powers of discretion in organising the flotilla.^ 
But it was to Osborn that he expressed his basic conception of its character 
and function.
I should like our vessels to be the finest and best equipped afloat!
We111 do the thing thoroughly well or not at all. I hear you say,"Yes, 
certainly." I hope you & I together will do more than any treaties can 
effect, to open China next year.
57* "Vide" Appendix VI Cl and C2.
58. "Vide" Appendix VI B. The evidence that amounts fixed in pounds sterling 
were either converted at the market rate or at the nominal rate of 3*1 
Plus compensation of as muoh as 10$ is so common that individual citations 
are unnecessary.
59* Lay* "LR". To Osborn. Apr. 16, 1862.
60. "Vide" Appendix VI B.
61. Lay, "Interests", p.9*
62. Lay, "LR". To Osborn. Apr. 16, 1862.
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With this "background, Hartfs "official despatch" of March 14 brought
63into sharper relief the principal areas of conflict. Hart assumed the 
mantle of authority, not only in terms of presuming to designate Lay as 
his agent, but also of investing himself with the Imperial authority, 
though he himself had not, in fact, received any formal instrument from 
the executive of that authority. Although part of his preamble was phrased 
in general terms, the terms of reference for "the construction of a Steam 
fleet" were extremely narrow and the elaboration embodied in hiB memorandum 
imposed the kind of limitations which would have been antithetical to the 
fulfillment of the long-term "large ideas" that were supposed to be shared 
by the executive of the Foreign Inspectorate.
While the memorandum had all the appearance of system and careful 
detail, Hart*s presentation was unsound in principle and deficient and 
inaccurate in computation,^ Explicitly and implicitly, both in the 
despatch and the memorandum, it was anticipated that the vessels would be 
procured on a piecemeal basis, and allocated, as they arrived, in the first 
instance under the provincial jurisdiction - pursuing activities appropriate 
to the immediate needs of that jurisdiction.
63* "Vide" Appendix VI, Cl.
64* "Vide" Appendix VI, C2. Commentary is required here, for hitherto
there has been considerable confusion on what Hart supplied Lay. The
confusion arises because two purported memos of Hart’s are at issue.
There is a "memo" in BPP (3271) which was included in the papers presented
by the Ch’ing officials on Oct. 25, I863, which it was alleged Hart had
prepared as the basis of Chfing approval for the scheme. It is undated
and precedes a document dated Feb. 1, 1862. The tendency has been to
assume that it was the memo referred to as the enclosure in the March 14
letter. The discovery of the March 14 documents clears up the problem
for this period. For the identification of the document in BPP (3271)
"vide petitea" Chapter X, pp.f-pb-joSi The documents were received at the
Embassy in Peking in the order in which they appear in the Blue Book.
FO,330/78 No. 59 Kung to Bruce. 25/10/63 with enclosures.
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Though not stipulated, the inference that must be drawn is, that relays of 
vessels would be operating in Chinese waters, while the commander-in-chief 
waited in London for receipt of the successive instalments which would 
enable him to complete his flotillal
Insofar as computations were concerned, it was patently obvious on 
the basis of Hart*s own figures that for the implementation of his own 
“scheme”, it would require a minimum of 400*000 tls. over and above the
600,000 tls. he had been authorised to collect from official sources. In 
fairness to Hart, however, it may be said that he did believe that he could 
count on a minimum of an additional 200,000 tls. from non-official sources, 
but in view of political and eoonomic conditions in China at the time, 
this was optimism indeed. Moreover, Hart’s calculations did not allow 
for a whole range of essential expenses; e.g., advance funds to pay the 
salaries and wages of the skeletal crews required to take the vessels to
China; reserve stores; insurance; etc.
65Lay’s long reply of May 9, which was on the whole even-tempered, 
analytical and explanatory, did not allude to all these matters.
65. Lay, “LR”. To Hart. May 9> I863. Major portions not printed in Lay, 
“Interests” are reproduced in Appendix VI, D.l*
He concentrated on six principal points: Hart’s inversion of their
positions; the uselessness of Hartfs "authorisation” as a legal instrument;^
the absolute necessity for Lay to be provided with a legal instrument
sent directly from the executive Imperial authority sufficient to enable
67
him to exercise “full powers”; the need to leave decisions concerning 
technical and organizational matters in the hands of Osborn - subject to 
concurrence with Lay; a brief outline of Layfs basic conception of the 
character of the flotilla; a request that bills of exchange for the re­
mittances be negotiable on sight - bills sent, as with the first remittance, 
negotiable ”at six months sight" in London would have to be heavily 
discounted were contracts, etc., to be expeditiously arranged.
Lay, in actuality, omitted any specific reference to the contents of 
Hart’s memorandum, except to acknowledge its receipt. It was almost as 
though he considered it, because of its glaring deficiences, irrelevant 
even though Hart specified that its contents had formed the basis for his 
proposals to the "Chinese” authorities.
66. Lay, "Interests”, pp. 10-11. In his "No. 3” of March 14* Hart stated 
that he had not yet seen the official authorisation, but in one of the other 
letters of March 14, Lay, "Interests”, p. 14, Lay quotes Hart as having 
received a personal despatch from Kung. This must have been the 
communication of Feb. 1^  "vide" BPP (3271)# There was, however, another 
communication from Kung to Hart of Feb. 20, whose contents in translation, 
Hart does not appear to have transmitted to Lay. The Embassy at Peking
had a copy of this, but did not transmit it to Ehgland as part of the 
documentation for the flotilla project. FO 228/341 (Commissariat & Naval to 
1863). This is reproduced as Appendix VIII, A.
67. In Lay, "LR”, the "legal" draft Lay composed was not recorded until he 
had copied his letter to Hart of May 23/26. However, in "Interests", p. 13* 
he asserts it was enclosed in his letter of May 9*
One critical aspect of Hartfs scheme, not referred to above nor even noted
by Lay in any of his general references, was the provision for a "Chinese"
contingent for each vessel substantially larger than the "European"
contingent, all the officers, however, to be "Europeans". The implications
of this provision with respect to the character of the force and to the
financing of the project were singularly ignored.
Between May 9 and 26, Lay received two further letters - as distinct
from "official despatches" - from Hart. In the first, realising perhaps
the impracticability of some of his calculations, he informed Lay that
seven vessels, rather than ten, was a more realistic number to be acquired
in view of the funds available and that he was committed to only the 
68smaller number. In the second, Hart reported news from Wade that Bruce 
had requested " 1 the admiral (Sir James Hope) to assist them in choosing
69steamers of which to make war vessels’ so we will have Mr. Bruce’s support." 
Hart also assured Lay that he could get as much money as he wanted and 
enjoined Lay to expedite the project.
As most of Lay's time had been occupied in concluding discussions on 
legal questions dealing with customs matters, he had not given much attention 
to the flotilla project.
68. Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart. May 23, 1862. With "PS" for May 26, "vide" 
Appendix VI, E.
69. In Lay, "LR", Lay records receipt of Hart's "of the 6th April" under a 
postscript of May 26. The quotations, not in "LR",are given in Lay, 
"Interests", p.14* where the date is given as "5th of April". There is a 
question as to whether Lay quoted Hart out of context or whether Hart 
misunderstood his information from Wade, "vide" FO 17/370 No. 9* Bruce to 
Russell. Feb. 23* 1862. Also "vide pp.JX$'-jr<£>.
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70In his letter to Hart, he made a rough calculation of the mimimum amount 
that would be required in London* His principal news item was added as 
a postscript; viz, that Osborn was at hand, having obtained his release 
from his command in the Royal Navy*
At this point, a survey of background developments in China, having 
reference to the flotilla project might be in order. This transition 
affords an opportunity to recall, with added emphasis, the prevailing 
conditions respecting communication between the two areas. A distinction, 
in this regard, should be made between "news” and "correspondence”.
”Stop Press” news in either direction would be "up-to-date” within limits 
of from five to seven weeks - depending on where the news originated on 
the China coast and on whether the events occurred in time to be carried 
by steamers to the "eastern” terminus of the telegraphic network. (There 
was a much more rapid overland service across the extended Russian Empire, 
but use of its facilities was narrowly restricted. The E. Asia - N. 
America elapsed-time pattern was slightly different, but since it did 
not have a bearing on the issues, the special problems are also omitted 
from this discussion). Detailed news normally followed six to nine 
weeks after the events.
However, for exchanges of correspondence, i.e., responses to queries 
or provocative commentary, the "circle” was still normally not completed 
in under fifteen weeks and it might, even "normally”, take as long as 
twenty-two weeks to complete.
70. "Vide” Appendix VI E
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In the present context, for example, Hart (from Shanghai) acknowledged
the reply (Layfs May 9) to his despatch of March 14 on July 15*
representing a "circle” of approximately seventeen weeks. In turn, Lay
acknowledged Hart*s July 15, being the latter1 s reply to Lay*s May 9* on
71
October 10 (indicating that it had probably arrived about Sept. 25/26 ),
a "circle" of approximately twenty weeks. The significance of this in
relation to the flotilla project is fairly clear: there could not be,
under the best circumstances, both consultations to reach concensus on
terms of reference and expeditious acquisition of a flotilla.
The survey that now follows will show that the lack of concensus
was much greater than that displayed in the Hart-Lay exchanges examined
thus far. These developments belie, in some measure, Hartfs claim,
72disputed by Lay on different grounds, that he was the author of the 
flotilla scheme. Hart based his claim on discussions which he had with 
Prince Kung and other members of the Tsungli Yamen during the early 
summer and fall of 1861, whereas some six months previously, the concept 
of the project had been discussed among Ch*ing officialdom as a result
75of French and Russian offers of assistance to quell the Taiping Rebellion.
71 • Lay, "LR”. To Hart, Oct. 10, 1862. In this letter, Lay acknowledged 
one of Aug. 2. It has been assumed that the letters arrived in normal 
sequence, viz., second September mail - July 15; first October mail - Aug.2. 
Here again there is a discrepancy in letter-dating: in Lay, "LR" the date 
given is "15th July”; in "Interests”, p.15* the date is specified as 
"15th July".
72. "Vide” Appendix VI, E.
75- For the discussions see Rawlinson, op.cit. pp. 65-64 and "Swisher", 
op.cit.pp.689-698. Both sources use"IWSM" exclusively. This author has 
checked all the entries in "IWSM" pertaining to the flotilla. Swisher, 
of course, terminated his study at early 1861. Rawlinson1 s precis 
translations are, with one serious exception (to be noted later), reliable. 
His dating, however, is invariably at least one day out, sometimes two or 
three days out and in one instance as much as sixty days out. His "IWSM" 
’fchuan" and page citations are frequently inaccurate.
In fact, in January, 1861, the central administration had received from
7 A
Tseng Kuo-fan a set of suggestions respecting the acquisition of a 
flotilla which, in basic outline, closely approximated in conception, 
organisation and plan of proposed operation the project which the central 
administration ultimately averred it had authorised* Though Tseng could, 
at this early stage, condone such a project, on his terms, he was not an 
ardent supporter for its adoption* Be that as it may, Kung and his 
colleagues were prepared at this early stage to sanction Hsueh Huan at 
Shanghai to "collect funds from the customs receipts of the various ports 
and take action £to acquire foreign-officered warships} immediately*
Nothing came of this suggestion, quite probably because provincial 
officials had already expressed opposition to acceptance of any foreign 
assistance and because conservative (atavistic) views were the dominant 
ones at the Hsien-feng Court, still in exile at Jehol*
In the "positive" Ch*ing approach antedating Hartfs initiative, then, 
there is nothing corresponding to "large ideas"* The attitude is typical 
of the period* In the face of resurgence of rebellious activities, 
almost any expedient was worth considering, especially if it might also 
serve to nullify the aggressive and energetic behaviour of the "barbarians"
74* Swisher, op*cit* pp.689-692 from "IWSM". HP 71*9^* 4-12,8. Memorial* 
Recorded Jan. 5> 1861. Rawlinson, op * cit.pp * 62-65 * covers this period 
but his dates, citations and authors are muddled*
75. Swisher, op.cit* p.698 from "IWSM". HP 72*7 > 10-7b#4* Kung and others* 
memorial. Recorded Jan 24> 1861. Rawlinson appears to have overlooked 
this early, firm recommendation.
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But the expedient proposed, to be intelligible, had to be circumscribed
by being made to conform to the traditional system of value and authority*
In other words, to be acceptable, it had in principle and in fact to be
subject to the discretion of the provincial officials, through direct
control of personnel and financing and, as a military proposal, it was
implicj&y a short-term expedient*
During this early period, Wade and Bruce were promoting the
concomitants of "large ideas" without, of course, spelling out those
ideas - except in private or confidential correspondence with friends or
76sympathetic compatriot officials* They concentrated on the central
administration, meaning in this period, Prince Kung and Wensiang, with the
object of enhancing and expanding the base of centralised responsibility
and authority. Alluding to what were, to them, but rumours of the
French and Russian offers, they warned the officials of the dangers of
accepting this form of "assistance" and instead urged the adoption of a
programme of self-help - advantageous as a permanent measure as well as
of a short-term expedient; of employing Europeans from non-treaty powers
to organise and train modernised, centrally controlled, corps of native
levies* As they were exerting themselves in this direction, they were
also extolling the advantages of the Foreign Inspectorate system,
77delicately but insistently*
76. For private correspondence! "E/b/* Wade to Elgin. Private, July 23, 
1861; Bruce to Elgin. Private, Aug. 6 and 20, Sept. 24* Oct. 10, 1861, 
and Apr. 10 and 20, 1862. P.R.O. 30/22/49* Bruce to Russell, Private, Feb. 
24, 1862.
77* Details from correspondence cited in n*76.
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It should be noted that in pressing these points, Wade and Bruce
were making an independent British policy. In one general sense, perhaps,
they were substantiating the British credo of having no other interest
than fulfilling the Treaty provisions for regularised diplomatic and
commercial intercourse. But in the more specific sense, they created an
active rSle for themselves by attempting to ensure that the Ch’ ing
government would adopt policies which would enable it, in the long-run,
to meet its obligations under the treaties. Wade and Bruce did not have
78
specific policy directives from the Government at home, because, except 
for indulgence in platitudes, that conglomeration of "Whigs" was incapable 
of crystallising specific policy directives for Chinese affairs.
Moreover, the British community in China provided no foundation on which 
to base constructive policies. Consuls, merchants, missionaries, and 
military were all at odds amongst themselves and frequently with each other 
as to proper policies to be pursued. The nearest concensus was to be 
found, in the period, among consuls and merchants opposed to the extension 
of the authority and jurisdiction of the Foreign Inspectorate - directly 
opposed, in consequence, to the heart of Wadefs and Bruce*s diplomatic 
initiative.
78. "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private letters passim to June 8, 1862. In 
this last, he commented "(HMG} agents here are left to reconcile •••• 
contradictory instructions, and to abide by decisions Govt, may adopt 
when enlightened as to the line it will be most popular to take." His 
letter to Lady Augusta Bruce, June 7* 1862, was even more despondent. 
Commencing with letters and despatches received from mid-June, Bruce 
at least had the consolation that his policies were being "warmly" 
approved.
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Lacking, as it were, the "legal" sanction for their diplomacy and the 
conditions which would permit them to "educate" opinion, the content of 
much of their diplomatic initiative was for many months at a time buried 
in the "circles" of official and private despatches#
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that well before Hart’s 
appearance at Peking, concepts and policies were taking shape that could 
be expected to condition the reception and, during the course of his 
discussions with the Ch’ing officials and Wade and Bruce, the formulation 
of the proposals he presented. It is well to keep in mind also some other 
aspects of Hart’s position. He was in 1861 still a very young man - but 
26 years old - and although Lay was not many years his senior, the diff­
erence in outlook and attitudes was comparable to the difference of a
whole generation of "China Hands". Hart, besides, was an Irishman, not 
79an Englishman.  ^ This is not to impugn his loyalty as a British subject,
80as was done by a vicious critic a few years later, but it is material 
to suggest that it affected, in juxtaposition to Lay, his interpretation 
of his responsibilities. Finally, while Lay could claim, as he frequently 
did, that he had been forced into the Ch’ing Emperor’s Service, Hart’s 
entry was by deliberate choice.
Hart had already established his credentials in the British Service 
and as a lieutenant of Lay’s in the Inspectorate, successively.
79* Lay was only 29, but had been in China seven years longer than Hart. 
On Hart’s Irish ancestry, "vide" Wright,"Hart,"p.173
80. J. von Gumpach, "The Burlingame Mission" (London, 1872). The entire 
volume is a diatribe against Hart, which includes the charge that Hart 
had Fenian connections.
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Having been merely ’’recommended” by Lay, as he considered it, to act
jointly with FitzRoy as Inspectors-General during Lay’s leave, he
appeared to be determined to establish his own credentials with the
central administration by insisting on, and succeeding in, extracting a
formal decree stipulating the joint appointment. This was conceded to
81
him very shortly after his arrival in Peking; a mark of the rapidity 
with which he made a favourable impression on Kung and Wensiang.
In the two series of discussions which he had in the summer and fall 
(the first probably interrupted by the Hsien-feng Emperor’s death in 
August and the second by the ’’coup” in November, plus an unwillingness 
to be caught in Peking in the winter), Hart concentrated on the problems 
related to gaining further support for the Inspectorate as an agency of 
the central administration. His most effective arguments were the records 
of customs receipts and most of his suggestions centred on the question 
of their value as revenue-producers. His recommendation on the acquisition 
of a ’’customs” flotilla was part of this pattern.
Without verbatim reports of the discussions, it is impossible to 
tell whether or not the Ch’ing officials appraised Hart of their own 
views on the subject. Having probed Hart, the officials again solicited 
Tseng Kuo-fen’s views, particularly as to the value of employing a 
flotilla against the Taipings.
81. "CMC” I, Extracts from ’’Circular No. 25 of 1869” (First Series) 
Inspectorate General of Customs. In full in Morse] ’’Subjection” as second 
part of Morse’s Appendix L. Hart was being referred to as ’’Inspectoiv 
General” in ’’IWSM” HF 78 (June 186l), but his designation thereafter 
varied, sometimes omitting qualification and sometimes including qualifiers 
as ”joint”, ’’Temporary”, etc.
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Tseng1 s reply was more enthusiastic with respect to the ac quisition of
steamers, not because he felt they could be used on inland waterways,
where they could be of little value, but because he felt that, in time,
82they could be used against the foreigners! To the extent that 
information is available, the officials* interest revolved around questions 
of time, personnel and cost. On all these questions Hart expressed 
himself optimistically and prepared a draft estimate of the costs for 
ten or more small steamers, apparently based on an expected appropriation 
of (800,000 tie. 5
Although the “official” Hart subsequently sent to Lay did restrict 
the specific terms of reference to suppression of piracy, smuggling and 
bandits, Hart may have been employing shrewd tactics. In the first 
place, “bandit” could be translated by the Chinese ideograph (or a 
compound) used in the language to identify rebels, or ”banditti". In the 
second place, by getting a commitment recognising the flotilla as pre­
eminently a”customs” force, Hart may have been endeavouring to secure 
its acceptance as a permanent force. If the commitment were to be a 
force related to military expediency, however, its permanency might not 
be too secure. Whether it was intended or not, there was an ambiguity 
in Hart*s definition of the flotilla. At the same time, there was no 
ambiguity in the Tsungli Yamen* s official notification of February 1,
1862, to Hart.^
82. Rawlinson, op.cit. p.64.
83. “Ibid”, p.63. Also, Kung to Hart, Feb.l, 1862. “vide antea” n.66.
84. “Ibid”. Kung to Hart citation.
The appropriation was for vessels to be used - without qualification -
to help suppress the rebellion.
It is to be realised that Hart*s discussion covered a wide range of
subjects. Customs problems simply received priority of attention for
immediate decisions. This was particularly so as copies of the Chambers
of Commerce Memorials as well as an endless stream of merchants1 and
Consuls1 complaints were reaching Peking. Hart*s presence was thus also
useful to Bruce. It is interesting that Hart*s memorandum on the Chambers* 
85complaints produced for Bruce was as broad and as scathing in its 
condemnation and counter-complaints as was that produced by Lay. Bruce, 
however, in forwarding the memorandum to the P.O. was careful to see 
that the despatch was not only marked "Secret and Confidential”, but he 
also wrote*
I trust the document will not be made public. It accounts in some 
measure for the unpopularity of the Custom House^as such frauds would 
not be taken notice of by the Chinese Officials.
Hart fully reported his discussions with the Ch*ing officials to
87
Bruce and Wade and, on the evidence, to Lay. By the time, of course, 
that Lay*s reactions reached him, Hart had been absent from Peking for 
three to four months. “Absent", perhaps, should be qualified, since the 
Inspectorate*s headquarters was still at Shanghai, which afforded greater 
accessibility than did Peking to most of the newly opened Customs Houses.
85. PO 17/357> No 91• Bruce to Russell. Dec. 23 > 1861. Enclosing Hart*s 
memo.
86. “Ibid”. Bruce to Russell.
87. "E/Bw. Bruce to Elgin. Private. July 8, 1861.
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These new stations, especially Kiukiang and Hankow on the Yangtze, were
still enmeshed in administrative and regulatory difficulties from which
only the authority and prestige of the I.G. could extricate them. Partly
because he was the one who had to visit these stations, partly because
of the new responsibilities - especially financial - arising from the
88
flotilla project - and partly because of ill-health, Hart's "absence"
from Peking lasted altogether about ten and a half months. He was, it
seems, receiving frequent communications from the Tsungli Yamen. It is
not clear how often or how fully he reported directly to it.
Pour other developments are germane to this survey. As in the case
of three of them the developments are generally familiar (however
controversial interpretations may be) they can be dealt with summarily.
Firstly, P.T. Ward's force, the embryo of the "Ever Victorious Army",
89entered the field against the rebels in the hinterland of Shanghai. '
Secondly, regular units of the British and French forces became increasingly
involved in operations to defend the "30-mile radius" around the Treaty
90 /Ports in the path of rebel advances. (It is not possible to resist 
the temptation to comment that,protestations by politicians and diplo­
matist notwithstanding, defence of a set position where mutual agreement 
is unattainable, invariably leads to "escalation").
88. "FL". Wade to Lay. Sept. 8, 1862. "Vide" Appendix VI,K. (Rec'd. 14 
Nov.). "Vide Chapter X, n. 91*
89* Ward's "force" had been active since I860, but did not gain prominence 
until later 1861.
90. For fuller account of development of the events, J.S. Gregory,
"British Attitudes and Policy Towards the Taiping Rebellion in China, 
1850-64". Unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis (London, 1957)*
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Thirdly, a transfer of power (to speak of an incipient polarisation of
a new form of regional power would be premature) was being rapidly
effected in the lower Yangtze valley, bringing to the fore a group of
energetic, Chinese neo-conservatives led by Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung- 
91chang.
The fourth development might more properly be included as a supplement
to British diplomacy at Peking, but it is important enough to be treated
separately. Within the time span covered by this survey, Frederick Bruce*s
attitude and outlook towards his functions underwent a gradual but decided
change, a change, that is, which was a reassertion of his basic disposition
The traumatic experiences of 1858, 1859# and I860, had forced him to stand
unequivocally with those who contended that only dictation backed by
coercive military force would succeed in bringing Ch*ing officialdom to
92the acceptance of the benefits to be offered by diplomacy and trade.
Having survived the traumatic experiences of these years and been sustained 
despite them, as British Minister, resident in the rarefieg/c., slowly-paced
and relatively culturally refined atmosphere of Peking, he reverted to
/ 93>the even-tempered (some have said indolent ) rationalism which by early
94-influences and training, was more conducive to his temperament.
91. Theme is developed by Wright, "Restoration”j S.Spector, "li Hung- 
chang and the Huai Army" (Seattle, Wash., 1964)* J.C. Cheng, "Chinese 
Sources for the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864” (Hongkong, 1963) adds much 
useful data on the period.
92. F0 17/339* Bruce to Alston. Private. Dec. 31# I860.
93* Lane-Poole, op.cit. I p. 442. Other critics have been less polite. A 
more sympathetic view of this characteristic may be found in Lord 
Redesdale, "Memories" (London, 1915) Vol. I. p.330.
94* Bruce spent many of his early years in post-Napoleonic Paris. The 
record of his background is in the "E/B" private collection.
In the process of adjusting to his new physical environment which, except
95for a few diversions it offered, he detested, he convinced himself, for
the time being, at least, that to achieve the objects in view -
reciprocating diplomacy, expanding commerce and "progress” - dictation
96
and military coercion must give place to persuasion and example*
Bruce professed to see in the Confucian tradition, as he generally became
familiar with it, a value system built upon those very same cardinal
97virtues of non-violent coercion.
Like many rationalist statesmen and diplomats forced to carry burdens
of individual responsibility in the public service, Bruce was torn
between making decisions consistent with his lofty ideas and those that
were expedient to resolve immediate problems, whether or not the expedients
were consistent with the ideas. His correspondence of the period,
individually and consecutively, is replete with internal contradictions
and inconsistencies characteristic of the never-ending struggle. Thus,
in all good faith, he could give his unofficial support to the long-term
98concept embodied in Hart*s flotilla scheme and yet, when consulted by 
the Ch!ing officials, because of the intensification of rebel depredations,
95. "E/B" Bruce*s private letters to Elgin and Lady Augusta Bruce, I862-63, 
passim. He began his plaintive cries in Jan. 1862, to Elgin. One of his 
strongest statements, to Elgin, Sept. 24, 1862, ”1 am well - tho1 sick of 
the country - of its monotony & anxieties”•
96. ME/B” Bruce to Elgin. Private. Nov. 10, 1861, is one of Bruce1 s most 
forceful statements. For earliest indication of changed attitude see letter 
of March 14, 1861.
97* P.H.O. 30/22/49* Bruce to Russell. Private, Feb. 24, 1862.
98. He elaborated this aspect of his support, ex post facto. ”E/B” Bruce 
to Russell (Originally addressed to Hammond). Private and confidential.
Apr. 12, I864.
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he could also urge on the Tsungli Yamen the immediate purchase of steamers
99 100from along the China coast or from the U.S. Given the state of
Ch’ing finances, the latter proposal, if implemented, could have no
other effect than to sabotage the flotilla project.
The illustration may appear tangential, but it is not quite so. The 
vital point is that Bruce, in re-adopting what was fundamentally a passive 
posture in relation to long-term objectives was endangering, in his day- 
to-day decisions, the realisation of those objectives.
Before resuming the account of X»ayls activities in London, a summary 
characterisation of the interests and influences just surveyed may be 
useful. The classification, for the early period, may be limited to the 
initial "sponsors" of the flotilla project, - the Ch*ing officials, Hart 
and, for ease of treatment, Bruce, - since the project did not become a 
matter of public knowledge until later.
Among Ch*ing officials who could be counted as sponsors, there was 
a fair degree of agreement on a number of points. It was taken for 
granted that the flotilla, or a part thereof, on arrival in China would 
come under provincial responsibility and its activities would be controlled 
by the authority of the Govemors-General or Governors within whose 
jurisdiction it operated.
99* "Vide antea" n. 69. In this despatch, Bruce was supporting the 
immediate acquisition of "war steamers”, on the coast, if possible. See 
esp. encl. No. 8. Bruce to Adm. Sir J. Hope, Feb. 22, 1862.
100. HE/B” Hart to Lay."No.6." Separate Series. June 12, 1862. "Vide" 
Appendix VI J.
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Delegation of some discretionary control to European personnel was not 
excluded, but it was assumed that at an early date most of the personnel 
would be drawn from native levies who would be under the direct command 
of native officers. It was also taken for granted that the flotilla 
would be subject to the same considerations as applied to other military 
forces within the traditional system; i.e. questions of numbers, distribu­
tion, permanency, etc., would be determined by short-term utilitarian 
factors rather than by long-term institutional factors.
The above points of agreement were virtually inflexible conditions.
On two other points, there was divergence of viewpoints - though not 
disagreement - which permitted an element of flexibility. Kung and 
Wensiang wanted the vessels to be sent out as quickly as possible. Other 
officials who expressed themselves, appear to have been relatively 
indifferent on this issue. On the point of expenditure, the first 
appropriation was charged against maritime customs receipts which, except 
for surreptitious practices, were not at the disposal of provincial 
treasuries, hence the issue of subsequent appropriations was not immediate. 
But complaints were already being raised about the shortage of funds for 
existing military needs, to which were added resentful comments about the 
high-cost of military operations t!a la barbarian1
There was some area of unresolved disagreement. Kung and Wensiang 
thought almost exclusively in terms of operations against rebellion 
along the coast and, inland along the Yangtze. On the one hand, Tseng 
openly disputed the views of Kung and Wensiang and opposed the use of 
the flotilla for this purpose. On the other hand, other provincial
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officials were being "sold" the scheme by Hart with the inducement 
that contributing provinces would be receiving vessels to suppress piracy 
and smuggling - the purpose of which was, if only indirectly, to benefit 
the provincial treasuries.
These were the most obvious aspects of concensus and divergence#
More subtle aspects associated with new power configurations, involving 
shifts of interest and influence, were beginning to emerge#
The nature of Hart*s interests and influence was ambiguous# Apart 
from a normal desire to make a good impression on his superiors, he was 
not inordinately ambitious. But his enthusiasm and energy impeded his 
ability to think through the implications of his precipitous commitments 
and actions. He did not sort out the interests he was seeking to promote 
and, consequently, had no real order of priorities. By over-extending 
himself in promoting a multiplicity of competing interests and in giving 
personal attention to, literally and figuratively, a host of widespread 
problems, Hart was diluting the force of his interests and influence.
By the middle of 1862, he was approaching the position of promising all 
things to all men - exclusive, of course, of pirates, smugglers and 
"bandits".
Bruce had had, and continued to afford himself, ample time to define 
the general structure of interests, including his own personal interests, 
related to his position. At the same time, he would have preferred to 
remain aloof from the arduous and profitless decision-making responsibilities 
attached to the position. He generally refused to acknowledge the
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specifics of any problem until it was thrust directly upon him.^^ He 
could act forcefully when he had at his side someone who could rationalise 
an obvious decision for him# When confronted by alternatives, each of 
which could be rationalised, he was wont to procrastinate until the 
"force of events" eliminated all but one choice. This analysis of his 
behaviour patterns, possibly over-generalised, seems to be warranted 
by the evidence. This pattern underlies the ambivalence of his responses 
to critical problems.
The survey and summary, limited as they must be, nonetheless 
illustrate the introductory point that the disparity in concensus on the 
flotilla project was much more comprehensive than that evidenced in the 
early Hart-Lay exchanges. It is now time to take up the further 
developments in Britain, where the flotilla was actually being formed.
101. "E/E" Bruce to Lady Augusta Bruce. Jan. 7> 1861. There is also a 
rather striking statement along similar lines in Bredon, op.cit. pp.66-67, 
in which, allegedly, Hart quotes Bruce verbatim. Hart was still alive 
when Bredon*s biography was published.
Chapter X
Servant as Master in His Own Home 1862
Captain Sherard Osborn1s arrival in London was the "signal” for
the official launching of the project in Britain. On May 29» 1862
Lay, on behalf of the Chinese government, retained Osborn on a five-
month basis to "devote his time and attention to the promotion of a
European Chinese Force".^ The written understanding also contained the
provision that from November: "a fresh arrangement fshalQ be made
between Mr. Osborn and Mr. Lay/1
Osborn and Lay had made their acquaintance during Elgin* s Mission
of 1857-59* During the campaign and negotiations of 1858, and the six-
week expedition up the Yangtze at the end of the year, they had worked
in close association with each other. Osborn had returned to England
in 1859 to undergo medical treatment and, incidentally, to add to his
already notable literary reputation, articles for Blackwood*s and a book
2
on Chinese affairs. He was noted as an adventurous, bold, dashing 
"maverick", feared and resented by the staid members of his profession, 
admired by the kindred spirits and invariably idolised by the men who 
served directly under him.
1. Lay "LR". Drawn up by Sherard Osborn, countersigned by Lay. May 29, 
1862. Recorded in "LR" after an entry for June 16.
2. "The Past and Future of British Relations in China" (Edinburgh, I860) 
Published by Blackwood and Sons, the book contains several of the 
"Blackwood*s" articles. Further characteristics of Osborn, "vide" LCE IV 
July 26, 1862. p. 532.
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After his recovery, he had again taken to sea in command of H.M.S. 
"Donegal", doing a tour of duty in waters off the Mexican coast, where 
Lay!s first "feelers" of 1861 reached him# The ship had returned to 
England for re-assignment at the end of the year, when Lay’s firmer
3
offers were made, first to form, and then to command, the flotilla#
He had acquired his release from the Admiralty and paid off his ship, 
for which he was compensated by Lay#^
The quasi-official understanding stipulated one significant point 
and implied three others# It clearly identified the force to be formed 
as "European Chinese"# It showed that Lay and Osborn, accepting Hart’s 
promise to provide between ;<£5&00,000 - £250,000 in four months (signifying 
receipt of the total in London by the end of August, 1862 at the latest),
5
expected the flotilla to be ready to sail early in November; that Osborn 
was directly responsible to Lay only; that Lay was not prepared to assume 
authority to make official Imperial appointments until such time as he 
had received the legal sanction to do so, which sanction, by conservative 
calculation, he might have expected not later than mid-October (allowing 
five months, or about twenty-two weeks, from the date of his request to 
Hart)#
3# Lay, "LR". To Hart. Oct. 26, 1861. Whether Hart or Lay was the first 
to recommend Osborn is uncertain# Lay, certainly, thought of him from the 
outset#
4# Per understanding of May 29* "Vide antea", n#l.
5. Additional confirmation of expected Nov#l, sailing date. PO 17/384*
Lay to Russell. Private, Aug. 18, 1862# The Ch’ing officials were, of 
course, expecting the vessels to arrive in the "first months" of 1863# 
"Vide", Rawlinson, op.cit# p. 69, quoting from Hstieh Huan.
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The understanding drawn up, Lay and Osborn appear to have spent
the following fortnight setting up an office as a "Chinese Government
Agency", reaching mutual agreement on concepts and objectives and
initiating informal inquiries on legal and organisational questions*
Lay prepared a memorandum on June 13» 1862 embodying the results of such
6
of their discussions as was relevant to an approach to H.M* Government* 
Their activities, however, received some attention within the Government 
even before Lay forwarded his first official request on June 16, enclosing 
a copy of the memo whose first definitive point wast
.... to obtain the sanction of H.M. Government, in order that 
officers and men, British subiects, may be at liberty to take employment 
under the Chinese Government.
The Duke of Somerset, First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed the 
following note to Lord Russell on June 15*
Is there any truth in a report that the Chinese Government are 
desirous of organising a force of gunboats under a British Naval officer?
From some words of Captain Sherard Osborn it seemed to me that some 
communication on this subject had been made to him. My opinion is, that, 
if it would not excite the jealousy of other powers, it would be an 
excellent plan, and one which you should encourage* A small force of gun­
boats maintained by the Chinese government, would repress piracy in those 
seas, secure our trade in Yangtze river, and keep down the Taepings.
We could sell to the Chinese government some of the gun-boats now 
at Hongkong and our expenditure would be reduced, as some portion of our 
force on the Chinese coasts could then be dispensed with*
I intended to have spoken to you yesterdag on this matter, but had 
no opportunity in the midst of other business*
6* Lay, "LR" "Hemordandum". June 13, 1862* Transmitted with covering 
letter of June 16, 1862, to FO. FO 17/382.
7* Loc. cit*
8* PRO. 30/22/24* News that Osborn was making preparations to form a 
flotilla was first carried in the press in "LCE". IV. June 10, 1862. p.430*
Somerset*s reasons for support all appear in Lay’s memo. In
addition, the memo specified as an object, *’c. To explore the interior
and promote foreign commerce by the introduction under Chinese auspices
9
of Telegraphic & Steam Communication.11 It included as reasons why the 
project ought to "recommend itself to H.M. Govt.", the followings^
It will make it impossible for the Chinese Govt, to return to a 
retrograde policy, even if so disposed.
It will ensure wholesome reforms in the administration of the Govt, 
throughout the Empire.
The preamble to the memo opens, "The Chinese Govt, deeply impressed 
with the necessity of a European naval force..." This reference clearly 
suggests that Lay and Osborn intended that the "nucleus” of the modem 
force to be created for China should be exclusively European. There 
were several practical considerations that probably led to this decision. 
The force had been approved, it was reasonable to believe, on the premise 
that "European” naval technology and experience were more advanced than 
anything China could provide from its own resources. The best method to 
vindicate this assumption would be to provide a prototype model in 
personnel as well as in "materiel". More concretely, the force was 
expected to be ready for combat immediately it arrived in China. If it 
were to be an efficient and effective instrument, its operations ought 
not to be impeded by the need to train raw "recruits", to provide 
qualified linguists, etc.
9# Lay, "LR". "Memo". June, 13*
10. Loc. cit.lt may be noted that the printed version in BPP (3057) did 
not contain these passages. They had been omitted on the express request 
of Osborn (on Lay’s absence). FO 17/385« Osborn to Layard. July 29, 1862.
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The sanction appeared to be, and of course, Lay intended it to be, for 
a permanent force. This being the case, the fusion of native contingents 
with the force as it expanded could be carried out as favourable conditions 
permitted.^
Lay's covering letter to Lord Russell was phrased as though
Government approval for the project was a foregone conclusion. In it,
he also listed three conditions that "would be necessary, in order to
enable me to take action in regard to it repeal of Bowringfs
Neutrality Ordinance of 1654 C8**?}* permission for leave of absence to
naval officers wishing to join the force; notification of Government
12sanction to British Civil and Naval authorities in China; These
13were conditions which Lay had crystallised some time previously; but 
for all his forethought he had not made sufficient allowances for the 
idiosyncracies of politicians and bureaucrats.
However, before following that trail, one other feature of Lay's 
opening presentation deserves notice. The memo and letter taken together 
leave no doubt that in this phase of the project "European" was taken to
mean British. There was no qualification as to where the vessels,
equipment or men were to be acquired; no reference to the fact that other
nations were being, or were to be, asked to participate.
11. Eventually confirmed. "Vide", "Times". Jan. 6, 1863, p.9c. Report 
from "Army and Navy Gazette".
12. Lay, "LR". Lay to Russell. June 16, 1862.
13» "Ibid". Lay to Hart. March 10, 26, Apr. 26 and May 9» 1862.
Lay had earlier written to both Osborn and Hart that he would have to
approach France, but he considered it, at the time, to be a necessary 
14formal gesture.
Here again, there is no documentary evidence to explain the decisions
obviously taken by Lay and Osborn. But the practical considerations
mentioned above, augmented by political factors, do offer an acceptable
explanation. If speedy organisation and immediately efficient and
effective operation were top priorities, these would suffer from any
attempt to develop a multi-national force at the start. Politically,
suspicion between Britain and France had been growing since 1859, a®
Louis Napoleon's policy of territorial aggrandisement unfolded. The
War Between the States, also for political reasons, eliminated the United
15States from consideration as an immediate participant. An explanation
for the exclusion of Russia would have to be based entirely on conjecture,
so this part of the question must be left unresolved.
The reasons for proceeding to organise a nucleic force, exclusively
16British in character, did not rest on ulterior, imperialistic motives.
14# "Ibid". Lay to Osborn, Apr. 16, 1862, and to Hart Apr. 26.
15* The difficulties were real. At just this time the U.S. Minister 
Burlingame was investigating the sympathies of one of the Inspectorate's 
Commissioners, with a view to insisting on his dismissal if reports of 
his Confederate leanings were confirmed. "CMC" VII pp.44-45* Citing 
"Records of the U.S. Dept, of State. Despatches, China, vol.XX. Despatch 
No. 17, 18th May 1862s Anson Burlingame to the Secretary of State."
16. "E/B" Russell to Bruce. Private, Apr. 26 £l862). Referring to a joint
military policy with France to control Taipings, Russell notes it cannot
be done "without taking China out of the hands of its Govt. - a change 
perhaps much to the benefit of China, but likely to ruin England. India
with its 130. million is quite as much as we can manage."
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On the same basis that the force could, under favourable conditions, be
developed into a "European Chinese" force, the European contingent
17could be developed into a multi-national contingent.
The inter-departmental correspondence touched off by Lay and
stimulated periodically by further letters from him, which covers the
period from mid-June to early September, makes intriguing reading. Only
the critical issues and decisions, however, can be discussed here. The
delay in the proceedings was not the result of reluctance to approve the
project, for this was given by the beginning of July. The delay was
in satisfying, beyond question, the legal position. To attain this,
many departments had to be consulted (Cabinet, Foreign Office, Admiralty,
Colonial Office, Home Office, Law Officers and "Council"), the correct
procedure in the light of operative legislation had to be clarified,
unforeseen complexities resolved, and some members of the Government,
who were reluctant to take certain types of action while Parliament was
18still in session, had to be placated.
The Admiralty and the Foreign Office, with the assistance of the 
Colonial Office, cleared the ground fairly quickly in reply to Layfs 
letter.^ _______
17. When it was necessary to clarify the issue, Lay and Osborn did so.
In the commentary to their 13-clause agreement of Jan. 16, 1863 ("vide"
BPP (3271)9 to balance the initial, exclusively British character of the 
force, Lay was to "submit to the European representatives" orders from
the "ruler of China" which appeared to be "at variance with law or justice".
18. Such an occasion did arise when a motion for papers was made in the 
House of Lords on July 28. For the debate "vide" Hansard’s (Third Series) 
CDCrai(l862) pp.882-899*
19• The clearance was achieved between June 17 and July 3» "Vide"
FO 17/382 and 383*
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The reasons for the Admiralty’s support of the idea of a European
Chinese force has heen recorded. Russell and Layard at the P.O. supported
20the "general” idea for more complex reasons. As recently as June 2,
Russell had received a lengthy despatch from Bruce reporting favourably
on the new spirit motivating some of the members of the new administration
and also reporting that Kung had agreed to act on Bruce’s recommendation
that Kung purchase "small steamers which can operate on the rivers and
along the lines of water communication". Russell, who had long been
convinced about the totally destructive attitude of the Taipings, was
also anxious to promote any policy that would protect and expand the
21China trade. As he wrote privately to Bruce at the end of June*
Our trade with China is now of vast importance - all the more as 
the U.S. by their quarrel have deprived us of so much of our most 
valuable importations.
The clearance that was achieved by the earliest exchanges, however,
had come too easily. Lay himself realised this when he received Layard's
letter advising that if he and Osborn would forward official applications,
the P.O. would send these on to the Home Office with a recommendation
that the Queen’s licence (under the Foreign Enlistment Act) be issued 
22to them.
20. PO 17/370. Receipt of No. 9* Bruce to Russell, Feb. 23, 1862. This 
was one of the despatches advocating aid to China on a "self help” basis. 
These passages were heavily lined in the margin and at end Russell noted: 
"Approve. Entirely concur with Mr. Bruce."
21. ”E/Bm Russell to Bruce. Private, June 26, 1862.
22. Lay, "LR”. Layard to Lay. July 3> 1862. This letter was not printed 
with the papers in BPP (3057)* It is copied in ”LR" after Lay’s entry 
for July 17*
In fact, Lay and Osborn had not been explicit enough about their plans
and the P.O. and Admiralty had misunderstood the nature of the project.
They had simply assumed that Lay and Osborn would return to China and
under the direct authority of the Emperor of China and within his
territorial jurisdiction, organise the flotilla.
After some unofficial enquiries, Lay submitted a second letter
23
amplifying his opening presentations. He and Osborn applied, he wrote,
for a Queen’s licence: to enable them "to accept naval & military service
in the employ of the Chinese Government; to fit out & equip vessels for
warlike purposes in China; and to enlist British subjects to serve in
naval and military operations in China". This was, indeed, all-inclusive
with but one limitation: the enlistment of British subjects1 But the
P.O. was undaunted (possibly because the Permanent Under-Secretary, E.
Hammond, was away on holiday^), and forwarded Lay’s letter to the Home 
25
Office. The events of the following week forced the Government to
make a thorough appraisal of the project and to review its China policy.
The process, on the Government side, was given direction apparently
by the Home Secretary, Sir G. Grey, referring the subject of Lay’s
26letter to a Cabinet meeting of July 19*
23. Lay, "LR". Lay to Russell. July 9> 1862. The unofficial inquiry had 
been addressed to Layard on about July 5* In the interim, July 8-9* 
Osborn had got Ids official permission from the Admiralty. FO 17/383*
24* M.A. Anderson, "Edmund Hammond, Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1873”* Unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis (London, 1936).
25* PO 83/2251 "Law Officers Reports: China 1860-1864”* Layard to 
Waddington. July 10, 1862.
26. "Vide p.lt?,n.28.
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Two questions appear to have been debated* a) whether Britain’s official 
policy of neutrality could be considered unchanged were sanction to be 
given to the creation of a force of such magnitude in Britain* b) whether 
under any circumstances a Queen’s licence could be issued under the 
Foreign Enlistment Act (which, it seemed, need not be publicised) to 
cover more than one individual or whether an Order in Council (which 
would be gazetted) would be required.
The F.O. had anticipated the discussions in the Cabinet and had
27requested an opinion from the Law Officers on the personnel question.
Their reply was at hand on the Monday (July 21) following the Cabinet 
meeting, giving their opinion that for Lay's specific request either a 
Proclamation or an Order in Council, preferably the latter, would be 
required, otherwise individual licences would be necessary. It added 
that applications for a large number of licences might be awkward.
Consequently, for the information of the F.O., Russell noted on 
the same day*
It was the opinion of the Cabinet on Saty last that a licence 
should be applied for in each individual case.
If an order in Council should required, it must be authorised 
at the Council for the Prorogation.
27# FO 83/2251* Layard to Law Officers. July 15, 1862. Reply received* 
Sir Win. Atherton and Roundell Palmer to Russell.
28. FO 17/383* Written on Law Officers' reply of July 21
And, for the information of Bruce, Russell wrote privately, in time for
the late July mail*
The question of how we are to aid the Chinese in putting down the 
Taipings is becoming a serious one. The Cabinet approve of Capt.Sherard 
Osborne’s having leave to go to China, & he may then serve the Chinese 
Govt. But the Cabinet do not approve of his (Capt 0fs) enlisting men 
in this country to serve the Emperor of China. So no Order in Council 
on this subject will be issued. When Capt. Osborne is in China he may 
do what he can to get good crews to his gunboats.
Just the day.previously, July 25, the P.O. had received an official
reply to Lay's application from the H.O. advising that it had no objection
to issuing Queen’s licences to Lay and Osborn. It added, however, that
additional needs for armed vessels and power to enlist could only be
30granted via an Order in Council.
Yet neither the Admiralty northe Foreign Office had capitulated.
In what must have been a rare burst of initiative, coupled with its
31customary doggedness, the Admiralty with the approval of the F.O. had
begun discussions with Lay and Osborn respecting the "purchase...[of]
32
such vessels and stores as can be spared from H.M. Dockyard."
29. "E/B" July 26, 1862.
30. FO 17/383* Sir E.Clive to Layard.
31. "Ibid". Layard to Adm. "Immediate". July 18, 1862. Adm. to Layard. 
July 19, 1862. Layard to Lay. July 19, 1862.
32. Lay, "LR". Lay addressed one letter to Somerset, July 17, which he 
enclosed in a letter to Layard of the same date. The quote is from the 
covering letter to Layard.
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Further, in a debate on a motion in the Lords for the correspondence
dealing with requests to enter the naval or military service of the
Emperor of China, Somerset smartly supported and defended the flotilla
scheme, obscuring the fact, of course, that the Admiralty was in the
33process of circumventing the Cabinets decision* Finally, on August 2,
the Admiralty requested the F*0. to inform Lay about some of the specific
34vessels, with purchase price, that it was prepared to sell*
In the meantime, on July 30, the F*0. replied to the H*0. letter 
of July 25• It took the position that Government policy and the Law 
Officers* opinion had decided against including a blanket authority to 
enlist men under a Queen*s licence* The matter of fitting out and 
equipping armed vessels was not at issue and it, therefore, requested 
that licences be drawn up for Lay and Osborn to include this and an
35authority to Osborn to select 11 such other officers”, as he might need*
At the same time, Russell continued to seek some way around the 
requirement for individual licences for the men to be recruited* He 
inquired of the Colonial Office on August 8, **whether Mr. Lay would be 
allowed to engage sailors of merchantmen in Hong Kong".^ An unofficial 
legal opinionwas submitted by the C.O. that Lay would still require 
some authority to enlist men.
33* "Videa antea" n*18. Somerset*s remarks appear on pp. 887-893*
34* FO 17/384. Adm. to Hammond. It may have been a reflection of Hammond * s 
influence, but Lay was not officially advised until Aug. 12.
35. FO 17/402. Layard to Clive. July 30, 1862. There is no satisfactory 
reason to explain why this letter was filed and bound with documents for
1863.
36. FO 17/384. FO to Col. Off. Aug. 8, 1862.
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It suggested that Lay could enlist men, with impunity, at Canton -
37always providing the individuals had permission! Russell grabbed at
a straw and countered with the inquiry as to whether the C.O. could and
would suspend the Hongkong Neutrality Ordinance if Lay "opened” in 
38Canton, Obviously the C.O* would not, for it referred all the P.O.
39questions to the Law Officers. But by this time, the P.O. had itself 
again approached the Law Officers to find out if there was any other 
method, aside from Proclamation or Order-in-Council ”to get by” the 
personnel and vessels problem and finally put the question in the proper 
perspective by asking whether it would be practical to issue 600 
individual licences.^ An immediate answer was forthcoming* individual 
licences were required.^
The extent to which Lay and Osborn were informed of the difficulties 
is not certain. These two were making frequent personal visits to the 
P.O., the H.O. and the Admiralty. Whatever information they acquired 
in no way deterred them from proceeding with their arrangements.
37* "Ibid”. Col. Off. to FO. Aug. 12, 1862.
38. "Ibid”. FO. to Col. Off. Aug. 13, 1862.
39. "Ibid”. Col. Off. to FO. Aug. 23, 1862.
40. FO 83/2251* Layard to Dr. R. Phillimore. Aug. 11, 1862. 
41* "Ibid”. Phillimore to Layard. Aug. 12, 1862.
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They had enlisted, in the non-legal sense, some naval officers to assist
42them. They had contracted for the construction of three vessels. When
they were notified that the H.O. intended to issue them each a personal
43licence restricted to service in a military or naval capacity, Lay
addressed a caustic reply directly to the H.O. on August 11, citing
the printed letter of Layard1s of 30 July, and as much as demanded that
the sanction 11 to fit out and equip” be inserted in the licences.^
43Furthermore, having finally been notified of the Admiralty’s 
offer of vessels, and proposing to take immediate possession of those 
selected, in order quickly to have them reconditioned and armed for 
service, they forwarded designs for a "national” flag and naval ensign 
to be gazetted.^ This was required to exempt the vessels from port 
dues, customs duties on equipment, etc. Thus, the pressures for a prompt 
and clearcut decision mounted. They were brought to a critical level 
between August 17 - 20.
42.Lay was to claim on Aug. 18, that he lacked the authority "to purchase" 
any, but he was indulging in his favourite past-time of hair-splitting.
"Vide n.48 and n.58.
43* No written evidence as to how Lay and Osborn were notified. That 
they were notified is stated by Lay in his letter to Sir G. Grey of Aug.
11, 1862 - copy of which was enclosed in Lay to Russell "Official". Aug.
18, 1862. "Vide" FO 17/384.
44* Loc. cit.Lay was trying to force a decision. He himself professed 
to know in July (Lay, "LR". Lay to Hart, July 23, 1862, "vide" Appendix 
VI F) that an "Order in Council" would be required. The earlier documents 
(BPPL3057]) which may have provoked his onslaught, were released on Aug.
10. "Vide", "Times". Aug. 11, 1862. p.7£*
45* "Vide antea" n.34*
46. The Chinese Empire did not possess a "national" flag or standard 
ensign. "Vide Also 17/384* Lay and Osborn to FO. Aug. 13> 1862.
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On the first day, Lay received an official notice from the Home 
Office that it could only issue personal licences to him and Osborn.
For the sanction "to fit out and equip vessels", he would have to refer
A 7
back to the F.O. The same day he had a long session with Layard.
The following day (August 18) he addressed two letters directly to Russell. 
One was an official letter in which he enclosed copies of his 11 August 
letter to Sir George Grey and the Home Office reply of August 16. In
JO
his covering letter. Lay briefly reviewed the statement on the problem
of "to fit out and equip vessels." He asserted that the exclusion of
this authority in the licence made the vessels "liable to seizure
and confiscation." He stated that he was not concerned about the
enlistment question for he felt he could overcome this obstacle by
recruiting the force and then submitting one roster for the entire force,
whereupon individual licences could be issued. He continued, "Although
I have Your Lordship*s authority to equip vessels, I am unable to do so,
unless the conditions of the Act of Parliament are complied with." He
concluded with the request, that Russell exert his influence to have
the subject clause inserted in the licences to himself and Osborn.
49The other letter to Russell was marked "Private".
47. 70 17/384. Lay to Russell "Official". Aug. 18, 1862. Enclosure No.2. 
Waddington to Lay. Aug. 16, 1862.
48. "Ibid" "Official"
49. "Ibid" Lay to Russell. Private. Aug. 18, 1862.
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50After recalling that he, Lay, had addressed Russell "on the 5th Instant, 
and I have taken the liberty of again trespassing on your time in a 
letter of this d a t e , h e  reviewed the vessels problem in essentiallly 
the same terms as stated in the official letter* However, the closing 
paragraphs were as follows*
Until the proper authority is granted me, I am unable to purchase 
any vessels, although this is of pressing urgency, as in order to enable 
the force to reach China in April next, it must be despatched from this 
country in the first week of November.
May I, therefore, pray that your Lordship will have the kindness
to give my letters referred to [ , ] your consideration, and favour me
with an answer at Your Lordship’s earliest convenience.
Lay’s two letters stimulated Russell to take up the outstanding
issues on August 19 and 20. His and Layard’s hand-written notes on 
Lay’s letters of August 15 and 18 ("Private") are quite revealing and, 
in consequence, warrant extensive reproduction here.
[Russell, 19/8 on Lay’s of 15/s] Is this the Chinese flag? Being 
in the service of the Emperor they ought to carry the Chinese flag with 
some mark of distinction.
[Layard, for same] Mr. Lay informed me two days ago [l7 August] 
that the Chinese Govt had no flag.
Mr. Lay's great object is to make his force rirespectable11 as he 
terms it. Hence his flag.
It is for this reason that Mr. Lay objects strongly to engaging 
men at Canton or Hong Kong. He means to do great things and he wants 
a respectable force engaged in this country to assist him. He has no 
fancy for the rowdies to be picked up at the Chinese Ports. It follows 
that no Colonial Ordinance or Proclamation would suit Mr. Lay. The 
alternative would be an Order in Council suspending the foreign Enlistment 
Act. But the necessity of this is obviated in Mr. Lay’s letter of the 
18th, and it is therefore hoped that on that head there will be no further 
difficulty.
Shall we notify Mr. Lay’s flag to the Admiralty?
50. No copy of this letter was found. It may also have been "Private” 
and in this instance not deposited by Russell .
[Russell] I think he cannot carry the flag without,-±he permission 
of the Emperor of China. Ask for this thro1 Mr. Bruce.
Two sets of notes were made on Lay’s "Private" of August 18, 
differentiated as indicated.
[Russell, 19/8 on the Cover] An official answer must be given to 
this as soon as an Order-in-Council is decided upon.
[Layard memorandum dated 19/8 attached; extracts;] I have seen 
Mr. Waddington [Permanent TJnder-Secretary at the Home Office] on this 
and he informed me it was done by order of Sir G. Grey who had stated 
that it had been decided in Cabinet....
I pointed out to Mr. Waddington that in our letter of July 30 we 
had requested that Licences might be issued authorizing Mr. Lay and 
Capt Osborne "to fit out & equip vessels" as well as to enter the 
Chinese service themselves, but Mr. W - said the meeting of the Cabinet 
was since that date [sic] and at all events he had Sir G. Grey’s orders 
in writing which were clear & precise. If therefore Lord Russell 
wished the licence to include leave to "fit out & equip vessels", His 
Lordship must address a further Comnrun to Sir G. Grey.
Mr. Lay’s letter is so far satisfactory that it seems to show that 
he will not experience any difficulty about engaging men, which was for 
a long time our chief embarrassment.
[Russell-on memo, 20/8] This is a question for Ld Palmerston or 
the Cabinet.*
Lay continued his unremitting pressure by requesting additional 
sanction to purchase "Guns, small arms, ammunition, etc. as may be 
necessary...." from the War Department, "upon the same terms as such 
supplies are now furnished to the Chinese Military service, through 
Vice Admiral Hope and Brigadier Staveley [viz., at 50 per cent, of cost!]"
51. "Ibid" Notes on Lay/Osborn to FO Aug. 13. Notice was sent to Admiralty 
on Aug. 28, and request to Bruce on Sept. 3» 1862; i.e., only after the 
decision to approve an Order in Council was taken.
52. "Ibid" Notes on Lay to Russell. "Private". Aug. 18.
55* "Ibid" Lay to Russell. Aug. 21, 1862. Request not transmitted until 
Sept. 3. "Vide" FO 17/385.
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Russell, however, had had all the pressure he needed. He gave his entire 
attention, with respect to Chinese affairs, to gaining approval for an 
Order in Council,
A dossier was compiled in the F.O. and this was forwarded to Dr, R,
Phillimore, one of the Law Officers, on August 25 with a request to draw
up a draft Order in Council that would satisfy the requirements of the 
54situation. Exactly when the decision was made is not on record in
the F.O, files, Russell wrote privately to Bruces
Lord Palmerston has agreed to a proposal of mine [ I ] that an 
Order in Council should be issued granting to Capt, Sherard Osborne &
Mr. Lay the license [sic] of the Crown to equip ships, & hire men for 
the service of the Emperor of China.
The draft Order in Council submitted on August 26 by Phillimore
56was excessively restrictive and was accompanied by the following comment*
2. I have concluded from the statements contained in both communications 
from the Foreign Office [Aug. 11 & 25?] that it was not the intention 
of HMG to grant, as in 1855> an unqualified licence to all British 
Subjects to enlist themselves in the service of a Foreign State, but to 
grant a qualified licence to enlist themselves in such service only under 
the command of Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne.
When the draft was transmitted to the "Council1' Office for engrossment,
57Russell attached a memorandum to it which began, "The representations 
of Mr. Lay & the state of the law, as explained by the Law Officers of 
the Crown have made it necessary to reconsider our position in reference 
to China & the Taeping insurrection".
54. FO 85/2251.
55• mE/B" Russell to Bruce. Private. Aug. 26, 1862.
56. FO 85/2251. Phillimore to Layard. Aug. 26, 1862.
57* FO 17/584* Bussell memo. Aug. 27> 1862.
378
Stating that the Government had decided to grant leave to "Osborn and 
some other officers to enter the service of the Emperor of China", he 
went on to explain why alternative procedures were unsuitable. He 
concluded:
If however an Order in Council is obtained Capt. Osborn and Mr.
Lay expect to organise a force by which our Trade may be protected 
both against the Taepings & against pirates.
On these grounds I have, with the concurrence of Lord Palmerston, 
advised that Her Majesty should sanction the Order in Council required.
At this stage, Lay’s unremitting pressure very nearly disrupted
the entire proceedings. He repeated his request, with more urgency
on August 28, for gazetting the Imperial flags, etc. He detailed the
reasons it was required, noting, "I see no reason to apprehend any
difficulty in obtaining the formal consent of the Emperor to the flag
58proposed.” And, then, "Lastly, I have already purchased five vessels.”
This letter brought the direct intercession of Hammond, who attached a
59memorandum to Lay’s letter before passing it on to Russell.
58.FO 17/384* Lay to Russell. "Vide antea" n*. 42. Lay, of course, had 
no more legal authority on Aug. 28 than he had had on Aug. 18 to 
"purchase” vessels, though by this time he may have learned that an 
Order in Council was being processed. But the "Times”, Aug. 20, p.9c 
reported the purchase from the Admiralty of two vessels and in Lay, 
”LR”. Lay to Hart, Aug. 24, 1862 ("vide" Appendix VI, G), Lay confirms 
that three vessels were being constructed and two had been purchased.
59* FO 17/384* Memo on Lay to Russell by Hammond same date. Hammond 
at the same time wrote to Admiralty (Aug. 28) about the flag question. 
The Admiralty replied to Hammond on Aug. 29 that the flag would be 
respected, but could not be gazetted until approved by Emperor.
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Expressing his own amazement that the Chinese Government possessed 
no flag flin their seas by which their vessels can be known,” he none­
theless conceded the need for some recognition and accordingly "directed 
a letter to be written to the Admiralty”* However, Hammond was not 
finished*
But there is another question of importance* We have nothing 
officially of Mr* Lay. He says that he is the Agent of the Chinese 
Govt* Should we not ask him for his authority to act? He should surely 
produce it before we go any further. I cannot make out that Bruce has 
mentioned him to us as the Agent of the Chinese Govt, in this country.
Russell's notation immediately followed.
The flag should be adopted or authorised by the Emperor of China 
before we recognise it.
Mr. Lay is well known as an officer of the Chinese Officer [sic].
He ought to be asked for his doggments empowering him to act here.
I thought he had produoed them.
The procedures, nevertheless, had gone too far to stop them going
any further. On August 29, Phillimore, now joined by Sir W. Atherton,
the Attomey-Solicitor General, had forwarded a revised draft of the
Order in Council with a report to the "Council” office (copies sent 
6lto P.O. ) "referring to queries made about the draft.*.." The report 
statedi
That we have settled the Draft Order in Council, and have appended 
our initials thereto. It did not seem to us practicable to include in 
the Order any provision regulating or restricting the conditions of 
service after enlistment. At the same time, regard being had to the
60. Loc.cit. Memo dated Aug. 28.
61. PO 83/2251. Law Officers to Privy Council Office. Aug. 29, 1862.
62. Atherton was probably more familiar with Lay's plans as he had been 
one of the consultants on legal questions discussed earlier. The more 
open phraseology may reflect the intent to keep enlistment open for 
"European" officers instead of British officers only. "Vide antea"
p.377, n.56.
very .peculiar nature of the service, we would venture to suggest that it 
might be expedient that some regulations and restrictions should form 
the subject of communications or of an understanding in this respect 
between the Govt, & Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn. As an illustration of 
our meaning we would point out the expediency of care being taken to 
guard against such of Her Majesty*s Subjects as may enlist being placed 
under the immediate command of Chinese officers, or being mixed up with 
the general forces of the Emperor.
The necessity for this suggestion appears to us to arise from a 
consideration of the barbarous manner in which hostilities have been,
& in all probability will be, carried on to a greater or less extent 
by the forces of the Emperor of China.
The formalised Order in Council was transmitted to the F.O. on
August 30,^ The order to gazette it was sent out on September 1, and
65it was gazetted the following day. y This released the backlog of
pending matters, many of which were, in effect, dealt with ex post facto.
The only two that are of primary interest concern the "understanding1*
that the Government endeavoured to reach with Lay and Osborn and the
question of Lay*s authority.
When the Order in Council had been gazetted, Layard raised the
66question of the revisions and report of the Law Officers* Russell
replied, "I think we should write to the Adm^ to propose that Capt
Osborn should make it an engagement that men enlisted should only
serve under British Officers". Following the usual initial "R", he
67
added, "Say same to Mr. Lay."
63. FO 83/2251 • Law Officers to Privy Council Office, Aug. 29*
64* FO 17/394* Privy Council Office to Foreign Office.
65* FO 17/385* FO memo. Sept. 1, 1862*
66. "Ibid" Layard*s memo, Sept. 2, 1862.
67* Loc. cit* Russell did not date his memo, but the letter to the
Admiralty went out on Sept. 2.
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The Admiralty was informed and was also asked to offer "any further
suggestions..• for the proper regulation of this service}" before the
68P.O. communicated with Lay and Osborn. In reply, the Admiralty asked
to know what terns of engagement Lay proposed to make under the Order 
69m  Council.
The P.O.!s reply, dated October 11, referring specifically to the
Admiralty1s letter (dated 4 September), simply forwarded a letter of
Lay!s of October 7 purportedly setting out his written authority from
70the Chinese Governments Most of the delay was occasioned by the
absence of Lay on holiday in "Germany”, where he had gone to take a
71"course" of the Schwalbach Waters.
72Whatever Lay1 s letter contained, it could not have been his 
written Authority from the Chinese government. But, in the first 
instance, it is important to note that the issue of "terms of engagement” 
was, apparently, suspended. For the purpose of fitting out and arming 
vessels, Lay had tangible authority: as of the date of his letter, almost 
£120,000 of it.75
68. PO 17/385* Layard to Adm. Sept. 2, 1862.
69* "Ibid” Adm. to Layard. Sept. 4> 1862. The PO did not write to Lay 
until Sept. 10. Copy in PO 228/319* No. 144 Hammond to Bruce.
70."Ibid". PO to Adm. Oct. 11, 1862.
71* Lay, "LR", Lay to Hart. Oct. 10, 1862. ("vide" Appendix VI H.)
72. There is no copy of Lay*s letter of Oct. 7 in the PO 17/- files. It 
may have been forwarded to the Admiralty without a copy being made.
73* "Vide" Appendix VI, H.
38.2
He had already compromised his avowed position that he would not order
Ma holt that I have not funds in hand to pay for";*^ hut to take risks
where the ground was not irretrievable (i.e., disposability of property)
was one thing; to enter into personal contracts (never mind what the
British Government might doj) without the authority he had requested -
"making contracts & arrangements with [men for the service] upon such
75terms & conditions, in all respects, as you shall think fit:" was 
quite another thing. Lay may have given sufficient assurances, verbally 
or in a private note, to RusselJ to satisfy him that the thing would 
be done properly before the force would be permitted to leave Britain.
In any case, the large-scale enlistment of men had not yet begun and did 
not appear to be imminent. At least, nothing further was written on 
the subject until Lay did have a written authority from the Chinese 
government.^
The nature of the authority that Lay did submit, in the second
instance, is for the time, only open to speculation. The only thing
Lay could possibly have submitted was a copy of the terms and conditions
which he had specified to Hart that he required, along with the positive
assurance he had from Hart, "So soon as I can get to Peking, I shall
procure for you the •full Powers' you require, to enable you to carry
77out the steam fleet project..."
74* Lay, "LR". Lay to Osborn. Apr. 16, 1862. Also "vide antea", ChapterIX 
fi, % 313 • n. 41 •
75. "Vide" Appendix VI, D.2.
76. "Times" Jan.6, I863, P*9c» The London correspondent of the "China 
Mail", "A.W." picked up the report on Jan. 10, which appeared in No.941, 
Feb. 26, I863, p.34.
77* Lay, "Interests", p.15*
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Except for the transmission of Layfs list of arms needs (which
included a request for the new Armstrong guns, that Russell assumed
78
the War Department would not supply) and a request, which was ultimately
refused, to have three specialist soldiers "lent" from the Royal Corps 
79of Engineers, x the flotilla project received no other attention in the
80London Office domestic files until the end of November. When it was 
mentioned, it was primarily in conjunction with responses to developments 
in China and not as a result of any initiative originating in Britain. 
Consequently, after a brief discussion of some significant aspects of 
the events just presented, it will be appropriate to follow the account 
through the transitional exchanges of correspondence between Britain 
and China.
Two of the significant aspects to which attention might be called 
are obvious. Firstly, Lay and Osborn were implementing the project 
by concentrating on forming a first class, efficient flotilla. Slowness 
of remittance, and exchange and discount costs aside, they were carrying 
out their responsibilities under the most advantageous financial terms 
to the Imperial government and as rapidly as circumstances would permit.
78. "Vide antea", n.$3. FO 17/385. Lay to Russell. Oct. 21, 1862. 
Transmitted to War Office Oct. 24> 1862. Gregory, op.cit. pp. 208-09. 
citing FO 17/376 shows that Russell was recommending that obsolete 
equipment be supplied in the anti-Taiping campaigns. Lay and Osborn, 
however, were not to be put off. "Vide" "Times”, March 5* 1863, p.l4h. 
They could not get the Armstrong gun for the vessels, but they did get 
new Enfield rifles for their marines.
79* FO 17/385* Lay and Osborn to Russell. Oct. 14* 1862. Sent to W.O.
Oct. 15. "Vide p . ^  n.83 and 84.
80. FO 17/375> No. 170. Russell to Bruce. Nov. 26, 1862, made a very 
general reference to British officers who, in addition to those defending 
the 30-mile radius, would be assisting to put down piracy. Neither 
Osborn nor the flotilla was specifically mentioned.
It seems, nonetheless, that they would probably only have met their
first-week-in-November sailing date at a considerable increment in 
81cost* As it was, their operations were at least slowed by the two
months* delay in acquiring all the necessary legal sanctions* Also,
although they had received in early October but slightly more than
82half the minimum they had been promised for late August, this had not, 
to that point, entailed any serious delay in proceeding with the project* 
Secondly, in part because of the insistence of Lay and Osborn on 
adhering to their terms of reference for the flotilla project, the British 
Government was forced into a two-fold policy decision* One side of the 
decision was primarily a personalised, executive decision* Palmerston 
and Russell combined to provide full legal (if not political) sanction 
for the flotilla project* The other side of the decision was, in reality, 
a joint decision of the P.O., Admiralty and War Office, the Ministries 
most aware of and sensitive to the rebellion in China. Nominally, of 
course, the same two men assumed responsibility, but each of the 
Ministries in its actions with respect to the flotilla project was 
accelerating a shift in policy to a less-than-neutral position in the 
conflict.
81. "Vide” Appendix VI H.
82. "Vide antea", p.3t/-
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There were, however, limits that could not be exceeded and it was
A
Hammond again, who tried to hold the breach* The War Office reply,
83
delayed for almost a month, to the request for "three soldiers",
which had been forwarded by the F.O. without any comment, approved
the request on condition that the "Chinese Agency" paid all costs.
The reply, according to practice, went to the F.O. On the War Office
letter Hammond wrote, "Do we not in some respects make ourselves allies
in this war by allowing our soldiers to serve, even though paid by
the Chinese Gov^ ?” Russell was forced despite the anomaly to concurt
"Yes - I think we must decline to allow it*"^ Letters of refusal
85were sent to the War Office and to Lay and Osborn, "Neutrality" was 
still, thus, the official and publicised policy, but the cooperation 
that was being given in developing the project was driving a rather 
large wedge into a rather large crack.
One significant aspect is not so obvious. It is the apposite of 
the discussion in Chapter VII, where it was argued that the dual role 
played by Lay while he was active in China, placed him in an enigmatic 
position.
83. "Vide antea", n.79. PO 17/385. W.O. to PO ITov. 12, 1862.
84* Loc. cit, Hammond and Russell notes are undated. Ironically, 
within two weeks, the FO was desperately trying to find a means to 
legitimise the "fait accompli" of British "soldiers" engaged in the 
Emperorfs service in China. The decision also was somewhat incongruous, 
since Lay and Osborn had the authority to enlist whomever they wished - 
naval or military, officers or "men",
85, FO 17/385* Replies dated Nov. 22, 186JL.
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In China he was attempting to defend the rights and promote the interests
of China. He was attempting to do these as an unacknowledged instrument
of a British policy of "large", ephemeral ideas, (un)supported by an
ineffectual "British" influence against a perpetual tide of unmanageable
foreigners, most of whom were British. And this effort was being
engineered in a Ch'ing structure built on a fractionalised executive
and on unstable authority.
In Britain, and especially in the framework of events surrounding
the flotilla project, Lay was being extricated from his enigmatic
position. The passive voice is essentially correct, for many of the
influences and interests that were at work were beyond the range of
Layfs control. The events of June-October added the remaining two
ingredients to the "large idea" formula. More important than the
"digging in" of ,the Embassy at Peking were the quasi-political/quasi-
legal and material support of the Government in London. The hard-
headed politicians unquestionably calculated their interests in pound?,
86shillings and pence, but these interests had been transmuted into 
commitment. The Sino-European mutual benefit concept was solidly 
backed by formal Government support.
86* Some intimations of this have already been given. In addition 
note FO 17/383* Admiralty notice of July 12, 1862 "to Chinese Volunteers" - 
promotions in Chinese service not valid in Royal Navy? no pensions for 
wounds, or if killed in action for widows of men who had been on half­
pay - yet these were men who would be replacing regular British forces 
on the China Station. Ordnance was to be supplied at "half-price", 
but payment for sales in England was guaranteed, whereas much of what 
was "sold" directly in China was never paid for. Other illustrations 
of the "£.s.d." theme will be noted below.
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The second ingredient completed the synarchic executive. To 
the modem, civil administration of the Inspectorate and to the security 
of a dependable revenue was fused an integrated naval force”cum”coast 
guard. This triumvirate was not to be a weapon* it was to be a vital, 
regenerative transfusion. For Lay, it was the clearing away of enigmas. 
The Master was a harlequin of "Progress”. The hope, optimism and self- 
confidence of the Fall of 1862 that replaced the pessimism, despair and 
insecurity of the Spring of 1861, was not just the result of the 
Schwalbach Waters. The rejuvenation may all have been based on a chimera, 
but the outlook was one of being on the threshold of fulfillment.
The exchanges between Lay and Hart may have cast a few shadows 
across the landscape. Had Lay seen the diplomatic correspondence, in 
addition to the newspaper accounts, he might have detected some ominous 
storm clouds directly overhead as well as on the horizon. With this 
cryptic introduction the account of the exchanges between Britain and 
China may begin.
The correspondence contributes more in the way of negative evidence 
than in the way of evidence that adds to greater knowledge of the flotilla 
project. The several factors that account for this will be considered 
as the different groupings are examined.
After the end of May, Lay*s definitive letters to Hart were much 
less frequent than they had been.
87. Esp. FO 17/374* No. 141# Bruce to Russell. Oct. 13» 1862.
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His own Letter Register contains no record of his having sent any
88letter between May 26 and July 23 and then there is only the one for
89July and one at the end of August. ' It is possible, however, that he 
did send copies of his memoranda and of his correspondence with Government 
Ministers (the more important are copied in the Letter Register) and it 
is quite probable that short notes accompanied the official receipts 
he religiously provided as remittances arrived from China. The last 
comprehensive letter recorded is under the date of October 10, 1862 -
90to catch the first mail after his September holiday on the Continent.
The last entry of a letter to Hart is recorded as a short note of October
27.
Though Lay and Osborn did open an "agency” in London, they did not 
have any clerical staff to handle administration or correspondence. With 
but one exception, all the entries in the Letter Register are in Lay*s 
own hand and all the correspondence to Government offices was hand­
written by Lay or Osborn. From June through August, Lay was exceedingly 
busy not only in his negotiations with the Government, but also in his 
"servicing" the needs of Osborn and the "officers” he engaged to assist 
him in selecting, fitting out and equipping the vessels for the flotilla.
88. "Vide” Appendix VI, F.
89* "Vide" Appendix VI, G.
90. "Vide" Appendix VI, H.
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Two factors would explain the seemingly early termination of
Lay*s correspondence. His October 10 acknowledged Hartfs letters
through August 2. On the one side, Hart presumably took some vacation
at this stage (Shanghai experienced a severe cholera epidemic in the
Summer, 1862) but this matter aside, he was sufficiently ill in September
so that he could not complete his journey from Tientsin to Peking for 
91several weeks. For a number of reasons, to be dealt with shortly,
most official or' quasi-official "despatches" from Peking from late
September were subject to abnormal delays, very few arriving in London
before mid-January, 1863* On the other side, the clue is in Layfs
"letter" of October 27, the notation for which is so brief, it can be
92quoted here in its entirety 
To Hart Octr. 27* 1862.
A short note - at a standstill for want of funds - want to leave 
in February, but can*t take my passage until I have sufficient in hand 
to discharge all liabilities.
Keeping in mind the general conditions affecting communications, 
it would not be unusual to forego lengthy correspondence. With the 
principal himself soon to be on the scene, critical questions could be 
postponed until his appearance. That LayTs departure had to be delayed 
to a subsequent sailing would normally have had little effect on this 
attitude.
91. "FL" Wade to Lay. Sept. 8, 1862, ("Vide" Appendix VI, K) and "E/B" 
Bruce to Russell, Private. Sept. 24, 1862.
92. Lay, "LR".
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As acquaintance with Lay*s correspondence to Hart shows, it was
not concerned with definition or discussion of conceptions and
objectives, or with any of the crucial problems, related to the flotilla
project* His information on development of the scheme is superficial*
Hart would have learned almost as much - possibly more - by reading the
"Times". Lay appears to have satisfied himself that lengthy discussion
was unnecessary since as he paraphrased it, "We are in perfect accord
93as to money & f l e e t . L a y fs promise to send a copy of "an article
[to be put] in "Blackwood*s" in December on Chinese policy & the steam 
94fleet", aborted. The material grew into two lengthy articles which did
95not appear until the January and February issues, but reactions from 
China on the contents, in either case, would not have been available 
before Lay, and according to expectation, the flotilla, were well on their 
way.
By October Lay was fretful about the delay in receiving funds and 
far more concerned, though still in a conciliatory mood, to insist on his 
interpretations of his position"vis a vis" Hart1s. It should, nonetheless, 
be noted that, apart from policies affecting customs* administration, 
Hart*s letters did not apparently contain any provocative questions
93. "Vide" Appendix VI, F.
94* "Vide" Appendix VI, H.
95* "Blackwoodfs Magazine" (Edinburgh) "Progress in China". Vol. 93 > 
Nos. DLXVII (Jan. 1863) and DLXVIII (Feb. I863).
391
concerning the conceptions and objectives of the flotilla scheme? hut 
more of this in a moment.
The final entries in Lay's Letter Register are tantalisingly 
suggestive, hut it would he folly to attempt any more than to record them. 
To Mr. Bruce
Novr. 10, 1862
Had hoped to get 5 vessels away in December - No funds.
Chinese Govt, should he strengthened gradually - Telegraphic wire - 
Emigration on a gigantic scale.
French officers - intention to visit Paris.
Tartar Contingent.
To Wade - Same date.
Same purport.^
The "profile" of Hart's correspondence to Lay has been outlined
above. After a spate of letters in April, Lay1s acknowledgements
indicate a tapering off. None is recorded for May (though these were
probably acknowledged by receipts and short notes) when Hart was
travelling among the southern Treaty Ports. The last of Hart's "officials"
97("No.6" Separate Series) was sent from Shanghai on June 12, (last of 
the "officials", presumably, because Lay's criticisms of Hart's 
"officialese" would have reached him soon after this date). Letters of
96. Lay, "LR" Only one of Wade's private letters to Lay for this 
period has been found, "vide" n. 91* Lay's to Wade of June 26 and 
July 10 were not referred to in "LR".
97. "E/B". Hart to Lay, June 12, 1862. "Tide" Appendix VI, J.
39.2
l12lst June from Woochang, 15th July & 2nd August from Shanghai*«••"
98are acknowledged in Lay’s of October 10* Lay records two additional
99letters from Peking* October 15 and November 22#
Hart’s official of June 12, reporting his successful efforts to 
forestall having steamers ordered from the United States, was written 
before he had received Lay’s reactions to his earlier communications*
Yet in one respect it confirmed, if anything, one vital point under­
lying Lay’s and Osborn’s assumptions* the flotilla was expected to 
function as a naval contingent to assist in the suppression of the 
rebellion* In this letter and in those through August 2, Hart accepted 
the fact that discretionary authority, insofar as the flotilla was 
concerned, had been transferred to London* In the letters he disputed 
Lay* s thesis on the exercise of the discretionary authority of the 
"officer-in-charge" in China, with special reference to customs' 
matters and with the kinds of commitments which could be made on 
general policy; but the flotilla appeared to be a closed subject* 
Chronologically, Hart’s letters of October and November might 
be thought to fit into the series under discussion, but because of 
abnormal conditions, they do not. The principal reason for this is 
that communications of late September and early October generally did
98. "Vide" Appendix VI H. 
99* Lay, "Interests" p*l6*
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not reach London until late January or mid-February.*^ Hart!s letter
of October 15> a "money" letter, must have been in this category, for
as of mid-January, Lay was still desperate for f u n d s . I t  is true
102that Hart’s letter of November 22 reached Lay on January 15> but 
the supporting documents from the Babassy, prepared in the same period, 
did not reach London until mid-February. The impact of their contents 
affected, therefore, a later phase of developments in Britain and will, 
consequently, be considered in that context.
There are several explanations for the unusual delays, which 
continued to affeot the Peking correspondence up to mid-December. For 
the earlier period, the cause was the sinking of the mail ship, the 
"Colombo". Most of the mail was salvaged, but by the time it was 
delivered, duplicates were arriving. There was, during the later period, 
an extremely heavy volume of correspondence - Consular, military, foreign
100. The date spreads are available from notations on the covers > of 
despatches received in the relevant FO 17/- files. The BPP also records 
date of receipt of despatches. For this periods a) "E/B" Russell to 
Bruce. Private. Feb. 26, 1862; b) B.M. Allen, "Gordon in China" (London, 
1933)9 which contains many inaccuracies, has a specific reference to 
sinking of mail vessel "Colombo", p.59* and note; c) The originals of 
the September-October correspondence were water-damaged.
101. FO 17/399* Admiralty to Hammond. Jan. 31* 1863* "Vide iwifea"
Chapter XI p
102. "FL". Layfs notation of receipt on the Chinese copy of his "full 
powers", enclosed in Hart's letter of Nov. 22, 1862, specifies it was 
received on Jan. 15, whereas F0 17/373 Ho. 168 Bruce to Russell. Nov.22, 
1862, is marked as received, in the F0, on Feb. 16, 1863*
394
community activities and communications with Chfing officials - that
built up a back-log in dispatching letters to all areas* In the
special case of Lay's Imperial authority for the flotilla project,
mentioned by Hart as being sent in a separate envelope along with his
103letter of October 15, the date on the official copy bearing the
Tsungli Yamenfs seal was, in fact, October 24*^^ According to Hart,
105"Bruce wished to see it,” in consequence of which only the Chinese 
copy was ready for transmission in Hart's letter of November 22, which 
on this occasion at least, avoided the Embassy bottleneck*
This last factor raises another question about the delay in 
correspondence concerning the flotilla* Russell's private letter of 
July 26, reporting the Cabinet "restrictions” on the flotilla project, 
should have reached Peking early in October* Did this cause Bruce to 
delay matters related to the flotilla? Russell's private letter of 
August 26 reporting his and Palmerston's decision to apply for an Order 
in Council should have reached Bruce early in November - thus releasing 
Hart from restraints! Letters and despatches of the period do not 
provide the answers. In the event, there was a long period during 
which Lay was completely out of touch with Hart covering Hart's 
critical conversations immediately following his return to Peking*
As for the diplomatic correspondence from Britain to China, this
103* Lay, "Interests” p.16*
104* Loc* cit. "Vide" Appendix VIII, B. 
105* Lay, "Interests", p.16*
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can be dealt with very easily. Following the transmission of the
gazetted Order in Council and the requests to Bruce to seek Imperial
ratification of the flags designed by Lay and Osborn and verification
of Lay’s authority, sent out in late August and early September,
respectively, literally not another word was sent out from the F.O#
referring specifically to the flotilla# For the latter part of 1862
this is not necessarily remarkable# The concept and objectives of the
scheme had been sanctioned and, until the flotilla was actually ready
to embark, there would be no need for notification nor "instruction"
to be sent in advance#
Only one additional reference was made to the project in Russell’s
private letters to Bruce# On December 26, he wrote, "I think we are
getting on with the Lay & Sherrard [sici] enterprise to put down piracy
106
and check Taepings#*' This comment was not provoked by any specific
reference in the correspondence at hand from Peking, but by developments
in Britain and, of course, it would not have reached Bruce until mid-
March at the earliest#
The official correspondence from the Embassy in Peking also
contained one direct reference to the flotilla project being carried
107out in Britain# In an October despatch - Bruce’s definitive policy 
106# "E/B" Russell to Bruce#
107* FO 17/374* No. 141. Bruce to Russell# Oct# 13> 1862. Enclosing 
Wade’s report on Hart’s conversation# Secret & Confidential. Oct. 12, 
1862#
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for the period, containing, as well, Wade*s memorandum on Hart*s most 
recent conversations with members of the Tsungli Yamen - Bruce refers 
to the function he expects the executive, which will be formed in
connection with [the customs establishment], under Captain Osborne, or 
some other competent naval officer...." to fill. This despatch, however, 
was one of those that did not reach London until February 4* Beyond 
this, only the late November despatches which contained the verification 
that had been requested by the F.O. referred to the Lay-Osbom 
"enterprise”. Most of the reasons for this situation have been given 
in the preceding discussion. Two, perhaps, are worth repeating: i) the 
Blue Book printed in mid-August aside, nothing official went out from 
the F.O. before late August; ii) the Blue Book and Russell1s private 
letter of July 26 (the reference in the despatch quoted above is 
ambiguously phrased) left the precise status of the project in doubt, 
whatever Lay may have been writing about it.
But the bulk of the despatches that did arrive in London, and here 
the scope of the discussion needs to be expanded to include naval, 
military and consular correspondence sent directly from the Ningpo- 
Shanghai area, was concerned with Taiping activities. The ever-larger 
commitments of French and British detachments, the relative ineffect­
ualness of Ch*ing forces in the region and the need for an effective 
naval arm, were central themes of this correspondence. On this last 
point, primary stress was placed on the tactical need for a support 
force to participate in offensives against the rebels, but it was also 
stressed that a water force was necessary to suppress the smuggling, with
and through connivance of foreigners, of military supplies to the rebels. 
This correspondence poured in on the War Office, the Admiralty and the 
Foreign Office without abatement from early June onwards. Indirectly, 
at least, it supplied a continuing "corpus” of evidence to vindicate 
the decision taken by Palmerston and Russell.
By a simple extension of the factors accounted for, the statement, 
that there was nothing directly bearing on the flotilla in Bruce1 s 
private correspondence (to include his sister, Lady Augusta, as well as 
Russell) to London, should not require further explanation. News
106directly from London (Lay) reached Peking (Wade) in early September.
Bruce was still on his summer schedule, resident in the hills 15 miles 
109from Peking. 7 Thereafter his letters were affected by factors already 
explained. His first specific reference in private letters to Russell, 
appeared in a letter of December 11, 1862, which reached London in 
early February,Neither his official nor his private correspondence, 
insofar as it related directly to the flotilla, affected the development 
of the project.
Britain and China were, of course, sources of other exchanges 
concerning the flotilla. Reviewing the question in this large sphere 
permits the transition from an appraisal of the direct bearing which
108* "Vide" Appendix VI, K.
109. PRO 30/22/49* Bruce to Russell. Private. Oct. 14* 1862.
110, FO 17/375* Bruce to Russell, Private. Dec. 11, 1862, (between 
Bruce1s "officials" No. 182-183) Bruce1s private letters did not 
usually find their way into the FO files, though several of them did 
circulate among Cabinet members.
exchanges had on the project to a wider appraisal of the "moods" in
the two areas*
From Britain for a while, at least, Lay kept Wade privately informed 
of his views and of developments* The only response of Wade's that is 
extant, which Lay received in mid-November, seemed to afford support 
for Lay's views,^^ - though these views may only have been expressed 
in generalities* Sir Harry Farkes from England was keeping in touch 
with Elgin, invested as Governor-General of India, through the latter's 
Private Secretary, T*J* Hovell Thurlow* Parke's views, which he was 
disseminating in Britain, are significant for they are typical of the 
rationalised support given by a number of Her Me jesty's China Servants 
to the flotilla ideal
I doubt whether the Taipings will be very soon put down - hitherto 
they have only met an opposition that they could afford to treat with 
some contempt, but their collision with the Allies will cause them to 
feel that they will now have to fight for their existence - Shanghai,
I imagine must be protected, but I am by no means one of those who 
advocate that ME"[ngland] should undertake the suppressing of the rebellion* 
I would rather see this left to the Chinese Govt* Lay and Osborn are 
busy organizing a Naval force, & the Imperial prestige may be weakened 
less by the employment of such an arm if [by] a similar one purely 
military - but on shore* I should think it advisable to limit the 
foreign element as much as possible to the work of instruction & 
inspection* A Chinese army in the field commanded by a European General, 
could not I fear be found to work, nor is it desirable for other reasons 
that the Chinese Government should be furnished too speedily with a 
large & efficient army, or the good relations now existing at Peking 
between J^jje Ch* Govt* & foreign representatives might experience some 
change*
111* "Vide" Appendix VI, K.
112. India Office Library, Elgin Papers. Private Secfy's Letters* 
Binding 9 Ho* 838. Parkes to Thurlow* Aug.ll, 1862* For Wade to Thurlow, 
"vide" Priv* Sec'y's Letters. Binding 5* Ho. 485* Apr. 17* 1862.
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Wade also corresponded with Thurlow, while Bruce, understandably, 
corresponded directly with Elgin* Wade, perhaps because of Bruce’s 
influence or perhaps because he did not wish to jeopardise his chances
^ 113
of being designated Charge d'affaires when Bruce took his leave, 
tended to become more cautious in expressing his views and, where policy 
was concerned, to confine himself to reference to others. Bruce was 
a bit more candid with Elgin, though usually he expressed many similar 
views privately to Bussell, having presented the material somewhat 
more systematically and polished the prose. Two passages from these 
letters reflect Bruce’s mood at the time. On September 24* he commented*
As to the Tae-ping, which is only the most formidable of several 
insurrections, 1 think the Govt, forces under Tseng-Kwo^fan are making 
considerable way against it - And if Osborne with a few gun-boats 
were here, with Ward’s men to head an assault, my impression is, that 
Nan-king would fall....
And on November 10, he wrote*
I have explained to the Prince that he must educate Chinese 
Officers - who in their turn must educate Chinese troops - for if 
Chinese are lead by foreign officers - they will end by despising 
their own Govt, and be more dangerous than the Tae-pings.
The principle from which nothing will induce me to depart is, to 
use nothing but persuasion in matters where we cannot appeal to treaty- 
rights ** But Parkes is still under the Empire of old traditions, 
when Chinese & English recognized no other right but might ■
113* Bussell ( and probably Hammond) had strong reservations about 
Wade’s suitability. WE/BM. Bussell to Bruce. Private. Oct. 10 and Nov. 
26, 1862.
114* WE/B”. Bruce to Elgin. Private. Sept. 24* 1862. Bruce had not yet 
learned of Ward's death.
113* This may have been the origin for the alleged Kung-Hart under­
standing contained in the undated document referred to in Chapter XI, 
n. 64w Also "vide L" n. 123«
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and unfortunately that system of proceeding is the popular one with 
the foreign communities*
i t w  M  w  M  W  w  W
Johnny Bussell is consciously civil, indeed friendly - I have 
told him I will not stay one hour, unless the Govt* hack me in my 
efforts to make both Britishers and Chinese abide by Treaties - Merchants, 
Consuls, & Missionaries are re-calcitrant but with the cfustj^ - 
House, and Osborne, I hope to be more than a match for them*
In the latter part of 1862, there were still only a small number
of people who were directly involved in the flotilla project* Expressions
of public views through the press, part of the inter-communication
pattern, were not numerous* Withholding of information was a conscious
policy of the sponsors* Public feeling, more openly expressed in China
than in Britain, was sensitive on China questions* The sponsors were
correspondingly sensitive about publicising their activities* Thus,
to the extent that concepts and objectives were divulged in Britain, an
attempt was made to emphasise the preventive, or "coast guard" aspects 
117of the scheme* 1 Enforcement of law and economising of public expen­
diture for the benefit of trade, would appeal to influential segments 
of opinion in Britain* Yet opinion in Britain was not easily hoodwinked
and as the scope of the project became known, some disapproval and some
118apprehension, conveyed through public media, were expressed* • Such
116* "E/B" Bruce to Elgin. Private. Nov* 10, 1862. "Vide supra" n.lJO.
117. "Vide antea" n.10.
118* "LCE", Sept* 1862-Apr. 1863, passim provides reprints or "precis" 
from a wide selection of the British Press* One interesting point was 
that "LCE" reprinted from the "Missionary magazine" of Oct. 1862, a 
letter from James Legge in which he expressed views opposed to assisting 
the Ch*ing government, claiming the rejuvenation of the Mancha "is a 
vain dream".Legge, of course, was H.N. Lay#s father-in-1 awl
a relatively formidable force under the control of one of the belligerents 
in this case a decaying legitimacy - could lead to dangerous commitments* 
In China, although foreign community opinion was divided, long­
term interests dictated support for established authority, however 
corrupt and decadent, against the relative anarchy which seemed to 
prevail in rebel-occupied regions* Here, the flotilla, despite Hart's
personal conceptions, was viewed as an instrument for the suppression
119of rebellion and the restoration of order and stability* But the
public, not less astute than that in Britain, though perhaps less
detached, sensed what the functions of the flotilla must be once the
primary objectives were obtained* Thwarted in its attacks upon the
120Foreign Inspectorate, finding little comfort in Taiping incapacity 
to govern "properly" and failing in attempts to gain sanction for the 
establishment of independent, foreign-controlled free ports, the 
prospect of an "Anglo-Chinese" flotilla was the least of the apprehensions 
of the foreign community*
The problem of "communication" has been considered in fairly 
broad terms* The negative aspects may, consequently, be more apparent* 
Partly because of the "time lag", partly because the principals and 
interested parties operated in quite opposite contexts and partly
119* See "NCH" Nov. 1662 - Jan* 1863, passim and "China Mail", Bee*
1862 - Oct* 1863, especially Wright, Hart, p* 239* Quoting "China 
Mail", Bee* 11, 1862.
120. While Bruce systematically supported it and the FO eventually 
approved his policy, Hart on his itinerary was eliminating administrative 
inefficiencies and malpractices and effecting some modifications in 
regulations*
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because of deliberate reticence, there was almost a complete absence 
of dialogue, The incongruities and contradictions, while in an incipience 
stage of crystallisation, were disregarded* Confident of the propriety 
of their own motives, Lay and Osborn had no reason to believe that 
their implementation of the project was not consistent with the interests 
of all parties concerned*
Since further developments, during this phase of the project, 
within the Ch*ing sphere of interests did not fit into the exchanges 
of correspondence problems, they have yet to be reviewed* Between the 
time that instructions were sent out to purchase vessels in the United 
States (which instructions Hart had been able to have set aside in June) 
and the time of his arrival at Peking in October, the flotilla project 
was not a subject of recorded discussion among Chfing officials. When 
Hart arrived, his immediate concerns were to get additional funds and 
to get the legal authorisation for Lay. Kung assented to these despite 
the fact that he must have been told that the expense would reach a 
far higher figure than the original estimates, that instead of ten 
vessels only seven were to be acquired immediately and that the vessels 
would not begin to arrive before early Spring* (it is not absolutely 
certain that Kung was the sole discussant with Hart on these matters*
He was the chief personage on the Tsungli Yamen and since he was 
invariably a signatory of recommendations, instructions, etc.*. it is 
simpler to identify him as the active agent of Ch*ing policy at Peking 
in these matters)*
Kung may have given Hart assurances that money matters would not
cause any difficulty, bit the records do not show, for this period,
that any official instructions were issued to provide for the guarantee
funds which loomed so largely in Lay's letters to Hart* He was, however,
*
persuaded to issue the legally phrased document purportedly investing
Lay with full discretion, though he apparently had some reservations as
to what was entailed*
Just when Kung decided to "hedge" the "full powers" to Lay is 
121not certain* There were many other problems which required early
122attention, that had been held in suspense pending Hart's arrival,
and further discussions on the flotilla were certainly postponed until
well after the document covering Lay's authority had been handed over.
Within weeks, however, Kung extracted a set of "Hegulations proposed
by Mr* Hart in regard to the (Chinese) Officers, Gunners, Sailors,
123etc., to be appointed to the Seven Steam-Vessels"*  ^ This undated 
"document", when it was transmitted to the British Embassy in October, 
1863, was alleged to be the memorandum drawn up by Hart - vaguely 
specified as "last year" - which constituted the starting point for 
Tsungli Yamen approval of the flotilla project* In the first place, 
Hart's definitive memorandum of "last year" was drawn up on the basis
121* The "soft" line in Kung's attitude was typified by his Feb* 20 
communication to Hart, "vide" Appendix VIII, A.
122* "E/B" Bruce to Eussell* Private. Sept. 24$ 1862 and FO 17/374* 
Ho* 130* Bruce to Bussell* Sept* 22, 1862*
123. BPP [3271]. Enclosure 1 in Kung to Bruce. Oct. 25, I863. (PO 
17/395 Po. 178. Bruce to Bussell. Bov. 19, I863.)
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of nine or ten vessels and when it was drawn up, there was no certainty, 
as stipulated in the "document", that Osborn could accept the position
1 O A
as senior foreign officer* In the second place, the identical 
specifications, in much the same phraseology, were included for the
125first time in a memorial from Kung which was recorded November 20, 1862*
The "document" itself and the references in the memorial are
sufficiently indefinite to pose the question as to the foxm of commitment
actually made by Hart* The former refers to proposals and the latter
refers to suggestions* The "document", in turn, contains an extremely
important concluding rider, viz. t
The above is only a general idea of the probable arrangement*
What the«actual arrangement will be can only be known when the vessels 
arrive*
For Hart to have committed himself without reservation and without
prior discussions with Lay and Osborn to the appointment of a Chfing
Commander-in-Chief to act jointly with Osborn may have been possible,
but it was highly improbable* The terms proposed for the balance of
the Imperial contingent* one "officer" - status and functions undefined -
for each vessel; complements of gunners, sailors, marines and service
personnel for each vessel - to embark at some unspecified time after
127the vessels arrival; these might be "phasing in" arrangements and
124* "Vide an tea". ChapterlX p337Appendix VI C*2*
125* Eawlinson, op.cit.p. 72. It is with this memorial that Bawlinson 
makes his serious translation error* The memorial (like the "document") 
specifies that there shall be a Chfing Commander-in-Chief, plus Osborn, 
plus seven additional Ch!ing officers - one for each vessel*
126. BPP [327l]* Enclos. 1 in Kung to Bruce. 25/IO/63.
127 • Loc»cit^
405
are, at least, conceivable commitments*
But the memorial, in this respect, represents an inversion of
what may have been an essentially nsoftH understanding into a hard fact*
The proposals were presented in specific terms, without the "document's"
128rider and the edict in acknowledgement prescribed the specific terms*
In both the document” and the memorial, a new dimension was added to
the Ch'ing contingent* The original proposals of 1861 had provided
for the contingents to be made up only of Cantonese and Shanghai 
129levies. * The 1862 contingents provided for the inclusion of between 
25*30 pendent* of Mane bus along with Hunan and Shantung levies*
Kung carried his hedging one step further in the memorial, a step 
that was also endorsed by the aforementioned edict. This was a step 
entirely consistent with traditional practice* Eesponsibility was 
shifted to the highest Imperially-appointed official in charge of the 
operations in which the force was to be employed* It is doubtful that 
this was done at this time because of the special personality or the 
influence of Tseng Kuo-fan. The sequence of these events originated in 
Peking* Tseng Kuo-fan was the official fulfilling his functions as 
well as could be ejected* He was believed to have a knowledge of 
foreign steamers* Had this not been the case, normal procedure would 
have called for the appointment of a special Imperial Commissioner
128. Bawlinson, op* cit* p* 72* 
129* "Ibid” p.65*
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"to handle the affair"•
What is being suggested here, in summary, is that Kung had second
thoughts about the authorisation prepared for, and transmitted to, Lay*
He was also heeding the warnings, frequently sounded by Wade and Bruce,
130and only very recently repeated by Bruce,  ^ concerning the consequences
that would follow were the Dynasty to neglect the training of its own
officers and men in modem military and naval technology and tactics*
But security had to be interpreted as adherence to traditional practices
and procedures* The clash of "systems" was still not comprehended*
The conclusion of this sequence necessitates a departure from
the chronological pattern observed so far* Tseng Kuo-fan acknowledged
the delegation of responsibility in a memorial received February 7>
1311863* Conscientious official that he was, he promptly announced
his nominee for Chinese Commander-in-Chief* He also outlined his
recommendations on questions of personnel; e*g*, that the first native
contingents should be made up exclusively of Hunan men: on the disposition 1
132of the force, i*e*, immersed "among a vastly superior number of junks" 
on the inland waterways: on a programme for gradual training which 
would enable the "native" crews to operate, eventually, in coastal waters.
130*"Vide antea" p$foon*ll6* 17/374 No* 159* Bruce to Bussell. Hov. 10,
1862 "Secret and Confidential"* (Bec'd* at the F0 on Jan. 26, I863).
131* Hawlinson, op. cit* p.74*
132* Loc* cit*
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133The edict in reply, while approving most of Tseng1 s recommendations,
reflected the continuing disagreement between Tseng and Kong on where
the vessels were to operate* Strangely solicitous about how the
NbarbariansfV would feel about Tseng's position on this point, the edict
134"ordered that the question be settled in advance"•
These developments lead but to a repetition of a monotonous 
refrain. The instruments vary, but the tone possesses the same 
discordant quality. Little, if any, improvement towards consonance can 
be detected.
The hiatus in direct communication with China, especially after 
he had caught up with the mails that had accumulated while he was in 
Germany, must have left Lay with little to do in the flotilla project. 
Although Osborn's contract had to be renegotiated, there is no record 
that discloses what new conditions were agreed upon. His collaboration 
on the "Blackwood's" articles probably occupied some of his time. The 
shortage of funds may have required some consultation and correspondence. 
His active mind would not, however, be satisfied by such concerns. He 
applied it to other types of problems.
One of his "brain-storms" was the "emigration on a gigantic scale" 
idea. This was to be his and Osborn's solution to the problem of
133* Loc. cit.
134. Loc. cit.
135rebellion in China* Another one of his preparations for the coming 
transformation of China was to have "open" contracts for financing 
(through government loans, etc.) construction and operation of railway, 
telegraphic and mining facilities drawn up and translated into Chinese. 
One project was difficult to promote; he wished to have bestowed upon 
him the dignity of the Companionship of the Bath (C.B,). It was 
difficult not only because, as he stated in his application to Lord 
Palmerston, "I have no superior to assist me in bringing my case 
before your Lordship, and I am therefore compelled to address you
137direct, and at some sacrifice to enumerate my services to the Crown", 
but also, because the principal grounds of his solicitations were 
invalid as well as misrepresented.
Lay's assertion that the only acknowledgement he had received 
for his part in the 1858 treaty negotiations was the Mission medal, 
did not coincide with the evidence. The data respecting the £500 
"acknowledgement" awarded to him has already been dealt with in Chapter
155* "Vide antea" p3?/ and "vide /Bo&Jia" Chapter XI pp
156. P.H.O. Chancery Court Records. Docs, in the cases of Smith &
Novelli vs. Lay (s.146, filed May 25. 1870) and Pairbairn & Osborn vs. 
Lay (F55 [incorrectly indexed as P59j» filed June 4> 1870). Statement in 
affidavit of H.N. Lay dated June 21, 1870. These suits were filed 
against Lay in connection with his negotiation of a Japanese Railway 
Loan, 1869-1870.
137* Lay* "C.B. Statement".
158. "Vide" Ch. Chapter Yin pp.j?JV?fn. 151-134
When recounting his services from 1834 through 1859# Lay further
asserted* ’’Other members of Lord EXginfs Embassy, whose services are
not, I would submit, superior to mine, have already received signal
139marks of their Sovereign fs approbation*" The members he was 
alluding to were Wade and H.B* Loch who had eventually been granted 
C*B*'s. Their awards, however, were granted because of their services 
in Elgin's ’Embassy" of 1860*^^ The only member of Elgin's "entourage" 
who received an Honour was Bruce, not because of services rendered 
during the Mission, but because he was Ministeivdesignate to the Court 
at Peking*
It is not possible to formulate a simple generalisation to account 
for this characteristic of Lay's to "twist" evidence* In moralistic 
phraseology, it would have to be described as a form of "dishonesty"*
Tet Lay could invariably rationalise a justification on grounds of 
"higher purpose", for his technique was not utilised in the pursuit of 
exclusively selfish interests* His concluding appeal in his application 
was as straightforward as what had preceded was devious*
As an additional motive for pressing my claims upon your Lordship,
I might state that I am about to return to the capital of China, and 
from my official position to be in constant intercourse with the Chinese 
ministers* I am consequently anxious to carry back with me some mark 
of the confidence and esteem of my own Government, which, elevating me 
socially in the eyes of a punctilious and ceremonious Court would add
139. Lay, "C*B.Statement"*
140* India Office Library* Elgin Papers* Private Sec'y's Letters* 
Binding 9* 874a* Elgin to Bussell [from Broomhall, Fife, Scotland]
Apr* 22, 1861.
weight to my counsels, and render me better able to promote the in teres' 
of both countries, in my endeavours for peaceful relations with China*
However, with a request that he "should feel indebted to you if
you would give my claims your kind support, should you have an
opportunity," Lay forwarded his application to Layard on December 5
1 i O
for transmission to Palmerston* Despite the appeal, the application
was periodically "lost"* He learned in late December that one of his
referees, Adm* Sir M* Seymour (Ret*) had been asked to supply a second
testimonial* He heard no more about the matter during the remainder
of his stay in England*
On December 8, a few days after Lay submitted his application,
he, Osborn and a whole "ooterie" of China Hands, Including Parkes and
Alcock, attended one of the regular meetings of the Royal Geographical 
14.3Society* ^  The reason for the interest - Osborn was a Fellow, in any 
case - was that Alexander Mi chi e and a "Mr* Grant" were presenting 
papers on their travels in Manchuria and from Peking to St. Petersburg, 
respectively* Why the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have been 
present, unless some form of public relations engineering had been 
employed, is not certain* Gladstone's principal interests in China,
141* Lay, "C*B. Statement"*
142. FO 17/386. Lay to Layard* Private* Dec. 5» 1862.
143* "LCE" V. Dec. 10, 1862, p*45» The "Times", Dec. 12, 1862, p. 8b 
A c, had a leader on the meeting. "LCE" V. Dec. 29, 1862, pp. 76-77» 
had a much fuller report on the remarks of the principals*
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such as tea duties, opium revenue, speeding up indemnity payments,
etc., had little to do with geography.
Formally the press reports of the meeting would have gone relatively
unnoticed and it was apparently a tradition that the discussions that
followed the formal presentations were considered privileged# But
in response to questions to Parkes, Lay and Osborn from the floor,
including some from Gladstone, Lay and Osborn launched into explanations
of their concepts and objectives not only with reference to the flotilla,
but also, expanding on the influence and resources which they professed
to command, with reference to the general policy of transformation
which they expected to effect within the Ch'ing administration and
within the Chinese Empire# It amounted to an informal, unexpurgated
and - in the event - indiscreet version of the articles to be published
145in "Blackwood*s"• The ideas presented were all lofty in concept,
humanitarian in purpose and progressive in technique and, one almost
need not add, directed to the promotion of commercial and diplomatic
intercourse for the mutual benefit of all#
The aftermath might not have become a cause of sensation had not
the Chairman invited Mr, Gladstone "to say what impression had been
146made upon his mind by the explanations...? He forthwith not only
147
reviewed all the economic advantages which he foresaw for Britain,
144* "NCH" No. 679* Aug. 1, 186J, p#122. Also suggested by "Times" 
leader of Bee. 12, 1862#
145. "Vide antea" n#95* The Jan* issue was released in late Jan., the 
Feb. issue in early March#
146. "Times" Dec. 12, 1862, p.8c.
147. ”LCE" V. Dec. 29, 1862, p.77.
but also:
expressed his personal and Ministerial approval of the departing 
expedition and prophesied of the day when its leaders should come back 
in professional fame, and also bringing with them fresh glory to their 
country. He bade them go and prosper, as men who went to undo what had 
been too often done, and whose mission it was. to carry to the Chinese 
blessings and not the curses of civilization.
A detailed report of the "conversation" did not become available 
until about two weeks later, but the earlier, sketchy reports printed 
in the "London and China Express" and the "Times" opened the question 
for leader comment in many of the news media. An analysis of the 
reactions would be revealing, but not especially relevant, since 
apart from generating much publicity about the flotilla and about Layfs 
and Osborns long-range plans for China, it had no affect on concluding 
the British phase of the project. It did have the effect of alerting 
the foreign community in China. But if any damage was done by the 
adverse publicity, most of which was levelled at the Government, Lay 
and Osborn had at least got what was interpreted as a public endorsement 
from the Government for a rather provocative policy*
148. Condensed and somewhat distorted paraphrase as it appeared in 
"Times" Dec. 12, 1662, p.8c. This was the quotation that supplied the 
text for most of the press comment. In the fuller version, however, 
there was a eulogy of Osborn and most of the remarks quoted were 
directed at him.
Chapter XI 
The Masterless Servants 1665-1664 
The excitement generated by the RGS meeting and the advent of 
the holiday season were probably responsible for preventing Lay from 
embarking on any new activities during the ensuing weeks* Nevertheless, 
unbeknownst to Lay or Osborn, the F.O. was actively engaged in an 
alteration in policy which affected the core of the flotilla scheme*
The reports about hostilities in the lower Yangtze region and the 
actions taken by Brig* Gen'l* Staveley and Vice-Adm. Sir J« Hope reached 
crisis level in the F.O* when, at the end of November, 1862 detailed 
information received by the Admiralty intimated that a British officer 
was being proposed to succeed in command of F*T* Ward, who had died of 
battle wounds* British officers had already been seconded or were 
otherwise being used to assist Imperial forces*^ The line defining 
their status was becoming rather blurred*
The F»0* felt compelled to take some action, especially in view of 
the issues when legal sanction for Lay and Osborn had been arranged*
But the Order in Council for these two had been deliberately made 
restrictive, stipulating among other things that it would be lawful 
for other persons to enlist in the Emperor* s service through Lay and 
Osborn ftand no other person or persons whatsoever, •••• either by land
1* BPP [5104] Adm* to FO* Nov* 27, 1862* Enclosing Hope to Adm* Oct* 1, 
1862 (with "P.S." of Oct. 6).
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or sea.**” The F.O. again consulted the Law Officers as to whether
this Order in Council would be adequate or whether a "larger one [were]
needed,” and if the latter, then the Law Officers were asked to supply 
2
a draft* Before the Law Officers presented their decision, farther
despatches from the Yangtze region were received through the War Office,
which, tacitly assuming the ”fait accompli” of a British Officer being
named as a successor to Ward, wished to know if "General Staveley’s
proceedings*•♦♦may properly be approved, and if so whether the services
of the officer*. • *will still be required after the arrival in China of...
Lay and*...Osborn.As for approval, the F.O. replied it would approve
if the War Office would, but refused to be committed any further.^
The Law Officers submitted their draft Order in Council on 
5
December 18, but the F.O. did not forward it to the Council Office 
until December 26.^ Another two weeks elapsed before it was approved 
and gazetted. Technically, it extended the Lay-Osbom Order in Council 
to permit all military officers to take, in effect, unrestricted service
2. FO 83/2231* FO to Law Officers. Dec. 4» 1862*
3* FO 17/387* W.O. to Layard. Deo. 11, 1862.
4# "Ibid” F.O. to W.O. Dec. 17» 1662* Bussell appears to have made the 
decision to give qualified approval, but it was Hammond who added,
"Lord Bussell is unable to say whether the services, .would still be 
required.” Copy to Bruce. FO 228/319* 209* Hammond to Bruce. Dec.
29, 1862.
5« FO 83/2231* Law Officers to Bussell. Dec. 18, 1662* The Law Officers 
did not comment. They just forwarded a new draft Order in Council.
6. FO 17/387* Bussell to Privy Council Office. Dec. 26, 1862. (Order 
in Council retroactive to Dec. 12, 1862)*
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in the Emperor's forces up to the same terminal date, September 1, 1664* 
This new action, seemingly a realistic and logical move from the decision 
made in August, was nonetheless antithetical to the concepts underlying 
the flotilla scheme* The earlier Order in Council, whatever the 
soundness of the concepts and objectives of the scheme, was conditional 
and discretionary* The second Order in Council was unconditional and 
discretion was left with each individual officer* While it was one 
step along the road to "less-than-neutrality", it was two steps back 
along the road generally designated, not only by Lay, but by Bruce as 
well*
Despite the connection between the two Orders in Council, neither 
Lay nor Osborn was either consulted or informed by the F.O. of the
7
step it was taking* The F.O., in fact, consulted only the Law Officers* 
From a diplomatic standpoint, the F*0* could not, of course, "consult" 
Lay and Osborn, since they were the agents of the Emperor for a specific 
undertaking and not his representatives and, equally, they could 
hardly assume responsibility for military policy in China* By failing, 
at least, to discuss the problem, the F*0* had got itself into an 
untenable position, Soon after the second Order in Council was issued, 
the F*0* as well as the War Office began to receive inquiries from
7* "Ibid" Russell to WO. Jan. 9» represented the first "explanation"
of why the Order in Council had been proceeded with and the conditions 
under which it was to apply*
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officers who wished to take service with the Emperor. The War Office
9
specifically asked the F.O. if there were a Chinese agency. Hammond's 
reaction was, "I presume they should apply to Mr. Lay."^ It appeared, 
however, that it was probably Lay who was sending some of the applicants 
to the F.O. and the War Office, for in the official reply to the War 
Office, drafted several days later,^ the F.O. was forced to state not 
only that it was unaware of any agency other than Lay and Osborn, but 
alsot
that the Order in Council. • .was not prepared in communication with 
that Agency, and that His Lordship believes that [they] are occupied 
exclusively in engaging officers & vessels for service in the ["Anglo", 
deleted in draft] Chinese Fleet.
And further,... .Lord Bussell is not aware that the Chinese Govt, 
has established any Agency. •• for the purpose of engaging military 
officers, to serve in the Chinese Army - [the balance added by Hammond 
in the draft] neither have H.M. Govt, any intention of interfering 
any further in the matter than by making known H.M. 's permission, as 
signified in the Order in Council, for Brijjsh Military Officers 
taking service under the Emperor of China.
The later stages of this sequence coincided with a new stage in 
the activities of Lay and Osborn. At the start of the new year
8. FO 17/399• During January and February several applications were 
received. One application received Jan. 3, was forwarded to Lay. 
Applications received after Jan. 9 do not appear to have been forwarded 
by the FO.
9* "Ibid" WO to Hammond. Jan 22, 1863*
10. Loo, cit. Hammond1 a notation.
11. FO 17/399* Hammond to WO. Jan. 27, 1863* Hammond's draft initialled 
by Russell.
12. Loc. cit.
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information was released as to the conditions of service for men to
15he enlisted for the flotilla. This was another radical departure
from Lay*s original plans, for he had not yet received any farther
remittances nor his Imperial authorisation. At first glance it might
appear that he and 0shorn, even though not informed by the F.O. of the
14new Order in Council, had had intimations of it from other sources 
and for some reason were desirous of "beating the gun". This would 
only make sense if they were incorrectly informed; viz., that general 
enlistment was to be sanctioned, in which case by publicising their 
very attractive conditions, they might hope to have the pick of the 
best men wishing to enlist in the naval arm.
Some other reasons are, however, more cogent. The vessels acquired 
from the Admiralty for reconditioning were ready for crews. If 
additional funds were received, the low-speed gun-boats could be 
dispatched. Another reason, related to this, was that Lay knew Hart 
was to be "en route" to Peking in late August or early September.
Allowing for the maximum delay in "mails", it would be reasonable to 
expect both funds and formal authorisation in the first January mail, 
due in England about the 12th.
13* "Times". Jan. 6, 1863* P*9c* Osborn and Lay were using the 
opportunity to introduce "civilisation" into European naval practice! 
Flogging was abolished, a scale of compensation to widows, mothers 
and children of men killed in action was provided and pay and other 
allowances were relatively more generous than for the R.tf.
14* The decision had been made, of course, on Lee. 26. "Vide antea" 
n.6.
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15The mail did bring the official Chinese copy of Lay's authority* J
At a later date, vhen describing his actions on its receipt, he was
ambiguous about them, stating that he "submitted it to [his] legal
adviser, who eaqpressed the opinion that under the circumstances [he]
16might act upon it with safety*M This consultation must have taken
place within a day of receipt, indicating clearly that Lay did not have 
the "official" (or any literal) English translation and the opinion 
must, consequently, have been based on Hart*s assurances that the 
authority was all Lay had asked for*
Again, possibly as a partial reflection of their reaction to the 
second Order in Council, on the day following receipt of his "powers/1 
Lay and Osborn^ committed to writing a thirteen-clause "mutual understand­
ing^ to which was appended a set of explanatory notes*^ Clause 2 
stipulated that Osborn was "to have entire control over all vessels of 
European construction, as well as native vessels manned with Europeans* •• 
in the employ of the Emperor* ***or, under his authority, of the native 
guilds*" While the explanatory note emphasised the naval aspect of 
this jurisdiction and was general in its coverage, the reference to
15. "Vide" Appendix VIII B.
16* Lay"Interests" p* 16*
17. FO 17/404* Enclosure in Osborn to Russell. Eov. 25, 1865* This was 
the version that was printed in BPP [5271 ]• The copy forwarded by Bruce, 
enclosed in FO 17/395 9 No* 178* Nov* 19, 1863* did not include the 
explanatory note* Despite the later date, Osborn's documentation 
reached the FO more than a month earlier*
vessels of native guilds and including, in the explanation, "men-of- 
war belonging to particular Mandarins" was, in part, a reference to the 
Ever Victorious Army (EVA). The EVA was primarily a land force, but 
an important element of it was its "naval" arm.
Tet another subtle aspect of the agreement, the explanation and
the EVA is evident. The latter was a pseudo - "Imperial" force,
primarily the instrument of "native guilds" and "particular Mandarins "•
It was to this force that most British Officers, acting under the
second Order in Council, would attach themselves. Though referring
specifically to lorchas and junks commanded by Europeans (characterised
as "freebooters" as well), Lay and Osborn explained, "they should come
under Imperial "authority", without which no European has a shadow of
18a right to levy war in China". Thus, while Lay and Osborn may in 
any event have intended to delegate to themselves - subject, of course, 
to formal ratification (Clause 12) - a broad range of control, the 
absolute terms of reference used in the agreement may have been partly 
motivated by a desire to secure the position threatened by the second 
Order in Council.
Lay's and Osborn's agreement was undoubtedly important to them.
It did not, however, have any immediate importance to any of the other 
principals associated with the flotilla project. It was not sent in
18. PO 17/404 "vide" a. 17.
advance to China, because even if there were objections to its terms,
discussion would have to await Lay's arrival. There is no record of
a copy having been sent to the F.O. Lay and Osborn were accountable
to H.M. Government under their Order in Council. It might have been
a courtesy for them to have provided the F.O. with a copy, but it was
quite in character for Lay to retaliate for the failure of the F.O.
to consult with him and Osborn in regard to the second Order in Council.
Lay did not, either, advise the F.O. of the receipt of his
authority. The Chinese would have been meaningless (there were no
translators at the F.O. and even such men as Farkes and Medhurst, Jr.,
who were in England, required the assistance of Chinese scholars) and
according to Hart's information, the F.O. would be receiving an
19"official" translation from the Embassy by the next mail.
The lack of funds continued to hamper the organisation of the 
20flotilla and Lay's self-restraint seemed to break down entirely.
He was in possession of "full powers" and he began to use them. Still 
desiring to purchase an Admiralty vessel for a storeship, he requested 
of the Admiralty "that the Emperor of China may be granted twelve 
months credit for the purchase money amounting to £8000..." The request
19* Lay, "Interests" p. 16. The "next mail" containing these documents 
did not arrive at the FO, however, until Feb. 16, 1863«
20. "Ibid" p. 17* Lay asserted that "little more than half" of £250,000 
had been received by the beginning of March. Since £120,000 had been 
received by October 10 ("vide" Appendix VI, H.), only about £10,000 - 
£15f 000, at most, could have been received in the entire five-month 
period.
21was passed to the F.O* Russellfs laconic instruction, "Ask Treasury’s
22consent", devoid of his faint suggestion of approval, was carried out*
The Treasury (Gladstone) did not disapprove nor did it give positive 
23consent* For some unexplained reason the matter was dropped*
In what was almost a diversion at this stage, Lay had his attention
drawn to customs affairs* As a result of the chaotic conditions -
following the opening of the Yangtze to foreign trade in 1861,
increasingly restrictive revisions of the regulations applicable to
the trade were introduced under Hart’s direction in 1862* Reports of
the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce’s (the various national Chambers
having combined) complaints to Bruce and Bruce’s reply reached London
at the end of January* Robert C* Antrobus, former Chairman of the
Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce, wrote, complainingly, to the 
2a
"Times". Lay replied to Antrobus through the "Times" and the
correspondence continued for almost a fortnight, when it was broken 
25off by Antrobus* ' The "argument" proceeded at cross-purposes since 
Antrobus was a) claiming non-treaty concessions as a right in perpetuity
21* FO 17/399* Adm* To Hammond. Jan* 31, 1863*
22* "Ibid" FO to Treas. Feb* 5t I863.
23* "Ibid" Treas. to FO [Omission of date, author’s oversight].
24* The report with leader, appeared in "Times", Jan* 30, 1863* P* 4Y* 
Antrobus' first letter, dated Jan* 3i» appeared in print Feb* 3* 5Y*
25. "Times", Feb. 12, 1863« p.9c. Lay's last letter in this series 
(dated Feb* 16) appeared Feb* 17» though it also referred to news 
reports in"Times" of Feb. 13*
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and b) insisting that, where treaty provisions were not specific 
enough, the most favourable interpretation in the interest of foreign 
rights should prevail* Lay, though indicating a difference of opinion 
with Bruce, insisted that the Ch9ing government had the unilateral 
right to withdraw or rescind voluntary concessions and that its 
interpretation of ambiguous treaty provisions should prevail*
Some statements made in Antrobus1 opening letter, while not 
representing a majority opinion of foreign merchants in China, did 
perhaps represent an influential segment of "respectable” opinion* He 
asserted*
I have always considered it the decided interest of British 
merchants to support the present system of customs houses in China 
under foreign inspection, not only as affording a valid security for 
the equal collection of duties, but as providing, as is now exemplified 
in the case of the newly disciplined Chinese force at Shanghai and by 
the powerful squadron fitting out in this country under Captain Sherard 
Osborn and Hr* Lay, the pecuniary means by which a gradual regeneration 
of the power of the Chinese Govt* may, it is hoped, be effected***•
Lay had, by now, evidently decided to take passage for China as
soon as possible* He turned over responsibility to Osborn to complete
the flotillats organisational phase in Britain, signed a "guarantee”
27
for £30,000 with a private bank should Osborn need additional funds
28and presented three documents to the F*0* All three have features
26. "Ibid” Feb. 3* 5*.
27* Lay, "Interests", p. 17*
28* At least one of these, the first discussed, was requested by 
the FO. It refers to a letter from Hammond of Feb. 25> 1863$ draft 
of which was not located in the FO files*
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of importance* As they were all submitted within three days, strict
chronology will not he observed in the following presentation*
Firstly, Lay provided a list of the six vessels acquired, with 'jkt
29number of guns and personnel for each*  ^ No mention was made that two
additional vessels were to be added to make up the full flotillas a
storeship and a dispatch-boat* This may suggest that Lay did not wish
the F*0* to become too aware of the extent of the difficulties being
30caused by shortage of funds*
Secondly, Lay prepared a short memorandum concerning his ideas
on emigration which he forwarded to Russell, soliciting H.M* Governmentfs
31support through Bruce* The memo was a much more conservative statement
of the idea which was alleged to have been given at the RGS meeting in
December* Bit the memo also included the followings
It is my intention upon my arrival in Peking, whither I proceed 
tomorrow [March 5]» to urge the subject upon the attention of the 
Emperor's Counsellors, with the hope of inducing them to repeal the 
law against emigration, as has already been partially done by the 
Governor General of Canton, during our occupation of that city*
It would contribute materially to so desirable a result, if the 
Representatives of the Treaty Powers would, when necessary, support 
such advice with the weight of their own representations*
The Imperial sanction to emigration is the more imperatively 
required at the present juncture, from the possibility of large bodies 
of Taipings being made prisoners, in which case it is earnestly to be
29. P0 17/400. Lay to Bussell. March 2, I863.
30* The FO was, of course, aware that additional vessels were being 
sought and it knew, at least, that Lay and Osborn had been pressed for 
funds as of the end of Jan* ("vide antea" p«^n*2l), but over a month 
had elapsed since the question of a relatively small amount had been 
discussed*
31* FO 17/400* Lay to Russell* March 4» 1863*
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hoped that they will he suffered to emigratg, instead of being subjected, 
as heretofore, to the executioner's knife*
The three central points of interest ares i) specified date of
departure; ii) expectation of joint action by Representatives of the
Treaty Powers; iii) application of scheme to prisoners of war rather
than to Taipings as a body* He emphasised, also, the population of
China as a general problem and referred to countries like "Burmah" and
Borneo as underdeveloped and underpopulated areas to which the emigrants
could be sent*
Russell did not take action until March 17, when he noted, "This
33plan should be recommended to Mr* Bruce." This was accordingly done
34m  a despatch phrased in rather strong terms of support*
, The last of the three documents to be considered was a booklet
"'The Regulations and Instructions for .the government of His Imperial
Majesty's Naval Service (abridged and adapted from the British Admiralty
Instructions)', which contains at the commencement, the agreement made
35with the Officers and men of the European Chinese Naval Force*" But 
the Lay-0sborn understanding was not included* By the first clause of 
the agreement, the men were bound, as long as they received their pay,
32* Loc* cit*
33* Loc* cit* Russell1s notes as indicated*
34* FO 17/388* No* 48* Russell to Bruce* Mar. 21, 1863*
35* FO 17/400* Lay to Russell* Mar. 2, 1863* Another copy supplied by 
Osborn* FO 17/492* Mar* 26, 1864* Summary of all the clauses in Wright, 
"Hart", pp. 234-235*
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»to serve His Imperial Majesty*..as we would serve our own Sovereign; 
to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief for the time being, and of 
our superior officers as if we were serving on a British vessel of War***" 
Clause 7 was also very interesting!
We*•.pledge ourselves that we will treat all Chinese officials 
with becoming respect, and be kind and conciliatory towards the Chinese 
people generally; that we will make every exertion to give the Force a 
high character for good order and efficiency, and use every endeavour 
to ensure unanimity and goodwill amongst those composing the Force*
The F.O* sent the manual to the Law Officers to find out if it
satisfied the stipulation of their report submitted with the revised
37Order in Council of August. The Law Officers reported back on March 311
that the subject to which reference was made in the former Report 
was the possible participation of this Anglo-Chinese force, in atroci­
ties perpetrated, in the course of hostilities, by the Chinese against 
the Rebels. *
But as the agreement, made with the officers and Men, embodies the 
observance of all applicable rules of discipline in force in Her 
Majestyfs Navy, and as the force is to be entirely under the command 
of British officers, the ["evil" - deleted] danger of any such 
participation appears to be guarded against*
Russell noted on the report , "Sir F* Bruce H*M* Consuls at Shanghai, 
& Canton", What should have been a routine procedure of transmission 
never appears to have been carried out* Whether this neglect was the 
result of an undercurrent of disapproval or hostility in the China Section 
to the scheme or careless indifference cannot be finally determined*
36* FO 17/4$2* Enclos* Osborn to FO* Mar* 26, 1864*
37* FO 83/2251* Hammond to Law Officers. Mar. 11, 1863* 
38* "Ibid” Law Officers to FO* Mar* Jl9 1863*
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There is more evidence to support the latter alternative, for towards
the end of March, when the F.O. was informed that General Staveley
wished permission to organise a British Contingent to campaign with the
Imperial forces (which the War Office opposed),^ Bussell reacted: "This
question is a very grave one. If adopted a convention with China will he
necessary* When does Mr* Lay go?” A week later, when the War Office
sent more details about Staveley*s plan,^ Hammond "replied", "Mr* Lay
went a few days ago."[ll]
Bussell had not been quite so unaware of Lay's existence for on
March 19 he had written to Elgin:
I am told Mr* Lay wishes very much to be a C.B. on account 
of his reputation with the Chinese* The Queen has referred me 
to you, and I should be Yfry glad if you could recommend him 
for the honour he needs.
Yet Hammond at this particular period seems to have been singularly
obtuse* He had been responsible for having Lay's indiscreet customs
memo of January 1862 printed in the most recent set of Parliamentary
42Papers, which had been released about March 13* Anyone with the least 
knowledge of Lay would probably have expected that if he were anywhere 
within reach, he would have come storming into the F*0* at the earliest
39* FO 17/400. WO to Bussell. Mar* 26, 1863* Bussell's reaction was a 
notation on this letter*
40* "Ibid" WO to Bussell* Apr* 2, 1863* Hammond's note on this letter*
41* India Office Library* Elgin corresp* "Misc.letters-In" - 1861-1863* 
"226". Bussell to Elgin.
J2* It has been difficult to determine the exact date of release of BPP 3104]* Evidence of press comment, on portions other than Lay's memo, place the date before mid-March*
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possible moment*
In fact9 of course, Lay had left when he said he would, on March 5*
It was doubtless more than a coincidence that this date coincided with
the launching of the vessel - the "Keangsoo" - which was to be the pride 
43of the flotilla* Nothing appears in the records to indicate whether
or not Lay received any further information, before his departure, from
Hart on the latterfs activities at Peking* If any such information did
arrive in the bustle of final preparations, it did not cause Lay to
alter any of the arrangements in process of completion in Britain*
Lay travelled through France to take up the booking for himself,
family and nurse from Marseilles on March 12*^ He had intended to
consult with officials of the French government on the flotilla project,
but on this matter, also, there is nothing in what remains of his records
to indicate whom he saw or what was discussed*
The final preparations for the phased departure of the flotilla
from Britain can be ignored without any serious qualms* The one
important factor was that the sailings continued to be delayed* Layfs
departure placed additional burdens on Osborn, funds were still slow
in arriving and, according to press reports - the items savoured of 
45"leakages” -, the F«0* was dilatory in processing clearances to enable
43*^or report of launching, "Times*, Mar* 8, 1863, p*12c* For performance, 
"Times", May 8, 1863. p.llf.
44* "LCT". V. Mar. 16, I863, p.169.
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the vessels to complete their equipment, etc. Osbom,s meticulousness
may well have been another contributing cause of delay. The vessels
were all away, however, before a major China policy debate(very poorly
attended by members) was opened in Parliament.^ But except for the
delay itself, these aspects did not have appreciable affect on the
sequence of developments in China following Layfs arrival there.
In covering this sequence, a different pattern of presentation
will be employed. A considerable portion of the documentation for this
next, and final, sequence has been printed, has been reasonably accessible
and has been frequently cited in primary, peripheral or derivative
studies. Consequently, a brief outline of the chronology of principal
events only will be presented. This will be followed by more detailed
consideration of evidence heretofore not accessible and of factors
heretofore given little weight in the appraisals of the denouement in
the light of all the evidence presented.
Lay reached Hongkong on April 24 and within two days he embarked
for Shanghai, where he arrived on May 1. He spent most of May at Shanghai,
settling in; re-assuming the direction of the Inspectorate; trying,
without sttocess, to browbeat the provincial authorities (principally
Li Hung-chang) to authorise the setting up of a three-year ’guarantee
A7
fund” to secure the pay, pensions, ordnance, etc., for the flotilla;^
46. For the debate, Hansard9s (Third Series) Vol. CLXXII (1863) pp. 270- 
329 (July 6, 1863). Efforts had been made to force the Government into 
debate on May 15 ("Vide" Vol. CLXX pp. 1783-1803).Heports in "Times", July 
7, 1863, pp. 8-9, and leader, July 9> I863, p.8c,f.
47. Cheng, op.cit. p.114* Li to Hstleh Huan, May l6;p.H5. Li to Tseng 
Hup-fan, May 21. Bredon, op. cit.pp. 71-72 reports on Li-Lay meetings and 
claims that by Hart9s intercession funds question was agreeably settled.
If so, it was not to Lay's satisfaction, for it was a major issue when 
Lay went on to Peking.
consulting with and admonishing Colonel Gordon, BE (who had succeeded to 
the command of the ETA in January, following the dismissal and defection 
to the Taipings of F.T. Ward’s successor, H.A. Burge vine) with respect 
to the unsatisfactory status and postion of British officers "serving"
JQ
in the Imperial forces. He set off for Peking, arriving there on 
June 1.
The metropolitan Chfing Authorities not only refused to sanction 
the "guarantee fund" on Lay's terms, but they also refused to ratify 
the Lay-0shorn thirteen-clause understanding. They found two of the 
clauses, which provided for the absolute centralisation of the chain 
of authority passing from the "Emperor", directly through Lay and then 
immediately to Osborn as sole Commander-in-Chief, completely unsatisfactory. 
Lay, thereupon, appealed to Sir F. Bruce, employing all his powers of 
persuasion to acquire Bruce's support. Bruce responded, not directly 
identifying himself with the flotilla scheme nor with the terms of 
authority defined by Lay and Osborn for its control, but by strongly 
re-asserting the necessity for effective centralised authority in general 
and by his insistence that British officers, serving in the Imperial 
forces in the field against the Taipings, should be brought under direct 
central government, as opposed to provincial government, command. Bruce's
48. "E/B" C.G. Gordon to Bruce. July 3» 1864* Enclosing memo "Views 
respecting Soonkong Force", date on heading "9th May 1863" (signed) 
"C.G. Gordon ....21st May 1863” with a "P.S." added. In his letter 
Gordon states that memo was given to Lay after three interviews he had 
with him in May, 1863.
pressure was ineffectual, mainly because it was all too apparent that 
he was, in actuality, powerless to impose his conditions* As Rung and 
his colleagues refused to give ground, Lay's continuing efforts were 
also unavailing*
Kung sought to break the stalemate by drafting an agreement, allegedly 
reflecting the concurrence of Hart and Lay to "compromise" proposals 
for the direction and operation of the flotilla* The "agreement" 
provided for a native Commander-in-Chief" with whom Osborn was to act 
as "joint" Commands j>in-Chief and, with virtually no attempt at 
dissimulation, the flotilla was placed under provincial jurisdiction*
In the meantime, a "modus operandi" had been worked out to assure 
monthly allocations from customs' receipts to cover the fiscal obligations 
for the flotilla for a four-year period.
Lay, however, emphatically repudiated the “agreement", despite the 
fact that he was told it had been further authenticated by an Imperial 
rescript on July 8. Lay made it clear that he would urge Osborn to 
refuse to serve under the teiras of the "agreement". Kung could not 
comprehend - or would not, since by this time he was aware, through the 
arrival of a personal emissary, HstLeh Huan, as well as memorials, of 
Li Hung-chang's strong opposition to Lay's influence - the possibility 
that both Lay and Osborn could refuse* Bruce, toiling under an unusual 
amount of summer work and bereft of Wade's services - for he departed 
in late June on a long delayed home leave - pined for his Holiday retreat.
Pending Osborn's arrival, Lay made a quick trip to Shanghai to
evacuate his family from the threat of yet another moderately severe
cholera epidemic. On his return to Peking, he applied himself to working
out, amicably, new and revised policies for the collection and
administration of customs' revenues. Hart, who had not in the first
4.9instance arrived at Shanghai from Peking until May 9 9 but who had then
travelled to the capital with Lay, remained there until early September. 
He became completely disassociated from the flotilla project, serving 
"informally" as adviser on Customs operations and as "assistant" to 
W.A.P. Martin, who was translating portions of Wheaton's "International 
Law". H.T. Davies, however, had died on July 15* which made possible 
a solution to an extremely delicate problem. From September 12, Hart 
was posted as Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai and concurrently 
"Superintendent" for the Yangtze region foreign customs administration, 
comprising four treaty ports in addition to Shanghai.
The first units of the flotilla reached the Yangtze on August 1, 
and Osborn arrived with the last units a month later. He found that 
both Li Hung-chang's and Taiping agents had been trying to entice the 
crews of the units which had arrived earlier directly into their
49.Cheng, op.cit. p. 114* Li refers to Hart's arrival yesterday [May 15] 
from capital. Bredon, op.cit. p.72 claims Hart returned from Yangtze 
trip. "CMC" I.p.32, reproduces "Maritimes Customs Circular" (First 
Series, I863) No. 18 in which Hart records Lay's return and resumption of 
office* dated Shanghai, 9th May. Hart claimed later that Lay did not 
advise him of agreements until they had reached Peking in June. "E/B" 
Enclosure in Bruce to Russell. Private. Feb. 2, 1864* Extract "Mr. Hart 
to Mr. Brown" Jan. 13, 1864* "Vide" Appendix IX A. This is also a clear 
refutation cf assertions made by Wright in "Tariff", p.169 and "Hart", 
pp. 234 & 255 (n.34 & 35) that on unimpeachable evidence Hart wrote a 
strong letter to Lay, then in England, objecting to the agreements.
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respective "services" and while there had been few acceptances, morale 
and discipline were disrupted. He restored these, after which he had 
some consultations with General Brown. Finding Brown seriously dis­
gruntled at Li’s behaviour towards British officers and the forces
controlled by them - although Gordon was anxious to have immediate
50cooperation from Osborn for launching new campaigns! - and lacking 
at least positive Instructions from Lay, Osborn decided to relocate 
most of the flotilla off Chefoo and from there, to proceed to Peking. 
General Brown was to follow shortly afterwards.
Immediately on Osborn’s arrival at Peking on September 25, Lay 
formally presented him with Kung’s "agreement", to which Lay had, of 
course, appended his objections. Three days later, after a number of 
interviews with members of the Tsungli Yamen, Osborn addressed his 
formal objections in writing to Kung. At about the same time, heeding 
the complaints of General Brown, Bruce, confining himself to the question 
of British officers serving Imperial interests, addressed further 
remonstrances to the Tsungli Yamen.
For shortly under three weeks Lay cajoled, argued and stormed at
50. Allen, op.cit. pp. 125-124* Allen claims Brown tried to persuade 
Osborn to join Gordon immediately, but this claim is not consistent 
with Brown’s activities at this time. In fact, in reply to Brown’s 
complaints, Bruce provided him with a letter advising him that if 
Chinese did not give effective cooperation to "European" forces, the 
officers should resign at once. FO 228/536. Oct. 6, 1863* "Vide" also 
FO 17/404* WO to Hammond. Nov. 17, I863, enclosing despatch from Brown 
to WO. Sept. 14, I863.
members of the Yamen, Osborn generally being present and Kung never.
On October 13, Wensiang asked Lay to transmit a verbal message to 
Osborn, "that...Kung would decline to .ratify the [Lay-Osbom] agreement.." 
Osborn sent a written ultimatum to Kung on the 15th stating, in conclusion 
"if I do not receive a favourable reply [i.e. ratifying the agreement]
52within 40 hours it will be necessary to immediately disband the force."
Receiving no reply, on the 19th Osborn forwarded all the documents to
Bruce with a covering letter stating his intentions to disband the force,
but requesting instructions concerning the vessels, since, while these
were the property of the Imperial Authority, he feared they would
constitute a danger if turned over to irresponsible foreign elements
53under provincial jurisdiction in the Shanghai area. Some confusion 
prevailed for about two weeks, during which the Ch’ing Authorities 
consulted regularly with the American Minister, as well as Bruce, on 
the problem, until it was mutually agreed that the force would be
51. FO 17/404* Osborn to Russell. Nov. 23, 1863* Enclos. Lay to Osborn. 
Oct. 13, 1863.
52. "Ibid" Enclosure. Osborn to Kung. Oct. 15, 1863*
53* f,Ibid" Enclosure. Osborn to Bruce. Oct. 19, 1863* "Vide" also an 
interesting account on this period in W.A.P. Martin, "A Cycle of Cathay" 
(Edinburgh, I896) pp. 231-232, where it is recounted "that Bruce had 
’struck his flag’" and that three days of U.S. persuasion decided him 
to capitulate. This may account for the delay beyond the 48-hour grace 
period. However, although Bruce replied to Osborn on Oct. 19 that he 
was writing to HMG for instructions, on Oct. 29 Bruce wrote to Russell 
(FO 17/404 No. I64) that the question of emancipating "Captain Osborn 
from the authority of.••.local officers.••.is not definitely settled.•• 
but I see no prospect of a favorable termination..."
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repatriated in the vessels which were plaoed under Osborn*s authority
for him to dispose of them in consultation with British authorities in
54India and Britain* Interim financing having been arranged, Osborn
departed from Peking on November 6*
Lay's activity in this last stage had been confined to rendering
assistance in working out the costs and allocations for the repatriation*
He claimed, subsequently, that after the decision had been taken, he
offered to resign as Inspector-General, but that he was strongly urged
not to do so by members of the Tsungli Yamen. However, on November 15,
he was dismissed and instructed to settle his accounts with Hart, who
had been promptly named as his successor* Lay very quickly supplied a
general accounting for most of the funds that had been assigned to him
for the project and departed on November 21 for Shanghai* He completed
the reconciliation of the details of the accounts with Hart on January
558, and began his homeward journey on January 9« He did not, in 
arranging his personal affairs, liquidate his property investments in
54* "Ibid" Osborn to Bussell, Enclosure* Bruce to Osborn* Nov* 6* In 
this letter Bruce only committed HMG to advance funds, to be repaid 
for the cost of the return of the vessels and of repatriation of the 
force, the Chfing government to be indemnified for any loss in value of 
vessels, stores and ordnance* The Tsungli Yamen members, Lay, and Osborn, 
all understood that M G  would also bear the expense of the vessels* trip 
back to India and Britain; "vide", Lay, "Interests" pp.51-52 and PO 
14/492* Osborn to Bussell* Bee. 20, 1864* Enclosures*
55• "PL". Hart to Lay. "No*2". Special Series. Jan. 7, 1864* Lay to 
Hart* Jan*8, 1864* NCH No.703. Jan.16, 1864* p«10* Notice of departure 
of Mr. and Mrs* Lay per "Ganges" (which left on Jan. 9*)
the Shanghai settlement*
The long drawn-out sequence of the denouement was basically an
anticlimax* The critical phase of developments took place when Lay
confronted the Tsungli Yamen members with the principles and concepts
underlying his agreement with Osborn* While not phrased in the most
tactful and diplomatic language, they did represent the conditions
upon which the sanction of the British Government had been obtained*
All the other questions* guarantee funds, distribution of the units of
the force, even the peripheral objectives and the identity of the
56principals themselves - in the last resort - all could be subject to
negotiation, but the force had to be a unitary force and it had to be
under the unitary direction of an Anglo/European Commander-in-chief*
On the Chfing side, quite independently of the influence of the
57individual provincial officials, 1 of the unforeseen financial obligations 
entailed or even of the progressive or retrograde outlook of any set 
of metropolitan officials, the conditions on which the flotilla was 
proffered were in basic conflict with the basic concepts and traditions 
of the Confucian State* The only condition which might have served to
56* "Times"9 Mar* 7» 1864* Letter from Osborn in reply to critical 
leader in "Times", Mar* 5» 11 d/e* Osborn's witness was, thus, independent 
of Lay's influence, for Lay had not yet returned - Osborn noting that 
he was expected in Apr*
57* Cheng, op*cit* p*114« The tenor of Li's comments makes it clear 
that he did not consider it within the province of Provincial officials 
to decide whether or not the flotilla should be accepted or rejected*
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force the Mancha rulers to accept it Xthe l^ anchus were still the 
dominant influence at the centre of authority) were a) the imminence 
of their own destruction by rebellion, or b) the threat to British 
interests becoming so great, that the British Minister would feel 
compelled to impose the flotilla by "force majeure" upon the relatively 
defenceless Dynasty*
Both the nature of the confrontation and the non-applicability of 
the alternative conditions were crystallised during the period June 1 - 
July 8* In the first three weeks of discussions between the three 
interests - the Tsungli Yamen members, Wade and Bruce and Lay - the 
lines of opposition had been drawn on all major issues. Lay was not 
only prepared to threaten to resign, he was prepared to resign, for the 
Manchu officials did not consider themselves so weak as to have to rely 
on foreign assistance in the form the flotilla was proffered* Lay 
prepared a formal statement of the central issue of the problem, which 
statement served as a covering letter for his submission, in text, of
CO
the thirteen article agreement* At the same time, he discussed the 
situation thoroughly with Wade.
58* PO 17/395 No* 178* Bruce to Bussell. Nov* 19* 1863* Kung to Bruce.
Oct* 25$ I863, enclosing Lay to Kung* June [29], 1863* i) The PO copy, 
printed in BPP [3271]> dates the letter as Indicated, ii) The copy, 
among translations of Kung's enclosures, in Embassy files (PO 230/78 
No* 59) gives date of June 22* It is possible that if the Chinese copy 
were located, it might indicate that it had been received on June 29* 
iii) Lay, "Interests", p.22 gives June 22*
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In Lay* s first "apologia”, printed late 1864> he cited the urgent
59appeal to him from Bruce not to resign* Lay did not cite what was
one of the most significant "documents" in the denouement* This was a
letter prepared by Wade for Lay, presumably with Bruce*s knowledge* It 
is too long for reproduction here, but the letter is included as
Appendix VII, A ^  and should be read in its entirety to appreciate
the full impact of its significance* In effect, Wade informed Lay 
that Bruce had all but abandoned hope for the rejuvenation of Ch*ing 
officialdom and was prepared, if necessary, in order to preserve the 
maximum strength for the British position, to abandon the flotilla, Lay 
and the Inspectorate* The issue was no longer whether there were any 
acceptable terms whereby the flotilla might be "saved", but how 
responsibility for its disbandment could be engineered; the object 
being to place as much of the onus on the Ch'ing Authorities as possible 
in order to prevent intolerable damage to British prestige and to avoid 
pecuniary liability* Lay's formal letter of June 22 and Kung's 
statement of the alleged Lay-Hart agreement of July 8, consequently, 
represented the set and inflexible positions on both sides*
The special circumstances that influenced the course of developments 
between Lay's return from England and his dismissal contributed to 
placing him and his "cause" in the most vulnerable position in the 
three-sided juggling act. Firstly, Lay, never strong in personal
59* Lay, "Interests", p.23#
60. "FL" Wade to Lay* June 23, 1863» Another letter from Wade (in England) 
to Lay, Oct. 25 >1863 is included as Appendix VII,B# It did not, 
obviously have any bearing on the developments since it was not received 
until Bee. 25, 1863, but it does indicate an area of concensus.
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following, appears to have "lost" Hart very early on# The only
references to his participation are to one occasion at Shanghai and
the Lay-Hart "agreement”, which Lay so emphatically repudiated. Wade
left Peking early in July, which appeared to have the effect of pushing
Bruce closer to his peers, the representatives of the Treaty Powers,
than to his compatriots# The full effect of the Tseng-Li consolidation
had transformed the structure of officialdom at Shanghai - Layfs
bail wick - so that most of the officials over whom Lay had exerted
some influence had been cashiered or transferred and replaced by men
loyal to the new power# Hstleh Huan, the lone survivor, had accepted
the "patronage" of the new group and no sooner had Li and Lay reached
their "impasse” in May, 1863 than Hstleh was sent to Peking, where, as
Li1 s spokesman and member of the Tsungli Yamen, he became one of the
6lYamen1 s most implacable obstructionists* Lay did not have a single 
Chfing official to support him.
Secondly, on matters related to the attitudes of British officers 
actively engaged against the Taiping, the responsible ones - such as 
Brown, Gordon, etc., - while prepared to dot the ”i,s” and cross the 
”tfs" of all the pitfalls that Lay could define with respect to questions
61# Lay, "Interests? pp# 27-30, which gives Osborn1 s over-dramatic 
account of one of the interview sessions. "Vide” also "E/S" Bruce to 
Russell# Private# Feb# 2, 1864* Enclosing Hart to Bruce. Jan# 14, I864, 
"in extenso" as Appendix IX, B#
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of status and position, were nonetheless soldiers first and foremost*
Gordon, in particular, despite the practical, ‘‘moral", and "political"
problems he encountered, periodically devoted himself to what he
understood to be his primary duty* His results, on two occasions,
undennined Lay* Gordon secured a series of minor, but impressive
victories, against some rebel strongholds early in June* During the
first part of October, Gordon was engaged in negotiation for the
surrender of Burgevine and a contingent of foreign adventurers who had
62joined the rebel forces at Soochow. These two events coincided with 
periods when Lay, joined by Osborn in the later period, was most 
forcefully pressing the Tsungli Yamen members* The news of these 
events, on the successive occasions, made his position even more untenable* 
Thirdly, Lay would never have scored very highly in a popularity 
contest held by the foreign community in China* As the press reports 
of the RGS meeting and "Blackwood's" articles reached China, the ideas 
and proposals credited to Lay (not so much his analysis of the deficiencies 
of the regime) aroused more of ridicule than of apprehension.^ To these,
62* BPP [3295] LXIII "Papers Relating to th$ Affairs of China". (China 
No. 3> I864) (London I864) for reports from Consular officers* negotia­
tions for surrender commenced Oct* 8* About half the force was released 
on Oct. 15» but Burgevine and the rest were detained until Oct. 19*
Por a curious interpretation of these developments and the direct 
relationship on flotilla discussions, "vide" "NCH" No* 701. Jan. 2, I864, 
pp. 2-3* "Retrospect.....1863"
63. Especially "China Mail" No. 939* Feb. 12, 1863, and "NCH" No. 656,
Peb. 21, I863, p.30 and No. 679» Aug. 1, I863, p. 122.
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shortly after his return, was added the almost unanimous hostility of 
the mercantile sector, for the Blue Book, which included the injudicious 
indictment in his 1862 memo to the F.O., was circulated and openly 
publicised^ There was no need for either the Ch' ing Authorites^ or 
Bruce to fear repercussions from a Lay following*
Finally, there is no positive evidence that the manoeuvre was 
premeditated, nor for that matter, was there any shred of evidence 
that precautions were necessary, but it was the fact that almost ten 
days elapsed between Osborn1 s departure from Peking and the transmission
to Lay of his notice of dismissal* At this last moment, Lay was in his
a 66public role, totally isolated; the masterless servant* Lay, in his
particular dual rSle, had become superfluous, The enigma was not
solved, simply shelved*
There must be two postscripts to this terminal period in Lay's
China career, both related to the flotilla project* One is customary
in an analysis such as this, though certainly immaterial and of
questionable historicity! ascription of an hierarchical pattern of causal
64* "China Mail" No* 9^3* July 30, 1863, p*122* "The*..address refers 
to the awful Lay Memorandum, which we alone of the Press in China had 
the courage to publish."
65. Cheng, op.cit. p.114* Li, at least, was aware of the antagonism of 
the foreign community towards Lay.
66. The one bright spot during this period may have been the announcement 
of his being awarded the C.B. The list appeared in "LCErt V* June 26, 
I863, the printed notice thus probably reached Lay before Bussell's 
notice: "FL" Bussell to Lay, May 25, 1863* Lay marked on cover "Ansd* 
Sept. 5, 1863*H "Vide" also Appendix VII,C.
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factors; i.e., who was most to blame? The other is material, for the
subject matter dealt with was an integral part of the flotilla project;
the settlement of costs subsequent to the decision to disband*
No attempt will be made here to evaluate the claims of accusers 
67and defenders* These are all compounded of truth, distortion and
absence of knowledge ~ feigned or otherwise* Suffice it to say that
most of the odium adhered to Lay for the longest period of time* The
one person, who received kudos from all sides, was Osborn (though there
was the occasional suggestion that he was out of his element in delving
in ''politics'* and became too easy a dupe for Lay)* The one person who
received the least attention and who, on the basis of the evidence,
deserved as much censure as Lay, was Bobert Hart*
Hart's was the vital link in the communications chain* Even when
allowances are made for the pressure of his responsibilities, for the
muddledness of his thinking, for the delays in exchange of correspondence,
for hisiLlness and for Lay's overbearing attitude, it is nonetheless
true that he had been as negligent in carrying out thorough consultations -
68on all sides - as Lay* He conveyed impressions which were erroneous, 
because he did not himself understand the implications of his commitments, 
and he made promises which he could not fulfill*
Censure of Bruce is warranted on different grounds* He understood
67* The most balanced early appraisal appears to be that contained in 
Michie, "Alcock" X, pp* 589-590.
68* "Vide antea” n* 49*
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the situation almost from the moment Lay arrived in Peking - that he had
not grasped it earlier is hut a relection of his failure to do his
"homework” properly# Fully aware of the limitations of his real
authority, Bruce, however astute his strategy, refused to acknowledge
the responsibility of his position until it was forced upon him.
Undeniably the strategy worked to his advantage, though until the last,
there was no assurance that it would. Bruce had self-contradictions
to hide and ambivalence to disguise and Lay's irascibility was as salt
to an open wound. But the unscrupulous ”ad hominem” condemnation which
Bruce employed to enshroud Lay when his dismissal was indicated was a
69demeaning gesture.
Bruce's "superiors”, the politicians in London who aided and 
abetted Lay and Osborn, were no less remiss than he in keeping the eye 
of unpleasant reality blindfolded, while staring through the eye of 
wishful thinking. The flotilla, Lay and perhaps even China, were but
69* Even before he sent his first official despatch on the disbandment 
decision, FO 17/595 No. 168, Bruce to Bussell, Nov. 9» 1865 (erroneously 
dated "November 19M in BPP [5271]), Bruce had prepared a vicious attack 
on Lay on Nov. 6, addressed to Elgin, and enclosed in a private letter 
to Elgin, under date of Nov. 8 ("E/B") stating "I send you a long letter 
about the flotilla, and I beg you to make use of it in England..." (By 
the time it reached India, Elgin was dead, but it was forwarded to 
Russell in any case). On Nov. 9, Bruce wrote privately to Russell and 
enclosed a copy of his Nov. 6 ^P.R.O. 50/22/50). There are two added 
points about this letter, i) Bruce notes that "[Lay's] day of usefulness 
in China is over", ii) Having read both letters (6th & 9th), Somerset 
wrote a lengthy note on the latter pinpointing the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies of Bruce's case.
Burlingame's letter on the subject ("CMC" 711 pp. 62-66 quoting 
"Rec. of U.S. Dept, of State. Desp. China, vol. XXI...No. 56, 7th 
November 1865*••M) contains a number of distortions, but is a much more 
judicious presentation than Bruce's.
savouries in the cauldron of British diplomacy. The dross of war and 
rebellion could not, however, be transmuted into the golden fleece of 
reduced budgets and expanded trade through the diffidence and 
inconsis tency (political opposition and public opinion notwithstanding) 
primarily characterised in the operations of the Foreign Office. In 
the present context, however, while Government spokesmen were incapable 
of admitting their own errors (and indulged in the time-honoured past­
time of blaming the heathen), without exculpating Lay, they gave both 
him and Osborn their due as bold and intrepid, if unsuccessful, visionaries.
These criticisms do not add up to an exoneration of Lay. He did
misrepresent and, to that extent, mistake his position. Defective in
character, deficient in personality, fundamentally "unpolished" and
inexperienced in politics and diplomacy, he was the chief architect of
his personal undoing. He may have had the most acute understanding of
the nature of the Confucian state as it existed in the late 1850's and
'60's, but he lacked a depth-perspective of the larger spheres of time
and space. Though he was the exponent of "large ideas", he lived by
small ones. He did not resign. He did seek to restore his personal
credit with the Ch'ing officers, by attempting to transfer financial
liability from their shoulders to those of Bruce, while he was privately
70
charging them with sole responsibility for the breakdown of the project.
70. Contrast Lay, "Interests", pp.31-52, with FO 17/404* to Eussell.
Nov. 10, 1863. [BPP 3271].
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An examination of a wide cross section of the evidence must, nevertheless, 
lead to the conclusion that insofar as the flotilla scheme was concerned, 
he proceeded step by step on the assumption that the conditions he 
stipulated were being accepted and acted upon* On this ground, at least, 
he is entitled to relief from total condemnation*
This first postscript cannot be concluded without reference to the 
responsibility of the Chfing Authorities for the "fiasco”* It is, 
perhaps, a moot question whether the blind leading the blind ought ever 
to be held responsible for infractions of the rules set by the all- 
seeing* Of course, the "all-seeing” were no less "blind”, but they had 
the presumption to seek to impose their conceptions on victims Chronically 
under duress* As in the case of all analogies, this one should not be 
pushed too far* The Ch*ing Authorities were not fools* Several of the 
Chinese provincial officials were fully alive to the difficulties that 
would arise in any attempt to incorporate an organism, such as the 
proposed flotilla, into the Confucian state* The metropolitan Manchu 
officials involved were not completely unconscious of the nature of the 
organism. However, whether from over-confidence, obscurantism, or 
language difficulties, they believed they had "managed the affair" in 
a way which would secure their control in a setting familiar to them*
When the reality of the confrontation proved otherwise, they had the 
fortitude to refuse ratification and when sufficiently relieved of duress, 
the courage to take the initiative of outright rejection of the flotilla* 
They could hardly be blamed for dissimulation in the case of Layfs 
dismissal*
If any hierarchical pattern of causal factors is valid, it is implicit 
in the order of the preceding presentation* The positions of the home 
politicians and Lay might he inverted as well might those of Hart and 
Bruce* If there were a guiding principal, it would be that the responsi­
bility of the initiators takes precedence over the responsibility of the 
seconders*
The second postscript concerns the settlement of costs for the
flotilla* The subject is material because new evidence has been uncovered
71which permits a very close estimate of the final distribution of costs, 
because more cogent evaluations are in order for some of the old evidence 
and because the question of costs is germane to the interpretation of 
Lay's role*
The cost figures presented here are represented exclusively in 
pounds sterling, although several kinds of currency entered into the 
transactions* Details of expenditures and reimbursements will not be 
referred to except for a few items of special interest, and by the same 
token problems such as minor exchange gains and losses; minor discrepancies
71* FO 17/492 and 495 appear to have been separate files kept during 
I864-I867 exclusively for matters concerned with the financial settlements 
of the flotilla* FO 233/85 (llisc* 1864-1875) contains a full set of the 
accounts settled by Lay in Jan* 1864* FO 228/361* (Misc* Haval & Mil*) 
Contains Osborn's accounts through 1864* There is some miscellaneous 
private correspondence on the subject in PRO 30/22/50 (Private to Russell) 
for 1865-1866* FO 83/2251 provides new data. There are occasional 
references in FO 17/419* 442, 467 and P.R.O. 30/22/26. BPP [ - -] XLVII. 
Accts and Papers* Supplementary Estimate - 1867, is not new, but 
completes the account*
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in balances carried forward, etc*, will be ignored* As the transactions
and accounting were spread over a period of five years (1862-1867) and
as four interrelated, but not integrated, sets of accounts were kept -
Lay's original accounts, Inspectorate accounts, Osborn's force repatriation
accounts and British Government accounts (Bombay as well as London) -
there are some unreconciled balances* Since the total of these amount
to less than £10,000 out of an aggregate of approximately £445*000, for
general purposes, these can also be disregarded.
The distribution of costs falls into two principal categoriesi
a) costs for which H*M* Government assumed absolute liability; the vessels,
ordnance stores, machinery and supplies, reserve marine equipment, etc*,
and b) costs ultimately borne by the Ch'ing government; maintenance,
wages and salaries and repatriation (including three months' severance
pay) for the force, and special considerations to Osborn and Lay* Osborn
expedited the repatriation of the force and his accounts were settled
72under this head by the Summer, 1864* The inability of H*M* Government
to resolve problems of disposal of the vessels for two years, followed
73by budgeting difficulties,  ^delayed the final, and largest, reimbursement 
to the Ch'ing government until mid-1967*
As indicated, the aggregate disbursed by the Ch'ing government was
72. FO 17/492.
73* Esp* FO 17/493* Memos by Russell (then Prime Minister) and Clarendon 
(then For* Sec'y*) May 50* and June 2, 1866 respectively*
about £445 >000* Of tills amount £45*000 did not enter into the general 
accounts* It was a reserve based on an initial estimate of repatriation 
expenses* It was remitted to Lay in England and the full amount was
*Ti
returned by him* ^ Of the remaining aggregate, £400,000, unused funds
75and proceeds from sales of ordnance and machinery in China totalled
approximately £22,000 while payments on account of vessels and stores
sold in Bombay and London, remitted to the end of December, 1866, amount
76to about £55*855* The final remittance from the British Government in
mid-1867 totalled £114*276* The bulk of this final payment represented
the difference between Osborn's valuation of the vessels and the sums
77received from the actual sales. Osborn's valuation for seven vessels 
(he sold one himself and applied the proceeds to the repatriation account) 
was higher (£152,500) than the cost value (approx* £147*000)* Even so, 
until the bottom dropped out of the market when the War Between the States 
ended in the Spring of 1865* the demand value was estimated to be much
74* la 1864 (“Interests”) Lay specified £45*000; in 1868 ("The P.O.") 
he mentioned both £40,000 and £45,000; in 1895 (“Opium") the amount had 
been reduced to £50,000. He may have been allowing for inflation.
75* FO 228/561* Some were sold at Chefoo and some at Shanghai* At the 
latter place, the sales were all to H* Macartney for his Shanghai Arsenal* 
For details and the benefits derived see D.C* Boulger* "The Life of Sir 
Halliday Macartney K.C*M*G." (London, 1908) pp. 124-151*
76. PO 17/493.
77* “Ibid". Hammond to Treasury. Feb. 26, 1867* The 1867 Supplementary 
Estimate figure ("vide antea" n. 71) had been £101,500* The FO arrived 
at its own figure by a duplicate payment for one vessel and by re­
imbursement for India Gov't, charges against another which, under the 
circumstances, also represented a duplicate payment*
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higher* Nevertheless, the total re-imbursements amounted to approximately
£192,101, leaving the Ch'ing government with a maximum net deficit on
the flotilla account of £207,900*
This deficit figure can be cross-checked in two ways* Firstly, on
a visit to the F*0* in 1866, Hart estimated that the loss to the Ch'ing
78
government would eventually be between £100,000 - 200,000 and Hart, 
who, consistently after I863, cast Lay in the villain's role, was not 
likely to underestimate the cost of the failure* Secondly, the actual 
cost figures roughly approximate the outlay - less reimbursement figures* 
Detailed expenses for non-recoverable goods and services to November 1, 
I863, totalled about £111,000; costs for the vessels’ return to England, 
about £14,000; discounts on sales of non-ordnance surplus supplies, about 
£6,000; force repatriations, about £68,000 (original estimate was 
£120,000^); special allowances to Osborn (£3,000) and Lay (£6,8338 )^, 
about £9,835* These figures total £208,853 in the expense accounts*
The re-evaluation of "old" evidence is concerned with a more careful
78* nIbidM* End of a long memo by Alston, dated May 28, 1866* He quotes 
Hart who "was at the Foreign Office last week***" Estimates of the cost 
have ranged from Hart's, to £250,000 by Wade (P*H*0* 30/22/50. Wade to 
Russell. Private* June 6, I865), to £550,000 by Morse, "Submission" p*42, 
to "not much less than a million sterling" by S. Wells Williams, "A 
History of China", Rev. ed* by F.W* Williams (London, I897) p*342*
79* FO 17/492* Osborn's accounts of Dec. 20, 1864*
80* "Vide yatfCea" pp.¥52-¥51 There is some disagreement whether Osborn's 
£3,000 was a gratuity voluntarily offered or an amount recommended by 
Bruce to re-imburse him for managing the disbandment of the vessels and 
force.
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appraisal of some of the transactions covered above* The differential
cost to the British Government, as noted, was above £114,000* The
Government bore this cost because it refused, on political grounds, the
81
immediate sale of any of the vessels in the open market, because the 
Admiralty refused to purchase any of the vessels except at unreasonable 
figures and because the delays, before permission was finally granted, 
resulted in the deterioration of the vessels* Had the vessels been 
offered in the open market in 1863-64* ‘tiie ne  ^deficit to both H*M* 
Government and the Ch'ing government would, in all probability, have been 
appreciably less* Both governments accepted the situation which dictated 
the policy - but not the inordinate delay - and, consequently, at no time 
was the responsibility for this loss factor held against Lay and/or 
Osborn by the British officials in London or the Ch'ing officials in 
Peking*
The exchange factor should also be examined carefully in determining 
the absolute figure for the Ch'ing deficit* Actual figures for all 
transactions are no longer available, but what can be substantiated is 
that all the exchange costs - differential between real as against 
nominal rates for currencies converted to pounds sterling - and discounts
81* PO 83/2251* Law Officers to P0*May 21, I864, ruled that Osborn and 
Chinese Government had legal right to sell vessels "as to when, where or 
to whom* • •M they desired* When HMG prevented sale as a matter of policy 
(recorded as a Cabinet decision by Bussell - PO 17/492* Memo* May 12, 
I864) HMG assumed responsibility for disposal and full indemnification*
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on pre-maturity collection of six months1 sight bills, are included in
the Chfing deficit figures, but the premiums on sterling re-imbursements
to China are not included in these figures* If the requisite adjustments
were made, the absolute figure of the Ch!ing deficit might be reduced
from between £20,000 - 50,000* It would still be a sizeable figure,
but not nearly so awe-inspiring*
The one transaction which has been distorted beyond all reality
relates to the sum designated as Lay's termination settlement* By a
careless reading of Bruce's despatch to the F.0* announcing Lay's 
82dismissal and by Bruce's apparent failure to read the translations of 
Kung's communications before he wrote his despatch, the settlement has 
been misrepresented* Kung's original notices to Lay and Bruce concerning 
Lay's dismissal stated that Lay was to be allowed four months to settle 
the flotilla accounts and that he was, as a manifestation of the Chinese 
government's "boundless liberality****to draw your salary [@ 1,000 
tls* /mo*] up to the end of the four months to which you are limited?^
82. F0 17/395 Ho* 185* Bruce to Russell. Nov* 27, 1863 (BPP [327l]).
85* "Ibid". No* 187* Bruce to Russell* Nov. 27> 1865* (BPP [3271]) Enclos*, 
Kung to Bruce Nov. 15, 1863* There is strong evidence to suggest that 
Layts dismissal had been decided on Nov. 5* i) ”Vide antea" n. 69 for 
Bruce1 s and Burlingame's comments of Nov. 9 ®ud Nov* 7> respectively; 
ii) The English translations of notice to Lay on his dismissal and to 
Hart on his appointment to succeed are undated; iii) The initial entry 
for Kung to Bruce Nov. 15* in F0 230/78 No. 62 which contains the copies 
of English translations of the Chinese documents, dated this communication 
as November 5* The numeral was crossed out and replaced by "15"»
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On the one hand, Lay must have objected to the financial settlement and, 
on the other, he did indicate that he had every intention of settling 
hits accounts and leaving China well before the expiry of the four-month 
pe:riod.^
According to the contents of Bruce's despatch, the government 
reconsidered its settlement terms and (from the context of the series 
of documents), a new offer was made between November 15-20. These 
terms were* i) a doubling of salary (to 2,000 tie* /mo.) retroactive to 
the date of Lay's return to Shanghai on May 1, 1865 to continue through 
the four-month period to Mar. 15, 1864; ii) a 5>000 tls. /mo. allowance 
for "expenses of his establishment during his residence at Pekin"; iii) 
gratification" of 6,000 tls. "on leaving their service". If these
Q C  g g
figures were computed as H.B. Morse and S.P.Wright subsequently did,
as gross payments, the total does look exceedingly generous. Thus, 
the total salary amounts to 21,000 tls. (lOj- months @ 2,000 tls. /mo.), 
the Peking expenses to 15,000 tls. (actual five-month period of residence 
@ 5,000 tls. /mo.) and gratuity to 6,000 tls. The grand total is thus 
42,000 tls. or converted at the nominal rate, £14,000.
84. FO 17/395 Ho. 187. op.cit. Kung to Bruce. Nov. 20, I863 (FO 230/78 
No. 63. Nov. 20). For the intercession of Burlingame and his colleagues 
see "CMC" VII, pp. 68—65. "Bee.....IT.S. Dept, of State. Dssp«, China, 
vol. XXI, No. 58. 23rd November, 1863"• Burlingame, it may be noted, 
does not specify a single date.
85. "Submission", p.46.
86. "Hart", p.250.
In the first place, however, Lay did not accept this settlement
and, in the second place, he would not have agreed to the classifications*
On November 20, a week before Bruce's despatch, the same day Lay submitted
his full interim account and the day before Lay left Peking, Kung
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informed Bruce of the terms of the settlement* i) Lay was to receive
a lump payment of 8,000 tls*, not calculated on any monthly salary
basis, but "to be paid out of the sum hitherto allowed for the expense
of the residence of the Inspector-General at the capital”, which residence
was to be considered terminated as of November 15* "In addition...the
Prince will still further show his generous consideration for Mr. Lay
by giving him a sum of 6,000 tls. to defray his travelling expenses to
England." Lay was, as implied, allowed a sum to cover "the residence
of the Inspector-General at the capital” and he did charge 6,000 tls* for
86this item in the final accounts he submitted to Hart*
By the most liberal interpretation, therefore, the value of Lay's 
terminal settlement would be i) "excess" salary, 6,500 tls. (l,000 tls. 
/mo. l May - 15 Nov*; Lay would probably have claimed he was entitled to 
this, since he drew only half-salary during the two years he was on 
leave, even though he worked a good part of the period; ii) severance 
pay, 8,000 tls.; iii) repatriation, 6,000 tls. - most of which, 
incidentally, would have been absorbed to defray actual repatriation
87* "Vide antea" n. 84* Underscoring added.
88. FO 233/85* Lay's accounts.
expenses. This "grand” total amounted to 20,500 tls. or, at the nominal 
rate, to just over £6,853. Lay did leave China a moderately prosperous 
man, but his wealth was accumulated by modest living and judicious
89
investments in real estate afforded with savings from a liberal salary 
rather than as the result of any excessive generosity on the part of 
his Ch’ing employers to cover his termination.
Finally, it has generally been alleged that the financial loss, 
invariably ascribed to Lay, entailed in the breakdown of the flotilla 
project caused extreme embarrassment to the "progressivists" among the 
Ch’ing Authorities, notably Prince Kung and Wensiang, which, in turn, 
hampered the efforts of the "progressivists” among the foreigners, notably 
Hart and the Ministers of the Treaty Powers, to make much impression 
against Ch’ing obscurantism. The refutation is involved and the evidence in 
support voluminous. It should be sufficient, however, to establish four 
principal points. Firstly, on the one side, the amount of actual loss 
was not cataclysmic. It remained as large as it did despite Lay’s and 
Osborn’s efforts a) because, according to their interpretation, the 
British Government reneged on payment of part of the disbandment expenses 
and b) because a poll tied, decision prevented the Ch’ing government from
89. Lay did not liquidate his property holdings when he left China in 
I864. One of the reasons he made a trip to China (and Japan) in 1869 
was to attend them. For citation "vide antea” Chapter X n. 1361 S.I46. 
Lay’s reply of Dec. 30, 1870 to Interrogatory.
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selling the vessels at prices veil above cost* On the latter point,
Kung and Wensiang were more severely embarrassed by the long delay in
indemnification repayment by the British Government than by the actual 
90disbandment* After all, Soochow was recaptured from the rebels in 
December, 1863, and Nanking fell in July, I864, without the aid of the 
flotilla*
On the other side, if Kung and Wensiang were embarrassed, they had
only themselves to blame* In reality, it could be argued, the losses
sustained in the disbandment of the flotilla were more than compensated
for by the continued stationing of a sizeable British naval squadron
(which, had the flotilla been retained, would almost certainly have
91\been reduced in numbers Jon the China coast, at British Government 
expense, to combat piracy and smuggling*
Secondly, relations between the members of the Tsungli Yamen and the 
Ministers of the Treaty Powers were more cordial in the flotilla crisis 
and the immediate post-disbandment period than they had been before* 
Thirdly, despite the rationalisation of men like Hart and Wade for
90* i) PO 17/492* Bruce to Russell* May 1, I865 "Separate1* [Prom 
Washington] enclosing long letter from members of Tsungli Yamen, 
recapitulating flotilla denouement* This had been sent to Bruce by Wade 
in late I864 or early 1865* (Copy also in PO 17/409 and in he/B"*) 
ii) P.R*0. 30/22/50* Wade to Russell* Private* June 6, I865. iii) PO 17/495 
No* 32* Alcock to Hammond* Mar* 51 1666 and Wade to Hammond, Private*
Mar* 6, 1866 (mentions a long despatch sent in Feb* 1865)* iv) PO 391/l9 • 
Wade to Hammond* Private* Aug* 21, 1867*
91* "Tide" esp* Somersets note on Bruce to Russell* Private. Nov. 9,
1863* n* 69#
1
their failures to influence Ch!ing progress, in 1867 WenBiang and Kung 
were at least relatively buoyant. The following views, ironically, 
were passed on by Wade, who had received them from Hart!
Wensiang said to me the other day, "You will be more anxious 
to stop our learning in 50 years time, than you now are to make 
us learn”. The Prince the last time I saw him said ”What you 
have been saying is fact. Had you said it five years ago I would 
not have understood it; three years ago I would not have believed 
it; but now - without your saying it • I can see it for myself.
Only those who think with us are but a few and we must be allowed 
time and freedom to take the steps which we best know to be mostg- 
calculated to gain the hundreds of thousands who now oppose us.”
Fourthly, as early as 1869, Hart developed a project for acquiring
steam vessels for a "coast guard” service, applying his methods. Three
new vessels were purchased, but when they arrived in China they could
not be used because Hart was. unable to get sufficient funds to put them 
93into service.
In effect, therefore, Lay,s role for good or ill, in British
relations with China, terminated in China, at least, when his career
terminated at the end of 1865. Insofar as any effect he may have had
in Britain is concerned, the test came with his publication in December,
I864, of the open letter to Lord Russell, being his "apologia" and a
94statement of what he believed Britain*s policy should be. Russell
92. FO 59lA9« Wade to Hammond. Private. Apr. 22, I867. Quoting extracts 
Hart to FitzRoy (n.d.).
95* Yon Gumpach, op.cit.p. 275(footnote 2) quoting "NCH". Mar. 29, 1870. 
Also "LCE” XII June 17, 1870 p. 537*
94* There was, of course, a private covering letter to Russells "Vide" 
P,R.O. 50/22/50. Lay to Russell. Dec. 8, 1864* Russell replied on 
Dec. 15, I864. "Vide" P.R.O. 50/22/101.
politely acknowledged it by private letter and most of the press that
took notice of it, acknowledged it impolitely. (Both Orders in Council
were rescinded simultaneously in the spring of 1864* the first, applicable
to Lay and Osborn, for obvious reasons; the second, applying to British
officers, as a consequence of the alleged "massacre" of Taiping Chieftains
after the surrender of Soochow - the EVA, under Gordon* s command, was
indirectly implicated in, though in no way directly responsible for, the
"massacre"). Lay continued to believe that he had a role to play in 
95China, but no one else, of any consequence, did.
95* Lay's principal effort took place in Jan. 1866. FO 17/462. Lay to 
Clarendon, Jan. 13, 1866. He applied to succeed Wade, who, he alleged, 
intended to resign the Secretaryship of Legation. The initial, tactfu). 
reply (Jan. 17) was that the FO had no knowledge of the alleged intention. 
Lay then had a long interview with Hammond olAJan. 18 following which 
he wrote a defence of his 1865 behaviour addressed to Hammond (Jan. 19)*
On Jan. 20, Hammond prepared a precis of the earlier interview, in which 
he had pointed out to Lay the reasons why he opposed Lay*s application for 
any position in the diplomatic service. The memo closed, "I spoke very 
kindly, as indeed I feel towards him; but I think it would be out of the 
question to reemploy him in China."
Clarendon's note of concurrence followed immediately and Hammond 
notified Lay of the decision on Jan. 22, 1866.
Chapter XII 
Summary and Conclusions 
The study of H.H. Layfs role in British relations with China, like 
.any other similar study, is the product of a selective process. Hone 
of the components of the terms of reference has been dealt with exhaustively. 
There is less need to justify what has not been done in this respect 
than there is to explain what has been done and to formulate the qualifi­
cations that naturally follow as the concomitants of the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the presentation.
In the attempt to provide a framework that could be considered 
comprehensive, if not exhaustive, two patterns of evidence, with 
corresponding analyses, have received primary attention. With respeot 
to one pattern, the effort has been made to concentrate on the conditioning 
influences which might help to clarify the process of initiative and 
response that affected the particular individual - H.N. Lay -, and the 
entities - the British "community" and China. The Introduction, in 
general terms, and the chapters on the background to Lay's career, in 
specific terms, established the lines of this pattern. In the succeeding 
chapters, this pattern became more and more submerged as more complex 
influences and factors led to the super-imposition of new designs. This, 
in itself, characterises one of the conclusions about Lay's role to be 
elaborated later. The entities, the British "community" and China, 
metamorphosed, however slowly, consistently with the changing pattern; 
the individual, Lay, changed within the initial simplistic pattern.
The other pattern has been developed as a means of concentration
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on selected aspects of Layfs direct involvement in Sino-British relations 
so as to exemplify the basic characteristics of his role. Lay, with 
varying degrees of capability and proficiency, became an interpreter 
"cum" administrator, an interpreter "cum” negotiator (never, in essence, 
a "diplomat") and, if the term is used loosely, a "policy-maker"• Prom 
the time his influence first began to be felt during his service in the 
Consulate at Shanghai, until his dismissal as Inspectoi>General, he was 
to a lesser or greater extent attempting to carry on all these functions 
concurrently. However, none of these functions has been exhaustively 
described and analysed throughout the chronological account. Had this 
been attempted, the study - even in the face of incomplete documentation - 
would easily have run into a number of volumes. Instead, the attempt has 
been made to define the special features of each function in the context 
in which that function predominated. Thus, the consulate experience 
defines Layfs role as interpreter "cum" administrator! tfhe Shanghai 
Inspectorate and Imperial Maritimeij Customs system, his role as admini­
strator; the treaty negotiations of 1858 and the flotilla scheme, his 
role as "policy-maker". Hone of these, of course, could have been 
considered comprehensive without some elaboration of the larger context 
in which the particular developments took place.
This procedure, because it has concentrated on definition of his 
role, has also served to emphasise areas of controversy respecting 
interpretations of that role. The tentative evaluations suggested in 
the different sections will be stipulated more precisely in the conclusions 
that follow shortly.
Theie is another "pattern" implicit in the structure of the study
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that is explicitly indicated in what may seem to be the supercilious 
titles for Chapters IV - XI. These titles have been used to suggest 
that there is a valid - though tenuous - correlation between Lay*8 
enigmatic function as a dual is tic "servant11 and the underlying problems 
of confrontation and conflict# Whoever was temporarily master of Lay 
was temporarily master of the situation# When Lay became masterless, 
it was not because of the simple reason that one or more substitutes 
were found to fill the functions he had performed, but it was because 
no one with his particular attributes and capabilities was any longer 
required#
The qualifications that follow as concomitants have been all but 
precisely stated# The focus of the study is on an individual# The 
development of that individual (perhaps, any individual) was relatively 
static while developments in the corporate and institutional sense, 
whether personal (the purely quantitative increase in numbers of similar 
individuals engaged in similar activities) or impersonal (the metamorphosis 
of the British "Community" and "China" - regardless of whether the process 
was constructive or destructive) were relatively dynamic. The relativity 
here alluded to was not only that applicable to the contrast between Lay 
and the two environments in which he performed, but it was also applicable 
to acceleration of change within both those environments#
Another qualification, not previously referred to in this chapter, 
has to do with the limited attention given to the structure of relations 
between other "powers" of the occidental politico-culture system and 
the Chfing Confucian system. Although there are, in the body of the 
study, references to various developments in which some aspects of this
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structure have been dealt with, most of the discussion has been indirect 
and it has certainly never been comprehensive* That this structure was 
a significant element in affecting Lay's role need not be laboured*
The qualifications with respect to the individual may easily be 
overlooked* The brief commentary on Lay presented here, combines summary, 
qualification and conclusion insofar as his individuality is concerned*
It must always be remembered that although his China "career" spanned 
sixteen and a half years (1847-1864)) he was but six months past his 
thirty-first birthday when it was terminated* The positions he held, 
which in some measure he sought and in some measure had forced upon him, 
would ordinarily have demanded a high level of competence and experience* 
As it was, his education, in a liberal sense, was deficient and in a 
vocational sense, extremely narrow* His experience, while to some extent 
unusual and to some extent remarkable, was, when viewed in conjunction 
with the responsibilities of his numerous positions, at best shallow*
That he achieved as much as he did with these very real personal handicaps 
can be accounted for partly by the environment in which he functioned 
and partly by other traits of his personality and character.
Insofar as the environment was concerned, his handicaps were 
initially obscured or discounted because the important attributes he did 
possess were at a premium* As the responsibilities became more demanding 
and as other foreigners attained adequate proficiency in language facility 
and administrative experience, his deficiencies became more pronounced* 
Insofar as his traits of personality and character were concerned, 
it is possible to detect in Us career his efforts to mould himself, to 
the best of his ability, in the image of his father. His personal
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commitments were as nearly identical as they could be* He was a 
religionist whose career was dedicated to the promotion of progress 
through the medium of public service* Even if it were conceded that the 
flotilla project stirred prospects of his emulating his "great ancestor*1, 
this is far from conceding that his ambition constituted an insatiable 
lust for wealth and/or power* Rather, the ambition for fame and fortune 
that he displayed throughout his career, and the energy and aggressiveness 
he generated in the pursuit of them, were not, in the light of his 
youthfulness and the disabilities connected with his father* s death, 
inordinately abnormal* His initial desires for status and fortune were 
converted (however misguided the tactics or rationalisations) in the 
latter stages of his China career, into a belief that they were the 
necessary accoutrements of his position.
Positively, it can be demonstrated that in part, at least, his 
views on this score were sound. Considering the establishment over which 
he was to have direction (without reference to the degree of executive 
discretionary authority he believed he ought to possess), the status 
and "fortune1* he sought in relation to the milieus of both the foreign 
community and the Ch*ing structure were not unrealistic. But that H.N.
Lay should be accorded the distinction and the emoluments was but a 
reflection of the incongruity of his being invested with the position.
Negatively, there is no evidence that Lay ever violated the rigid 
terms of his appointment or exploited his position for his personal 
advantage, despite the fact that there was little to prevent him doing so 
had he been inclined that way. He had a reputation, on the contrary,
for dealing with severe harshness towards anyone against whom the slightest 
irregularity could be substantiated. He was also what, in modem 
vernacular, would be called a "loner". His seeming inability to elicit 
or to offer ties of personal attachment or loyalty not only makes any 
suggestion that he was capable of mounting a programme that might be 
directed at building a personal "empire" incredible, but this condition 
also, in fact, left him in a chronically vulnerable state throughout his 
career. The only personal weapon in his armoury was the threat of his 
personal resignation. While he was supported, it was for the cause he 
epitomised and not support for him as a person.
The one possible exception that may come to mind is his relationship 
with Captain Sherard Osborn. But the fact that Osborn was above all 
else famous as a man of principle "proves the rule". He was as much 
Layfs choice as anyone1 s. That Osborn could come through the flotilla 
fiasco with enhanced prestige and that he could remain a determined 
defender of Lay, must surely, to some extent, indicate the limited nature 
of Lay's ambition.
There is no intention here to convert Layfs weaknesses into virtues, 
but the discussion is relevant because his detractors have often tended 
to convert these self-same weaknesses into vices. His most serious 
weakness was his self-righteousness which led him, always, to analyse 
and interpret facts and events to fit the cause he happened at any given 
moment to be supporting and which led him, frequently, to employ 
questionable means. As an ordinary man, more could be said to his credit 
than for most. His role in China, having been an extraordinary one,
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everything about him was and has been exaggerated. What was the nature 
of the extraordinary role which this ordinary man attempted to perform?
At this point there is the strong temptation to continue with 
lengthy - and with what would undoubtedly become tortuous - elaborations 
of additional qualifications and definitions. This must be resisted 
for any number of obvious reasons, the most valid of which is that if 
the main presentation has been adequately formulated, it should be 
unnecessary. Since interpretations are the essence of research, however, 
these must be positively summarised.
In their simplest terms, Lay's positions as a representative of 
the British presence were twofold} to interpret, literally and figuratively, 
for the most influential Ch'ing Authorities with whom he could communicate, 
the British interest in expanded intercourse; to demonstrate, both to 
the foreign community-at-large and to the Ch'ing Authorities, the mutual 
advantages that could be derived from the effective application of 
occident-designed, rationalised, centralised administrative organisations 
and practices. His function as an imposed, as a self-appointed and as 
a passively accepted representative of the Confucian state interest were* 
guarantor (first locally at Shanghai and then, generally, for the other 
treaty ports) for the transmission of a sizeable revenue; buffer between 
Ch'ing officialdom and British officialdom until 1859? agent for the 
acquisition of modern armament to be used in the Taiping suppression 
campaign; pseudo-consultant for the Tsungli Yamen. Viewed in juxtaposition, 
while the two sets of functions were not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
neither were they necessarily parallel or convergent.
The tangible results directly attributable to Lay's activities and 
influence were, in relation to the notoriety he gained, very few. His
most significant contribution was made in his capacity as interpreter 
"cum" administrator. His consolidation of the foreign Inspectorate, 
administratively, politically and legally, was his major achievement. 
Nonetheless, however much credit he may be entitled to on this account, 
it is to be noted, firstly, that the Inspectorate survived these early 
years mainly because the British plenipotentiaries were able, in the 
years from 1854-1862, gradually to convince the Government in London that 
it was a necessary adjunct to British diplomacy; secondly, that its 
extension was provided for as a part of a treaty settlement that was 
imposed by armed coercion; finally, that when it was "officially" recognised 
by a faction of the metropolitan Ch'ing Authorities, it was not in 
consequence of any direct influence exerted by Lay.
Two other complementary "contributions" can be recorded that, in 
fact, were the results of Lay's connection with the Inspectorate system.
The first was that despite the thwarting of their ceaseless efforts to 
retain special concessions or to increase their privileges at the expense 
of the Inspectorate, the largest segment of the British mercantile 
community (which in time included almost all the most responsible houses) 
accepted the system. In the course of this acbeptance, and by virtue of 
it, commercial intercourse was facilitated. The second was, that largely 
as a consequence of Lay's consistently (from conviction) and stubbornly 
(from pride) supporting derivative concepts of the status and authority 
of foreign "inspectors", Lay was responsible for some curtailment in the 
status and authority of the consuls at the treaty ports. To some extent 
this facilitated the assumption by the Embassy of the political and judicial 
prerogatives which had, because of the conditions that had prevailed in
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China, been partially delegated to the consuls. To some extent, this 
"contribution”, even though the beneficiary was the foreign Inspectorate, 
restored to the Ch’ing government a measure of authority which it had 
relinquished by default.
Here again, the case can be overstated. Lay had made his opposition 
to the setting up of mixed tribunals, at the treaty ports, for the 
adjudication of customs cases absolutely clear, threatening to resign 
should Kung consent to the proposal.^ The very next day after Bruce 
received the official notification of Lay’s dismissal, however, he 
informed Bussell that he had formally recommended to Kung that such 
tribunals should be introduced. His remarks to Bussell included the 
following.
Mr. Hart, who has had much practical experience, during 
the last two years, in dealing with such cases, is favorable to 
the proposal on account of the publicity which will attend these 
investigations, and of the benefits to the Customs-house, of 
its being relieved from the charge of exercising an arbitrary 
power in such cases. Mr. Lay, unfortunately, did not seem to 
appreciate these advantages, and wished that the investigation 
should be conducted before the Commission [sic] of Customs alone, 
a coursedproceeding which would be totally unsatisfactory to the 
parties interested, and would recognize, in a Chinese Authority, 
a certain judicial power in dealing with foreigners, which it 
is objectionable to admit.
1. "Vide” Chapter IX p.*JL^  n.14. (App. VI,A.) For the specific threat 
to resign, "vide” Lay, LR. Lay to Hart, Jan. 27, 1862. Lay’s first 
references to the subject in his correspondence is in his letters to Hart 
of Jan. 8 and to FitzRoy of Jan. 9, 1862.
2. FO 17/395* No. 177* Bruce to Russell, Nov. 16, 1863* Russell had been 
writing privately to Bruce earlier in the year (E/B. Letters of Feb. 23 
and Apr. 10, I863) recommending that he ease up somewhat in his curtailment 
of consuls' powers. This was in connection with control over the actions 
of British nationals and it was only to apply selectively? i.e., for 
senior and responsible Consuls.
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To speak of Lay’s "contribution” to the Ch’iLng government in his 
capacity as interpreter "cum" administrator in otfcher respects, is to 
speak with a forked tongue. Luring his tenure, ait least, while the 
Ch’ing Authorities may have been made aware of thie fiscal and diplomatic 
advantages of the Inspectorate system, this awareness did not lead to the 
adoption of any of its organisational or administrative features in any 
other branch of the Ch’ing government, whether at the provincial or the 
metropolitan level. The point is not so much thait the adoption might 
have facilitated British relations with China in *other spheres of 
intercourse, but that Lay's efforts were ineffectual in conveying to the 
Ch’ing Authorities the essence of the "mutual bentefit" concept propagated 
on behalf of British interests.
As for other tangible results directly attrilbutable to Lay in his 
other capacities, these must be basically definad. in negative terms.
His role as interpreter "cum" negotiator may hare! facilitated some foims 
of intercourse, but in actuality he was being mlsccast by both sides.
Each was using him as a sounding-board. To the enctent that he had any 
advice to offer, it appeared to be "accepted" bf cone side of* the other 
because it coincided with positions formulated is the result of previous 
definition of interest, or it was not accepted it all. Even if, for example, 
there were a basis for giving him credit for a teccisive influence in the 
negotiations at Tientsin in June, 1858, the gla^img faet remains that 
the Treaty signed at the time and the Tariff an( Rules negotiated later 
that year at Shanghai, were not accepted by theChh’ing government until 
the Allied forces were required to reopen hostilities and to occupy Peking
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in I860. If his influence was decisive, then he must he charged with 
misguiding "both sides. If it was not decisive - which is what the evidence 
discloses - then his role was a secondary one. That efforts were made 
to make it appear that his role was more significant (and that he 
permitted himself to he deluded hy these efforts) is a different problem.
The preceding conclusions as well as the evidence in the principal 
portion of the study point to the last of this group of conclusions. 
However he may have interpreted his own functions, he was not a policy­
maker. He tended to confuse the function of policy-making with the 
function of policy-implementation. Although he obviously possessed more 
than ordinary intelligence and an unusual ability to analyse general 
problems, his inability to understand and his refusal to grasp the 
“realities” of the everyday environment in which he functioned contributed 
to this confusion. In the one major activity in which he could exercise 
a relatively independent discretion in policy-making - the flotilla 
scheme - the enterprise turned into a fiasco. Within the framework of 
the phantasy, the structure was valid, coherent, sound; but it was a 
phantasy. That others indulged in their own forms of phantasy in 
connection with the flotilla scheme is beside the point, but the dis­
bandment of the flotilla and Lay*s dismissal seemed to be the indicators 
that all those concerned with British relations with China had decided 
that the days of phantasy were over.
The foregoing, with some stretch of the imagination, may be considered 
the specific conclusions related to the principal features of Layfs role.
A few general conclusions of a still more provocative nature may not be
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out of place*
The yardsticks customarily employed in evaluating or interpreting 
developments in mid-19th Century China are the circumstantially definable 
interests of the contemporaries of the period and/or the "large”, 
indecipherable ideas of the 19th (or, frequently, of the 20th) Century* 
Alternative yardsticks may be just as narrow or just as indecipherable, 
but perhaps by adding to the range of perspectives, a longer measure of 
comprehensiveness or comprehension, may be addedt Thus, while the final 
conclusions that follow may go beyond the limits of the terms of reference 
of the study and may even violate some of the canons of historical 
research, they are part of the product of the effort that has been put 
into the orthodox preparation of the study*
Lay's role had a basic significance distinct from the individuality 
of the man and the evaluations of his successes and failures* It was 
that in the state of conditions of intercourse and relations that prevailed 
at mid-century, "interpreters" in the more comprehensive meaning of the 
word, were required* Lay's inadequacies and seeming failures were a 
characteristic of the probings - on both sidess one active, one passive - 
for interpretation and comprehension* There were "interpreters" active 
in various capacities, but Lay's unique role was that for a number of 
critical years he was one of the principals in a direct, intensive and 
sustained person-to-person dialog on a "system-to-system" level* The 
significance of the dialog was that, all other considerations apart, it 
contributed to the development of a mutually intelligible language of 
communication. The process itself encouraged the attempts to get more
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from it than could he expected from iti hence the enigma of Lay's dual 
role* Whether a different individual might have served as a more 
effective instrument is a hypothetical problem. One need not add fruitless
~ speculation to one's list of sins of commission.
The final general conclusion to be included in this study pertains 
to another intangible effect of Lay*s influence. It may be suggested 
that because of Lay's propensity to commit himself absolutely and dog­
matically to the interests of each of his Masters (as he understood 
those interests), he forced each of them to re-appraise and re-define 
the nature of those interests in more explicit and more specific terms. 
Lay's commitment, being more than an intellectual exercise, since he 
was generally as uncompromising in his actions as he was dogmatic in 
his views, also contributed appreciably to forcing both Masters to 
crystallise and, subsequently, to institutionalise limits of confrontation, 
accommodation and disengagement. There was no war to establish absolute 
pre-eminence of one system as against the other. There was to be 
accomodation (less aggressiveness on the "British” side, less passivity 
on the Confucian side) in the protection of the vital interests of both 
sides. There was to be disengagement (as a matter of policy, at least) 
in those areas where intercourse, as an extension of interests, were 
recognisably incompatible. Bruce took particular care to brief Sir Harry 
Parkes, when he returned to China, on the "new look" in policy.^
3. E/B. Bruce to Parkes, Private. Jan. 2, 1864# (FO 17/407• No. 9*
Bruce to Russell. Jan. 13, 1864# Enclosure.)
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In fact, as our interest in China is trade, and as trade 
is certain to increase, provided China enjoys internal and external 
tranquillity, my opinion of the policy to be pursued here differs 
materially from the views of the school of headlong progress, 
of which men like Lay and Osborn may be considered as the chief 
exponents* We do not wish to revolutionize the country, for 
I am convinced that we are more likely to get on with a Manchoo 
than with a purely Chinese dynasty. We do not wish to turn 
China into a second India, even if that were possible, and we 
should not be satisfied were any other foreign Government to 
make the attempt. Projects such as Railways and Telegraphs 
which would give to foreigners a landed interest in the interior 
of China, would lead to most seriohs complications unless the 
Government of China takes the initiative in such enterprises, 
and unless they axe in the main Chinese concerns, and exclusively 
within Chinese jurisdiction. I do not look to railways as likely 
to be of much benefit to foreign trade, which is of far more 
importance to us than putting money in the pockets of foreign 
speculators. If they are to be constituted in the hands of 
foreigners, who will be guaranteed in their rights by Foreign 
influence, they will embroil us with the native authorities, 
and their benefit and internal improvements would be outweighed 
by the obstacles thus created in the way of friendly relations 
with China. Lay hoped to make China the vassal of England, as 
representing western civilization in these waters, and to compel 
her to adopt the material symbols of progress in the 19th century. 
To suppose that a flotilla and 500 men were a sufficient force 
for the objects contemplated, and that other nations would have 
long acquiesced in the inferior position allotted to them, 
shewed an utter incapacity to comprehend China, or to realize 
the susceptibilities of foreign powers. Iobject is to work 
with the Chinese Govt. & not to supersede [sic] it, on the 
fallacious assumption that a foreigner is better able to govern 
China than the natives. I offer them suggestions, I propose 
novelties; if I can persuade their adoption so much the better.
If not, we must trust to time and increasing confidence in us, 
to do what argument and persuasion are unable suddenly to effect. 
Progress in this country must be slow in order to be safe; and 
no course is so calculated to produce a reaction fatal to our 
interests, and to involve England in responsibilities, with 
which no lover of his country would wish to see her burdened, 
as a disregard of the legitimate right of this Govt, to be 
consulted on questions affecting her interior condition, and the 
attempt to introduce by pressure, material improvements, which
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require a continuance of the same foreign pressure, to enable 
them to subsist. I shall be very glad to see railways and tele­
graphs established, if their necessity is felt and admitted 
by the Chinese. But they ought to be the badge of the progress 
of the Chinese, not the symbol of foreign domination or influence.
No one can be more conscious of the gaps and inadequacies of 
"conclusions” than the one who is responsible for them. Yet, it is to 
be hoped that this study of Lay's role in British relations with China 
has resolved some of the controversial aspects of Lay's role, has 
contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of those relations and, 
at the same time, has added clarification to some matters that have 
previously been obscure. It may, perhaps, stimulate interest in other 
lines of research on related problems of the inter-action of the two 
politico-culture systems.
APPENDIX I
FL Collection: Lay’s "guardian” [K. Gtitzlaff]
To Lay, March 6, 19^9*
The present expedition upon which you enter of your own 
accord, is of such great importance, that a few words from your 
guardian will be here at their proper place.
Remember first of all, that unless God in his mercy grants 
success, all efforts how wisely devised soerver will be of no avail. 
Seek him therefore in prayer and beseech him for his Son’s our 
Lord and Savelur’s sake to bless the present enterprize.
Consider yourself entirely at the disposal and under the 
orders of the Commanding Officer, obey implicitly.
You have entered upon a dangerous, very difficult undertaking, 
which notwithstanding the previous strenuous endeavours of many 
others has hitherto failed. You will never get on if you shew the 
least want of courage and decision, the Japanese ridicule such 
persons and treat them with contempt. Do not for a moment disguise 
to yourself the real difficulties, which antinational principles 
have created but meet them fearlessly.
You are aware of your own position, as the eldest son of a 
widowed mother, you ought to be her support. An opportunity is 
given to you to distinguish yourself by zeal and energy, such as 
perhaps never will offer again, and the prospects of your whole 
life may be 'humanly said to hinge on your conduct in the present 
instance. You have none to recommend yourself but your own 
exertions, with the blessing of the Most High; if you fail to do 
your duty, your progress in life will be blasted and you will 
repine in vain. Your great ancestor who has a name in British 
History, was never a protfeg£, but rose to the highest honours by 
individual exertions. May he in this respect be an example to you.
The principal business in which Captain Glynn will employ 
your services, will be faithfully and pointedly to translate his ideas.
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In all important matters this must be done in writing and the 
Chinese gentleman who accompanies you will assist you in this 
department. Whenever anything is official, be careful about 
the forms, such as you have learnt in the office, and let Chin 
who is well acquainted with them give it the requisite finish, 
so that nothing defective in style and expressions may leave 
your hand. The care you bestow on these things can never be 
too great.
Whilst strictly guarding against admitting the inferiority 
of the United States, a powerful Empire, to the Japanese in 
your terms and expressions and strictly maintaining the equality 
of officers of both the nations which have been established in 
China, you must never allow yourself to be outdone in politeness.
Be courteous in all your phraseology, and whilst you strive to be 
exact, never forget that suavity of expression, which will not 
fail to make the Japanese favourably inclined towards you.
On the other hand give with faithfulness the decided 
sentiments of Captain Glynn, be precise when he speaks in that 
tone, which becomes him as a messenger from a great and powerful 
nation, never abridge the terms of national dignity and national 
rights, and truly convey a detail of the consequences, in which 
the Japanese Government will be involved, if they persevere in 
their hostility against all those who approach their shores with 
peaceful intentions. There must be no shrinking, no mincing, the 
plain truth must be told in proper language, I should suggest 
that of all the important converstion you hold in writing, you 
should keep a copy.
The Japanese officers you will meet, will be full of 
subterfuges, and endeavours to evade the subjects, which give 
rise to the expedition. For this purpose they will use the most 
unaccountable and unwarrantable means.
The objects to be gained, are the restoration of American 
ship-wrecked seamen, and an assurance on the part of the Government, 
that they will in future be promptly delivered, without undergoing 
tedious examinations and torture. 2/ Permission for an American 
agent to reside in the country in order to keep up a good under­
standing and take charge of the sailors who are cast away. 3/ A 
coal dep0t on one of the islands south of Jedo.
You must endeavour always to bring back the conversation to 
these points heedless of the remarks of the Mandarins to refer to 
other topics. These are essentials, of paramount importance; to 
secure them nothing should be left untried.
Keep always in mind that the mere verbal promises of these 
people are of no value; to settle every thing you must have a 
paper to which the seal of the High Officers is attached. The 
Emperor alone can decide on the questions brought forward, and 
only when he with the Gorache (the privy council) [Go-R3ju] 
signify their assent, the convention is binding.
The three islands of Japan are divided between tributary 
princes, most of whom are Sovereigns in their own Country. If 
they enter into an understanding, it would only refer to their 
territory, not to the whole Empire.
Nagasaki is an imperial port, whither the most intriguing 
Mandarins are sent, who will leave nothing untried to deceive you, 
and render the expedition void. Be therefore very cautious in all 
your words, avoiding as much as possible all discussions except 
those which bear directly on the subject. They will endeavour to 
find out something, which they may nse as a pretext to reject the 
whole application. Knowing all this beforehand, you ought to be 
much on your guard.
Whenever public duty calls you do not eschew dangers. Never 
be disheartened, but always cherish courage, for how ill matters may 
look at the beginning, success will be awarded to the judicious 
and persevering.
During your voyage never neglect the reading of the scriptures, 
and likewise do so with Chin in Chinese. Read as much as you can of 
the works oh Japan in Captn. Glynn*s possession. Study the Chinese 
language as much as wind and weather will permit.
Recommending you to the gracious protection of your merciful 
and omnipresent Redeemer, to protect and assist you
I remain
Your affectionate Guardian
Hongkong 
6th March 18^9
rr
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APPENDIX II
Views on The Resident Minister Issue.
A. E/B.
Frederick Bruce to Lady Augusta Bruce (his sister) Shanghai
April 3, 1858.
The first approaches to Peking have been made in the shape 
of letters addressed to the Chinese Minister by the four Pleni­
potentiaries. The reply leaves no doubt as to the intention & 
wish of the Govt, to repel all advances towards more simple & 
direct communication with the Court. I fear that the capture 
of Canton has produced little effect on this bigotted & ignorant 
Govt., 8e will only be a further instance of how completely Sir J. 
Bowring has misunderstood its temper & policy. Fortunately the 
answers are so unequivocal in their tone, so palpably a violation 
of our treaty rights in refusing to allow us to communicate 
directly with the Ministers at Pekin & so preposterous in requiring 
us to go back to Canton, & negotiate with the man sent to arrange 
the local affair there, & evidently so determined not to admit our 
right to the access we claimed to Canton under the treaty, as to 
leave us no option but a trip to the Pei-ho. Whether this 
demonstration will suffice, or coercive measure must be undertaken 
in that quarter - nothing but time can show. Of one thing I am 
certain, that if the Chinese Govt, yield anything it will be due 
to fear & to that only, & that whatever were the rights of the 
original quarrel, a change must be effected in our relations with 
this country, if progress is to be made hereafter by pacific 
means.
In truth it is even more the interest of China than of 
Europe that 1his change should be forced upon her. According to 
her maxims, a local authority who gets into a difficulty sufficiently 
serious to be reported to the Emperor is degraded at once, whether 
he is in the right or no. The consequence is, that their object is 
to interfere as little as possible, 8c they rely on the sense of
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order prevalent among the Chinese, partly the result of their 
education & partly due to the universal prevalence of habits of 
industry among them, to act as a preservative from the evils 
attending their abdication of authority. The littoral provinces 
swarm with pirates & robbers, the Govt, makes no serious efforts 
to repress them, but leaves the people to supply their apathy by 
associations in self-defence. Now & then a great rebellion takes 
place, even for its suppression they look to time rather than to 
any decisive action.
This negation in spite of the disasters it inflicts on 
industry & trade may act when applied to the Chinese alone, who 
do not exceed certain limits in their opposition to constituted 
authority, who obey it implicitly, when it acts according to law 
and custom, 8c who, when driven to resistance by oppression, are 
satisfied with removing the cause and then stop. But now that 
they are confronted with the bold 8e adventurous people of the 
West, the governors are paralysed - they dread their power, and 
being ignorant when they can assert their just rights without 
involving themselves in a collision with foreign nations, they 
prefer as the wisest course never meddling with them at all.
The foreigner becomes more audacious, and the scum of the earth 
are attracted to a country where they can commit excesses without 
restraint.. This state of things will increase, the people of 
China will be exasperated to vengeance, 8< it will fall indiscriminately 
on all who bear the name of foreigner, so justly made odious by the 
conduct of the black sheep among them. Nations will take up the 
cause of their innocent countrymen 8e hostilities will begin.
The greatest service to China 8c the best hope of effecting 
peaceably those changes which she must undergo to fit her for the 
new phase now opening in her national life, is undoubtedly, 
ministers at Peking, 8c a recognition by her of the existence of 
other nations with whom she is bound to act on the usual international 
principles. They could teach her how 8c when to assert herself, 8c 
how to make use, for her own benefit, of the arts 8e sciences of 
modern civilization. Steam on her rivers, reform in her armed 
forces would strengthen her GoVt.. enormously against insurrection, 
would put down pirates, 8c by inspiring a wholesome respect of her 
power, would enable her to enforce her regulations. Unless she 
consents to enter on this path, she will be broken in pieces by 
her contact with Europe, as surely as glass is broken by iron.
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But the Emperor remote from this contact, & unaware of the process 
that is going on will not see the necessity till too late - his 
own Ministers have not the courage to tell him, & the alarm of 
the consequences of intercourse with foreigners is too great for 
him to swallow the dose of his own accord.
I hope people in England understand the situation. In my 
opinion if we leave the difficulty unsolved, we insure a fresh war 
in a very few years, when the state of Europe may not allow the great 
Powers to be as unanimous & as moderate as they are at present.
B. From Lane-Poole, Parkes. I, p.259
1) To Mrs. Lockhart - Feb. 16, 1857•
It is well that we should be only heard, in the first 
instance at Canton; but in such a manner that the Emperor will be 
glad to hear us speaking to another tune elsewhere, - it should be 
in no other place but Peking.
2) To Mr. Lockhart between above date and end of March.
The issue of these troubles ought to be a resident Minister 
at Peking and liberty to go through the length and breadth of the 
land, and I trust it will be so.
C. While the following extracts are retrospective, Elgin's terms 
of expression and his attitude, clearly demonstrate the factors 
that de/termined his decision. The substance of the extract for 
June 29 may be found in Walrond, p.255* However, Walrond's entry 
for July 19 (p.258) is valueless; teit copied from E/B. ms. Lord 
Elgin's letters journal to Lady Elgin.
June 29th....On Friday afternoon, however, Baron Gros came to 
me looking very much discomposed & said that the R & A M§ had come 
to him to implore him to induce me to recede from two of my demands -
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1. A resident minister at Pekin; and, 2. Permission to our 
people to trade in the interior of China; because, as they 
said, the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had told them that they 
had received a decree from the Emperor, stating that they 
should infallibly lose their head6 if they gave way on these 
points. Gros said if you have anything to say to Lord Elgin 
why do not you go? The resident minister at Pekin I consider 
far the most important matter gained by the Treaty; the power 
to trade in the interior hardly less so. I also suspected 
that the Russians who are constantly pulling the wires by no 
means desire that we shd obtain either of these objects - 
the American is such a fool that nobody can tell what he 
wants, but a slap at England is laways a lfbonne aubaine11.
Even Gros as I tell you had deceived me. I had at stake not 
only these important points in my treaty, for which I had fought 
so hard, but I know not what behind. For the Chinese are such 
fools, that it was impossible to tell, if we gave way on one 
point, whether they would not raise difficulties on every other....
July 19th....1 had no instructions from this Government, 
except the intimation that they were desirous of finishing the 
affair, and that they left it to me to determine what the honour 
and the commercial interests of England required. I was therefore, 
of course, open to attack on both flanks, not by the enemy only, 
but also at the hands of my employers. For if I patched up a 
peace in order to comply with the desire that I should "finish 
the affair", I might be accused of not doing enough for the "honour 
and commercial interests of England;" on the other hand, if I went 
on fighting for the "honour and commercial interests." I was open 
to the charge of not "finishing the affair." *Sur ces entrefaites*,
I struck out a plan which I firmly believed would enable me to accomplish 
both objects....This plan consisted in a rapid move upon the capital 
by the route of Tientsin; a diplomatic move, in the first instance, 
but so supported that it could, if necessary, repel hostility. I was 
perfectly satisfied that this plan, if carried boldly and rapidly 
into execution, would not be attended with any serious difficulty.
I had therefore, as I believed, difficult as was the feat which I 
was called to accomplish, the game in my hands. Imagine ray position 
when I found that the whole of my plan, with the important issues 
involved, was absolutely at the mercy of the naval authorities who 
had resolved to thwart it....Observe what was at stake; on the one 
hand, as I believed, and as the result has proved, a complete
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success; but on the other, if we had left the Gulf of Pecheli, as 
the Admirals intended, without having brought the Imperial Government 
to terms, I am not sure that an attack upon the Europeans at all the 
ports might not have been the consequence. All the blame of this 
would have been cast on me, and I should have borne the reproach 
of having by my rashness and folly, compromised the whole relations 
of Europe with China,•*
D. I,C.Y.HsU,,in his China*s Entrance into the Family of Nations, 
(Cambridge, Mass. i960) p.*f8 and p.229* n.14, basing his information 
entirely on Wright, Hart citations, repeats the assertion that Lay 
was responsible for Lord Elgin's insistence on including the 
resident minister clause in the treaty of Tientsin. In the first 
place, HsU cites the wrong page in Wright (i.e. "139" instead of 
"127,f)* In the second place, Wright cites two sources (n.l*f, p#153)s 
a) "F.O. 17/289* Elgin to Malmesbury, 5th July, 1858". The 
despatch number is not given. Several despatches, numbers between 
139-1^1 were dated July 5* None of them gives any indication 
that Lay, any more than any other member of the Mission, was 
responsible for Elgin's determination, b) Wright quotes Lay's 
Opium p.12 (most of which is reproduced by HsU) which was written 
about 35 years after the negotiations. This affirmation by Lay 
of his influence is the only evidence which credits Lay, alone, 
with any special influence.
Other contemporary sources (e.g. "[Scarth]"), berate Elgin 
for having demanded too little instead of too much because of the 
insidious influence of Lay and Wade!
APPENDIX III
E/B Extract from 'ms* of Lord Elgin's letters-journal: June 12, 1858#
June 12 th. - Last night things looked promising. The Russians 
and Americans had made an attempt to check me, by affecting to believe 
that my interpreter, Mr. Lay, had spoken too roughly to the Chinese 
Plenipotentiaries. I do not think it is possible to imagine anything 
more contemptible than the conduct of these gentlemen - especially 
the Americans. Of course my great object is to get the Chinese to 
make the requisite concessions here, so as to prevent its being 
necessary to resort to further acts of violence; these sneaking 
scoundrels do what they can to thwart me and thus while affecting 
to support the Chinese act as their worst enemies. However, I made 
my language stronger instead of weaker in consequence of their 
remonstrance, and the result was, that at a late hour last night I 
received from the Chinese Plenipotentiary a most promising 
communication. God grant that it may enable us to finish this 
wretched affair1 I am reading over your last letter. [There follows 
in the manuscript several passages of endearment.] Your visit to 
Dunnikier takes me a generation back, when another two sets of 
cousins, divided much the same as to sexes, used to spend many 
pleasant days together there. [A few additional passages of 
personal reminiscences follow.] Alas how old we are getting - 
I ought to be a great deal older since we parted for I have gone 
through a good deal in several ways. Certainly I have seen more 
to disgust me with my fellow creatures than I saw during the whole 
course of my previous life. I did not know what brutes - lying - 
sanguinary - cheating - oppressive to the weak crouching before the 
strong - I did not know I say what they are those smooth faced 
countrymen of ours who look at home as if butter would melt in 
their mouths, and as if nothing could tempt them to step an inch 
on either side of the strict line of propriety, till I found them 
in the East among populations too timid to resist & too ignorant 
to complain. I have an instinct in me which loves righteousness 
and hates iniquity and all this keeps me in a perpetual boil, I 
must tell you that I do notthink "Our Own's" letters in the Times 
give a really correct view of this country. I saw very well, from
M s  case, what the great evils are of this way of informing the 
public mind. It was always necessary for him to write a telling 
letter. Everything was exaggerated for effect. The fighting was 
a work of the fancy, and the poor Chinese were of use only as 
'materiel' for caricatures and epigrams. I do not think he was at 
all a bad specimen of his class - Except that he belonged to that 
most begotted of all classes the radical 'John Bull'• He never 
entered into or ever approached the heart of Chinese life. He 
looked at them entirely from without, with the ^ es of a man whose 
whole stock of ideas has been laid in at Temple Bar, and who had 
not room for any importation from any other quarter. As he said 
of the Chinese in one of his letters, "they are not a cute, but 
a cutaneous people;" That was pretty much the sum of his 
observations. All this is between ourselves and t^ prevent you 
from being too much influenced by his prejudice ag a people who 
have many good points & whose political & social condition is by no 
means so bad as he makes them out to be. [Here follow six sentences 
of strictly personal expressions about his wife and family]. It is 
rather strange that Malmesbury saw not only my despatches, but also 
Fredk's letters, that he sh have written impertinently to me, but 
I suppose that is part of the system. I am most obliged to 
Mrs. Campbell & think her a person of very good taste. I have not 
been in the way of compliments of any sort lately - so they are 
all the more prized when they come. Mr. Algernon Wort [?] is a 
gentleman who wanted to come with me. [This concludes the entry 
for this date].
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APPENDIX IV
Notes on the origins of a "Foreign Board",
Extension of remarks on Ch.8, designated by n.46.
This phrase is used in order to cover the requests and 
authorisation to set up what has been known as the "Foreign 
Board" or, according to the abbreviated Chinese version, as the 
"Tsungli Yamen". This writer has concluded that the contention 
that Lay played any significant part in the origin of this 
board is predicated on extremely shallow evidence* The main 
proponent of the view here refuted was S. F. Wright, Hart pp.1^5-^9* 
who based his assertion solely on a brief passage in a precis 
prepared by Lay of a confidential conversation he had with Hstieh 
Huan in April, i860 (Vide Ch.VIII n. 16*0, during which Lay 
recommended that a ’foreign office" be established, ((This 
conclusion has been accepted by W. Levi, Modern Chinafs Foreign 
Policy (Minneapolis, 1953) P*l6 ff, without too much discrimination)). 
There were so many other factors that came into play before the 
Tsungli Yamen was inaugurated nine months later that Layfs 
contribution (even assuming his was an original suggestion, which 
there is good reason to doubt) should be considered relatively 
inconsequential, ((This view is well illustrated by the more 
comprehenisve studies of SM, Meng, The Tsungli Yamen: Its 
Organization and Functions (Cambridge, Mass, 1962) and M. Banno, 
op.cit.)), T.F. Tsiang, "Origins of the Tsungli Yamen", CSPSR XV
1 (apr. 1931) PP*92-971 has argued that Article V did not establish 
a "foreign office" as a 'sine qua non* of formal diplomatic 
relations and that a branch office might have been set up under 
the Li Pu, One may also speculate that even had this been done, 
the Ch'ing officials almost certainly would have been required to 
try to pass it off as a "foreign office".
Because of the foregoing reasons and also because, in the 
context of Ch.VII Lay was not associated with any of
the early developments of the Tsungli Yamen, a notice of this sort 
is all the writer deems necessary to account for his ignoring the 
subject in the body of the study.
APPENDIX V
E/B. Lay and Wade to Lord Elgin: l86l
A. H.N. Lay to Lord Elgin* Private* Shanghai, 22 March l86l.
My Lord,
At Mr* Parkes' request I send your Lordship a Printed copy 
of the "Provisional Regulations for the trade in the Yangtsze .["].
All accounts concur in pronouring the prospects of business at 
Hankow to be "very good"*
Prince Kung has sent me a Commission as Inspector-General.
But the rebellion has gained such strength of late as to threaten 
now the immediate downfall of the Dynasty. This fact and the state 
of my health considered have determined me to go home on leave of 
absence for this year. And I propose starting by the next mail.
Mr. Wade writes that Peking is in an "awful state", and that "if 
Tsang kwoh fan or any other Chinese agent be really able to 
reconquer the provinces, which are so disordered that they are no 
more of the empire than the flag which hangs down from a rent in 
the coat, then of course the Tatsing will revive again. Otherwise, 
the question is only when will its remaining solidity melt away".
In another letter he says: "This morning brings news of Sangkolinsin*s 
being shut up in Tsi-ning chow. Whether this be true or not, we 
know that he has sustained some very serious defeats. He can have 
no artillery, and in Peking they have no money. If the Nien Fei 
destroy Sangkolinsin, Peking is inevitably lost". This position 
of affairs deters me altogether from incurring fresh responsibilities. 
Before extending the System, I think it prudent to wait and see what
this year will bring forth. From the present aspect of things, it
seems certain that the Dynasty must either revive or fell this year.
If next year the Tatsing be in the ascendant, I shall have a clear 
field for my operations, while if the rebels are triumphant, I 
shall have nothing to regret. In the meantime, I shall have an 
opportunity of explaining at home what the Foreign establishment is.
I am told that great efforts are to be made shortly, at the
instigation of Perceval and others, to effect a change of System.
My address in London will be no.6 Burton Crescent, W.C.
Believe me, My Lord,
Yours very faithfully,
[Signed]HN. Lay
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B.
T.F. Wade to Lord Elgin. Private. (Extract) Peking, 23 July l86l.
...The presence of foreign ministers at Peking stands the city
in some stead no doubt; so that of the Allied Force at Tientsing,
or, where I suppose it will soon be at Ta-ku, does the whole
vicinity. The rebels will keep a respectful distance so long as
there is a chance of a foreign complication; at least the rebels of
the North. If, as it was predicted, there is a solid move in the
South of all gangs confederated, I doubt that they will again
venture on Shanghai. The [sic] keep clear of Ningpo simply on our
account. No doubt all this is in contravention of the letter of
non-interference, but I see no alternative except to be burned out
by a banditti who are a spreading fire leaving nothing but ruin
behind them, and in some places not even ruin....a change on the
Throne may$.ve the dynasty which is still respected, a new lease
and between Ministers and Customs it will be hard if it be not
inoculated with new ideas that will avail it within and without.
I say this is its last hope. It is, God knows, but too probable
that it will continue dreaming and unreformed,...indeed a not
very grave crisis might destroy it suddenly such....as would be
caused were the Manchu Garrison of Peking to revolt for want of
pay....These are our fears and few hopes on the dynastic side; on
the other there is as yet worse than nothing....Between the
pressure of two such forces it would be a bolder man than I who
would predict the result of China.
* * * * * * *
P.S. Mr. Bruce has read my letter to your Lordship and begs 
me to say that.••.he has nothing material to add....
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APPENDIX VI
Exchanges of Correspondence: Hart, Wade and Lay - 1862
A* Lay, L*R.
March 26* [1862] & Garter11 Richmond* %
To Hart,
Attorney General's opinion on the whole satisfactory, though 
carelessly worded by Hannen in one or two places*
Parkes's suggestion for a conversation respecting Courts for 
settlement of Customs' cases* If Kung cedes any more Sovereign 
rights, I resign*
Interviews with Lord Palmerston, Layard, & Gregson.
1 shall not leave before March* Parkes loud in denouncing 
imbecility of Chinese Govt. Considering the absence of Christianity 
in China we are not entitled to look for the truth & principle we 
find in our own more forward country*
I 6hould have been inclined to take a higher tone with Kwan, &
I would not have received the 0200 because a present of the kind 
implied your infinite inferiority in position to himself, & would 
deprive you of your proper weight with him & other officials* Now, 
the Inspector-General has of course no no [sic] formal rank (at 
present); & it is not necessary or expedient to claim any* But as 
the p'oong yew and confidential adviser of the Prince, he is by 
courtesy entitled to equal respect & consideration with the 
Highest officers in the Empire* The Inspector-General has a right 
to, & must have, the same position which the confidential 'tzeyay' 
of the Prince or Governor General has assigned him* It would be 
absurd to attempt to get formal rank, - which would excite the 
jealousy of the officials, & make Kung's work perhaps more difficult,
- but we must see to it that we have the real power* I should 
receive no orders from Hsieh or any other official, but from 
Prince Kung direct alone* Complaints against consuls should go 
from the Prince upon his own inclination, when he gets it from you*
These would probably be of a general nature when furnished by you.
Where they touch upon a particular case, the report of the Governor 
of the province would be of service. The desp. upon it to the 
Foreign Minister should be submitted to you, for you to add any 
details or remarks that might have been omitted, or that it would 
be advisable to add. The Inspector-General must have direct access 
to Prince Kung, 8c the Tsung le yamun. All desp. to Foreign Ministers 
upon Customs matters should pass through his hands for his suggestions 
and corrections. Copies of all instructions to the Provincial 
Author, upon Customs should be furnished him. These are indispensable 
rules, I conceive. I should say to Prince Kung, I have only to do with 
'you* 8c nothing whatever with Hsieh or any other provincial authority.
1  am not a Chinese, 8c therefore have no formal p'in, but the duties 
of my position considered, if I were, my [rank] would be only one 
degree below yours. And you must take this line, which it is only 
necessary for me thus to indicate briefly. We must insist upon 
this principle, or we shall lose weight with the officials, 8c 
presently with Kung himself. You must remain at Peking as long as 
you can this year.
p'oong yew 5 tzeyay ; p'in °cq •
B, Lay, L.R. [Not copied in Lay's handwriting.]
Star 8c Garter Hotel 
Richmond. S.W.
April 26/52 [sic]
My dear Hart,
Your most welcome note of the 27th Febry announcing Laou's 
receipt of instructions to pay over a portion of the 600.000 taels, 
authorized by Prince Kung for immediate payment towards the purchase 
of Steamers, reached me on the 15th Instant. I wrote off at once 
to Osborn, telling him I thought he might apply at once with 
perfect safety to be suspended. I do not apprehend any difficulty 
about his getting leave, and I am sure that so far as he can 
command his own movements, he won't lose an hour. But I fancy 
he will be obliged to remain on board the "Donegal", until actually
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relieved by bis successor* That there may be no delay however, I 
have asked him to send me instructions with respect to the building 
of two eighty h*p* gun boats, which I can order forthwith* I have 
also suggested that he may consider it adviseable to have them iron­
clad, to a certain extent* You make a serious mis-calculation in 
your note: ’’The sum of 600,(XX) taels i*e* about £250*000 Stg.lf
Were the money remitted entirely from Shanghae, at its highest rate 
of exchange* 6/8, we should not realize more than £200*000* We can 
scarcely count upon an average of more than 6/; in Canton or H-Kong, 
you won’t get 5/-*
In your letter of the 20th Janry, you said that Woo Taoutae 
could produce eeuld-preduee in four months 200*000 tls*, Sc Hsieh 
had promised to get in other ways 600*000 tls* in addition* If 
you can get this 800*000 tls* in addition to the Canton 200*000, 
do so by all means* We shall need all ’you can send*, duplicate 
machinery, coajjs"7"‘powder, shot, paint, stores of all sorts, cost 
of passage out, and last but not least, the guarantee fund, considered. 
The salaries of the officers & men composing the force must be 
guaranteed by a deposit in the Fund or, in some Bank* This I 
consider absolutely necessary* The vessels might be fully supplied 
for three years, so that we may avoid as far as possible making any 
fresh call upon Kung during that time*
You must send me by return of mail a despatch from P* Kung, 
undertaking to agree to, and confirm such terms and conditions as 
I may arrange with Osborn, and those under him* Take care please 
that its wording be full and exact*
Upon my word, what we are going to do, is a very serious & 
responsible undertaking! We must have the consent of our Govt., 
and, if possible, this consent must be notified to the Civil 8c 
Naval Authorities in China I shall also go through the form 
of applying to the French Govt, for permission to employ some of 
its ferees- officers. The compliment will please and conciliate 
them. As things are, we ’must* work with the ’French'. Our 
policy can't be a different one from that of tfee-aew our own 
Govt. - I must have a look at the Foreign Enlistment act and see 
what it says - Sir F. Kelly was just starting for Switzerland, 
when the Customs' questions were laid upen before him, so I said 
I would wait till his return* He was prepared to name a day for 
an interview, but as I did not want the points disposed of helter 
skelter, I preferred waiting until he could give them his deliberate 
attention*
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You must take care and see that Kung agrees to no proposition 
for a mixed court. From a remark Parkes made in one of his recent 
notes to me, he has evidently been talking to some of the merchants 
on behalf of the F.O. on the subject. The result will doubtless 
be that he will draw up some proposals which will be out to Mr. Bruce, 
with the request that he will lay them before Prince Kung. 'Be on 
the qui-vive' Supported, as I have said before, by the Attorney 
General's opinion, there is not the smallest reason for Kung's doing 
otherwise than simply declining to entertain them, as involving a 
further surrender of sovereign rights, not ceded by Treaty. I know 
what fools the Chinese, from unpleasant experience, are on these 
points, and so I am a little nervous - perhaps deubt needlessly so - 
that they should accede to 'any' proposal of the sort wh. would I 
believe bring our Establishment down by the run. Parliament has 
been adjourned for a fortnight during the Easter holidays, so Lord 
Palmerston is out of town. When he returns, I think I shall seek 
another interview.
It seems to me probable, and more so every month, that on my 
return to China, my presence will be required for some time at any 
rate, & perhaps permanently, at Peking. I believe that to carry 
out our Customs, and the other business which we shall have on 
hand safely not to say satisfactorily, you or I must live at 
Peking. Questions will be always arising which the Chinese alone 
are utterly unfit to answer, and as long as they are left alone 
we shall have no end of trouble from consuls & possibly from 
unfriendly Ministers. The Inspector-General must therefore have 
a house to go to, & I want you to ask Prince Kung to allot me 
for the purpose, or authorize you to hire or build one. I should 
require a house commensurate with my dignity 8e rank (1) and one 
that I could put my wife & child in. I suppose there are large 
& comfortable 'Kung-Kwan' to be had.
Impress upon Kung that he may be sure that what he sends 
will be rightly used, and that it will be false economy if he 
stints us. A Hundred thousand taels more or less he mustn't 
object to.
Yours very truly,
H.N. Lay.
P.S. Ask Laou whether he would not like to have two gunboats for 
the Canton river. Send the money as fast as you can; any delay
won't be on this side of the water Kung may depend. Did you read 
Mr. Gladstone's speech - his Budget I mean. He says. "The 
expectation entertained in China as to the field of the Customs 
duties has been somewhat too sanguine, and I consider, instead of 
^ or 5 years, a period of 7 or 8 years from the first payment will 
be necessary to realize the whole indemnity, unless some arrangement 
be made in the meantime for anticipating the payments and shortening 
the time." Don't you let Kung agree to any thing of the sort. The 
payment of the indemnity serves the Govt, as a good argument for 
supporting our Institution, which can't be gainsaid.
Kung-kwan /£_ Jgg
C.l: E/B. Bruce collections
Hongkong.
l^th March, 1862.
Sir,
At the many interviews which I had, during the summer and
autumn of last year, with the Prince of Kung and the other members
of the board recently established for the superintendence of foreign 
relations, I repeatedly took occasion to draw attention to the 
growing necessity for the introduction of measures calculated to 
repress piracy along the coast, and to secure from the inroads of 
lawless banditti the ports and places opened by treaty to foreign 
commerce. His Imperial Highness evinced great interest in the 
schemes proposed, and directed me to draw up in writing a
memorandum containing my suggestions both as to what ought to be
done, and as to the manner in which such propositions might most 
easily be carried into effect; the memorandum then drawn up was
"Copy"
No.3 
Separate
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subsequently laid before the late Emperor HBenfung, who issued a 
Decree ordering the Governors General of Hoo-Kwang and the Two 
Keang to report upon the practicability of the scheme.
The memorial in reply, which, however, I have not yet seen, is 
said to have approved of the suggestions made by me.
Amongst the measures proposed for adoption was the construction 
of a Steam fleet for the police service of the Chinese waters, to act 
in cooperation with the maratime [sic] customs under foreign inspection; 
and it seemed to His Imperial Highness, that that project ought to be 
the first to be carried into execution, as likely to be attended with, 
immediate, beneficial results, and as being a measure of a kind that 
would protect commerce and, in that way, tend to prevent any interruption 
of the friendly relations which it is the determination of the Prince 
shall be maintained with foreigners, so long as his voice is powerful 
in the counsels of the state. If the motive which actuates the 
Prince, in his attitude towards foreigners, be, to say the least of 
it, nothing more than that he sees the necessity of accepting the 
situation and of making the best of the position to which circumstances 
have led, it ought to be a cause of much satisfaction that His 
Highness should have taken even that step in advance, throwing aside 
both the exclusive policy and the opposition to innovation, which 
have of late been so detrimental to the best interests of China.
The intestine disorders of the past fifteen years, aggravated 
by foreign wars during the last five, had, however, interfered so 
sadly with the finances of the country, as to make it somewhat 
difficult for the Prince to say at what time it would be possible 
to provide sufficient funds for the initiation of the changes proposed. 
Moreover, upon the death of the Emperor HBBn-fung, the self-styled 
Regents were so powerful, while the court remained at Jehol, that it 
would have been inexpedient for His Imperial Highness, already 
accused of being too favourable to foreign interests, to further 
endanger his position by advocating the adoption of my propositions, 
and by demanding authority for the outlay, for such a purpose, of 
public money, while there remained in power a court party notorious 
for its retrograde policy and antipathy to foreigners.
The return of the young Emperor to Peking, an event which the 
Prince was most anxious to bring about, together with the subsequent 
occurrences, not only reinstated His Imperial Highness in his proper
position at court, but made him virtually the ruler of China. One 
of the Prince’s first acts has been to approve of the adoption of 
ray proposition for the construction of a steam fleet for coast­
guard and police duty in the Chinese waters, and to give directions 
for the appropriation of funds.
On the 3rd day of the 1st month of this, the first year of the 
young Emperor Tung-che, despatches were addressed to the authorities 
of Kang-soo * Fuh-Keen, and Kwang-tung, informing them of the measures 
I had proposed, and directing them to place at my disposal, within 
fournmonths, the sum of *eix hundred thousand taels’; and His 
Highness has likewise issued instructions, addressed to myself,
ove sum, with all expedition,
The despatch addressed to Laou, the Governor General of the 
Two Kwang, authorised His Excellency to hand over to me at once the 
sum of Two Hundred Thousand Taels. Unfortunately, the finances of 
the southern provinces are not, at the present moment, in a condition 
to meet the demand in full; but, notwithstanding, His Excellency, 
who is personally much in favor of the scheme, has already supplied 
me with half that sum, namely ’One hundred thousand Taels’, or dollars 
one hundred and thirty nine thousand four hundred and seventy, and 
has assured me that he will pay over regurlarly every month at least 
Twelve thousand five hundred Taels, until the sum authorised shall 
have been delivered in full.
I now enclose Firsts of Exchange at six months sight for Pounds 
Sterling 'Thirty One thousand Three hundred and forty three, eleven 
shillings, and five pence’ the receipt of which you will please to 
acknowledge by return of post. [N.B. Note in margin details bills 
of exchange.] Before the expiration of the present year, I trust 
to have sent you by successive payments, not merely the remaining 
Five hundred Thousand Taels of this the first, grant, but, in 
addition, a further sum of Two hundred Thousand Taels.
His Imperial Highness is most anxious for the arrival of the 
steam fleet, the construction of which ha has now authorised; and 
for various reason which you can well understand, it Is of the greatest 
importance that no time be lost in despatching the vessels procured.
For my part, nothing will be left undone to obtain and forward funds 
with all expedition, and you, I am sure, will spare no pains to send 
the steamers well fitted out and with the least possible delay.
<
irnoses I had susrffested. LSiCJ
In a private letter connected with this subject written last 
year, I mentioned to you the name of Captain Sherard Osborn C.B., 
and esqpressed a hope that he might be induced to superintend the 
construction, and subsequently take command of the fleet; a letter 
of yours, since received, has, to my great satisfaction, informed 
me of his willingness to do so.
Being fully assured that, in this matter, the end in view 
with you, as with myself, will be the benefit of this country, I 
now conclude this despatch, enclosing a memorandum with reference 
to the vessels to be procured, the people to be engaged, and the 
rates of pay, on all of which points I beg that you will without 
delay report to me for the information of the Chinese High 
Authorities.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) ROBERT HART
Offg. Inspector-General 
of Chinese Maratime Customs 
[sic]
H.N. Lay, Esquire 
London
C.2.
Memorandum
"Enclosure in No.3 Separate"
Steam Fleet for the police of 
The Chinese Waters:- Vessels 
to be procured, People to be 
employed, and salaries.
1. The money now sent, One hundred thousand Taels [£31*3^3 - 11 - 5 
Stg.] should at once be applied to the purchase or construction of 
Two Gunboats, similar to those of eighty-horse power in the English 
Navy. These, as soon as ready, should be sent, without delay, to 
cruise in the Canton waters, where piracy has of late been greatly
on the increase.
2. The money yet to be sent, Five hundred thousand Taels, together 
with an additional sum of Fifty thousand Taels, should be appropriated 
for the construction of Two additional Gunboats and three despatch boats.
3. The remaining One hundred and fifty thousand Taels, for 
which authority has yet to be procured, should be expended in 
the purchase of two additional Gunboats.
4. The rates at which the above items of expenditure are 
calculated are:
£30 per Ton, and £90 per horse power.
250 Tons: 80 horse power: each £14,700 i.e.
Tls ¥*,100: with spare machinery &c. Tls 5900. 
Each gunboat Tls 50,000: total, six Gunboats,
Tls 300,000.
750 Tons: 250 horse power: each £45*000 i.e.
Tls 135*000: with spare machinery &c. Tls 15*000. 
Each Despatch boat Tls 150,000. Total Three 
Despatch Boats Tls 450,000.
Tls 300,000
Tls 450.000 
Total Tls 750*000
The sum now authorised by the Prince is Tls 600,000; in June an 
authorization for an additional sum of Tls 200,000, or perhaps 
more, will be procured
[I am of opinion that the fleet should at first 
consist of 4 despatch boats and 6 gunboats; one 
despatch and two gunboats to be stationed at 
Canton; do at Foochow, and do at Shanghai; the 
4th despatch boat to be Captain Osborn’s flag 
ship.]
5. With regard to the number of people to be employed; and the 
rates of pay they should receive, I cannot venture to give any 
other than very general suggestions.
6 Gunboats:
3 Despatch Boats:
Six gunboats 
Three despatch 
boats
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To the enquiries of the Chinese authorities as to the amount to 
be appropriated annually for the payment of the foreigners 
employed in the fleet, I have replied that
a* for each Gunboat there should be
[ a Commander 
[ 2 Officers
about £600 a year
M O O  and £300 11
European \ 2 Engineers £400 and £300 it
\ 2 Gunners 6 £150 each ti
[10 Seamen
Marines £60 " it
Chinese [30 Seamen £25 each tt
Total Pay for crew of each gunboat £3*650, i.e. Tls 10,950* 
Six Gunboats Tls 65*700.
and
b. for eachcfespatch boat,
about £800 a year 
£500 and £300 "
MOO, £300 8c £300 a year 
£150 each "
£60 each w
[amongst whom should be six marines]
Chinese (100 Seamen @ £25 each M
Total Pay for crew of each despatch boat, annually,
£7,500, i.e. Tls 22,500. Four despatch boats Tls 90,000.
Grand Total, 6 Gunboats, and 4 Despatch boats about Tls 155*700 
yearly.
N.B. What is to be the pay of the Commander in Chief? £2000 a year?
I am of the opinion that the above rates of pay will not fail 
to secure first class men.
European
a Commander
2 Officers
3 Engineers
4 Gunners 
[30 Seamen
@
@
6. Coal must be sent out from home: say three cargoes, to 
Canton, Foochow, and Shanghai.
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7* On my return to Peking, I shall endeavour to produce commissions
for the Officers, and Government papers for each vessel. The Prince, 
too, will probably fix upon the ensign to be worn by the Chinese 
Government fleet.
8. The last word to be written for the purposes of this memorandum
is - haste!
(Signed) ROBERT HART 
0 I G 
of C.M.C.
D.l# Lay, L.R. [Extracts, Portions not given in Lay,’’interests]
ftStar & Garter Hotel11, 
Richmond, May 9« 1862
My Dear Hart,
I have your No. 5 dated Hong Kong March l*f, and the "official 
despatch11 from yourself which accompanied it, enclosing several 
bills of exchange for £ 31*3^3« 11/5 at six months sight, remitted 
by the Chinese Govt. On receipt of these Bills, I lost no time in 
signing the enclosed receipt, so as to prevent the amount being 
included in my personal property by ray executors, in the event 
of my death.
I have not executed a document by vhkh this sum of money 
would in the event of ray death "revert to me to be held for the 
use of the Prince of Kung", as you have requested me in your 
note to do, because to give such request due validity, it needs 
the formal authority of the Chinese Government, without which 
I have no right whatever to vest the property of the money in 
you, or in me, or in any one.
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The same remark applies, to.vour further request that "the 
ownership of the Steamers is to oe vested f°r the use of
the prince of Kung, until handed over by you , on arrival in 
China to the Agents of His Highness• " The ownership of the 
Steamers can be vested only in the Chinese Govt. Without its 
distinct authority, I should incur a perilous responsibility, 
were I to vest their ownership in any one. Where so large a 
sum of money is concerned, it behoves me to act with the utmost 
caution. All that I can do, is to secure the Government against 
loss in the event of my death. In regard to yourself, you ar©e 
protected by the terms of my receipt "through Robert Hart Esq ." 
And here I must correct a mistake you appear to have fallen 
into. The money, I take it, was not handed over to you, Hart, 
but to you as the Offg. Inspector-General. In an official matter, 
there can be enly no individual action. Once admit individual 
action, and we shall have our French and American Colleagues 
scheming and acting independently. The money is handed over to 
you to be remitted to me the Inspector-General, not to Lay, for 
disbursement.
In writing you*"official [sic] despatch , you no doubt 
simply meant to say put something on record to ,fconstaterl!, as 
Wade would say, the undertaking. But you quite forgot the danger 
yourwere running of embarrassing my action. Though your memo, 
it is true, was written of yonr own motion and without authority, 
yet if eventually adopted by the Chinese Government, it ought 
in strictness to be adhered to. The exact cost of the vessels, 
&c., cannot be precisely determined until Osborn (or some other 
competent man) has prepared careful estimates after consultation 
with various authorities. The calculation I sent you will I 
make no doubt prove now considerably under the mark, by reason 
of the results attained by the recent experiments upon iron and 
wood at Shochuryness. Each vessel may cost much more than 
£30 per ton. I know not. Kung might complain of this, and say, 
what Mr. Hart wrote was with my sanction, and he might bring an 
action against me for unauthorized use of the money I And I 
should have no authority to show that I was entitled to depart 
from the only sort of authority in my possession. Where so 
great vast a sum of money is concerned, one cannot, I repeat, 
be too careful.
In a matter which is of necessity one of entire trust, the 
Prince need not hesitate about putting the fact that it is so on 
paper. Tell him from me that at present I dare not use the money, 
because I have not his authority for doing so, and that as it is 
quite impossible, he will allow for him to send me specific 
instructions it is necessary that he should send me "full powers". 
The one thing or the other they must be. Specific instructions, 
supposing me willing to act upon them, would serve but one purpose, 
namely to fetter and embarrass the ship-builders and others and 
consequently ensure a half equipped and in every respect inefficient 
fleet.
....There could not be two sets of Foreign Advisers, and a rival 
board for the management of affairs connected with Foreigners would 
infallibly involve both itself and the Customs in speedy ruin. The 
house would be divided against itself, which as a wise man said, 
cannot stand.
There is another condition that I should include in the "terms 
and conditions" of our com in Chief. It is this. The Ch. Govt, 
must be bound to have no Foreigners in a military capacity, save 
and except those under his authority, - my object being to snuff 
out Taoutae's fleets and "Col. Ward's divisions". We must secure 
ourselves against a rival military force on shore. But first and 
foremost there is the legal ground to be cleared.
The strengthening the Chinese with a really formidable fleet 
will be viewed with no little distrust, I assure you. Since the 
murder of DeNorman & Bowlby, people in England seem to have lost 
all faith in the Chinese. The Foreign Office will, I expect, be 
primed with many objections to the scheme to remove which I rely 
as I have said on the personal character of myself and the others.
Mr. White and others will not fail to call the attention 
of the House te-a-seheme of Commons to the scheme. How careful 
then should we be to make our footing sure, so that we may be
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in a position to flip our fingers te at Consuls, Merchants, and 
HongKong juries♦
Our endeavour must be to get the help of the Govt, as well 
as ite approval. We should get instructions sent to the Admirals 
on the China Station and to Bruce and the Consuls. An Admiral 
jealous of Osborn or *s gaining glory, might and would in
the absence of instructions, most effectually bother him, while 
if a Minister unfriendly to Customs were to take the place of 
Bruce, we might meet with serious opposition te-eup-plans at 
his hands.•.•
You had better send the remittances at sight. As time will 
be an object, I shall have to discount the Bills. It is better 
that you should get less for your tael out there, than that we 
should have to pay discount here. It comes to the same thing, 
but the bills represent a larger amount in Sterling than we 
actually get the benefit of, and the charge for discount in 
the Accounts, Kung will look upon as a "squeeze*1. You must not 
adopt the notion that Kung’s consent to buy steamers is altogether 
owing to your efforts. The subject has been brought before the 
High Authorities repeatedly, and memorials have been sent up on 
my suggestion It was thus that I obtained authority to purchase 
the "Confucius" During the negotiations at Tientsing, I urged 
the subject in person, and it was at my dictation that the 
article in the Treaty about joint action for the repression of 
piracy was inserted, and it was worded as it is in order to give 
me a handle for inducing the Govt, to buy Chu’eif. [sic] I tell 
you this, however, not to detract from your merit in getting 
Kung’s consent. I should be slow "to drill men". That will 
come in good time. You must take care not to do too much, 
before our footing is sure.
With regard to additional clerks for the Customs, if Kung 
will send me the requisite authority & a remittance to pay their 
passage, say £200 each, I shall be happy to select half a 
dozen men - 20 to 23 years of age. I should like to send Kung 
a few things from the Exhibition, such as models of steamers, 
Engines, &c.
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I have had the words "Substitutes or Agents" put in, so 
that should I return to China before the vessels are completed,
I may have the power of authorizing some one to do whatever may 
remain to be done*
I send you the "Times" of the 3rd** Mr. White promises you 
will see to bring the Taeping movement before the House shortly.* * * 
Our preliminaries once arranged, we can make up for lost time* I 
have put in "pensions" in the authority* Men won*t go out to be 
potted at and wounded, unless they are in that event to receive 
compensation* Not only have we to buy ships, but we have to 
"organize a service".
I will enclose in my next a duplicate, which you can keep, 
of the receipt now enclosed for the £ 31*3^3* 11/5*
What about the "tribunals" In Customs case? Has anything 
gone out from the F.O.?
D.2 [N.B.]
BART) Enclosure in my letter to Hart, dated 9th May/62.
To be embodied in a despatch from the Chinese Government addressed 
to Mr. Lay.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Yours &c.
Referring to the £31*3^3.11.5. British money, already paid 
to you, and to all monies which may from time to time be paid to 
you (except on account of the Maritime Customs) the same are to 
be applied by you as follows:- In purchasing Steam Vessels, and 
fitting them out with all necessary machinery, armament, boats, 
coals, stores, and other appendages &c. &c:- In the engaging of 
Officers and Men for the service of such vessels, and making 
contracts and arrangements with them, upon such terms and 
conditions, in all respects, as you shall think fit:- In the 
providing of a guarantee or reserve fund, for the salaries, 
wages, pensions, and other compensations, of or to such Officers 
and Men:- And in payment of all expenses of, and incidental to, 
the effecting of the above subjects, and generally for such 
purposes as you shall, in your absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion, think necessary or advisable, for the benefit of the 
Imperial Government of China.
And I hereby undertake, on behalf of the Imperial Government 
of China, to confirm all that you, or any substitutes or Agents 
acting under your authority, shall do, in the application of such 
monies, or in effecting the objects, hereinbefore referred to.
[N.B. Follows immediately after conclusion of postcript to letter 
of May 23* Copy also found in E/B. Bruce’s papers.]
E. Lay, L.R.
To Hart "Star & Garter"
(Extract) [sic] May 23. 1862
I enclose copies of my receipt for the £31.3^3.11.5 sent 
in my last letter as having probably handed the original to 
Prince Kung you may like to have something in your own possession.
Sir F. Kelly having returned and declared himself ready for 
a consultation, we lost no time in fixing a day. I found when we 
met that he had scarcely looked into the case - that he had not 
even read the Order in Council. However, he made up for this by 
his painstaking during the consultation which lasted over two 
hours, to inform himself of the actual state of things in China 
to which our questions had reference - went very fully into his 
reasons for the opinion he pronounced in our favour, and gave 
us some valuable hints as to procedure. He even suggested 
changes in certain of our questions, such as would elicit exactly 
the answer we desired to obtain. - Any defect arising existing in 
the Treaty by reason of which we as Customs Officers might at ary 
time incur a hazardous responsibility, or our action be hampered, 
can be got over, it seems, if we can plead the sanction of the Law 
of China. If the Treaty does not explicitly authorize a particular 
act, it is of no consequence, if the Law does. China like any 
other country is entitled to make her own laws, without reference 
to other Powers, provided these be not in violation of the 
International Law of Nations. For example, the word "dues" in the
________  art. of the Treaty is now held to mean "fines11. That
art. says that on the payment of the dues and duties the Supt. 
shall give up the vessel'6 clearance, and it is doubtful whether 
under the Treaty a ship's clearance can be detained for non 
payment of a fine. But if there was a law of China declaring 
that no vessel should be permitted to leave a port until she had 
paid any fines she might have incurred, we should be perfectly 
justified & quite safe in detaining her.
The Supreme Court (or Consular Court) can take cognizance of 
our acts, because no British subject can acquit himself of his 
nationality, but it will be sufficient for us to plead our office,
& that our action has the authority of the Law.
It seems to me, therefore, that our next step must be to 
draw up a short code of Customs laws, and get them embodied in 
the i In a copy of the which I have in
-Shanghae there is one law, I remember, making foreign vessels 
trading at non treaty ports confiscable. I wish you would turn 
it up and let me have the Chinese of it, & at the same time 
ascertain from Kung or Wanseang whether there are any le [ 3
besides this one with reference to foreign vessels or trade, and 
:if so please send me them as soon as possible. I shall consult 
-Stephen as to the terms in which the code should be drawn up so as 
to secure U6 complete immunity. We cannot make our ground too safe.
I told Sir F. Kelly of Meadows having fined our tidewaiter 
200 dollars [at the top of the page of which the following is the 
continuation of this letter appears "Extracts not in extenso."] for 
seizing some gunpowder on board a Ningpo Boat# He said Meadows 
was flagrantly wrong!
I have asked Stephen his opinion as to whether it would be 
safe for me to use any portion of the money without express 
authority from Prince Kung# His reply was, certainly not.
Don't forget my house.
X am glad I may be quite certain of Tls. 65O.OOO before 
November, & that you are moreover strong enough to get authority 
for half as much more. "That sum (you say) will do for 3 despatch 
boats and four gunboats." I am glad to see that you have reduced 
the number in your own mind from ten vessels to seven, to which 
latter number you say you are pledged. I don't expect that 3 
despatch boats 8e k gunboats can be turned out - "All expenses 
included - under £250.000. [sic] There is the guarantee fund, 
coal, stores, a supply of shot, shell, &c, & insurance which I 
forgot to name in my last, for I apprehend it would be our duty 
to insure the vessels for the passage out. Tls. 65O.OOO & half 
as much more, viz. Tls. 325*000 would make 975*000, which at 5/ 
exchange would realize £2^3i750 or at 6/ £292.500, short of our 
wants, as I reckon them, by £100.000.
As soon as Osborn comes home, we will make as accurate a 
calculation as possible. Without him no calculation that I make 
can be relied on.
May 26th
To the above I added a postscript announcing Osborn's 
arrival.
Ackd. his letter that morning reed, from Foochow of the 
6th April.
"With regard to my brother Walter", I said in substance as 
follows: "To say the truth, being no doubt impressed with the
uncertainty of things in China, I quite forgot to answer your 
query about him. I asked Mr. Bruce to give him an appt. Mr. Bruce
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said he would on the condition that he should not be afterwards 
withdrawn for the Customs' service. In this condition I agreed, 
and explained it to my Brother. I do not think therefore he 
would be entitled to ignore that condition. Unless Mr. Bruce 
would consent to release him from it, out of a kindly wish not to 
stand in the way of his advancement, he would not be free to leave 
the Service even were it safe for him to do so;
Told him to send the money fast, & there should be no delay 
on this side of the water.
F. Lay, L.R.
Bedford Hotel, Brighton 
July 23. 1862
To Hart.
Summary, [sic]
No license yet, notwithstanding a 5 weeks' siege of Home Office,
F.D., & Admiralty. Order in Council will be necessary.
Vessels (k) from Admiralty I hope.
House, godowns, 8c dockyard at Shanghae above Tong Ka doo.
Mr. Collins as Naval Storekeeper £ 1 5 0 0  salary and £ 5 0 0  for house 
rent. Osborne [sic] > } 0 0  . Burgoyne £ 1 5 0 0  with £ 2 5 0  outfit.
Commanders Solway 8c Noel Osborn £ 8 0 0 .
"Salamis". Shall get her lines 8e plans.
Kung had better set apart a certain percentage of Customs revenue 
for maintenance of naval force.
Enclosed copy of memo. [June 13] laid before Lord Russell.
Article from "Daily News". [Reports of atrocities perpetrated by
Imperial Forces].
Receipt for £27•177*6.7*
We are in perfect accord as to money & fleet. Object is not 
simply to get so many steamers for so may dollars, but to create 
a permanent force.
I consented to Glover's going to Shanghae [as acting Commissioner 
of Customs] on the understanding that he was quite willing to go.
"Do remember in your intercourse with K., my dear fellow, that we 
have to govern and guide him, and not he us."
G. Lay, L.R.
6 Burton Crescent 
Sunday, August 2**. 1862.
To Hart
Wrote him a long letter. referred to the postscript of his as 
to my "glib" tune, & "dictatorial" message to the Prince -
Difficulties respecting license. "Africa" & 'Jasper" purchased.
One steamer building by White; two by Laird, Bros..
Great work before us if we all pull together.
Terms & conditions not yet drawn up - shall be sent for the 
information as also full particulars respecting vessels purchased. 
Flag adopted - to avoid port charges & light dues.
Dock expenses £80 per. month. Insurance of vessels will be a 
large item.
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H. Lay, L.R.
119 Gloucester Terrace,
Hyde Park. W.
October 10. 1862.
Dear Hart,
On my return on the 4th from Germany I found your letters of 
the 21st June from Woochang, 15th July 8c 2nd August from Shanghai, 
in answer to mine of the 9th and 23rd May.
I  enclose receipt for £ 12000 reed, from the HongKong Oriental 
Bank. Kwan's reception of you at Woochang was very handsome: but I 
am sorry to hear that the Yangtsze regulations are all to be changed, 
and duties collected at Hankow 8c Kewkeang, as I  fear this alteration 
will cause us infinite trouble without proportionately, if any, gain 
to the Chinese. Time will show. You mention having asked Adkins 
to join us. He would be an acquisition, but I doubt whether Mr.
Bruce will give his assent. In your letter of the 15th July, you 
ask me what in my opinion is the position I share hold relatively 
to yourself, yours being that it is analagous to that held by a 
Consul in H.M. Service, Parkes for example, on leave, - that 
consequently I have nothing specifically to do with Customs business, 
and cannot give any orders affecting it, while absent from ray post.
I do not altogether agree with you. My view of my position 
is that it is analagous, not to that of Consul, but to that of 
Plenipo; that it corresponds to Sir Geo. Bonham's when he came home 
on leave: yours with Bowring's, who acted as his 'locum tenens'.
Sir Geo. Bonham had a certain control while away over his Plenipo 
ship, that is, in so far as general arrangements were concerned.
And Bowring was not entitled to make radical changes or initiate 
measures without some regard to the known opinions and wishes of 
his absent chief. I take it that in like manner while I have 
nothing to do specifically with Customs business, and do not give 
"orders" in regard to it, I have a certain control over the 
Department of which I am the representative or head - this control 
being conceded to me by the loyalty to the service of my 'locum 
tenens'•
I say my position is, so to speak that of Plenipo. It would 
be so (as in Sir G Bonham's case), were the Chinese Govt, strong 
and independent. It is doubly so, the peculiar 'status' of our 
Institution considered. The Chinese Govt, is weak and dependent, 
and (at present) cannot by itself give the Customs any solid 
foundation. It leans upon the Customs, and not the Customs upon 
it. The Customs has to rest upon a bottom of its own forming, 
which gives it a 'status' separate and distinct from that attaching 
to it as an establishment pecuniarily dependent upon the Chinese 
Govt. It has to rest upon the British Govt, without whose 
sanction and support the Chinese Govt, cannot take any measure, in 
respect of British subjects in or British trade. Our institution, 
therefore, being a separate and distinct establishment, it must 
of necessity have its representative and chief, - for the time 
being, myself.
To go back to your letter in which you sent the first remittance 
Without meaning to do so, I fully believe, you reversed our positions. 
You made yourself Inspector-General, and. me your agent. You required 
me to disburse money belonging to the Chinese Govt, for you, and so 
vest the ownership of the thing purchased in you. This position I 
could not accept but I never for one moment, I do assure you, 
doubted your loyalty to myself, though I did think that your success 
had carried away your judgment.
As to the "credit of setting the project a-going", you have 
quite misunderstood a remark of mine at the close of my letter of 
the 9th May. Your letter which it acknowledged was so full of 
"I's" that I thought that I would say that the idea of a Chinese 
naval force had entered other minds besides your own. To the 
credit of getting Kung's assent to the actual purchase of vessels,
I cannot possibly lay any, the slightest, claim: It never entered
my imagination to claim any. How could I, seeing that I have been 
from China since April l86l?
I have only kept copies of two [sic] of my letters to you 
besides those of the 9th & 23rd May, but, as far as my memory 
serves me, I am not conscious of having written harshly to you.
If I have, I am very sorry for it. I was, I confess, greatly 
disappointed at your having undertaken the Steam fleet project, 
without exacting any pledges from Kung in regard to it. Such was 
my apprehension of the consequences that might ensue, being aware 
of the opinions of F.O. and of the Press, that I was earnest in 
my reminders of what should be obtained from him. Hence my
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unconscious use of the words "you must", which were addressed not 
to you, but as to what Kung must do, if he, would enable me to 
carry out the scheme with any success,
I am very sorry that you should have fancied I intended to be 
harsh or curt to you. No one could have treated me better than 
you have treated me since I have been away. Fully sensible of 
this, and entertaining as I do an affectionate regard for you, I 
have never had any but the kindest feelings towards you. Acquit 
me altogether of any such intention as you have imagined.
You have reason, and I likewise, to be thankful that you did 
not send to the United States or to the Continent for Steamers and 
crews. Had you been instrumental in introducing this sort of 
irresponsible aid, you would, I am perfectly sure have been 
stopped by an Order in Council, and all British Subject would 
from that time have been interdicted from sending aid. There 1 
would have been a great stir in the press, & perhaps relations 
would have been opened with the rebels. The down fall of the 
Customs would have been a mere matter of time. With rowdies above 
us, and we deprived of all executive power, I don't see how we
could have long remained in Chinese employ. Even now, we shall
have hard work to maintain our ground Ward's doings and 
Admiral Hope's doings are doing us damage, and have produced more 
or less a reaction in favor of the Taepings. I send you a slip 
from the United Service Gazette,
We are going to put an article in Blackwood in December on 
Chinese policy 8c the steam fleet. You shall have a copy. The 
public want setting right upon more than one point.
I have had a talk with Davies 6ince I came back. He will
write this mail to tell FitzRoy not to send him any more salary.
He has at my request given up his claim to 6alary at the rate of
£3000, and will draw at the rate of £2000 from the balance
(some £4000) which he has in the Banks in Shanghai, [sic] So
you need not give yourself any further trouble about him. I shall
keep him at home until I go out, and all that you will have to do
will be not to remit any more salary on his account from Shanghae [sic],
Hughes came to see me the other day. He starts on the 20th 
with a wife. I thought him much improved by his sojourn in England.
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I hope next mail will bring me more money from you. We are 
now at a stand still for want of money. I have received
£ 31.343. 11. 5
27.177. 6. 7
45.646. 2. 4
3 000 . .
12 000 . .
£119.167 n r
To meet our outstanding liabilities I want £ 140.050, and am 
thus £20.883 short. To enable me to buy armament, stores, and 
ammunition, and store ship, respecting all of which not a day 
should be lost, I want £60.000 more. We are as I say literally at 
a stand still for want of funds.
I think I told you that the Admiralty offered to sell us the 
"Diamond11 We can get her hull for £8000 but it will cost £7000 
more to mast, rig, copper, caulk, and store her ready for sea.
Osborn says she has a very fine main deck as well as lower deck: 
the former would serve us for a temporary hospital. There is no 
vessel in the market, he thinks half so well adapted for our wants. 
But I am in debt, aid can't afford to buy her, otherwise I would do 
so forthwith, for she ought to be despatched, filled with ammunition 
and stores, in December, at the latest! I am most anxious to buy 
the Armament 8c Gunpowder 8cc., while the Admiralty is in the humour, 
for in the event of a war with the Northern States or such like 
complication we might find some difficulty, for though we have 
friends at the Admiralty we have I suspect enemies there too.
And to buy powder & shell in the market would cost us twice the 
sum the Govt, would charge us. But it can't be helped. Kung should 
have sent the money. He can't expect to get his fleet without it.
If I had plenty of the needful, I could push things forward with 
great rapidity. I should at once pay for double time, & men would 
work day and night by gaslight. Here the days are very short: it 
is dusk at % past 4, 8: will soon be dark at 4. Money in this 
country, where the appliances and means are so perfect, will effect 
anything: but money you must have ..
I send you 2 copies of the Gazette containing the Order in 
Council. - I want to get all our vessels 8c guns and ammunition
away if possible, before Parliament meets.-
5 L
I smile at your injunctions respecting armour plated vessels, 
which you think "utterly useless"* Osborn is of a totally 
different opinion, and thinks that the Chinese would be doing the 
right thing if they made their fleet consist of one vessel, and 
she an iron plated vessel, - as she would do the work of ten 
easily and efficiently! But don’t be alarmed, we have not gone 
into armour plates.-
Admiral Hope's work in China will cause us no end of work 
by & by, I suspect* However, we must take things coolly, and 
according to the Chinese motto act as circumstances may render 
expedient.
I look forward most of all for money - money and next to it 
to your letters from Peking I am much benefitted by the Schwalbach 
Waters. I only wish I could get another course of them before I 
return. My wife & child are quite well. She desires her kind 
regards to you
' Believe me, yours &c.
(signed) H;N. Lay
P.S. FitzRoy writes that he has had some difficulty of late to 
get the monthly allowance - that Woo, Taoutae has forestalled this 
year’s revenue, i.e. he owes 3 million Taels. - that he has 
borrowed AOO.OOO Taels from Agra Bank which he is not likely to 
have the means of paying &c.&c. Can’t you stop this squandering 
of public money through Kung? At all events, you can obtain 
authority to draw, i.e. to intercept before it reaches the 
Taoutae’s hands, a percentage of the revenue for the maintenance 
of the steam fleet. I would suggest your doing this at once, but 
perhaps you have already done so.
J. E/B Bruce Collection.
"Copy"
No.6.
Separate Series
Office of Maratime [sic] Customs 
Shanghai, 12th June, 1862.
Sir
In my despatch marked "No.3 Separate11, of the Ikth March last, 
I forwarded Firsts of Exchange of the Oriental Bank Corporation, at 
six months sight, payable to your order, for the sum of Thirty one 
thousand three hundred and /forty three Pounds eleven shillings and 
Five pence [£31,3^3* 11• 5] sterling.
I subsequently requested the Manager of the Oriental Bank 
Corporation, Hongkong, to forward to you direct Bills of Exchange 
for any sums of money, paid into the Bank by the Canton, Amoy, and 
Foochow Customs, to my credit, always retaining in my name a sum of 
Five thousand dollars. On the *fth Instant, I received a letter 
from the Manager, Mr. Lormond, [Lamond] stating that he had 
forwarded to your address Firsts of Exchange for the sum of Twenty 
seven thousand one hundred and seventy seven Pounds, six shillings 
and seven Pence [£27,177* 6* 7] sterling, and enclosing Thirds of 
Exchange for the same.
On the 7th instant, His Excellency Woo, Superintendent of 
Customs Shanghai, handed me a cheque on the Hai-Kwan Bank for the 
sum of One hundred and twenty five thousand Shanghai Taels 
[Tls 125,000].
This money has been collected for me by the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China, from which, after 
deducting the expences of collection [Tls 16.1*3*0], I have 
received Bills of Exchange payable to your order at six months 
sight for the sum of Thirty eight thousand One hundred and forty 
six pounds, two shillings, and four pence [£38,146. 2. *f] sterling:
I now enclose 5 Firsts of Exchange for the amount in question.
His Imperial Highness, the Prince of Kung in a despatch 
received a fortnight ago, directed me to consult officially, on the 
subject of the steam fleet project, with the Imperial Commissioner 
Hsieh, and Admiral Sir James Hope. His Highness had heard that 
steamers could be obtained more readily in America than in England,
and being anxious for their arrival with the least possible delay 
it seemed expedient to make some alterations in the original 
instructions.
At my interview with the Imperial Commissioner Hsieh, I 
explained that contracts had probably been already made in England 
for the construction of certain vessels, that a considerable sum 
of money had already been sent to that country, that arrangements 
were doubtless now being made there for the engagement of fitting 
and trustworthy officers, that, instead of expediting, any change 
in the instructions would have the effect of retarding the arrival 
of the vessels, and that, taking all things into consideration, 
the most expedient course was to allow the plan to be proceeded 
with that had been, months ago initiated; the Imperial Commissioner 
agreed with me entirely, and at once addressed the Tsung--le Yamun 
to the effect that my original plans ought not to be interfered 
with. I then waited upon Admiral Sir James Hope, to whom I gave 
a full account of the manner in which the Prince had baen induced 
to authorise the construction of a steam fleet, and of the various 
steps which had already been taken to carry out the scheme - Upon 
my mentioning that Captain Sherard Osborn had consented to 
superintend the construction of the fleet and afterwards take 
command of it, His Excellency observed that with an officer in 
charge, of Captain Osborn's ability and experience, the various 
details would be properly managed, and that, with reference to 
the proposed alteration, the course already adopted had better be 
carried out. The Admiral seemed to be of opinion that vessels of 
the despatch boat class [such as the "Nimrod", "Snake" &c] are not 
well adapted to making passages against the north East monsoon, 
and that Gunboats, similar to those of eighty horse power, draw 
too much water to be of service in the inner waters of China.
I may here mention that the cause which let to Sir James 
Hope being mixed up in this matter is that he had recommended 
that an adventurer named Ward, - who for the last two or three 
years has been employed by the Shanghai Taoutai in procuring arms 
and drilling soldiers, and who really has on some occasions fought 
successfully with his men against the rebels, - should be countenanced 
in his projects, which, upon being taken by the hand by the Admiral, 
Mr. Ward [now a Colonel in the Imperial service] developed into the 
organization of an army and navy - Colonel Ward's bravery is 
unquestionable, and his enthusiasm has attracted some attention;
it is doubtful, however whether the services rendered by him iave 
been worth the immense expenditure which has been incurred by the 
Taoutai in following his advice.
The Chinese are shrewd enough to know how powerful he may 
with safety be allowed to become. My influence with the Prince 
is sufficient to prevent any effectual interference, on the part 
of Colonel Ward and his supporters, with the formation of a steam 
fleet, under proper officers, for the Chinese service.
The Prince continues to display the strongest desire for the 
arrival of the fleet, or somd portion of it.
I shall anxiously await your report, as to the terms upn 
which officers and men are to be engaged, in order that I may 
obtain authority to draw funds for monthly expenditure from the 
various Offices of Customs.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) ROBERT HART 
Offg. Inspector-General of Chinese 
Maratime (sic) Customs.
H.N. Lay Esqre.
London.
K. FL Collection.
8th Sept. 1862 Peking
My dear Lay,
Two long letters of yours 26 June & 10 July came to hard 
on the 6th and gave me much pleasure to read. I shall write at 
greater length when I have seen Hart who has been sick at 
TienTsing. I am also delighted with your views which are 
precisely mine about supporting and yet not supporting this
Governt. Unless it be disinterestedly taught to do its own work, 
it will cease to be anything but the dependency of the person or 
nation that does it for it. Alcock's speeches to Louis Napoleon 
don't surprise me. Except by accident I never knew him - A - 
say or do a sensible thing. A man with many good points - but 
better morally than intellectually - and weak either way, when 
the 'moi qui vous parle' fit is on him. Why haven't you visited 
France Sir, and studied the language. Parkes and you exchanged 
notes I mean my notes - good- cultivate him he has as practical 
a head as I know and a good and improving heart. What will they
do with him now? His return to Shanghai as mere 'cawnsul' can
hardly be I should think - I always had thought Hammond meant 
him to fill my place which indeed he may yet. I rejoice to think 
you will be here in Spring. Tell me Cooke's [sic] proper direction 
and send him enclosed please.
My salaam to your wife and your mother and my blessing -
for as much as it is worth - on the baby.
Yours always aff.
(Signed) T. Wade
Love to Osborn
APPENDIX VII
Wade to Lay and Lay to Elgin: 1863.
A. FL Collection.
British Legation, Peking 23 June 1863#
My dear Lay,
I had a long talk with Sir F. Bruce in re support etc. He 
evidently thinks that it would not be advisable for g^im to come 
forward insisting on the adoption by the Chinese Gov. of any 
specific proposition made by you or any one else in regard to the 
revenue. He is persuaded that the position taken by some of the 
Ministers (K [leczkowski] especially) of demanding this or that 
has impressed these people with the notion that we can't do 
without them. This he says it is most desirable they should be 
quit of as soon as possible. If they are to be helped by us, it 
is for them to come forward, and the only chance of compelling 
them so to do is by the fear they may entertain, as in your case, 
of being dropped altogether or, as in Gordon's, of seeing men 
like him withdrawn. I told you the difficulties surrounding this 
last night. You reply let Sir F. B. do so and so, and the rest 
follows - Good. Still, as a minister, he must not commit his 
Gov. before China and his colleagues, farther than the rights 
of the case demand, and disgusted as he is with the Chinese he does 
not feel justified, whatever the consequences, in dictating to 
them, on the subject of their own affairs, in terms so absolute as 
those that would be necessary. He has no case that authorises 
him so to do. He is going to tell them again, officially, that if 
they do not promptly keep the treaty where it has been broken, 
everyone shall be withdrawn - also, that if the Chinese Gov. 
cannot do without foreigners, these have a right to have the 
satisfaction of their money claims guaranteed them, and that 
unless such guarantees can be givea, he will use all his influence 
to discourage Englishmen from entering or remaining in the Service. 
This is the most he is prepared to go in the direction you want, 
and he has more confidence in the success of your personal 
negotiations from the fix that your threat to resign will put them
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in than from any other cause. I |hink what has modified his zeal 
is this, that the tone of the Gov., notably towards yourself since 
you arrived, has shewn that it is imbecile beyond what had been 
thought of it; that there is in the Central Gov. neither vigor nor 
ability, but the most abject fear of certain powerful provincial^, 
and the question arises, Is it well, by forcing this Central Gov. 
to take this or that step that they can only £gke in entire 
dependence on foreigners, to link foreign Gov. irrevocably to 
its destinies? Is it not better, if it shew so much aversion 
to doing the only thing that save it, to leave it to itself? Of 
course this involves the abandonment of flotilla, Customs, and 
goodness knows what, but, quore, is thi| worse than undertaking 
the complication inevitable if this Gov. is so weak as to shew no 
initiative capacity whatsoever? I confess that ever since the 
Burgevine affair my thoughts have been set in the same direction 
not, because of the action taken quoad Burgevine, but because of 
the childish embarrassment & puerile talk the 2nd act of that drama 
produced at the Yam£n. P.S. Of course should you break down [,] 
the claims of Osborn & men are clear that is if you break d^wn 
because of a breach of faith on the part of the Chinese Gov.
But, I have been thinking much during the night on this point, and 
it seems to me that you will have to make your ground very clear 
before your claim can be pushed. I am speaking^without your 
agreement before me; but the line the Chin. Gov, may take if you 
sell the fleet is this - You were told to buy vessels,^etc. You 
did so and engaged men on the faith of the Chinese Gov.'s promises - 
continue to trust these. We don't say we won't pay you, but we 
don’t pay in advance and if you can believe us you won't require 
us to mortgage revenue. If^  not believing us, you throw up the 
concern, on you be the consequences. Give us ships or what they 
cost; with the men who won't serve without guarantees not originally 
proposed we have nothing to do.
I should get from them in writing a form of all they say 
they insist on respecting Customs Flotilla, and all beside. It 
is certain to be childish and unreasonable and on that I should 
base farther action either as regards resignation or disbandment.
But be very cautious about flinging up flotillg unless you see your 
way to a clear charge of 'breach of faith' ags. Gov. otherwise your 
own will have no fighting ground. Would I could send you more 
comfort.
Ever yours 
(Sgd.) T.W.
B. FL Collection
Seymour St. [?] 25th October 1865 
My dear Lay,
Just a line to say that I am here and well as I hope you 
are and politically prosperous. I have told the Chief that I 
think if the dynasty is not to be overthrown - it must not be 
thrown over, but supported by the powers interested conjointly 
declaring that they will support it, if it will adopt the 
necessary reforms at once. If it will not, they should with like 
publicity declare that they will not support it, nor any one but 
a Chinese competent to tranquillize tha land, i.e. to reform to 
the point necessary in finance and executive. If the Tsing will 
reform I am sure the Chinese don't want a change - wanting only 
peace at any time. If they won't reform, the announcement that 
foreigners consider them past hope but will recognise any 
competent substitute, will induce some respectable Chinese to 
start. Support (as at present even) of^the Tsing must deter 
any respectable Chinese from coming for. to turn out those 
imbeciles. I see no other policy that can keep the country 
from falling to foreign states which fall wd be the beginning 
of troubles the like whereof etc. Sir Macdonald Stephenson, an 
engineer of repute is on his way to India where he has done 
much in rail ways, and goes thence to China hoping etc. - He 
consulted me as to the expediency of moving the Govt, thro' 
the Br. Minister I said by no means for all the reasons you 
do well know, but to consult you and Hart. He wishes it kept 
very quiet, lest others should compete and I have heard of one 
competitor yestr. My friends are all pretty well, all out of 
town where I am alone.
My kind regards to Mrs. Lay.
Ever yours aff.
(Sgd.) T. Wade
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C. India Office Library: Elgin Papers. 
Peking. September 7i 1863
My Dear Lord,
I sincerely thank your Lordship for your kind note of 
the kth March - which did not reach London till after my 
departure - no less than for your kind support of my application 
to Lord Russell, from whom I have since heard of my appointment 
to the Bath.
I am sorry I cannot give Your lordship a very favourable 
report of Prince Kung, who seems just now little disposed to 
trouble himself about his foreign relations. No doubt his time 
is fully occupied with home affairs. The success too that has 
of late attended the imperial arms in more provinces than one 
has contributed to allay the apprehensions he entertained twelve 
months ago. At the same time, the eagerness with which, under 
Admiral Hopefs auspices, officers of every description - gentlemen 
and the opposite - have been placed at the disposal of the local 
officials, - under whose unchecked authority they have been 
permitted to act, - has done much harm. It has induced the 
belief in the minds of Prince Kung and his advisers, that they 
can get all the aid the coutry requires, without incurring the 
responsibilities it is of importance they should incur, and 
without making the return which we naturally look for, - the 
adoption of a policy towards foreign nations some steps in 
advance of that hitherto their guide.
The Chinese will as we well know, make no changes except 
under the pressure of necessity. If we help to remove that 
necessity, without making our aid conditional, we forego a 
golden opportunity of forcing the Government to move in the 
direction we want them to take. - Your Lordship has perhaps 
heard that one of the "Generals" recently in the employ of the 
Shanghai authorities has gone over to the Taipings with some 
200 followers. I should not be surprised to see filibustering 
begun on a large scale in China
Believe me, My Lord,
Your faithful servant,
(Sgd.) H.N. Lay
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APPENDIX VIII
Documents in Chinese and English Translations, relating to
The Flotilla Project.
A. FO 228/3*11
"Copy of a despatch from the Foreign Board dated 20th February 1862, 
the Chinese of which was transmitted to Mr. Lay by Mr. Hart11.
The Foreign Board write for the purpose of again urging 
that the instructions already issued with respect to the purchase 
of foreign steamers may be carried out without loss of time.
It was settled that the Shanghai and Canton Custom Houses 
should each contribute 200,000 taels; the Foochow Custom House 
100,000 taels, and the Amoy and Ningpo Custom Houses each 50,000 
taels towards the above object. Sieh, the Governor of Keangsoo, 
was desired to make the necessary arrangements, and in consequence 
of a Memorial submitted by us to His Majesty, that functionary 
was commanded to lose no time in communicating with the various 
Customs Houses and in collecting the above amounts, while the 
Governors-General and Governors of Canton and Foochow were alike 
ordered to look out for and hire steamers [for the protection of 
those ports]. The Acting Inspector-General was requested to 
confer with Sieh, and act without delay.
As Shanghai is now threatened by the rebels, the Steamer 
project must on no account be delayed. We have again memorialized 
the Emperor, urging haste on the part of the Authorities. And 
His Majesty having graciously granted our request, it becomes our 
duty to inform the Acting Inspector-General thereof, and to beg 
him by all means to hurry on the arrangements for the purchase of 
Steamers, in concert with Sieh.
We understand that there are several classes of Steamers: 
there is the mail steamer, the merchant steamer and the War 
Steamer: that the first is very small, the second unwieldy and not 
available, like the third for warlike purposes. We understand 
further, that the Mail Steamers and Merchant Steamers are paddle- 
wheel vessels, that the War steamers are screw-vesseLs. We 
earnestly hope that war screw vessels will be purchased. This 
is of great importance.
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As to the people to be employed on board the Steamers, the 
Acting Inspector-General when in Peking said that if Chinese were 
employed in the first instance, they would be found incompetent, 
and that, in order to render (the vessels) efficient, it would 
be better to employ foreigners, subjects of non-Treaty powers. 
Upon this point, we request him to confer with Sieh, and arrange 
as may be deemed advisable. If, owing to his engagements 
consequent upon the critical position of Shanghai, Sieh should 
not be able to give his attention to this matter, the Acting 
Inspector-General must hasten to Canton and confer with H.E. Laou 
on the subject. We have sent instructions to this effect to 
Sieh and Laou and desired them to act without delay.
With regard to the expense of the maintenance of the fleet, 
let the amount be that stated in the reduced (?) memo, of the 
Acting Inspector-General. As to the funds (for the purchase of 
the Steamers,) the Canton, Foochow, and Shanghai Authorities have 
reported themselves prepared to pay the amount required, and we 
have accordingly sent orders to them to hold those amounts in 
readiness. As soon, therefore, as this letter reaches the 
Inspector-General, let the matter be proceeded with with all 
speed. Let there be no delay on any account, for delay might 
involve serious consequences. HastenI Hasten!
To the Acting Inspector-General Hart.
Tungche 1st year, 1st Moon, 22 day
i.e. February 20th 1862
B.
Prince Kungfs Authorisation to H.N. Lay; FL. Collection.
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C. FO 17/395. Enclos. in 178. Bruce to Russell Nov. 19, 1863.
This copy from pamphlet of correspondence of documents submitted 
by Capt. S. Osborn to the Admiralty in Jan. l86*f.
’’Translation of Prince Kung’s letter of instructions to Inspector- 
General H.N. Lay”.
Pekin, Oct. 2*f, 1862.
The Prince of Kung, charged by Imperial authority with the 
superintendence of foreign afairs, addresses a communication to the 
Inspector-General, Mr. H.N. Lay.
The official records show that At the interview which the 
Acting Inspector-General had with me in the autumn of l86l, he 
represented that, in order to render our navy efficient, it was 
absolutely necessary that foreign vessels and foreign guns 
should be procured. He subsequently addressed me in writing, 
beggirg, that orders might be issued to the custom-houses 
to contribute towards the purchase of foreign vessels and guns.
The Foreign-office thereupon memorialized the Emperor on the 
subject, and His Majesty’s assent having been obtained, orders 
were issued to the custom-houses to pay into the hands of the 
Acting Inspector-General the amount sanctioned for the above 
purpose, and the Acting Inspector-General was desired to act 
without delay.
The Acting Inspector-General has now come to the capital, 
and apprised us that all the arrangements connected with the 
purchase of the vessels and guns he has officially handed over 
to the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, to carry out on his behalf 
in England, and that he has remitted the moneys paid by the 
custom-houses to the Inspector-General Lay, who is proceeding 
in the matter with the utmost dispatch.
Mr. Hart has stated further that the ability of the 
Inspector-General Lay is great, and that he possesses a mind 
which embraces the minutest details; that he is, therefore, 
fully competent to make the necessary arrangements with more 
than a satisfactory result, and he has accordingly requested 
us to address a dispatch to the Inspector-General Lay to serve 
as his authority.
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In any arrangements which the Acting Inspector-General might 
have made with respect to the purchase of vessels and guns, there 
is no doubt that he would have taken the greatest pains and would 
have left no point unconsidered, but as he has now requested that 
the management of the whole affair should be entrusted to the 
Inspector-General, this will be, of course, still more satisfactory.
I therefore address this dispatch to the Inspector-General, 
and transfer the management into his hands.
There are three important points:-
1. The purchase of the vessels, guns, gunpowder, coal,
and the miscellaneous articles for the use of the vessels.
2. The engagement of officers, gunners, seamen, and 
others for services in the vessels; and the arranging the terms 
and conditions of every description of agreement.
5. The retention, as proposed, of a sum of money to meet
the salaries and wages that may be settled by the agreements, and 
also to provide for the payment of compensations and other items 
in time to come.
The above three points we leave to the Inspector-General to
dispose of as, in his discretion, he may see fit.
The money already collected from the custom-houses has been 
transmitted through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, who is alone charged 
with the responsibility of its disbursement; and we leave it to 
Mr. Lay to appoint, if he think fit, a person to help him, and 
also to make whatever arrangements may in his judgement seem 
desirable, with a view to successful carrying out of the objects 
in view.
China is in urgent need of the vessels and guns; effort should 
therefore be made to effect with the least possible delay their 
completion and despatch [sic] to Shanghai, there to await orders.
The work (put into the vessels) should be strong, the materials 
genuine, both of super-excellent quality, that so the high trust 
we have confided (to Mr. Lay) may be fulfilled.
In the event of the Inspector-General1s returning to his post 
before these ships and guns are ready and despatched to China, and 
if any other circumstances, which we cannot here foresee, should 
arise, let the Inspector-General report thereupon to us himself, 
and recommend a person trustworthy in all respects to act in his 
room - so that, in respect of the arrangements subsequently made,
the responsibility may be definitely fixed.
N.B. For Ch'ing'interpretation see enclosure (n,d.) in Kung to 
Bruce, Nov. 2, 1863* FO 230/78 No,60. (FO 17/395* Enclosure in 
No.178 Nov. 19 and BPP [3271],)
APPENDIX IX
Hart's Views on the Flotilla disbandment - Jan, l86*f, 
A, E/B. Bruce Collection: Enclosure in Bruce to Russell. 
Private. Feb, 2, l86*t.
"Extract” Mr. Hart to Mr, Brown
r
The history (of the flotilla) may be summed up in four 
sentences. I broached the subject in 1861; the Yamun (Peking 
Foreign Board) ordered my propositions to be acted on in 1862. 
My propositions approved of by the Yamen were communicated to 
Lay to be carried into effect, but he, instead of acting on 
them, proceeded to carry out other views, neglecting at the 
same time to report the change and leaving it to be understood 
that the original scheme was being carried into effect. It was 
not until his arrival in Peking in June that I knew what he had 
done, and as his arrangements were ones that had not only not 
been reported to the Yamun but were in direct opposition to the 
conditions on which the Yamun sanctioned the experiment - hinc 
illae lacrymae.
Shanghai
Jan.y 13, l86*f
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B. Hart*s Views on the Flotilla disbandment - Jan. l86*f.
[Same as A] Shanghae, l*fth January, 1864.
My dear Sir Frederick,
I duly received your very kind letter of the 17th Nov. 
forwarded by the Tsung le Yamun in the same cover with my 
appointment: Mr. Lay also handed me one of the 22nd. of the
same month having reference to his claims.
Any one who, like Mr. Lay, thoroughly distrusts the 
Chinese, and believes that the only way to manage, is to drive 
them, can easily put together facts and arguments sufficiently 
specious to cause many to coincide in his views; but, for my 
part, though I have not infrequently been unable to induce them 
to follow my suggestions, I must say that my want of success was 
attributable rather to my inability to convince, than to their 
unwillingness to be led. The dictatorial attitude that had 
proved successful with a Taoutae at a distance from the capital, 
turned out to be mistakenly applied when assumed towards the 
high functionaries at Peking: and indeed that Taoutae who has 
yielded to it originally was the one who eventually resented it 
the most. To say, that nothing is to be hoped from the present 
government because it does not at once turn its attention to 
the construction of railroads, the laying down of eiljtric 
telegraph wires, the negotiation of foreign loans, and the 
introduction al all the appliances that exist among the people 
by whom it has been thrashed, and for whom it has heretofore 
had an ignorant contempt, is, to my mind, justified by neither 
logic nor common snnse. What ought to be expected from the 
government is, that it will endeavor to carry out faithfully 
the treaties into which it has entered; and if, in addition to 
peaceful acting up to the terms of those treaties, it listens 
with attention to the representations made by foreign ministers, 
it will I think be enough to hope for, even though no other 
result became apparent for a quarter of a century. We cannot 
call upon them to change at once; and, indeed, any such demand 
is more likely to delay than to accelerate a wholesome change. 
Experience will eventually convince the government, that in no 
way can it get on better with foreign powers than by adhering 
to its engagements, and carrying them into effect in a liberal
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spirit: but for experience, time must be allowed: and to management 
of a rational kind, rather than to dictation, must we look, if, 
while giving the government time, any active attempt be made to 
lead it to profit by experience. Dictation may succeed for a time 
with weak people, as it did with Hsieh while Taoutae; but, depend 
upon it, with the acquisition of what they suppose to be strength, 
they will break out in opposition, just as that worthy did when he 
took his seat at the foreign board at Peking. Of one thing I am 
perfectly certain, & that is, that had the British minister at 
Peking been a less considerate person than yourself, matters would 
not, in any respect, have gone on so well as they have done. The 
Chinese have a thorough appreciation of courtesy, and have no 
objection to submit when rationally convinced. Allowance must be 
made for the difficulties of the position of the few men who 
have the pluck to form the foreign board, and who, as members of it, 
expose themselves to inimical insinuations, and incur responsibilities 
of a kind that others, - ignorant, exclusive, anti-foreign, - are 
free from}, and they must be given time, and be allowed to shelter 
themselves against their opponents by such breastworks as they can 
construct out of quotations from treaties.
I quite concur in your remark that the head of the foreign 
establishment could not now reside at Peking without the odium and 
responsibility of the errors the Chinese will commit falling upon 
him; I am quite satisfied to make Shanghae my headquarters, - my 
orders are to do so; but I am likewise directed to visit Peking, 
Whenever I think the requirements of business make it advisable to 
do so. My wish is to confine myself to customs* business: on the 
other hand, I wish to get the offices into efficient working order 
so that the merchants may have no cause for complaint, and the 
Chinese suffer no loss of revenue; and, on the other, I should 
merely desire to give such general advice as shall lead the Chinese 
authorities to act liberally by, and look favourably upon, the 
interests of foreign commerce.
Capt. Osborn and the last of the fleet left Shanghae on the 
12th of December.
Mr. Lay and myself signed the accounts on the *fth instant, 
and he left Shanghae on the 9th. He handed over to me certain 
balances, and I gave him a simply worded discharge, in which he
was released from all claims, with the exception of such as had 
reference to certain sums which were distinctly specified in the 
document. He left with me a copy of the accounts to be forwarded 
to you; I don’t like to send them overland, but shall forward them 
by steamer.
You will have heard before this of the capitulation of 
Soo Chow, after Gordon's successful, but severely contested, attack 
on the stockades near the Low-mun. When the Wangs came out to 
tender their submission, they refused to disband their men and 
insisted upon holding some of the city gates. The Footae had 
previously promised that, not only should there be no slaughter, 
but the Wangs should be decorated with buttons &c, in the event of 
a surrender which was to be, in other respects, unconditional.
When the Wangs refused to disband their men and insisted on 
holding certain gates, they violated their part of the bargain 
previously entered into. It was then open to the Footae to 
acquiesce in, or to object to the demand: in the event of his 
acquiescence, he had two things to dread, - 1 a recurrence of the 
Tae-tsang treachery, in which place some five hundred Imperialists, 
who had entered the city, which, having surrendered, gas allowed to 
be garrisoned by the Taepings, - were beheaded, and 2 the Wangs 
with their men might at any time cause grave troubles; acquiescence 
was accordingly hot to be thought of for a moment. On the other 
hand, supposing the Footae to refuse acquiescence, he had only 
three courses before him: the first was to allow the Wangs to 
return to the city, and, to have done that, considering that 
Gordon's force had already gone back to Quinsan, would have in 
aLl probability entailed a sally that must have resulted in the 
dispersion of the Footae*s troops; the second was to make prisoners 
of the Wangs, but such an act would have been soon known and would 
have been followed by the closing of the gates, and the butchery 
of such of the Imperialists as had entered the city; the third was 
to act as the Footae dod, - to take off the heads of the Wangs at 
once, and to occupy the city without delay.
Gordon looked upon the Footae's conduct as a gross and 
treacherous breach of good faith}.; and since that he has merely 
garrisoned Quinsan, and has refused to take part in any active 
operations. But I am inclined to think, that, when he and Genl. 
Brown decided on following that course, they were not fully 
acquainted with the nature of the original verbal convention, and
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that they did not make allowance for the difficulty in which the 
Footae found himself involved when he met the Wangs. The action 
taken may result in a determination to place the force more on an 
imperial than on a local footing; but I really fear it will have 
a bad effect, and in this way - it may cause the Chinese to see 
that such a force is, not only powerful, but unmanageable, and 
they may thence be lad to place greater opposition than ever in 
the way of military reform.
The taking of Soo Chow was not followed by the usual slaughter: 
the Wangs, it is true, were beheaded, but there was no massacre. 
Moffit, Gordon’s surgeon, tells me that very few people lost their 
lives - certainly not five hundred, and his account differs totally 
from that given by Prince Wittgenstein, in whose case the excitement 
of the moment allowed the imagination to obscure the perceptive 
faculties.
Had the Wangs made no fresh demands, and had the city been 
peacefully occupied, Gordon would at once have gone Nanking-wards, 
and Taepingdom would have received its death blow before the 
Chinese new year. Without knowing all the circumstances it is 
difficult to pass judgment on the Footae; but there are cases in 
which circumstances "mitigate the slackness of wrong and weaken the 
force of right", and the present seems to be one of them.
At the ports, matters are going along quietly.
Apologizing for the length of this letter, - a much longer 
one than I had intended when I sat down, -
I remain,
with much respect,
Yours very faithfully,
(signed) ROBERT HART.
The Hon:
Sir Frederick W.A. Bruce, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
Peking.
i
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